THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

;~4ppro~ed`For r~: ~ 65B Ot~~'00'21000'1-9
`n worth of second-stage tax cuts-
$4 billio
unless ,the` net public debt on -next June
30 is $36~ billion or~ess. To some,"tiffs may
~raurid harmless, inagmuch as this figure is
only slf~lit~y 7esa tf~ian that resulting from
.Treasury Secretary bhlon's own rough esti-
lnate of,.the aurrent- budget deficit. But
this amerid'ment was dejected in the-House
:Ways aril T1VIeans Committee, and 'should be
rejected if offered again ion the House floor,
for iour_~undamental reasr~ns:
,(1) 1~e'tax bill is needed ori Sts own
merits ~sid should` not.. be e~onditfoned by
(2) Shou"Id lagging Federal r enues next
summer'rm~lce fulfillment of thi condition
iilapossible, that would be a clew sign to
;proceed with, not prevent, the seco stage
(3) Revenue deficit and deUt estimates
for the e~c~of thfs~fiscaiyear are'nedessar
do upon dozens of unpredictable contingen-
cies to Which his bill should-not be tied;
aYld .,.
(4) 'I"iiis` amendmment would be self=de-
;,teating;'_for' taxpayers, uncertain of receiving
..the full benefits pf the bill would hold back
on their investment and `expansion outlays,
-thus retai'~in~ revenues and enlarging the
debt. Tf tax reduction is essential to the
:progress of our economy-and I think it is-
`then it is essential whether Secretary Di1=
on's estimate turns out to be accuiate or
ilot> The need for more. private demand-
for more find ,ri the ~ands'ol`consumers
a~ld Snvgstors-w~l~` exist in i?b64 ~"axid 1965
regardless of, whet~iei the net public debt
-:ori next .7une . ~Otli is $304 billion bf $306
billion or ;$3b2 billion. History teaches us
that the,public cleb'~~unexpecteclly rises when
-;public revenues 'Pa`ll unexpectedly short--
.. and they have been consistently falling short
precisely `because o`ur tax- rates, which were
originally designed to meet wartIxne and
postwar conditions are now imposing a re-
atrictive brake on iia`Eipnal growth and in-
COme. Thus, this amendment could deny
the Nation a tax `cut at the very time it
3xEeds i't most-wFien revenues are falling
short of. expectations because of` a slowdown
in business activity.
Secretary Diilon's rough estimate, more-
over, is exactly that-a verg ?rough esti-
mate-made _at a ?time -when t3ie Congress
has not completed action- on legislation and
ilpproprfatfons for the current year. ' To re=
quire, as this amendment requires, that it
months later his estimate must prove wholly
correct is wholly unrealistic. Actually, the
Ydecretary forecast" a deficit for this fiscal
gear of $9.2 billion-which would, ~ on the
basis oi'~ the existing public debt, mean a
fist debt on next June 30 of $304.2 bit=
lion. This is an estimate both of what the
.. r
Congress will do and of what the economy
will do: ' Tf it were exactly correct, the Na-
'tion would lose' a `~4=billion economic boost
because'of a~200 million difference.
Yet ,$~00 million is not even one-tenth of
1 percent of our national debt-lt is~ not
even one-half of the amount we are likely
to collect on June 30th alone-arid, 'while i
always expect great things of Mr. D111on~
11 years, 'revenue` estimates made at t
time of. year have only ~ times-in fi al
'
a
.. years 1566, 1962 and 1963--come with
~1llfon dollars of fife final actual fl~ur To
il.),iQw, ~~ie fate of a yitall needs x re-
Y
~llction to be decic'~ed.by the accxrac or in-
a~C~a~ of ~a nets"ssarily inexact p .diction
CoiflB `P~ elose` to resting the not nal wel-
fare on"a game of chfiance.
l?lts~n~ssman or investor. plan fo ~he future?
coq,! Gan ~e make even a reasiria"bie guess
ap to ~iow ,close t?ifs estimate (will 'be, :how
Yn,'ucli; Federal revenue wfh b earned, how
YYluc#1 the Congress. will spen . , whether the
weather will bring' a bigger farm surplus,
whether buyers will be found for Federal
mortgages and other assets at reasonable
prices, or whether sometechnological break-
through or raw material price increase or in-
ternational crisis will suddenly augment our
outlays for national defense? The cost of
last fall's Cuban crisis alone, for example,
waS nearly $200 million.
A businessman attempting to formulate his
spending plans in advance with regard that
kind of second-stage tax cut promise as no
promise at all. It will become a highly spec-
ulative matter-and concrete plans cannot be
based on speculation. Being less certain o
his market and profit, therefore, he will no
undertake as much expansion now-and this
will not only shortchange the national econ-
omy but increase the national debt. As
former Treasury Secretaries Humphrey and
Anderson pointed out during the last admin-
istration, the debt limit does not and cannot
control expenditures-for they. depend on
the appropriations voted by the Congress
cept for unavd
terest charges
a total well below that submitted
ary.
This administration is not opp ed ex-
penditure control. On the contr y, we ke
pride in the fact that our bu et expen -
Centage, rose last year t a considerably
slower pace than the debtedness of our
Nation's consumers, lusts business and
State and local gover enta. We take pride
in the fact that we ve reduced the ratio of
oiu''Federal civilia xpenditurea to national
output and to the xpenditures of State and
local government We take pride in the fact
that we have re ced the postal deficit-we
have reduced a cost of surplus food grain
storage-we ve reduced waste, duplication
and obsoles ce in the Pentagon-and we
have achiev d noteworthy economies in every
Governm t agency. And, finally, we take
pride in a fact that-1n each of the three
budget I have submitted-expenditures
other an those required for defense, space
and terest increased less than they did in
the t three budgets oP my predecessors.
could be effectively carried out by the pri-
vate economy-for example, substituting
private for public credit wherever feasible.
In the last fiscal year over $1 blllion of finan-
cial assets in Federal portfolios were trans-
ferred to private holders. We have also
sought to initiate or increase "user charges"
to cover a more equitable share of the costs
of services provided by the Federal Govern-
ment-to introduce modern equipment and
management techniques for improving the
productivity of all departments-and to con-
trol Federal civilian employment as well as
expenditures.
Last year, if Federal civilian- employment
had increased at the"same rate as popular
-tion grovrth, it would have increased by
only 5,800 persons-one-eighth the rate of
population growth-so that we ended the
year with far fewer Federal employees per
1,000 population than we began. To illus-
trate .the significance of this accomplish-
ment, let me point out that, during the same
period, State and local government employ-
ment grew by about 300,00 persons.
Moreover,-this administr tion's pledges on
expenditure and debt c trol, unlike the
amendment under discu ion, have not been
limited merely to the p t and present fiscal
years. In a recent Lett r to Chairman Mu.Ls
of the House Ways Means Committee, I
repeated my pledge o achieve a balanced
Federal budget in balanced full-employ-
ment economy-to: exercise an even tighter
rein on Federal a penditures, limiting out-
lays to only tho expenditures which meet
strict criteria national need-and, con-
sistent with t ese policies, as the tax cut
becomes full effective and the economy
climbs tow full employment, to apply a
substantial art of the increased tax reve-
nues tow~d a reduction in our budgetary
Assuring enactment of the pending. tax
bill, I -expect-in the absence of any un-
foresen slowdown in the economy or any
sera s international contingency-to be
abto submit next January a budget for
fl al 1985 envisioning an estimated deficit
resulting from these transitional budget
deficits will be kept proportionately lower
than the increase in our gross national prod-
uct-so that the real burden of the Federal
debt will be steadily reduced.
This is true expenditure control. It can-
not be done automatically by erecting some
arbitrary, artificial figure and declaring that
a much-needed tax cut will not go ahead if
the debt exceeds that figure. The lmposl-
tion of such a device can only reduce the
effectiveness of the tax. bill and invite the
higher levels of unemployment which re-
forwar to more unemployment, to more
lags in ome, to mare and large budget
deficits, an to more waste and weakness in
the econom and that course is the height
of fiscal irres nsibiiity.
The Federal dget has been in deficit
during 7 of the ast 10 .years, regardless
of which party con oiled the executive and
legislative branches, regardless of where
Congress set the debt fling, and regardless
of what controls were aced on expendi-
tures. Without a tax cut, ere is at present
no ascertainable prospect f reaching a bal-
ance. But with a tax cut, d its a tempo-
rary transitional increase in t deficit, this
Nation can move within a very w years to
an even higher trend of econo activity
capable of sustaining bath full em oyment
For all these reasons, the efforts o this
organization and conference on behal of
the pending bill .are vital to our Natlo 's
future. I do not assume that every busi'-
nessman here agrees with every provision of
that bill. But after 7 months of intensive
committee study, a fundamentally sound
and strong program has been produced. It
must be voted up or down on the floor of
the House this month. Every month it is
delayed costs this Nation dearly in lost out-
put, jobs, profits and the increased danger of
a downturn.
I do not promise that passage of this bill
will achieve lull employment on the follow-
ing day or even in the following year. But
I do know that we will never get there if
we do not start moving-and the time to
-start is today.
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S p
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. HUMPHREY obtained the floor.
Mr. MANSFIELD.. lVr, _ President,
will the Senator from Minnesota yield,
without Iosing his right to the floor?
Mr. HUMPHREY. L: yield. ,
Mr. MANSFIELD. T, suggest the ab-
sence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mx?,
WALTERS in the chair). The clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order for.
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
LIMITATION OF DEBATE ON H.R. 12,
ASSISTANCE TO MEDICAL AND
DENTAL SCHOOIJS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish to propound a unanimous Consent
request, with respect to S.R. l2, a, bill to
increase opportunities for training of
physicians, dentists, and professional
public health personnel, which has been
repo>~ted by the Committee oxi:Labor and
Public Welfare, and, on which minority
views will be ready tonight, that on
Thursday, next, beginning at 12 o'clock
noon, the bill be laid before the Senate
and made the pending business, and that
during the consideration of that measure
there be allocated 1 hour of debate on
each amendment, with one-half hour
controlled by each side, and 1 hour of
debate on the bill.
