TRADE WITH CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200230051-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: February 7, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE February 11
the technicians who are associated with the
weapons that are being removed, the
MRBM's are probably en route back to
Russia along with those weapons. Now how
many "technicians" remain in Cuba in con-
ndction with, the IL-28 bombers or with the
surface-to-air missiles or with the other
equipment which has been furnished for the
military in Cuba by the Soviets, it is im-
possible for us to tell as of now.
'Mr. CLARK. How about those 70 Soviet
Mig fighters that are still in Cuba, are we
worried about those
Mr. GILPATRIC. The Mig fighters are pri-
marily interceptors. That is they are used in
the defensive role. They have a range, of
course, that could carry them across the
'F'lorida straits and over the mainland of the
United States. Indeed they could reach other
parts of the Caribbean area, but they are
designed primarily as our fighters are of
similar nature, as air defense fighters so we
have not classified them as weapons which
we regard as offensive.
Mr. SCALT. They could be used, couldn't
they, though, to deliver nuclear bombs if
they were converted to longer-range, fuel
tanks and so on?
Mr. GILPATRIC. I haven't examined the
characteristics of the Mig's. Only a few of
them, only a portion of the total number of
Mig's are the high performance. There are
Mig-17's and 19's . as well as Mig-21's. It
might be that these Mig's could be used for
nuclear weapons delivery although that has
not happened before to my knowledge.
Mr. SCALI. Well, Mr. Secretary, how about
the antiaircraft missiles and the missile
sites, do we continue to classify them -as
defensive weapons and thereby conclude that
the Soviets don't have to remove these at the
present time?
Mr. GILPATRIC. The characteristics of the
surface-to-air missiles which have been in-
stalled in Cuba by the Soviets is such that
their cone of fire, their range, their general
utilization is such that we don't consider
them a threat to the United States or to
other Latin American countries. Obviously
they facilitate the use of offensive weapons,
so it would depend on what weapons Cuba.
was left with to know how valuable those
.surface-to-air missiles are to the Cubans
or how much danger they pose for us.
Mr. SCALI. Some Republican critics claim
.that the President's agreement with Mr.
Khrushchev guarantees a sanctuary for com-
munism in the Western Hemisphere which
will not be invaded. What do you say to
criticism of that kind?
Mr. GILPATRIC. Well, as I said earlier, our
covenants, the U.S. Government's pledges
regarding invasion of Cuba do not come into
play until the commitments on the Soviet's
part have been fulfilled so as of now we don't
have any obligation that is extant, because
the Soviet performance has only been partial.
Assuming for the moment that the Soviet
performance is complete, which may be a
very large assumption and therefore that
our pledge about invasion does come into
play, it may not fundamentally change the
Status quo ante because under the Rio Pact
.and under our own national policy we have
.,never had an objective of invading Cuba.
We have an objective of maintaining peace
in "the Caribbean, of protecting the United
States and honoring our treaty obligations
under both the U.N. Charter and the Rio
Pact.
Mr. CLARK. I think you would agree,
though, that we were pretty close to a de-
'cision on possible invasion of Cuba at one
and by deceitful means prior to the 14th of holds sufficient to accommodate missiles, so
October. we assume-in fact I believe there were fur-
Mr. CLARK. And it is a course of action ther missiles on there way over when we an
which will now be closed to us if the Soviets nounced our decision to apply the quaran-
do carry out their pledge to remove all tine measure.
offensive weapons? Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, much has been
Mr. GILPATRIC. The Castro problem we had said about the threat of nuclear war that
before the Soviets decided to establish a hung over the world during this period. Do
major military base in Cuba and we will you think we were ever at the brink of war
have the problem after the Soviets' base with the Soviets?
is removed. Mr. GILPATRIC. Here was a situation where
Mr. SCALI. Mr. Secretary, some persons the two great thermonuclear powers of the
have said that the administration was just" world were in direct confrontation over a
late in waking up to the fact that these major issue, something that, as the President
missiles were there, that actually they were pointed out in his statement of October 22,
there far longer than our intelligence had was a new departure from any move the
reason to believe. Do you accept this? Soviets had made before. They had never
Mr. GILPATRIC. No, because I feel we have attempted to bring as close to the shores of
had access to the most effective intelligence the United States the existence of their
means that have yet been developed, to my strategic weapons. Obviously under those
knowledge at least. We acted immediately circumstances, very grave consequences could
upon the receipt of intelligence that the mis- have ensued had not the Soviets backed
silo bases were installed. There was a great
deal of concealment, a great deal of secrecy
about the introduction of these weapons.
