PRC MEETING ON RHODESIA, 12 APRIL, 3:30 P.M. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP81B00401R002000050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1979
• Content Type: MF

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National Intelligence Officers
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED
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-- present to the President the three alternative proposals re
Rhodesian policy, plus any others that might meanwhile be
developed.
4. Re Rhodesia, the three proposals were, in essence:
-- stand fast with our present policy posture in the Executive
Branch, adhering to the principle that we will not support
or recognize as legitimate any government that does not meet
the test of international acceptance, acknowledging at the
same time that the Congress may very well act toward lifting UN
sanctions this month and the subsequent formation of a black-
11 April 1979
led government (Moose);
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FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT : PRC Meeting on Rhodesia, 12 April, 3:30 p.m.,
White House Situation Room
VIA : Deputy Director for National Foreign AsI
-- report to the President on the disagreement among the agencies
ever the timing of normalization of relations with Angola,
and particularly the questions raised by David Aaron re any
quid pro quo, especially a draw-down of Cuban forces;
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
1. Action Requested: None; this memorandum is for your information
and possible use at the PRC meeting.
2. Background: This meeting is a follow-on to the meeting you attended
on 6 April. A new agenda and discussion paper, prepared by State, are attached.
3. You will recall that on 6 April, the PRC agreed to:
I
-- send to the President a draft letter from him to Prime
Minister Botha, in an effort to encourage Botha to be
forthcoming on the Namibian question;
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-- with an eye mainly toward forestalling or diluting Congressional
action, undertake further diplomatic moves which would consist
of
a. an approach to Nyerere; if he disapproved, we would go
no further; if he approved, then
b. an approach to South Africa; and then
c. an approach to Muzorewa (assuming he is the head of the
new regime in Salisbury), asking him again to accept
the principle of UN-supervised elections and to begin
at once negotiations with the Patriotic Front to
determine the modalities of such elections and the
procedures for a transitional regime to follow such
elections; Smith's departure would be part of the deal;
d. we would tell Muzorewa that if he accepted these proposals,
and the Patriotic Front did not, the US Executive Branch
would not oppose the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia;
if, on the other hand, the Patriotic Front also accepted
these proposals, our sanctions policy would not change
pending the outcome of the negotiations (Lake);
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-- attempt through various channels and by various means to
encourage Mugabe to split from the Patriotic Front and enter
an alliance with Muzorewa, thereby forming a Shona base
(consisting of 75% of the African population) for a black-led-
government, and leaving Nkomo to wither on the Soviet/Cuban
vine (Roberts, DOD).
5. The latest agenda makes no mention of Roberts' proposal.. The:
Discussion Paper includes only the "Lake" proposal and what appears to be
a more detailed and somewhat more "active" version of "Moose".
6. The potential intelligence contributions to this meeting would
appear to be consist primarily of assessments of relationships among the
leading players. NFAC views on these questions have been attached, as
well as an appreciation of Mrs. Thatcher's attitudes and likely policy
re Rhodesia. We have also included some fact-book type materials on 25X1
Rhodesia, Namibia and Angola.
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NFAC #1600-79
DDCI MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
29 March 1979
DDCI MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
ti
SUBJECT: Conversation, 28 March 1979
Keen interest was shown in the briefing on Rhodesia. The
observation was made that Muzorewa was not reputed to be a politician
but he seemed to be doing quite well. He was a sensible man. It was
noted that Muzorewa would prefer to deal with I'1ugabe while the whites
would prefer Nkomo. I said that was correct.
I struck a particular reaction when I indicated that the South
African attitude was hardening and that the possibility of Thatcher
coming into power was giving heart-to the Rhodesian whites.
When I noted later in the briefing that the Congress could
preempt our options, the comment was made that the British might preempt
them before the Congress did. He had not focused on the importance of
the UK internal situation, but it clearly had a bearing. One possibility
would be to cut a deal with the South Africans where they support us on
Namibia and we would agree to recognize the internal settlement. Brzezinski
was directed to organize an immediate PRC meeting on Rhodesia.
/s/
Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
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Rhodesia - Congressional Actions
-- the Case-Javits-Moynihan Amendment (to the State foreign aid
authorization bill), which calls on the Executive Branch to
determine if the elections to be carried out by the Smith
regime are fair and just, if all parties and population
groups are given an opportunity to participate, and if the
fairness of the elections is attested to by internationally
recognized observers. Case-Javits further requires the
President to cease U.S. observance of UN Security Council
sanctions regarding Rhodesia if he determines that the con-
ditions of the Amendment have been met. (The other con-
sideration in the Amendment was a determination that Rhodesia
had committed itself to negotiate in "good faith" with the
Patriotic Front and other parties; this question is not
at issue at the moment, although it could well come up
again later despite Smith's "acceptance" of US-UK proposals
for a meeting.)
-- the McGovern-Hayakawa Resolution (passed by the Senate,
but not yet -- if ever -- by the House), which calls for
the selection by the president pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of two "co-chairpersons" who
? in turn are to select 25 to 50 private individuals to serve
on a team to observe the Rhodesian elections and to report
thereon to the Congress. This resolution is in the context
of providing "assistance" to the President in reaching the
determination required by Case-Javits.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAB A - Agenda and State Discussion Paper
TAB B - Talking Points -- Namibia & Rhodesia -- and Briefing Notes
TAB C - Military Statistics
TAB D - South Africa: Nuclear Developments
TAB E - Briefing Papers
-- UK: A Conservative Government and Rhodesia
-- South Africa-US Current Relations
-- South African Policy toward Rhodesia
-- South Africa and the US - Quids and Quos
-- Muzorewa-Mugabe Alliance?
-- Nyerere and a Muzorewa-Mugabe Deal
-- Nyerere and the Lake Proposal
-- Muzorewa and the Lake Proposal
-- Nkomo's Prospects
-- Substantive Progress by the "Internal" Regime
TAB F - Background Papers
-- Namibia
-- Angola
-- Rhodesia
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