This proposal is being made with the
approval of the distinguished minority
leader, and the distinguished Senator
from Arizona CMr. GoLDWATERI, the
ranking minority member of the com-
mittee, and, I understand, with his col-
leagues on that side of the committee.
Mr. KEATING. Mr. President,l?eserv-
ing the right to object-and I shall not
object---in accordance with the state-
ment which I made a few moments ago,
I shall offer an amendment to that bill
to extend the life of the Civil Rights
Commission. This is the first appox-tu-
nity which will be offered to take such
action. The limitation of time sug-
gested is adequate to deal with the prob-
lem> and I therefore have no objection
to the limitation. However, I would ob-
ject to any provision of the unanimous-
consent request relating to germaneness.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I wish th@ Sen-
ator would reconsider his position. I
assure the Senator that it is my intention
to see. to it this month that an amend-
ment to that effect fs offered to a bill..
However,. in view of the importance of
the school, measure, I believe it would
be advisable for the Senator to consider
postponing his action until later in the
month.
Mr. KEATING. I shall be very glad to
do so if the distinguished majority lead-
er is able at this time to tell me some-
thing more about his plans for action to
extend the life oP the Commission. If
he is able to do so, I shall be happy to
hear his statement. Perhaps he will wish
to renew his request in a few moments.
I shall be glad to have shim tell me about
jt off the record.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No. It has been
my intention to offer an amendment to
an appropx?fate bill which would be forth-
Comi:n?~, at which tixxie the matter in
which the Senator from New Xork is so
very much interested':. will at least be
brought to the floor for consideration
and debate until completion of action.
Mr. KEATING. At that time, I would
assume, the distinguished majority
leader would not havein mind any mo-
1-ion, a,t least not emanating from the
leadership, to table such an effort.
Mx'. MANSFIELD. No.
Mr. KEATING. And that action will
be taken prior to the end of this manth?
Mr'. MANSFIELD. 'ghat is my inten-
tion. '1'o the best of my ability, it will be.
Mx. DIRKSEN. If 'the Senator will
yield., l: know that the ~vil Rights Com-
mission expires at the end of September.
Therefore, action is ~tnperative if the
Commission is to be kept alive. I have
discussed this matter'. with the distin-
euish.ed Senator from'New York, and I
fully concur in the sentiments expressed
by the majority leader. I would be as
helpful as possible in order to consum-
mate the action, so that the life. o:f the
Commission will be continued.
Mr. KEATING. I appreciate this as-
surauee; and on the basis of that assur-
ance of the majoxlty leader and the mi-
nority leader, I shall not offer the amend-
ment to the bill which will be before the
6enate on Thursday, acid will not object
to the unanimous-consent request.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is thex?e
objection? The Chair hears none, and
the order is entered.
The unanimous-consent agreement re-
duced to writing is as follows:
UNANIMOUS-CONSEPST AGREEMENT
Ordered, That, effective on Thursday, Sep-
tember 12, 1983, at the cdnciuslon of routine
morning buisness, the Seaa,te proceed to the
consideration of the bill, ",H.R. 12, the Health
Professions Educational; Assistance Act of
1963, and during its cons~4derationdebate ott
any amendment, motion,' or appeal, except a
motion to lay on the table, shall be limited
to 1 hour, to be equally divided and con-
trolled by the mover oi; any .such anxend-
ment or motion and the majority leader:
Provided, That in the ?vent the majority
leaden Ss in favor of anq such a,xnendment
or motion, the time in ; opposition .thereto
shall bey controlled by the minority leader or
some Senator designatedr by him: Provided
further? That no amendmlent that is not ger-
mane to the provisions of i;he said bill shall
be received.
Ordered further, That on the question of
the fi,na,l passage oP the said bill debate shall
be linnfted to 1 hour, to' be equally divided
&nd controlled, respectively, by the maJority
and minority leaders: Prodded, That the said
Ieaders, or either of them, may, from the
time under their control`on the passage of
the s;3.id bill, allot additional time to any
Senator during the consideration of any
amendment, motion, or appeal.
THE NUCLEAR TES'' BAN TREAT
The Senate, as in Committee of the
Whole, resumed the consideration of Ex-
ecutive M (88th Colxg., 1st sessJ, the
treaty banning nuclea:Y weapon tests in
the atmosphere, in Quter space, and
unde:rarater.
i
Approved For Release 2004/03/11
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if
there is no further debate, I ask that the;
treaty be considered as having pa sect
through the several pa~rliameritary
stages up to and including the presen-
tation of the resolution of :ratification.
If I may explain, this means that this
will preclude offering of amendments,
but will make it possible to offer reserve-?
tions, which cannot be offered at thf:>
time.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Merely to clarify
the situation, a reservation that fs ofl'erecl
is not a reservation to the treaty itself,
but is a reservation to the resolutionx.
Is that correct?
Mr. MANSFIELD. To the resohxtion
of ratification. It is necessary t+~ ga
through this procedure before a reser??
vation can be offered or consideredl.
Mr. GOLDWATER. If a reservation
is offered and is adopted, that reserve-
tion applies to the resolution., not to the
treaty itself. Is that correct?
Mr. MANSFIELD. It applies to the
resolution of ratification. If it were
adopted, it would be voted on, when
the final vote came, with the reserve,-
tion included.
Mr. GOLDWATER. But the rese;rva??
tion would be included in the resolutionx,
and not in the treaty.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is true; butt
it would be a part of the treaty. This is
the way it has long been done. The
Renate is following the regular prose-~
dure as delineated by the Parliarnen.??
tartan. Up to now it would not be in
order to offer a reservation. If this pro-
cedure is adopted, it will be in order to
propose reservations to the resolution of
ratification. Amendments could be of-
fered up to the adoption of this pro-?
eedure now. If it is adopted, they would
not be in order.
1VIr. RUSSELL. I do not; intend to
propose any reservations or amend??
ments; but it seems to me that in con??
nection with so vitally important asub-?
jest as this, it might be well. if the dis-?
tinguished Senator from Montana would
give notice that tomorrow roe will pro-?
pose the unanimous-consent request, i:r,~
order that the rights of all Senators may
be protected. I have no aci:ual knowl-?
edge, but I have heard over the radio
that the distinguished Senator from Con-?
necticut said he desired to propose un-?
derstandings; and other Senators-:[ be-
lieve the distinguished Senator i'rom.
Louisiana CMr. Loxcl is one--have rug-?
Bested that they intend to offer eiither
reservations or amendments.
So that all Senators nlight be put on.
notice, it seems to me that it would be
well to have they Senator from Montana.
state exactly t:he effect of the tmani-
mous-consent request he will suggest;,
and thus put the Senate on notice that;
he will propose it tomorrow ;at the con-
clusion of the morning hour. I have no
objection to his proposal, but I believe
it would be fairer to offer it tomorrow,
in view of the rather sparse attend;l~nce
of Senators at the present time.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is perfa;cti;y
agreeable to the leadership. I wish tt~
.IA-RDP65B00383R000100210001-9
 Approved For~g4~1"R~~~1~65~00010021'0001-9
s:,
tOY' from In performing this function, the Senate
inform the distinguished Sena
Georgia .,that a gUOrum' Call Was lnsth- has several options. Normally, the procedure
toted fpr,th~ purpose of calling Senators for unconditional approval of a treaty is by
adoption of a resolution of advice and con-
t0 1110 Qhalx~ber. Since they did, nOtap- gent to ratification which, in the case of the
pear in large numbers, the leadership .Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, wools read as
thought .it well to proceed. I am _de- iouows:
lighted that the ~Sgnator from Gegrg'ia "ae tt resgZved (two-thirds of the sen-
is present, His ObSP.SPatiOn kS (~ good one, ators present concurring there2n), That the
and hiS S~gestion will lie followed. Senate advise and consent to the ratification
On behalf. of the distinguished minor- of the treaty banning nuclear weapon testa
sty leader. and .myself, notice is given in the atmosphere; is outer space, and un-
.that tomorrow this proposal will be derwater, which was signed at Moscow on
August s, lass, on behalr of the United
`b
o
g
f
h
t b
S
r
e
u
r
e
ore t
enat
e
fo
its. con-
h
sideration.
Mr. RUSSELL. I assure the Senator
from Montana that_I shall not interpose
objection tomorrow. However, it seemed.
that a proposal of this kind might well
be placed before the Senate, by means
of actual as well as constructive notice.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I agree with the
Senator from Georgia. , That will be- to an "interpretation and understanding."
~~Mr. FUL1iRIGHT. Would it be pos-
sible to place in the RECORD, iP it has not
States of America, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The Senate may, however, reject a treaty
!a toto, or stipulate conditions in the form
of amendments, reservations, underatand-
ings, declarations, statements, interpreta-
tions, or statements in committee reports.
For example, the Statute of the International
In that case, so, that no uncertainty would
exist as to whether the United States might
be obligated by some suture amendment that
the Senate saw fit to reject, the resolution
of ratification was approved "subject to the
i
t
ti
t
n
erpre
a
on and understanding, which is
amendments, reservations, and under- `
hereby made a part and condition of the res-
i
a
nd
ngs?
st
Mr. RUSSELL. l: heartily subscribe to
that suggestion of, the chairman of _ the
Committee on Foreign Relations.. Lllave
been a Member of the Senate far some
.time, but I am not completely clear as
to the differences between such propo-
sals.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. These are prose-
. dures which perhaps are not completely
clear in the memorandum, but it is the
best we could do,
IVIr. DIISEN, IVIr. President, i. sup-
. Best that the memorandum be amplified
a little, because i!kle treaty is considered
in Committee of ..the Whole. It .is the
only time under -the, Senate rules that
t$at 1s done.. Perhaps the rule itself
ought to be quoted, and then it should be
stated that .when the proposed unani-
mous consent request has been adopted,
amendments will thereafter. be pre-
Chided, and the treaty will then be sub-
ject to a reservation to the resolution of
ratification.
Mr. F"U'LBRIGET. That iscorrect.