The actual preparing of the sites and the
placement on them of these weapons took
place very quickly and I believe that we acted
as quickly as we could.
Now as bearing on that it is most impor-
tant to remember that for our allies to stand
with us as they did so effectively in the OAS,
as well as the support which we have since
received from our other allies in NATO and
elsewhere throughout the world, we had to
have a hard case. We had to have good evi-
dence of this threat and without the kind of
photography which our surveillance planes
came through with, beginning with the 14th
of October, I doubt that we would have had
this support and that we could have been as
effective in our policies.
Mr. SCALI. How long do you think, Mr. Sec-
retary, these medium-range missiles were in
Cuba before we spotted them?
Mr. GILPATRIC. Well, all I know is our pho-
tography at the end of August, as the Presi-
dent has pointed out, did not disclose any of
these missiles and therefore our assumption
is that sometime between the end of August
and the 14th of October they were brought
in or at least they were brought out into the
open in the erection process and the place-
ment of the missiles on the sites where we
first observed them.
Mr. CLARK. Of course those first pictures
which were made public by the Pentagon
which were taken, I believe, on October 14
showed that these bases were almost com-
pleted. Now doesn't this indicate there was
a lag in our aerial survey, that there was a
period of perhaps a couple of weeks where
our aerial inspection was inadequate?
Mr. GILPATRIC. The first pictures, as I re-
call, at San Crist6bal were of only one or
two sites, one of which was only partly com-
pleted and only had part of the equipment
Mr. CLARK. What do you think Khru-
shchev's real motive was in trying to estab-
lish these missile bases in Cuba?
Mr. GILPATRIC. I can't read his mind and
I have never heard any single explanation
which would answer all the questions that
might occur to any of us in analyzing his
motives. Obviously he was, I think, trying
to present us with a heightened threat for
some purpose, whether to enhance his bar-
gaining position over Berlin or in some other
of the numerous confrontations we have with
the Sino-Soviet bloc throughout the world.
We have to view the threat of communism in
its totality. We have to regard it as an in-
divisible affair. We have to make all our
policy decisions in the light of reactions and
counterreactions and how the Soviet moves
in this particular instance related to other
plans they had I couldn't say and may never
know.
Mr. SCALI. Do you think that perhaps Mr.
Khrushchev might have decided on this very
chancey maneuver because he realized that
compared to the United States the Soviet
Union is weak in its ability to deliver nu-
clear warheads, on target?
Mr. GILPATRIC. I do not regard the Soviets
as considering themselves weak. We do feel
we have, as we have stated several times dur-
ing the past 12 to 18 months, a measurable
margin of superiority in strategic weapons.
Khrushchev, we think, knows that and while
our intelligence is not precise enough to
put a pair of calipers on the 'margin of the
superiority we enjoy, it may be such as to
lead him to think that he had to improve
his strategic posture but in my own mind
the military equation was not altered, the
military equation between the Soviets and.
the United States, by the bringing closer to
our shores of these missiles that previously
had been ranged against us, or longer range
missiles of the same weapon-carrying capac-
on it. ity at longer range. After all, the Soviets
Now we subsequently through the exten- have missile-bearing submarines. Those
sion of our surveillance during the week submarines can reach our shores and war-
after the 14th did pick up additional sites. heads comparable to those that would have
How fast those were brought in, how much been borne by these missiles could be struck
before construction was underway and dur- from submarines off our shore. So that
Ing a period I might say when our surveil- I don't believe there was any major change
lance was hampered by bad weather, I don't in the overall military equation as a result
think we will ever know exactly the exact of this particular deployment.
sequence of events during those 8 weeks from Mr. CLARK. Do you think then that we
the end of August until the middle of have over emphasized the danger of these
October. medium range missile bases in Cuba?
