Chinese Influence over North Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000300030001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
10 March 1967.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
SUBJECT : Chinese Influence over North Vietnam
REFERENCES : A.
25X1A2g
C. Item #1, Diplomatic Summary, 9 March 1967
1. In confirmation of the comments on the referenced documents
relayed to you by telephone, we do not subscribe to the view that North
Vietnam is so economically dependent on China that Hanoi has no independent
latitude in determining its policies. We believe that North Vietnam's 1966
rice harvest involved a shortfall of about 300, 000 tons. (In recent years,
the average harvest has been on the order of 4 and 1/2 million tons.) We
believe North Vietnam will attempt to make up this shortfall from various
sources, including China, but also including the Soviet Union and the East
Eau pea.n Bloc. North Vietnamese imports of foodstuffs from the Soviet
Un; :a, China and Rumania in the first quarter of 1967 have almost equaled
all foodstuff imports in the calendar year of 1966.
2. Although North Vietnam receives considerable aid from Commu-
nist China, we do not believe it is as dependent on Chinese aid as the three
referenced reports would suggest. By dollar values, China has provided
only 35 percent of the cumulative foreign aid deliveries to North Vietnam;
most of the remainder comes from the Soviet Bloc. Vietnamese imports
of rice from Communist China during 1966 were less than 1 percent of their
domestic production. Hanoi certainly considers Peking's likely reactions
to any policy moves it may desire to make but is not, we believe, rigidly
constrained by Chinese wishes.
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We do believe a
North Vietnamese delegation went to China approximately twenty-four hours
before Kosygin left London, but are not positive that this visit was related
to British proposals on opening negotiations.
4. In sum, we do not consider that these three reports offer signif-
icant new information influencing our assessment of present North Vietnamese
plans and attitudes.
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
8sr CcpY
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