Mr. RUSSELL. That is an excellent
suggestion. Senators will then knew. the
path they are treading.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is nay under-
standing that the 4ommitte~ on, For-
e sign Relations iss>~,ed such a memo-
. random. ' Unfortunately, I did riot re-
Ceive acopy.: Perhaps it was lost,in the
mail, because I feel certain one was sent
to me. I wondered whether the., dis-
tinguished, chafrlnan of the committee.
would net place it in the RECORD,
Mr. FLT~,I3RIGHT, I shall be glad to
do SQ.
(Subsequently Mr. FuLSeICHT submit-
ted the .following memorandum, which,
"without objection, _was ordered to be
printed at this .point in the REcolln.)
COMMITTEE.. .Q,N FORE.~GN RELATIQN? STAFF
MEM031,AlYRIT~M DN T#~E ROLEOF THE SE~7ATE
III 2'~E ~kEATY-MAI~INC PnooEaa
Article II, section, 2, clause 2, of the U.S.
Constitutign states .,,that the .President
"ahaA haVO power,.. by and with the advice
and conse3lt of the Senate, to make treaties,
provided two-thirds, o; the Senators present
olution of ratification, that (1) any amend-
ment to the statute shall be submitted' to
the Senate for 1ta advice and consent, as in
the case of the statute iself, and (2) the
United States will-not remain a member of
the Agency in the event of an amendment to
the statute being adopted to which the Sen-
ate by a format vote shall refuse its advice
and consent."
This "interpretation and understanding"
in no way affected the international obliga-
tion of the United States. It was, however,
made a part of the. operating instrument of
ratification and Presidential proclamation
and circulated to the other parties to the
treaty with the following statement: "The
Government of the United States of America
considers that the above statement and un-
derstanding pertains solely to U.S. constitu-
tional procedures and is of purely domestic
character."
The Senate also approved the NATO
Status-of-Forces Agreement subject to an
"understanding." Article III of that agree-
ment provided that under certain conditions
members of a military force were to be ex-
empt from passport and visa regulations,
from immigration inspection, and from reg-
ulations on the registration and control of
aliens. The effect of article ZII on U.S. im-
migration laws was not entirely clear, and in
order to remove all doubt about the matter
and to make sure that the United States
could take appropriate measures to protect
its security, the following language was made
part of the resolution of ratification:
"It is the understanding of the Senate,
which understanding inheres in its advice
and consent to the ratification of the agree-
ment, that nothing in the agreement dimin-
ishes, abridges, or alters the right of the
United States of America to safeguard its
own security by excluding or removing per-
sons whose presence in the United States is
.deemed prejudicial to its safety or security
and that no person whose presence in the
United States is deemed prejudicial to its
safety or security shall be permitted to enter
or remain in the United States."
This "understanding" was also included in
the instrument of ratification and the Pres-
idential.. proclamation which was circulated
to theotherparties tg thQ,agreement. Here
again, however, it had no effect on the inter-
national obligation of the United States,
Another, and perhaps better known case
involves the _so-called_Connally reservation
to the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the
Statute oP the Iltternaiii?nal .Court of Jos-
,:tics. In that instance the Senate gave its
advice and consent to the deposit by the
President of a declaration under para-
graph 2 of article 36 of the statute-the so-
called optional clause. By accepting the
optional clause, the United States agreed
that in certain types of legal disputes it
would recognize the compulsory ]urisdiction
of the International Court of Justice. How-
ever, in accepting that jurisdiction, the Sen-
ate stated that it did not apply to matters
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
ai the United' States as determined by the
United States. For technical reasons the
Connally reservation is not viewed by all in-
ternational lawyers as a true reservation; in
fact, it was communicated to other parties
and the obligation of other parties with re-
spect to the United States is no greater than
that assumed by the United States.
Aa a practical matter, li the Senate at-
taches a reservation to its resolution of ad-
vice and consent, the inference is that the
contractual relationship 1a being changed.
However, ii the Senate uses language of
understanding, the implication (but not
necessarily the fact) is that the contractual
arrangement is not being changed.
Irrespective of what term is used to de-
scribe acondition imposed on a treaty, how-
ever, the view of the U.S. Government is
that the content or effect of the statement is
of prime importance. Ii, despite the desig-
nation, the executive branch believes that
the condition has the actual character and
effect of a reservation, it would be so treated
and thus would open the treaty to further
negotiations. In this connection, the fol-
lowing extracts from a Department of State
memorandum on the subject of "Depositary
Practice 1n Relation to Reservations" which
was submitted to the United Nations last
year are relevant:
"It is understood by the U.S. Govern-
ment that ? the term `reservation' means, ac-
cording to general international usage, a
formal declaration by a state, when sign-
ing, ratifying, or adhering to a treaty, which
modifies or limits the substantive effect of
one or more ai the treaty provisions as be-
tween the reserving state and each of the
other states parties to the treaty. A true
reservation is a statement asserting specific
conditions of a character which (ii the re-
serving state becomes a party to the treaty)
effectively qualify or modify the application
of the treaty in the relations between the
reserving state and other states parties to
~he treaty. If the statement dose .not ef-
ectually change in some way, either by ex-
panding or diminishing the treaty provisions,
the application of the treaty be-tween the
reserving state and other states parties.
thereto, then it is questionable whether
it is a true reservation even though it may
be designated a 'reservation.' The terms `un-
derstanding,' `declaration,' ar `statement'
may be used to designate a statement which
may or may not be a true reservation. More
properly, 'understanding' is used to desig-
nate a statement when it is not intended
to modify or limit any of the provisions of
the treaty in its international operation, but
is intended merely to clarify or explain or
to deal with some matter incidental to the
operation of the treaty in a manner other
than a substantive reservation. Sometimes
an understanding is no more thane state-
ment of policies or principles ar perhaps an
indication of internal procedures far carry-
ins out provisions of the treaty. The terms
`declaration' and 'statement' when used as
the descriptive terms are used most often
when it is considered essential or desirable
to give notice of certain matters of policy
or principle, but without any intention of
derogating in any way from the substantive
rights or obligations as stipulated in the
treaty. As a general rule, it hs considered
necessary in the case aP any instrument of
ratification, adherence, or acceptance em-
bodying any of the above-mentioned ,types
.Approved For Release 2004/031,1_ CIA-RDP65BOQ.383R00010021000`1'-9
already been done, a short memorandum
explaining the differences between
 i
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Approved For CONGP?ESSIONAL~ ~ECORD65B~~~001D0210001-9A,~ep~temb~er
of etatement, that the other state or states
conaerned be notiflefl 'thereof and be given
an ,opportunity to comment. If -the state-
sngzrt is designated a `reservation' but is not
s t,rti`e reservation, the notification to the
oilier;, state or states may be accompanied
by' ail explanatory statement designed to
eiYlphSsize the fact that no actual modifica-
tion or limitation of the treaty provisions i$
intended.
w a ^ r r
"The U.S. Government as depositary floes
not, as a rule, consider it appropriate for
reservations to be set forth merely in a 7et-
ter ar note'accampanying an instrument of
ratification, accepptance, adherence, or aC=
cession. If the instrument is to be quail-
fled by a reservation,- it is connsidered that
the reservation should be embodied in the
_ instrument itself. A declaration, under-
standing, ar other statement net consti-
toting an actual reservation may, of course,
b8 set forth In an accompanying letter or
note, the text thereof then 'being notified
to interested states at the same time they
arm notified regarding the deposit of the
formal instrument."
One of the most authoritative statements
63i reservations appears in Lharles Cheney
Mates (vol. II, p. 1435) : "A reservation to a
treaty is a formal statement made by a pros-
pective party for -the purpose of creating
a different relationship between that party
sad the other parties or prospective parties
than would restiIt should the reserving state
accept the arrangement without having made
stiCh a statement. A mere interpretative
declaration made by a prospective party with-
out such a design, and with a niew merely to
at'xentuate a common under"standing, is not
regarded as a reservation, unless another
party or prospective party deems it to be
productive of a different relationship between
file state issuing the declaration and the
other parties or prospective- parties 'than
would result were the declaration not made.
In a word, whether an interpretative state-
raent !s to be regarded as a reservation and
dealt with as such depenfls 3n practice upon
the place which the states to which it is ad-
dressed are disposed to assigx~to it."
AMENDMENTS
"' A distinction should be made between an
amendment and a reservation. The df3`-
terence between the two Ls that' an amend-
ment, if it is accepted by the President and
the other party or parties to the treaty,
changes it for all parties, whereas a reserva-
tion limits only the obligation of the United
States under the treaty, although a reserva-
tion may, in fact, be of such significance as
to lead other parties to file similar reserda-
Lions, to seek renegotiation of the treaty, or,
indeed, to refuse to proceed with ratifica-
tion. `
To put it another way, theidistinetiions be-
tween the two "are not in the essential ob-
jects sought, but in the form taken by file
qualified assent and in the notice or action
called for from the other party to the agree-
ment. As the contrast is ozdinarily drawn,
an amendment to a treaty is a textual changge
in the instrument itself by way of an adcll-
tion, alteration, ar excision;'it makes a. part
of the identical contract to"which the two
goverxunents are to give their assent fir the
exchange of ratifications. A reservation, on c~.e may be, which !must be proposed on a
the other hand, is an interpretation or con.- sulasequent day, unless by unanimous con-
struction placed upon same portion of the sent the Senate determines otherwise. After
instrument by the Senate, to indicate the the resolution of 'ratification is offered,
understanding with which the 'United States awrcendments to the text of the fxeaty at the
'enters into the agreement fls to the oblige- resolution of ratification are not in order.
tfons which this country is to assume." On the final question to advise and consent
(Haynes, "The Senate of the United States," to the ratification it the Yorm agrE;ed to, the
4a1. II, pp.817-1S.j oonaurrence of two'-thirds of the Senators
svMaseRY ' present and voting lghall be necessary to de-
an summary, therefore, and Yn order of i:ermine it in the affirmative; but all other
.importance so far as the effect on other motions and questions upon a treaty shall be
parties is concerned, the Senate might take cie'~ided by a majority vote, except a motion
to postpone indefinitely, which shall be dE;-
oided by a vote of two-thirds.