Mr. SCALI. Mr. Secretary, is it possible that Mr. Gu,PATRIC. Not at all. I think the
the rapidity with which we did spot these presence of the missiles there, in this con-
medium range missiles stopped the Soviets text of this being the first time the Soviets
in midsea from bringing their longer"range had over put any such weapons outside their
missiles into Cuba? own immediate territory and in a situation
Mr. GILPATRIC. That is another enigma we where they might not always be able to con-
of +action that obviously came up for con- that after our limited quarantine was im- warning period and where the effect on the
sideration if the Soviets had not backed posed beginning following the President's Latin American countries as well as on our-
Tdown and removed at least the most threat- statement on the 22d of October, a number selves in the Western Hemisphere was very
ening of the offensive weapons that we found of Russian ships turned back, including at destabilizing-It changed the juxtaposition
there had been introduced surreptitiously least two ships that had large hatches and of these arrays of power, so I think it was of
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1963 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- HOUSE
,Mr. BUNDY. Well, I don't myself think
that there is any present--I know there is no
present. evidence. and I think there is no
present likelihood that the Cubans and the
Cum Government and the Soviet Govern-
Went w Uld In combination attempt to in-
stall a ;najor offensive capability.
Now It is true that there words "offensive"
and "defensive," if you try to apply them
precisely to every single item, misleads you.
Whether a gun is offensive or defensive de-
pends a little bit on_ which end you are on.
It is also true that the.dig 3fghters which
have been put in Cuba for more than a year
now, and any possible additions in the form
of aircraft might have a certain marginal
capability for moving against the United
States, but I think we have to bear in mind
the relative magnitudes here. The United
States is not going to be Placed in any posi-
tion of major danger to is own security by
Cuba, and we are not going to permit that
situation to develop. That, I think, is what
the administration has been trying to make
clear.
So far, everything that has been delivered
in Cuba falls within the categories of aid
which the, Soviet Union has provided, for
example, to neutral states like Egypt, or In-
donesia, and I should not be surprised to see
additional military assistance of that sort.
That is not going to turn an island of 6
million people with 6,000 or 6,000 Soviet
technicians and specialists into a major
threat to the United States, and I believe
most of the American people do not share
the views of the few who have acted as If
suddenly this kind of military support cre-
ated a mortal threat to us. It does not.
Mr. ScAar. Mr. Bundy, how about Senator
B,Eeriwc's claim that these antiaircraft mis-
sileswhich are being provided to the Cubans
right now could be converted with some
little adjustment into ground-to-ground
missiles with a range of up to 1,400 miles?
Mr. BUNDY, Well, if that is what Senator
SEATING said-and I am not in a position of
having seen exactly what he said, but any-
one who said that is saying something which
just does not correspond with the situation.
That Is just wrong.
Mr. SeALr. These missiles cannot be con-
verted?
Mr. BUNDY. The missiles of the kind which
we have identified' up to this point are
certainly not srsceptible to this kind of
conversion or translation. It is as if you
were to try to turn a destroyer into an anti-
aircraft carrier by waving a wand.
Mr. ScALL In that connection, air, there
has been a good deal of attention and some
excitement in this past week about the
negotiations that Mr. Donovan is conduct-
ing to free the Cuban prisoners. There have
been all sort of whispers that the U.B. Gov-
ernment is secretly financing whatever sup-
plies are to be given Castro. Could you
comment at all on that?
Mr. BUNDY. Well. I think It Is Important
to understand that Mr. Donovan Is acting, In
the first instance, for Cuban refugees and
for the families of the Cuban prisoners. it
is true obviously that the United 8taten.has
an interest and a concern In what may come
of his negotiations. ;t 1s equally true that
those negotiations are, as far as I understand
.it, not at a stage at which it would be ap-
propriate for me to try to give any clear
answer to the kind of question you have
stated.
Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Bundy, In the.little more
than a minute that we have ,eft, let's try
to broaden the horizon briefly beyond Berlin
and Cuba. I get repeatedly the argument
from the administration-and I must say
that it sounds like an impressive one-that
the Communists are discovering that com-
munism as an article, or vehicle upon which
to ride to world domination, is failing and
No. 21-19
that If we can exploit those failures with
some forthright strategy of our own, barring
some accidental push of a button, we will
look at the future confidently. Would you
like, in a.few seconds, now that I have taken
this time, to try to develop that briefly?
Mr, BuxnY. Well, we do believe that Com-
munist power to in trouble in a variety of
ways all around the world. There is this
sharp confrontation and difference of view
and purpose between the two great centers
in Moscow and Peiping_ There Is the con-
tinuing and persistent and spreading failure
of nearly all Communist societies in the
agricultural field. There is the obvious fact
that the West intends to sustain and main-
tain its essential positions in Berlin and
elsewhere. There Is the increasing aware-
nees among neutral states-Guinea Is an ex-
ample-of the problem of getting along with
communism. They have problems of their
own and it is comforting as we work on
ours.
Mr. MORGAN. On that note, Mr. Bundy,
thank you for being with us on "Issues and
Answers."
The ANNOUNCER. This has been another
in ABC's newsmaking series which brings
you the answers to the issues of today.
Next week at this same time our guest
will be the West German Foreign Minister,
the Honorable Gerhard Schroeder. We hope
you will be with us.
ISSUES AND ANswza6-THE HONORABLE
EoswELL L. GILPATamc, DEPUTY Sscarra6Y
or DZTSNEE, INTEavSLwED by BOB CLARK
ABC CORRESPONDENT. AND JOHN ScAz.I,
,
ABC CORRESPONDENT
The ANNOUNCER. Deputy Secretary of De-
fense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, here are the
issues: How can we be sure all the Soviet
missiles are out of Cuba.
Have we guaranteed the Communists an
invasion-free aantuary in the Caribbean?
What does the Cuban crisis reveal about
Russia's military might?
You have heard the issues. Now for the
answers from the Deputy Secretary of De-
fense. Roswell L. Giipatric, who is a member
of the President's three-man Committee cur-
rently negotiating the conclusion of the
Cuban crisis. To interview Secretary all-
Patric. here are ABC Correspondent Bob
Clark and with the first question, ABC Cor-
respondent John Scan.
Mr. Scats. Mr. Secretary, welcome to
"Issues and Answers".
It seems to me that our inspection of
the Soviet missiles at sea, as the missiles
leave Cuba, really constitutes no more than
a peek. How can we be sure that the Soviets
haven't left any missiles behind?
Mr. GILPATRIC. Mr. Scala, we never knew
how many missiles were brought Into Cuba.
The Soviets said there were 42. We have
counted 42 going out. We saw fewer than
42. Until we have so-called onsite inspec-
tion of the Leland of Cuba we could never be
sure that 42 was the maximum number that
the Soviets brought Into Cuba.
Mr. ScALI. Well, Mr. Secretary, were all
these missiles medium-range and inter-
mediate-range or just one kind?
Mr. Grt.PATRIC. The missiles that we saw
and the missiles which have been removed
are the medium-range. That is about 1,020
miles range. We never saw any IRBM's for
which sites were being prepared, but for
Which no missiles apparently were put into
place.
Mr. CLARK. How about the Soviet jet
bombers in Cuba, are we going to insist that
they go too?
Mr. OILPATRIC. We regard them as offen-
sive weapons.
They have strategic capabilities similar to
our own B_47's. They are no older. They
2097
can carry 8.000 or 7,000 pounds of high ex-
plosives a rang of 700 or 800 miles which
would reach portions of the United States
and other Latin American countries, and we
think they clearly fall within the weapons
we regard as offensive which was what we
aim to remove from Cuba.
Mr. CLARK. How serious are we about their
removal at this stage? Would we really fire
up the Cuban crisis again to be sure that
these bombers are taken out of Cuba?
