THE SOVIETS AND AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002100070031-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2003
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: January 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

1. The ovie s y
cumstances in Africa which is gradually expanding their influence and
their range of future options at the expense of the West. They are well
aware of the great uncertainties and difficulties that still face them,
but are probably even more impressed with how far they have recently ad-
11 "nitial position. They appear' to have a sense
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
National Foreign Assessment Center
April 6, 1978
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THE SOVIETS AND AFRICA
PART I: PRESENT SOVIET ATTITUDES AND EXPECTATIONS
S t Coda see themselves riding a wave of favorable cir-
vancea from a much weaes
of having turned a corner in the last three years. Having now established
a strong presence in two major centers of former Western influence,
they seem determined to do their best to build on this, to persevere in.
exploitation of what they regard as a significant breakthrough.
forces used as proxies, and in the severity of the palltIca cons rain
hindering any Western response. There is little doubt that this cumula-
tive experience has greatly strengthened Soviet self-confidence and long-
The Soviets do not conclude from this experience that
n
2. Since ,
the Portuguese and Haile Selassie, the Soviets have for the first-time
found it possible to intervene in black Africa on a large scale, first
in Angola and now in Ethiopia, to secure victories for ideologically
congenial forces, and to obtain what they hope will be an enduring
presence for themselves. Each of these interventions set a new precedent in the increasing scope of the Soviet logistical effort, in the quantity
of Soviet military hardware deployed, in the size of the Cuban combat is
the wake of-the simultaneous disappearance of
1975 i
range expectation.
other arenas in Africa will necessarily offer them similar scope for the
display of great power muscle. They probably believe, however, that they
have now established their role as a permanent actor in Africa much more
firmly than before and that they have vividly advertised. their capabilities
and the alternative they offer in a manner that will pay dividends for years
to come.
3. In looking for ways to expand on these achievements, the Soviets
probably consider their most valuable discovery of the past three years
to have been the political advantages of the extensive use of Cuban proxies.
The Soviets have found that deployment of the Cubans evokes considerably
less African resentment and much less risk of drastic Western reaction
than would the use of comparable Soviet forces. At the same time, the
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introduction of Cuban combat forces, assisted by appropriate Soviet
leadership and weaponry, has greatly extended Soviet geopolitical reach.
In Africa as a whole, Cuba's revolutionary credentials and status as a
small state claiming membership in the nonaligned movement gives the
Cubans broader access and acceptability than the Soviets, while paving
the way for Soviet influence.
4. At the focal points of the black nationalist struggle, the
demonstrated availability of the combination of Cuban manpower and
Soviet hardware increases the political weight of Soviet-favored
contenders and alternatives, and generates continual pressure on
insurgent leaders and Front Line states to accept a greater Cuban/
S
i
ov
et presence. The Soviets thus have reason to value highly this
promising partnership in Africa with Castro,'-and probably see it as
dependent upon a mutuality of interest.
5. Castro's behavior in Africa, in turn, appears motivated partly
by a genuine ideological fervor for "socialist" and "anti-imperialist"
causes and partly by ambition to expand his own role on tthe world scene,
and the Soviets apparently believe these interests. will probably continue
to run in fundamental harmony with their own.
6. For their part, the Soviets are motivated at the most fundamental
level by a political-ideological felt need to do whatever can be prudently
done to encourage the ejection and replacement of Western influence from
an area -- Africa -- which they regard as having until recentl
b
y
een totally
dominated by Western imperialism and "neo-colonialism." Successful Soviet
efforts to produce such subtractions from "imperialist" strength tend to
revive their own view of themselves, weakened by negative trends elsewhere,
as upholders of a preordained, long-term historical process in which power
and-influence around the world is gradually shifting from the West and
toward themselves. To the degree that they can inter
ret trends
b
d
p
a
roa
in this light, this also helps to legitimize their own rule in the Soviet
U
i
n
on as an essential part of the world process.
7. Superimposed on this underlying motive are powerful geopolitical
and strategic concerns: the desire to assert and compel recognition of
the USSR as an effective great-power actor with global reach, and the
desire to secure bases and support facilities for the expansion of Soviet
distant naval and air operations. These strategic considerations appear
to have played some role in the Soviet decisions to seize the opportunities
presented in Angola and Ethiopia, on the west and east coasts of the conti-
nent. In the Ethiopian case, this strategic motive was fortified by the
Soviet wish to respond to the Somali expulsion of the Soviet Union from
its base at Berbera. Finally, the Soviet geopolitical reasons to act in.
Ethiopia were reinforced both by the desire to consolidate a position in
the largest East African state and by the wish to respond to US actions in
recent years perceived as intended to constrict Soviet influence in the
Middle East.
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- F I -
 strat
ca
ern
~z
land from the two coasts, f -
be somewhat
to
appear
ilities
r
itself, Eritrea is likely to prove a mo
the Ogaden, and that heavy Soviet-Cuban military involvement there could
occasion more serious political costs.
11. Despite these difficulties, however, there is every rd evidence
that the Soviets intend to continue to pursue what they regard
of opportunity in Africa, and that they will not be deterred by
any adverse effects upon the detente relationship with the US or other
Western powers. They are evidently convinced that Africa will remain
their most fertile available field for an assertive foreign policy.
a
they have achieved their greatest success, as
challenge which continues in Neto's Angola. Finally, they know h than was
e difficult military problem
by the Front Line presidents to a Zimbabwe se
osithey are also awarenof the volatility
a sufficiently important role to Nkomo.
and potential vulnerability of their p
ttested by the strong insurgent
imp aortan t in the mix OT S mo >
itical-ideological urge to weaken Western influence st~rr~ stru ~1lesy
1~'1 The Soviets foresee a sequence of long- g9
more -important.
power b black liberation movements -- in Zimbab