Mr. FULBRIGH'P. 1VIr. President, the
followillg statement has been prepared
by the Farliainentariitin for guidance of
the Senate during consideration of the
Nuclear Test Ball Treaty:
NUCLEAR TE;aT IiAN TREATY
(Procedure tinder the rule)
fine treaty is in the Committee of the
Whole and shall be proceeded with by a.rti-
tiles. This provision, however, may be
waived by unanimous consent, and thus per-
mit an amendment to be offered to any part
cf the treaty.
A majority vote is.
ai an amendment.
A motion to table
bs in order.
Where there is no further debate or action
to be tEEken in the Committee of the Whole,
the proceedings are reported by ^the :Pre-
siding Officer to the Senate. if any amend-
ment has been made, the Senate voteEO on
concurrence therein.. Further amendments
are then in order.
Reservations are not in order a~hlle the
treaty 1s being considered in the Committee
of the Whole or in tyre Senai;e. They should
be offered to the resolution of ratifcattion.
Wherr there is no further debate or
amendment to be proposed, the next step
would be the proposal of the resollutian of
ratification. It cannot, however, be proposed
on that day except by unanimous consent.
If any amendment has been made to the text
of the treaty, it must be incorporated in. the
resolution of ratification.
After the resolution of ratifcation has
been proposed, no amendment- 1s in order
except by unanimous consent. Reserva-
tions, however, are in order at that stage, and
not before.
Tha vote on the question of agreeing to
the resolution of ratification or on a motion
to postpone indeflnit;ely requires atwo-thirds
vote for adoption. All otlEer motions and
questions upon a treaty shall be decided by
a majority vote.
DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC EN-
ERGY IN PACIFIC NORTII'WE~iT
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as in
legislative session, I ask that file Chair
lay before the Senate a message i'rom
the House of R.epresentatsives an. S. ].007.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (NTr.
WALTRRS in. the chair) 'laid before the
Senate the amendments of the ]Floosie of
:Representatives to the bill (S. 100T) to
guarantee electric conswners in the Pa-
cific Northwest first call on electric en-
ergy generated at Federal hydroelectric
plants in filet region arnd to guarantee
electric consumers in other re@;ions
reciprocal priority, and for ot]aer pur-
poses, which were, on pa],e 4, lines 9 and
10, strike out "seven days" axed insert
"sixty days,"; on page 4, line ].7, strike
out "seven days" and insert "sixi;y days";
on page 6, line 2, strike out "forty-eight
months" and insert "sixty months,' ; on
Page 7, line 25, strike out "section 8"' and
insert "section 9"; on -page 8, liar. 10,
strike out "section 8" and insert "sec-
tion 9"; on page $, after line 19, insert:
SEC. 8. No electric transmission fines or
facilities shall be constructed outsid.E; the
Pacific Northwest by any Federal agency for
the purpose of transmitting electric energy
for sale or exchange pursuant tc~ thLs Act
except those lines and facilities hereafter
specifically authorirzd by the Coni;ress.
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i
1
the aollowing steps to!make its views known
or tE> qualify its cons~nt to ratifCation Of a
treaty:
1. The (Senate may advise and Consent to
ratiiieation, but make Sts views known in the
committee report. This would have no more
lel;al effect on the treaty than other nego-
ti2?ting background oi? than legislative his-
tory has on public laves.
rZ. The Senate may~lnclude in its resolu-
tic>n language expressing its understanding or
interpretation. 50 long as this language
does not substantively affect the -terms or
Snternatfonai obllgatibns of the treaty, or
re:lares solely to domestic matters, there
would be no legal effedt on the treat}~. Under'
existing practice, however, the hacecutive
would communicate sloth understandings or
interpretations to this other parties for such
reaction as they may'ta.ke. `?
3. The Senate may';inciude in its reso]u-
tion language expressing its reservation.
Normally reservation language would in-
volve some change in'the lnternatianal obis-.
ga?tfons of the treat and might ;affect Sts
terms in such a signs cant manner as to re-
quire the Executive to communicate the
terms oP the reservation to other parties to
the treaty, thus enabling them to take such
action as they felt 'appropriate, including
.reservations of their ',own ar even refusal to
proceed with the treatly.
4. Finally, the Senate may amend the terms
of the treaty itself. lIn this instarnce, there
would be no questiain but that the treaty
wotAd need to be reregotiated.
Comznittte 1>r?ocedure
The Committee on Foreign Relations trans-
ac;ts business by a rajority vote of .a legal
quorum (currently nine membersj. Once a
.legal quorum is established, it is presumed
to be present, and thereafter oral or written
p,ro:xies are valid for the purposes of voting.
This procedure applies with respect to any
treaty reservations qr amendments consid-
ered by the committee. However, on the
-final question ae to jv~hether the .committee
shall agree to report.., favorably a particular
resolution of ratification, an actua't physical
quorum of nine merribers must be present.
Senate procedure
~1ie act of ratification for the United States
is a Presidential act, put it may not be forth-
c~>ming unless the Setrate has- consented to it
by the required two?thirds of the Senators
present (which sig~lrifies two-thirds of a
quorum), otherwise' the consent rendered
aauld not be that ofthe Renate as organized
under fire Constitut~gn to do business (art.
I, sec. 5, clause i) .
Insofar as Senate procedure is concerned,
rule XX3C,VII states.,-that when a treaty is
r+eported from the lrommlttee on Foreign
F;elations it shall, uhlese the Senate unani-
nsausly otherwise df~~'eects, lie 1 day for con-
sideration. Amendrr4~nts or reservations are
subject to approval''bby a majority vote.
An amendment QT reservation may be
modified before any; action is talt:en oa it.
They are net, hawev~er, subject to modiflca.-
tion after adoption ; by Lhe Senate. More-
over, an amendment. or reservation which is
substantially the settle es one previously of-
fered and rejected is'not in order.
The decisions madb must be reduced to the
form od a resolution of ratification, with or
 '9R~ --'` LL,, Approved For 6~1R~~,~AAf~~/,-1~ ~:,~(~~65~QQ,~$,~,,R000100~'FU06'~=J
once. Thy President Can make ozza,- lVZr. PASTORE. When I am through, from Rhode Island are of such quality
irefzdatioris? .but_in order to ;xt,tain . I w :yield. I thought I was going along and importance that they should stand
the facil,;ties on Jol~2lston Islaan,,d~ Con- .pretty well. on their own. For the moment I shall
gross mu ~ appropriate the mone~r,._and. if _ Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator was not yield for further inquiry.
we do no~ Flo it, it is our fault. ~~ the ,going along very well. Mr. CARLSON. Will the Sentor yield
laboratories are,xo~be nnamt~ized~ Con- Mr. PASTORE, If_ we test under- on the particular point under discussion?
gress must provdo thg, motley, If, we ground, we cannot go very far before Mr. HUMPHREY. On the point of
are to co~l~uct ztis~erground tests, Con- the debris begins to get out of our ter- testing and its alleged contribution to
gress must appropriate the money. If rita:~al boundaries, and that is not per- the spread of the arms race?
We do not;do it, it will be our fault.. mitted under the treaty
Once that ha
M
CARL
.
p-
r.
SON. Yes.
Talk to the.effeCt that "we want these ,.,pens, we are becoming too big from the Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Sen-
safeguard~s" dresses the treaty. It znay .standpoint of .she bomb. The treaty ator on that point.
be the ribbon on all,C package, but it has .prohibits such a procedure. We are lim- Mr. CARLSON. I appreciate very
nothing to do with the substance, of the ited. much the courtesy of the Senator from
package. 'VVhether,or not safeguards are If any Senator for any reason thinks Minnesota. I refer to the point which
prOVided is the responsibility of the_Con- ,Eisenhower sold out to Khrushchev was opened up when the Senator from `
. gress; and if the Senator froze Iowa will when, in 1959, he made the same pro- Iowa referred to the reduction of arms-
. stand with the Senator from, Rhode Is- posal that is now before us, or if any meets under the treaty, and when the
land and the Senator from Minnesota in Senator believes that John Kennedy -is distinguished Senator from Rhode Island
seeing to it that, we do the necessary.. selling out to the enemy because he is made the statement that there was hope
things, the Senator will have the assur- in favor of the treat, that Senator in the treaty. It is important that the
arises he, wants. There are Ce>t?tain should in full conscience and on his re- ~Rz:coRn in the Senate, from a historical
things that can be done in the atmos- sponsibility vote for the rejection of the. standpoint, be complete, and therefore I
phere that cannot be done underground.. treaty. refer Senators to the statement of Sec-
What sari. be done lnderground is lim- Iiowever, let me say to Senators who retary Rusk at page 29 of the hearings.
iced. would reject the treaty that under our Mr. HUMPHREY, Will the Senator
^rMr. MILLER. Mx. President, will the .Constitutional process atwo-thirds af- read it?
Senator yield? firmative vote is required. Mr. CARLSON. The Senator from-
Mr. PA~ORE, I yield. This treaty was initiated by two ad- Alabama CMr. SPARKMhNI was asking
Mr. M ER. 'lj'hat is exactly ~ the ministrations, a Republican administra- questions of the Secretary of State, as
point of what the.~enator.from Minne- . tion and a Democratic administration. follows:
sofa IMr. HUMPHRI;XI said about how. This is a treaty that vrwe have been trying Senator SPezixivieia. And is there any pro-
the Joint Chiefs of Stan? or the military }~ get for years.. It all began on April vision in this treaty for the reduction of
officials argued about the. limitations of 13, 1959, when 'President Eisenhower arms or armaments in any way?
the treaty. ~ made his suggestion, I am saying to Secretary Rusx. This treaty itself does not
It is not so much & quest~iori of Cutting .those who are inclined to have doubts reduce weapons in being or prevent their
down on the number of tests, It is a about the treaty that they have a double further production.
Casa of quality... Those, who are.. Con- responsibility, because eve vote that This treaty is aimed only at the question
cerzied about eliminating testing, in. the ~ of nuclear explosions. I regret mysei; that
- they cast counts for two votes. We need it has not been possible to make greater
atmosphere are concerned about the fact ..two votes in the affirmative to block one headway in some actual physical disarma-
that we cannot, have the same, .quality of vote in the negative. went measures consistant with our own se-
testing underground as in the atmos- I do not like to imagine where we curity.
phere. would begin all over again, if this treaty But this treaty is not a step in that direc-
Mr. PASTQ:RE. ,That is true.. Not one is rejected. We have been trying to get tion-this treaty is not itself dealing with
offlciai ixl the Mil..itary Establishment it since 1959. Every time Khrushchev that problem. It may turn out to be one
who appeared before.. our committee- .said, "No." All we said was, "Will small step that opens up some possibilities in
you this field but that has not yet become ap-
al~d if I .asked the question of ,one .wit- talk again? Can we resume the talks?" parent.