Mr. On.PATRic. Our objective remains to re-
move that kind of a threat from Cuba.
Mr. SCALr. Well, Mr. Secretary, if there is
no on-site inspection, plus a look for ex-
ample into caves to see whether there are any
hidden offensive weapons, will we stand by
our pledge not to invade Cuba?
Mr. GILPATRIC. Our pledge in the Presi-
dent's statement to Premier Khrushchev is
twofold. It is that once the Soviet commit-
ments have been fulfilled or arrangements
satisfactory to that end have been made, we
will lift the blockade and we will offer as-
surances against the invasion of Cuba.
Our obligations do not come into play,
however, until the Soviets have fully carried
out their commitments and as of the present
time there has only been a partial fulfill-
ment. They have simply removed what they
say were the missiles that were brought in.
Beyond that their performance has not yet
gone.
Mr. Scam. Well, what can we say to them
when the Soviet come back to us and say
"Well, we have tried to talk Castro into giv-
ing up these bombers and he won't"?
Mr. GILPATRIC. We hold the Soviets re-
sponsible for the types of military equipment
which it has furnished to Castro and as of
the present time we regard the removal of
those bombers as within the capacity of the
Soviets to bring about. What future de-
velopments may tell, I am not in a position
to judge,
Mr. CLARK. Mr. Secretary, aerial recon-
naissance has been our most valuable way,
first of detecting the presence of the Soviet
missile bases and then of assuring that the
bases had been dismantled and that the
missiles were being moved out. How long do
we plan to keep up this aerial survey?
Mr. GILPATRIC. We regard aerial surveil-
lance as a part of our inherent self-defense,
a means of protecting our country as we
would through any form of intelligence col-
lection. The extent to which we will need
to rely on continued air surveillance over
Cuba will depend again on what the nature
of the threat is that remains in Cuba after
the Soviets have completed, if they do com-
plete, the undertakings made by Premier
Khrushchev to President Kennedy.
Mr. CLARK. Do you mean we might con-
tinue aerial inspection even though we were
totally assured that the missiles will be
removed.
Mr. GU.PATSIc. As I say, the conduct of
aerial surveillance is part of our overall
Intelligence collection system and we never
are going to bargain away any part of our
right of self-defense, which Includes the con-
duct of aerial surveillance. I do not know
as of today what the need would be in the
future for a particular type or a particular
frequency of aerial surveillance over Cuba
or any other foreign country.
Mr. Scats, Mr. Secretary, nothing much
has been said lately about those 5,000 or so
Soviet military technicians that went to
Cuba with many of these weapons. If I
recall the Pentagon did say that It saw
several hundred young Soviets aboard one
of the freighters leaving Cuba. What has
happended to them? Are they leaving? Have
they left?
Mr. GILPATRIC. We have seen a number-
several hundred in fact, Mr. Scali, boarding
ships, or on board ships and we believe that
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February 11
9. a .. Cb1 GI E55IUNA RECORD -'HCSClS
E
and I thiniithey are both"of very great fm= -do not believe either one should be re- responsibility for decision, as the joint res-
portance. -gorded as a lever against the other. I my- olution of Congress makes clear, rests with
IMlr. ScALr Mr Bundyy, what do you think self would not on the whole be of the view him and equally in my experience of the way
of korelgn NTinister Iioeder's idea that the that the Soviet moves in Cuba are moti- he goes about this kind of problem, there
erms- vated in the way that you suggest. I cer- is.no doubt that he will make decisions of
ktiussia to join in a
sill
e
p
s as
Western
neilt done t nce on tile Berlin and German tainly do not believe that we are going to this sort In the light of much wider and
k es hat this `be at 6'd eputy foreign be disuaded from meeting our responsibili-
ministe,rs levelf larger considerations than the, I agree, diffi-
"ties as defined by the President, both in cult, complex and wearing temporary issues
Mr BiJNDYIi; this is an idea In which Berlin and in Cuba, by any hypothetical con- which you have mentioned.