Hess, I asked it of at least six-would ....Khrushchev did not ask that the talks Senator Srnaxacnx.,. It is a treaty of hope so
say that the balaaice of power.is not in be resumed. We asked that the talks iar as that is concerned.
our favor...but in favor of the Russians, ba resumed. This is our treaty. This Secretary Rvsx. so iar as actual disarma-
They ail agreed that..the balance. of :pow- is America's treaty. This is not Rus- meet is concerned, it is a treaty of hope. It
er`was in our favor. -sia's treaty. If the Russians think it is is a treaty of fact insofar as explosions in
If that is the case, if the balance Of of advantage to them, let them think so. 'those three environments are concerned.
power is in our favor, and if we can bring What their motiaes are is of no concern I thought the reference to hope should
to an end. this madness.. what is wrong to the Senator from Rhode Island, All be in the RECORD, from the standpoint of
with that? America does .not want to I knave is that this treaty is g for me. history. It was a hope.
make a hundred .megaton bomb. I do This treaty is good for my (amity, This Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Sen-
not know_rvklai; we~ Would want. to_blow treaty is good for my country. This ator from Kansas for his contribution to
up with a, lOQ taegaton bomb... I azzi told? treaty is good for the peace of the world, the colloquy. `It is pertinent to the dis-
that one 20.megaton bomb is the equiva- This is the reason why one should be in cussion. The point needs to be empha-
lent of the,amount, Qf TNT that Can- be favor of it. If anyone does not believe sized again and again that the responsi-
piXt in a freight train str@tclling from it, ho should vote against it. ble officers of the Government have not
the east coast to the .west coast, Qne However, let no one forget that the attempted to oversell the treaty. The
20-megaton. bomb.. rCpresents six times .President of the United State is exhort- President, in his message to the Senate,
the. explosive force Qf all of .the.. explo- ing the Senate. He needs atwo-thirds had this to say:
sivcs used ix1 World War Il:.. ,._ _, vote in the Senate. That is eat easy to This treaty advances, though, it does not
People talk about,a,_100 megaton bomb.. obtain always. There is talk about ma- assure, world peace; and it will inhibit,
What dp theY want to, blow up? Do they jority rule. We had best realize that though it does not prohibit, the nuclear arms
want to . blow... up the entire world? every vote that is cast against it is the race.
America. dyes not Want that.. kind. of vote of two Senators under our demo- Then he went on to say:
bomb. cratic process in the Senate. This treat will curb the
y pollution of our
Mr McNamara, when he appeared be- I say to those who have doubts about atmosphere. While it does not assure the
foe: the e,CZj,ttee, said. that we, have the treaty that I want them to open their world that it will be forever free from the
n "~el1Te tit. l~ak~ a.,~90-megaton bomb. hearts and look into their COI1SCienCes. fears and dangers of radioactive fallout from
It is trlfe ?t~a~., in .the. atmosphere it I want them to realize what they might atmospheric tests, it will greatly reduce the
would be possible to achieve it. How- be doing, If by their vote they destroy numbers and dangers of such tests.
~ ever, we can make ae SQ-megaton bomb and kill the treaty, in all sincerity-in I believe it is fair to say that, from
now, with th ;knowledge that We possess. .all reverence, I say God help us; God the President on down through all the
Mr. HUMPIREY. Without testing. help us. echelons of Government, those who have
Mr. MILKER, Mr..~resdent, will the Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe that the been advocating the treaty have at-
Sena~orvield? ,.o,,,.,s~ ,.~ +w.. a._+,_~_,_,___.
;Approved Foy Release:20fl4/03/11 :CIA-RQP65B00383R000100210001=9
 Approved For~~~l~~~~p~a4~~/I11~-~P6~8~000100210001~pte~i2ber' j0
15.750 1V
limits; as well as stating its assets. A his experience, and h~s knowledge-for I have .repeatedly made clear, as have
factual, fair, and open presentation has this country. Senators have both the all other Senators, that this is not apar-
been made. privilege and the responsibility to ex- tisan debate. Mr. President, the Senate
No one can say what the future will amine carefully into every aspect of all does not advise and consent to treaties,
offer. No one can say whether the treaty proposed legislation and all proposals of under the constitutional provision, on a
will work. The future is in the hands the Ixecutive, including every treaty that partisan basis. The Senate does so on
of men who make decisions daily and is sent to us. Therefore, rather than be the basis of the responsible position uvhi,prii 20, 19[)Q: F'OllOwing KHRUSHCHEV and put into effect agreements looking to-
1s the teat of President Elsenhower's April DENVER, May 1$.-The text of President ward the permanent discontinuance ?of all
13 letter ty ~rezni@; N.ikita S? 7~hrilsYa.CheY on Eiserihower's letter to' Premier Nikita S. nuclear weapons tests in phases, expanding
a suspension of test, of nuclear weapons: Bhrushchev, dated from Washington May b, the agreement as rapidly as corresponding
"AFAR 1178. C,tlt~aN; ..Today the Geneva follows: measures of control can be incorporated in
negotiations for the?, discontinuance of nu- "DEeR MR. CanIRalAiv: I have your reply to the treaty.
clear weapons tests are resuming. During the my communi
ti
"
ca
on of April 13 in which I
I would again propose that toward this
recess I hav,~ considered .where. we stood in suggested ways in which we might move end we take now the first and readily attain-
these negotiations and .what the .prospects more rapidly toward the achievement for able step of an agreed suspension of nuclear
.are for the successful conclgsion which I the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests weapons tests in the atmosphere here up to
earnestly desire. I have. also talked with under adequately safeguarded conditions. I the greatest height to which effective con-
Prime Mixiis~er Macmillan, who. .reported to do not disagree with your statement of the trols can under present circumstances be ex_
me of his hank discussions on thLs matter need to conclude a treaty which would pro- tended. In my communication of April 13
With you. vide for the cessation of ail types of nuclear I suggested that the first phase of such an
'The United States strongly seeks & lasting weapons teats in the air, on the ground, agreeemnt should extend to the altitude for
agreement for the discontinuance of Nuclear underwater, and at high altitudes. This is which controls were agreed upon by the Ge-
weapona tests. We believe that this. would the objective I proposed last August, which neva Conferences. We would welcome dis-
be an important .step toward reduction of my representatives at Geneva have sought cussions of the feasibility of the present time
internaticnai tensions and would open the since the beginning of negotiations there of extending the first phase atmospheric
way to further agreement on substantial and which in my most recent letter Ire- agreement to higher- altitudes and our repre-
measures of disarmament.. affirmed as the goal of the United States. sentatives in the present negotiations at Ge-
Such an q agreement .must, however, be I sincerely hope that your affirmation of this neva are prepared to discuss the technical
subject to fully effective safeguards to insure objective will prove to me that you would means for controlling such an agreement.
- the security interests of all parties, and we now be willing to accept the essential ele- "It is precisely because of my deep desire
believe that present proposals of the Soviet ments of control which would make this for a complete discontinuance of nuclear
Union fall, sbgrt .4~ providing assurance of possible. weapons tests that I urge again that you ei-
the type of effective, control. in which all "You refer to the possibility mentioned ther accept the measure of control that will
parties. can have .confidence; therefore, no by Prime Mtnister Macmillan for carrying make such an agreement possible now or, as
basis fpr agreement is now in sight, out each year a certain number of previ- a minimum, that you join now in the first
"Tn my view, these negotiations must not ousiy determined inspections. I have also step toward this end which is within our
be permitted completely to sail. If indeed been informed that your representative at reach. Such a step would assure that no
the Soviet TJirion insists on the veto on the the Geneva Conference has formally pro- time will be lost in setting up the elements
factflnding activities of the control system, posed that agreement be reached on the of the system already substantially agreed
with regard. to possible underground detona- carrying out annually of a predetermined and in stopping all tests that can be brought
dons, i believe that there is. a way in which number of inspections both on the territory under control. While this is being done our
We can hold fast to tl}e progress already made of the Soviet Union and on the territories negotiators would continue to explore the
!n these negotiations and no longer delay in of the United States, the United Kingdom, Problems involved in extending the agree-
putting into effect the initial agreements and their possessions. In keeping with our went to other weapons testa as quickly as
which are within Qur_grasp. Could we not, desire to consider all possible approaches adequate controls can be devised and agreed
NTr.,Chairlrlat}, put the agreement into effect which could lead to agreement for discontin- upon.
in phases 'beginning with a prohibition of uance of nuclear weapons testa with effec- "Sincerely,
nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere? tive control, the United States is prepared to "DWIGHT D, EI5ENHOWER."
A .simplified, control system for atmospheric explore this proposal through our repre-
tests up to 50 kilometers could be readily de- sentatives in the negotiations at Geneva. ~r? CARISON. Mr. President, will
rived from , tine Geneva experts' report, and "In particular, it will be necessary to ex- the Senator yield at that point?
vtould not require the_ automatic onsite in- plore the views of the Soviet Government on Mr. HUMPHREY. I am happy to
spection which created the major stumbling- the voting arrangements under which this yield to the Senator from Kansas.
black in the negotiations SO Par. and other essential elements of control will Mr. CARLSON. Those of us who)lave
`'NTp representative is putting forward this be carried out, the criteria which will afford followed this subject for years well Te-
suggestion in Geneva, today. I urge your the basis for inspection and the arrange- member the efforts of President Eisen-
serous consideration Qf this possible course ments which you would be prepared to ac- hOwer iri trying to Obtain some Sort Of
of action,, ; If you are prepared to change cept to assure timely access to the site of
yoixr present position on the veto, on pro- unidentified events that could be suspected treaty iri regard t0 testing. At present
cedures for.. onsite ?inspection and on early. of being nuclear explosions. It will be man3' people are writing to me and ask-
discussion oz Concrete.measurea for high-al- necessary to know, also, the scientific basis ing questions. One of the questions fre-
titude detection, we Can.. of course proceed upon which such number of inspections quentiy asked is a,5 follows: "How does it
promptly in :the hope of concluding the ne- would be determined and how it would be happen that Mr. Khrushchev would not
gotiation of,.a comprehensive agreement for related to the detection capabilities of the agree to a treaty in 1958 and 1959, and
suspension of nuclear,.gveapons tests. If you control system.
are not yet ready to go this far, then Ipro- "I have noted your understanding that now he seems t0 be enthusiastic about
pose that we take. the first and readily at- these inspections would not be numerous: a treaty . "
tamable step of an agreed suspension of nu- The United States has not envisaged an un- It would be helpful if the Senator
clear. weapon tests in the. atmosphere up to limited number of inspections but adheres Could give me some erilightment on that
b0 kilometers while the political and 'tech- to the concept that the number should be Point, so that at least I can answer my
nical problems associated with control of un- in appropriate relations to scietttiflc facts mail.
derground and outer space tests are being and detection capabilities. Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Sena-
resnlved, If_ we could :agree to such initial "As I stated in my last communication, if for from Kansas. He has placed far too
implementation of the first-and I might you are prepared to change your present much Confidence in me, although his
add the most .,important-phase of a test Position on the veto on procedures for on- flattery makes me feel very Well. I shall
suspension agreement, our negotiators. could site inspection, and on early discussions of
continue to ,explore with new hope the po- concrete measures for high-altitude inspec- discuss what I believe are some Of the
_Iitical and technical .problems involved in tion, we can proceed promptly in the hope motivations, as I see them, of the Soviet
extending the agreement as quickly as pos- of concluding the negotiation of a compre- Union for being willing t0 sign the treaty.
sable to cover all nuclear. weapons testing, hensive agreement for suspension of nuclear I note again the testimony of Dr. York,
Meanwhile, fear of .unrestricted resumption weapons tests. I hope that your position on who, by the Way, is considered one of the
of nuclear weapons testing with attendant these basic issues will change sufficiently to Outstanding Scientists. AR during the
additions to evels of radioactivity, would be make this possible.
allayed, and we wogldY be gaining practical "There are re orts that 1940's and during the administration of
p your represents- president Eisenhower he made and con-
experience anii confidence in the operation tive in Geneva has given some reason for
of an interX}at;onal coptrQi .system. thinking the Soviet Government may be pre- tlriues to make a great COritribution t0
"I trust that one 01 these. paths to agree- pared to modify its approach regarding these his Country.
went X~'l?.} gQ~l~e,11d=jt~lf tQ .you and perlnit questions. If this should prove not to be the The thrust of Dr. York's testimony was
the resuming negotiations to make a ? far- case, however, I could not accept a situation to the effect that while we may be able
reaching response to. tYie hopes of mankind. in which we would do nothing, ? to build bi
"Sincerely, "In that event i would 1 h ?gger bombs and more Weapons,
w a t
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o urge your and to increase our military strength, we
"Dwrcli~' D. EISExHOwER,'.' renewed consideration. of my alternative pro- do nOt,rieCeSSarlly illCreaSe QUr S@CUrity.
 157'52
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For example, during the late 1940's, when
we had a monopoly on atomic weapons,
and during the 19511's, when we were far
out. in atomic weapons, we saw the gap of
our security being closed even as we
stepped up our pace to improve our
atomic weaponry. In other words, even
as we stepped up our efforts, the Russians
were stepping up their efforts. While we
were building bigger bombs, going away
fxom the kiloton range in fissionable ma-
terial to the megaton range in fusion
bombs, and acquiring hundreds and
thousands of such weapons, supposedly
giving us unbelievable power-and they
do give us unbelievable power-our se-
curity has ,not increased in direct pro-
~hetyield oftthe bombs.of We were much
stronger in the 1950's vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union than we are today even though
we .have a great arsenal of weapons.
I believe the Soviets may very well
have come to the conclusion that they
have enough- weapons adequately to de-
fend themselves, just as I hope we have adtvA~e~. ~ hearings, a dopy of wYzich is before e,acn
came to the conclusion that we, too, have M:r. SPARKMAN', Dr. Kistiakowsky
enough weapons adequately to defend testified that he Was present in 1959 Senator. I have studied this volume; of
ourselves. Possibly that within itself is when the treaty wag submitted, and that hearings. I can say, in all good con-
one of the reasons why the Soviets have there was practically no difference be- science, that this testimony should. set
given favorable consideration to the tween the effect of that proposal and the t ous a,eyn for feel. w'th rep's d to ~ the
treaty. But that is a subject I-shall dis- present proposal.
cuss in more detail later. Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is military security of this Nation, insofar
What I am most impressed about from correct. Again I believe these references as the impact of the treaty is concex?ned.
the testimony-and it is a large volume help to document the .record that those rmOreasonable basis forRCOncluding fihi+,t
oP testimony-is the fact that, with few officials who have had the responsibility
exceptions, the .witnesses who appeared for the security of !our country and the the Un ted Statesstorunac eptalale n1n lie
before tl>;e committee supported the direction of our foreign policy have fully tart' risks.
treaty. They supported the treaty re- supported the type' of proposal and the Mr. PRO~MIRE. Mr. President, will
gardless of their politics, their occupa- objectives of the proposal in the treaty the Senator Yield?
tion, or their profession. Some were in that is now before the Senate. Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to 'the t3en-
opposition. Those few in opposition were Mr. SPARKMAN? The testimony by ator from Wisconsin.
given a full hearing. -But those who were Dr. Kistiakowsky may be found begin- Mr. PROX11rIIRE. There is a theme
in opposition were, to my mind, fully n.ing on page 852 of the hearing.,, which has been consistently voiced by
xefuted by those who supported the Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank tlhe Sena- critics of the treaty. It was w~iced re-
traaty_ There was excellent testimony tor'from Alabama.
_,~ ,,,~.. ,~_,...sse?+ ,s~fl+. An of thla toads Gently by a Wisconsin newspaper,.which
be said that if one were in a court of up to is trie tact >}nati >;nose uiuaviuusuia Senator from Minnesota defendin@; the
law, he would judge Prom the evidence who either are nqw or have been pri- treaty. On the basis of that theme the
that was placed before the committee rnarily responsible`far the military secu- Wisconsin newspaper has taken a posi-
that the overwhelming burden and ritey of the United States have; testified tion against ratification of the treaty.
weight of the evidence was in support in support of ratification. Mr HiJNCPHREY I was not very per-
of the treaty and not opposed to ft. 'The doubts have been weighed and suasive, then, was I?
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. ,President, will ~~?ubts they have had have been recont Mr. PRO:XMIRE. This is, of course, an
the Senator yield. issue as to which there are many re:zsons
Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Sen- cil.ed in behalf of the treaty, because the for ,taking a position.
ator from Alabama. advantages of the'. ta~eaty to our country I know the Senator will deal wii~:h the
Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator has oLitweigh what they consider to be its theme in lus speech, or perhaps he has
made a very fine point relative to the aimitations. already dealt with it. He fs i+,n expert
preponderance of the evidence. In effect, The individuals to whom I have re- on the subject. The tY:eme to which I
he said that the overwhelming prepon- ferred include, argong others, the Secre- refer is the argument that the Russians
derance of the evidence 'was in support ta,ry of Defense, the Joint Chief's of Staff, .cannot be trusted.
of the treaty. That was true from the tYce present and former Director of De- Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.
scientific level, the military level, and the fence Research, the Chairman of the Mr. PROXMIRE. The editorial finally
.public level, was it not? Atomic Energy Coarnmission, the Director concluded that the United-States should
Mr. i-iUMPHREY. The Senator is ab- of the Central. Intelligence Agency, and not adopt or ratify the treaty because
solutely correct. the former science adviser to President the Russians could not be trusted,
Mr. SPARKMAN. We hear a great Eisenhower. in the article written by the Senator
deal of talk about our military being op- Let us be perfectly clear about their
from Minnesota, the Senator said that
posed to the treaty. Is it not true that testimony. this was irrelevLViP~iFtEX. That is a possibil- Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield, name is mentioned,
itY? There , vyas .testimony concerning. Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator is ab- Mr. PROXMIRE. What page is the
this by the ,scientists-not by the Sena- solutely correct in that regard. Risks
for from _lVhnnesQta, CMr, HulvrnHREYI, are involved, no matter what course we Senator reading from?
but by men wi}~ ,save: developed the follow. There are terrible risks of nu- Mr' HUMPHREY. Page 557 of the
weapons now ixl. , .aiir nuclear .arsenal, clear accident or catastrophe of some hearings. I continue to read
They are hg Ln9St able atomic scientists kind if there is not at least some begin- I quote: ?I would like to ask"-this is Dr.
in, the would, The testimony was to the Wing toward control. Teuer speaking:
effect that such clandestine tests, if un- What I should like to ask the Senator nesses Drs Brawn ~skw 11, who hasi thewre-
dertaken ~y the, Soviet Union= at great relates to trying to assess the risks in- sponsibility in this matter, as advisers of the
risk, I add,. of being caught-would allow volved under this particular treaty. I Government, what tests; what atmospheric
little or no military advantage to them. understand, for example, that there are tests, have we planned, why nave we
That is what they said-"little or no mill- three possible ways under this treaty in A em orhbalustichmissi eeaefense,t and for
tart' advantage to them." _.. which the Soviet Union, allegedly, could the insurance of our retaliatory capability?
I was going into a discussion of that test, in the atmosphere without being what would hagpen if. we did not carry out
point in my prepared. statement today. detected. These illegal tests might these tests4?~
I will say now. that we do not base the give the Soviet Union an opportunity to Dr. Baowx. Yes, sir. It is a series of ques-
treaty isnnottbased upon acharity, The edgenand advanceits milita i~capabfl- bons. i will try to answer them.
ny great lave ry I cannot describe in individual detail the
for or, respect for the. officials of the So- ity, as compared to ours. tests in open session, but I can tell you what
viet Union,,. The treaty is not based?upon First, they could test out subkiloton kinds they were. They were, the tests which
any regard for their,yeracity or for their explosions and antimissile systems to the were planned, are planned, if atmospheric
record of .,fulfillment of treaty obliga- extent of determining how a nuclear ex- bons are being madenincludehte is on the
bons, :plosion, even a subkiloton explosion, effects of surface shots. on hard sites.