Mr. SCALI? Mr. Bundy, in that connec-
there andbeen in, toed otherdea p l`of interest, al "riectr. SCALL Mrr.. the Bundy, two. it is obvious that tion, Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON has
arts of the Federal Mr. Scan: M
in B Bonn
Republic and'liere=in the "Flnfted States. We Cuba is not being eliminated from the elec- given two speeches in which he says flatly,
believe tl>a# it is use3ul to maintain contact tion campaign in the United States. How if I remember his exact words, that the poi-
and to maintain communication and to keep much damage, if any, does continued harp- icy of the Kennedy administration is to "get
a serious discussion om in the constant ing on this In an election year cause to the rid of Castro."
effort to see iF we cant make a settlement-administration's conduct of foreign policy? This seems to be a little further than
that meets the igilimate interest's" of all, Mr. BuNDY. Well, I don't think one should President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk have
Administra-
; Is this the of the arid therefore would thTxi'that is a sensi- put all discussion of Cuba in the same box. gone. policy
ble. and one which deserves con- There are serious and responsible commen- tion at this time?
think the policy of
aideration arid. which we hope would be re- tators and observers in and out of politics Mrthe. BUNDY.
rati Well; ell; I I wouldn't agree with
eeived with attention and res ect on the' who have said important things, and it Is
other side. quite proper that they should, whether or you that there is any wedge between the
?dr, AA CALI ; Mayor Willy Brandt on this - not there is an election campaign going on. Vice President, the President and the Secre-
prbgram last week also strongly endorsed As to other kinds of things to which the tary of State.
the idea of a `referendum in West Berlin, to President referred yesterday in describing Mr. SCALI. It is just that they haven't
used those words.
put the West Berliners on record as want- the views of one Republican Senator on Cuba,
ing to keep "Allied troops in West Berlin. which he thought were inappropriate and Mr. BuNDY. I certainly don't intend to
How sloes that Idea strike you? excessive and undersirable, it seems to me join with you in trying to drive one, Mr.
Iii BIINDY ell we believe that the in best to leave the President's comments to Scali, but I will say this, that I think the
terest and tile rights of the West in Berlin, Speak for themselves. Vice President, is using clear, short, terse
while they rest 'legally and by historic right Mr. SCALI. Much attention has been cen- language to describe a general position of
upon the occupation status, rest also in an tered lately, sir, on the activities of Cuban the U.S. Government which is that Fidel
important sense upon-the will and purpose exile groups in attacking or claiming to at- Castro, who came to power on a wave
-dfthe, people of West-Berlin: We think that tack shipping and Cuban coastal areas. Can of popular support in an expectation, and
both of these kinds of rights are of great the administration argue effectively, do you even among most of his own supporters, that
significance and-if if-should-turn out in the think, that it has no control over these exile there would be reform and freedom and lib-
view of the Mayor and Senate of West Der- groups, many of whom are based in and' erty in Cuba, has betrayed that expectation.
around Florida, and isn't there the danger He has betrayed it in two ways: by imposing
liroblem that a plebiscite was a good way at that one of the forays by one of theseoutfits a totalitarian tyranny in his own country
a'certain point of registering the feeling of may involve us in a serious international and by accepting an increasing measure of
the people of West Berlin, their honest feel- incident? control and influence by the Soviet power
ing about what 'they want, I- myself think Mr. BUNDY. You have raised a difficult and within Cuba. These two acts of betrayal
that this might a very constructive step. a serious question. Under the terms of the constitute in our view a course of policy with
Mr 1MoRGAs Tvfr. Bundy, it would be eatoii= _ joint resolution of the Congress and also I which we cannot sympathize and against
isliizlg, i suppose, to expect allies, partieu think in terms of the natural sympathies of which we must range ourselves.