The treaty is based upon what we con- might distort our capability to determine They aye large tests, hundreds of kilotons,
sides t0 be mutual .advantages to the the path of incoming missiles. It was as- and or course, would be easily detectable.
United States, to the Soviet Union, to the serted that we have not conducted those They include tests on the effects or nuclear
United Kingdom, and to other signatory tests to the extent that we would have explosions in the atmosphere on blackout,
nati0llS. ,_ , _. _.,- liked. and tests on the effects oP nuclear explosions
Any treaty which .does not offer ad- Mr. HUMPHREY. It depends on who on reentry vehicles.
,vantages is?seldom .kept. Seldom is it said we have not conducted these tests bysundergound hest b ti much or it cannot
worth the paper it is written on. Ana- to the extent that we a'ollld have liked. and the information can be gotten better
tion does not sign a txeaty merely for Where are some who say there is no from atmospheric tests. If the atmospheric
ari exercise.. in penmanship. A nation limit to the number. of tests we want to tests are not conducted, we are going to go
signs a treaty _beC$USe 1t seems to have Conduct. ahead and design our systems so that these
solYlething within its context which is to Mr. PROXMIRE. I am referring to Dr, uncertainties, which could be reduced with
its advantage, or meets some of the na- Edward Teller, who, I think, raised sev- atmospheric tests, are compensated for by
bon's needs, ._ eral profound and disturbing questions-- 'the design of the systems, and that is what
Furthermore, the detection, identifl- I am sure the Senator will _ we would have planned to do anyway,
cation, and monitoring in respect to the hearings. One of the questionsehe wised sli~hti way we win have to compensate for
treaty, relating to nuclear explosions, is relates to what tests we had planned that g y greater uncertainties. But there are
not to be ;.done by__ an international we now will cancel in view o4 the pro- some uncertainties tha~we can't compensate
agency. We will not rely upon the So- posed agreement. As I understand, the for no matter how man atmospheric nuclear
tests were done.
Viet Unio We will not give the Soviet tests which he said we had Tanned in- We don't know how big the soviet war-
Unipn a veto. We will rely upon .our eluded tests which would develop our heads win be in Ie'ro, we don't know how
owri. national..-.system of verification, skill in detecting incoming missiles and gOOd their accuracy will be in Is7o. we
identification, and monitoring, We have permit us to develop a better antimissile vehicl s viii bhe~ vulnerable their incoming
spent hundreds of millons of dollars to system.
develop such...u system, and`it is a good Mr. HUMPHREY. We shall have t0 We have to design our systems around
system. Every Senator knows it is a explore this area fri same detail, because' t gose uncertainties, and we will, we will de-
good system.. si n them, if necessary, around the remain-
Those of us i~vho have seen the reports oaEempted to make several sal points, h'g uncertainties in nuclear effects, we -nave
points, re- already been doing so.
from. the Atomic Energy Commission, Toting to the antimissile system. I be- The testimony continues. Dr. Brown-
frolli the Air Force, and from the Cen- lieve his testimony was fully answered, corroborates the testimony of Secretary
trap Intelligence Agency with regard to His testimony was more than fully an- McNamara that in the antiballistic mis-
5oviet tests.. get .those reports as the re- swered by Dr. Brown, Dr. Bradbury, Dr. sale field we have considerable informa-
sult of our ..monitoring, identification, York, and Dr. Kistiakowsky. There are tion, and denied that we had inferior
alYd verification .system. This is the those who finally disputed Dr. Teller's knowledge as compard to the Soviet
oY~l~y way we can know, how many tests knowledge of antiballistic missile devel- Union.
th'e Soviets have conducted We seem opment.
to be fairly sure as to how many weap- I do not claim to know anything about York~bothreminentkscient sts, stated t
one or devices they have exploded or set the scientific arguments, and I shall seems to be extremely difficult to build
ofY in the .atmosphere, under ground, not argue with Dr. Teller, but the argu- an antimissile system that can stop
tinder water, or in outer space. Why are ment that was advanced by eminent penetration of an enemy's ballistic mis-
we sure about these things? Because we scientists, men like Dr. Brown, who is a Bile system, and that it was felt we must
have developed a system which is a sea- man of great competence, answered the build an effective missile system.
sonably reliable, one. argument of those opposed to the treaty. I say to the Senator from Wisconsin
No one would. say it is absolutely per- Dr. Brown has ,access to the latest in- that the best answer is to read the testi-
feet.. Of course, that would be ridicu- telligence information. Regrettably, Dr. moot' and satisfy himself. He is not
lous. .There.. is , not a man in America Teller does not, because he is not in a going to be satisfied by the statements
who. can say that he can- walk out of a Position where the latest intelligence in- of the gentleman from Minnesota,
door .and be safe. But the odds are that formation is available,.
Ile Can. -..,., - I3UBERT HUMPHREY, nOr ShOUId he. I am
There is no guarantee that eve thin The Senator from Montana CMr. no expert in this field. The Senabar
1't' g MANSFIELD] pi;t this case right to Dr. should not take my word for it. But
will Vie. perfect, Those who want that Brown, He said:
kind of guarantee are ill the wrong en- I suggest to the Senator from Wiscon-
vironment; they should be in heaven, which youehave refenraAy~mad?.+a statement sin, who is a thorough student, a man
riot nn uo,~-1,
_ _.__, _ ,.., ,...,, ..v,.,~av uca~unony of lir, Teller aSld. Dr, .Foster
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CONGP:IiSSICONAL It~CORD -SENATE- September 10
on one side, and Dr. Bradbury, of Los
Alamos, Dr. York, former research de-
fense-adviser #or the Eisenhower admin-
istration, Dr. Kistiakowsky, and Dr.
Harold Brown. There are at least six
or 'seven scientists,. everyone of them
dompetent, everyone of whom has made
a great contribution to this country.
As a Senator who is not a nuclear
physicist or a scientist, I must look at
the testimony and ask, "Which of these
men seems to make the most plausible
argument?"
It seems to me that when one hears
ar reads the testimony he must be moved
very much and influenced by the wise
and responsible words of Dr. Kistiakow-
sky and Dr. York. These are not men
who slow work for the Government.
They have worked for the ,government,
as has Dr. Teller, but they have occupied
key Positions in the nuclear weaponry
field of the Government of the United
States. -
Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator from
Minnesota is correct. The record?of the
hearings should be read Carefully. I have
been doing it. I have almost completed
reading the record of the hearings. Of-
ten hearings are so voluminous that it
is impossible for a Senator to read them,
but this is the' most important decsision
that will be made in the 6 years I have
been in the Senate, and I want to read
the mare than S,OOa pages of hearings
very earefnlly.
I value very highly the opinion of the
Senator from Minnesota. He has been
m3' Ieader in the field of arms control.
He is one of the best informed men ixi
the country. As a Senator who must
make up his own mind, I vivant to get a
balanced view, and not merely the views
of scientists or physicists. Responsibl?,
sincere patriots came before the commit-
tee. Some say the treaty is bad, and'
some say it is goad. We cannot defer to
an opinion merely because of one's au-
thority or position. We must make up
our own minds. I aln sure the 6enator
will agree.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Sena-
torfor his kind remarks.
I note far the information of the Sen-
ator that at page 852 of file hearings
begins the testimony of"Dr. George B.
Kistiakowsky, of Harvard University.
On page 854 he discusses breakthroughs
in design of warheads for penetration,
relating to antiballistic missile systems
and advances in distinguishing between
decoys and incoming weapons, which re-
lates to radar and nuclear warheads. He
comments on an antiballistic missile. sys-
tem.
Listen to this testimony. This is Dr.
Kistiakowsky, who, more than any other
witness, -impressed me. I was impressed
by his Solomon-like characteristics. He
seemed like a wise man; and seemed to
me a very prudent, cautious, responsible
man. All witnesses would fall within
that category, but this witness more than
any other. Here Ys what he had. to say:
Much has beeen made St the necessity to
actually exercise any ABM'system if it is to
b~ eiYectiv'e when needed. I would make the
following observations with respect to this
arguument.
First, such bests. are not likely to be very
productive even with the hest of efforts since
the3~ must be conduotek! against one`s own,
and not the adversary's; warh~da One oan
have as much, perhaps riven more, confidence
franc underground nuclear explosions, Prop-
erly lastrumented, and ABM esercisea that.
do not actuallq involve detonating warheads
if coupled with a careful and contfnui:ng the-
orelical analysis taking into account all that
is known from intelligence sources regarding
the adversary's mLSSiles
Second, the same di~dvantages, if indeed.
there are any, in not exercising a sgstem will
apply equally to the Soviet Union.
Isefore leaving the ABM problem, which
seems to be, perhaps, the issue of greatest.
concern to those who ;question the wisdom
of 'the treaty, I would Tike to make one other
observation. I am not really intimately ia-
mi:[far with this important problem in all its
technical details. Neither have been mast
of the other witnesses who have been heard.
I would therefore urge that the committee
give special weight to 'the testimony of Har-
old Brown, who, to my; knowledge, is the only
witness so far heard who can speak witri
real authority regarding the total ARM prob-
lem, and the related developments in offen-
sive systems.. He has ~cceas to all of the in-
te'lllgence regarding Soviet activities and all
of the expertise in the United States on our
fu.ttue capabilities that relate to the prob-
lem.
Based on my own inowledge, I believe it
veer likely that the ofi"ense has now, and with
even only moderate efforts to counter ABM
development, will coatinue to have, a Com-
n~anding lead over the defense for as far into
file future aS we can foresee.
If we go back to ~ the testimony of Dr.
Brown, at about petge 528, we find that
Dr. Brown had a g;eat. deal to say about
they antiballistic missile system. His..
testimony is too long to read. Dr. Brown
poixrts out that we have considerable
knowledge in this' area. We have the.
capability to develpp such. a system; but,.,
Tike Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr. Brawn feels
that the offense will always have? the
advantage in this area over the: defense.