fatly in what we refer to as peacetime, to all Americans it is very difficult to withhold Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Bundy, given that sit-
be completely in accord on how you ap- _ understanding and a feeling of a certain sym- nation as you interpret it and given what I
proaeli a given problem, even one -6 8, rathy for people who are trying in their take to be our general policy without any
as :Berlin. own way, or appear to be trying in their wedge being involved of trying to isolate
The fact is,, t gather though that there own way, to restore the liberties of Cuba. Castro's Cuba and eventually get it to col-
is a great deal of difference between us on ? At the same time there is a responsibility lapse internally, how a, a we doing really,
the-o'ne'-side', London, "Paris, and Bonn. on us and the balance between these con- candidly, with our Latin American allies, in . 1-1 Do you think that this administration
- aiderations is a difficult one. persuading them that we need to have them
would if it felt necessary," step out ahead I don't think you should assume that join with us more forceably and more out.
to honor our Commitment militarily in Ber every mile of the U.S. coastline even at wardly in supporting such a policy?
fin if it felt it necessary? best is really very easily patrolled or Mr. BUNDY. Well, I think we have made
Mr. 13TJNDY , Well, I think you perhaps a ? controlled. It is not as simple as that. But very considerable progress, in stages, since
little exaggerate tile degree of difference Tiere this I. a different problem and while we do 1960, in ranging, or in succeeding in getting
is on the essentiais'of the problem of Berlin not-there is no way in which the United a wide range of countries with quite dif-
and the wider problem of Germany. "Iris cer-. States can maintain control over the many ferent interests in a sense, because of the
tain~ly true at there have been historically scores of thousands of Cuban refugees and distance at which they find themselves, be-
0 cause of their own size, because of their own
ffer ib-year period, taotfoaT differences the many scores of groups of organized Cu-
_aiisl differences in emphasis and it is always bans or partly organized Cubans. It is true particular internal political situations, we
important and it becomes more 'important ` that this problem of relationship is a ditfi- have made very considerable progress in
when, there are times of higher tension to cult one. sustaining unity in the Western Hemisphere
work together closely to try to limit those 'Mr. MORGAN. I want to bind two of the and in developing a constantly stronger view
difl`erences-or eliminate them and o --fry _to- points that Scali made into one question, if within that hemisphere toward Fidel Castro,
present a 'common"`front I may. and Castro-type communism in Cuba. But
-We would be very reluctant, and we don't That is this: He mentioned the fact that, it is also clear that in the view of many
believe there fs any call for a prediction that unfortunately or not, inevitably, the Cuban of these countries the problem is not a prob-
we aregoiiig to find ourselves in 'a "situation situation is occupying time in the congres- lem of overwhelming urgency. They don't
in which at a moment of decisive test we_ sional campaign. see it in quite the same light that we do.
would not all be together Buttould have Secondly, these refugee raids so to speak tither countries close to Cuba may feel
to add that if It should come tO;such a' are very difficult, if not impossible to, as you every-more urgently about it than we do.
point- which we- do noti anticipate the point out, to control at least totally. But We after all are in no serious danger of In-
United States does intend to honor its own aren't those two facts taken together, poli- ternal subversion from Cuba. Other coun-
Qbli ations. , tics goaded if you please by opposition in tries are.
1Vlr, QRGANf. Is I suppose is-in the pu`b- this case, in criticizing the Kennedy ad- Mr. MORGAN. That brings up a point which
lie mind this crisis or this possible 'Crisis` ministration; politics goaded by the cam- seems to be worrying a lot of people, and
inBerlin is oyersh&dowed by Cuba. Do you paign and the unpredictability of refugee if that, as you say, is true, it hasn't gotten
think doers is a .possibility at the l$ussiaris` activity- don't those things combine to al- completely across, and that is this interpre-
th
re deliberately screwili up the lines of most force more direct action by the ad- tation of the military installations in Cuba
>terlin in an effort to make a ministration on Cuba? which the administration emphasis consist-
tension on
{
dSYeraion or ,the her way around that Mr. BUNDY. I certainly don't believe that eiltlY are defensive in nature and not of
tuba is a diversion_preoccupyiyng the Amer- the President intends to be forced by any- Pensive.
loan people away from the main bullseye of` body or by any period of time or by any Isn't It possible, isn't it really possible that
attention?rr nlornent of debate into decisions 'different these could be converted into offensive wea -
Mr BuNDY?'We believe that it is important from those which' he regards as in the na- One virtualy night,-and- if so, what
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