]: tivant the RECQRxh to note the extensive
festimony of Dr. grown, who was ques-
1;ianed at length by the members of the
committee.
Dr..~York had this to say, at page 758
of the hearings:
FIowever, i am very much more optimistic
'with regard to whdt human ingenuity can
accomplish in the a?ay off designing ballistic
missiles which can;'-easily beat or penetrate
any antiballistic missile system. The race
between offense andjdefense is a race between
a tortoise and a h~.x?e and if only the bare
does not go to slfJep, the tortoise has no
chance.
Therefore, in con>jiection with the so-called
Soviet antiballistic missile problem, I be-
lieve the concern expressed by many is mis-
placed and that priXnary emphasis should be
placed on making slzre that our own ballistic
missiles will penetr~ste, and not placed on the
questio~x of precisel where we stand vis-a-vis
tine Soviets in the development o:: antiballis-
tic missiles themse3vea.
The matter of penetration has noth-
ing to do with warheads. It has some-
thing to do with Lockets, with the thrust,
with the radar system, with the comput-
ers, and the other facets which Secre-
tary McNamara ;described. .
Therefore, as a Senator, and as a lay-
man who has liijnited technical compe-
tence, Imust ask; Whom am I to believe?
'What evidence xlust I coxisidcr? When
I hear the testixboxiy of file Secretary of
Defense who is ~t the head of: the great-
est research department in the world,
when I hear the head of the Los Alamos
Laboratory, who is the du?ector of tare
research far t)ie Department of Defense;
when I hear Dr. Harold Brawn, who was
a collaborator and partner with 7Crr.
Teller in the development of the Izydra-
gen bomb; when I hear Dr. Yorl:, w]ho
was with President Eisenhower as Direc-
tor of Defense Research; when :C hear
Dr. Kistiakowsky, who is the science ad-
viser to the President and one of the
greatest scientists in the worlds; [und
when they all stand on one side and say
this treaty is to our advantage and sholrid
be ratified, and when they say the prob-
lem is not the antiballistic missile s;ys-
tem, but it is a matter of perfecting stile
oii?ensive, all I can do is consider t;he tes-
timony and some to the conclusion ta~~t .
on the antiballistic. missile item, at least,
the proponents of the treaty have the
better of the argument.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The E3eriator makes
a conclusive answer, but I feel that; we
must evaluate the position oP the propo-
nents of the treaty. It is true tY.:at they
have a preponderance in numbers.
There is one more thing which, ii[ it sloes
not puzzle Senators, at least giv~as them
some pause, and tYlat is that there must
ibe a subtle evaluation of the testimony
of the administration witnesses after the
treaty has been initialed.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I agree.
Mr. PROXMIRE. The fact "is that
there is a commitment. We cazurot ex-
pectanyone working in the Deiellse De-
partment or in the Military EstabRish-
ment to come before the Senate calrimit-
tees axed say, "We advise you not to sup-
port the President, not. to support the
'position already taken by the administra-
tion; our position. is that this treaty is
unwise."
At least one member of tlhe daint
Chiefs of Staff, General LeiVfay, indi-
cated some hesitation about it. But
there is a feeling that the testimony of
Dr. Brown., who is under the orders of
Secretary McNamara,---
Mr. HUMPHREY. He: is a civilian.
Mr. PROXMIRE. That is true, but
he is still under the direction and disci-
pline of the Secretary of Defezlse.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Dr. Browlz dais not
need the job.
Mr. PRUXMTRE. I am sure of that.
Mr. HUMPHREY. He can :leave this
Government and get five times 1;he money
he is now getting in the Federal Gravern-
ment service.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Tb.e Senator makes,
a point.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I[e is where he is
because he loves his country, .and he is
putting his brilliance at the service of his
country. Any one of these scientists
could leave the Government service and
get five times -the income they now get.
I know what the Senator has in mind.
Dr. Brown is a rnan of tY:e highest
professional and ethfesil stanciarcis. He
has a great reputation, which is a part
of his character and a part of his back-
ground; and no one cam tell him haw he
is to testify.
By the time Senal;oas get through
working a witness over, if he i.s tx~ving to
take a position only to pleas?; Secretary
McNamara or President Kennedy, he
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 .CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.z- SE~LATE
will be caught. The best way _nat to
get caught is to tell the truth. _ NA man
has a greater reputation than Dr Brown.
The same is true of Dr. Teller, , I':do, not
question Dr, Teller's motivation and
sense of integrity. Why should I? This
man has done a great deal for our. coun-
try. He ought tobe honored, instead of
abused, He has a point of view. But he
has a minority point of view.
Mr. PR~XIVIIRE. The most disturb-
. ing point raised by Dr. 3'eller is that we
have been. consistently wrong in our fn-
telligence estimates of the Soviet. Union's
capacity and of our own capacity. In
1945, 1946, and 1947, after . we ,had de-
veloped the atomic bomb, we were told
by our outstanding experts that we could
not develop the hydrogen bomb. We did
it. We were told that the Soviet Union
probably could not, develop an atomic
bomb for many years. They did it in 4
years. We were told: that they could not
make tk~e hydrogen bomb for ,many
years, but they did it. -They beat us
to it.
Mr. HUMPHREY.- Mr. President, will
the Senator .hold up on that point for a
morxlent?
- Mr. PROXMIRE, I should.. like to
-1~lake my point; then I will hold up on it.
It seems to me that the areas in: which
intelligence is likely to_ be most vulner-
-able and most likely in error is in trying
to estimate the knowledge that a paten-
- tial enemy may have and his capacity
to develop his knowledge in this field,
which has been proceeding. at ,such a
rapid page.
Mr: Hi'JMPHREY. The scientists who
have advised. this Government have not
underestimated what the Soviet Union
can do. Those who write. press releases
__or make spe$ches, and the commentators,
might have underestimated what the So-
.Viet Union. Cando, because the favorite
' pasttime in the United States is to make
the Communists look either like l2ygmies
or giants; to make them look either 2-
feet .tall or . 16-feet ~ tall. They are
neither. They are people. They have
' able scientists.
The US. Government has made. it quite
clear throughout the years that the So-
viet Union. was perfectly capable of de-
' velopfng an atom bomb. So are Israel,
'Egypt, and Formosa, if they are given
- the resources.
Mr. PROXMIRE. But the estimates
of time were .crucial and they were far
ofP.
-Mr. HUMPHREY. Estimates of time
are matters of human judgment. For
example, we were wrong in our estimate
of the time the Soviet Union would need
to develop an atom bomb. That is un-
derstandable,
But. I add, .further, that even if we had
a test breakthrough-and I shall discuss
.this point later-it takes time to be able
to interpret what such a test organs, to
develop- into weaponry the information
gained from such a test, to get the weap-
on into aloe arsenal,.and to phase it into
military strategy.
? Ono final point ought to be made.
Who ready believes that any nation can
win a nuclear war? We discuss this sub-
ject as though. it were a game of ping-
No.142-5
gong, a game of croquet, or a game of
football We speak. of it as though some-
one will mak~e_a_tRUChdown, and between
halves the Foaches..will.get the team to-
gether, think up a new play,- and then
come through with a touchdown that will
win the game.
We talk about exploding nuclear bombs
as though- ft were some- form of sport.
We are talking_not about life or death.
We are talking about death and destruc-
tion. We should. put the discussion in
proper perspective.- I do not .speak in
criticism of the Senator from Wisconsin,.
I merely say that_the discussion should
be on the merits, of a test ban treaty.
We are not talking about outlawing
bows and arrows.. We are not thinking.
of a limitation on the. number of deer.
that can be shot next season.-.,.. We are
talking about weapons in existence to-
day that are: large enough ,to demolish
any city in the United States. We talk
about 100-megaton bombs. We talk
about knocking out New York five times.
There. is no need., to knock. it out. more
than once.
Mr, PROXMIRE. .The danger of nu-
clear war might be greatly enhanced if
one side could obtain a sharp, decisive
advantage, particularly in the area of
an antiballistic missile. system so that
that side would be able.. virtually to elim-
inate. the retaliatory. power of the other
side. That is the point of the analogy
the Senator from Minnesota gave us,
which came from Dr. York, as to the
difference, between offensive and defen-
sive wars; the race between the tortoise
and the hare;,if only the haze does not
go to sleep, the tortoise has no chance,
The question may be raised, "Are we
going to act the part of the bare and
go to sleep by not testing ourselves, thus
giving the Soviet Union the advantage of
testing in the atmosphere in violation
of the treaty?"
They may thus be enabled to develop
a perfect antiballistic missile defense
.system which would give them a supreme
advantage and the opportunity to
achieve victoxy.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I know .the Sen-
ator's question is directed in terms of
the elucidation of information, and not
argument.
Mr. PROXMIRE. That is correct, _
Mr. HUMPHREY. _ I shall try to speak
to the point. It is possible that the So-
viets might test ~ubl~iloton devices or
weapons in the atmosphere .and not be
caught. But there .will be many win-
dowpeepers, .many .private eyes, looking
at. them, because at least 100 nations
will sign the treaty, and the risk of being
caught, ff one is trying_to make a break-
. through in science, fs too much. A sig-
natory had better. announce .that in 90
days it will break the. treaty; because
.under the treaty, I believe there is the
right, for compelling reasons, fora na-
tion's own security or its national needs,
to serve notice that. in 90 clays it will
abrogate the treaty. During that period
of time, .preparations for tasting could
be made.
Why take apchance on~acting secretly
when one can do what he .wants to do
without acting secretly? The treaty
..15755
provides for abrogation by us as well as
by other nations. It provides fora with-
drawal from the treaty. If a nation
abrogates the treaty, it runs the risk of
being caught, without at any time ob-
taining a decisive... military advantage
from one little test or series. of tests that
it might be able to make.
The only knowledge I:have on this
subject is that obtained from .the ex-
perts. I heard the experts, those outside
the administration, who came before the
committee at their own request. or who
were asked by .the committee. to appear.
Those experts told. us that the possibil-
ities of decisive or significant military
advantage from the -abrogation of the
treaty, sneakingly, were minimal. I
cannot believe that. the risk. involved
either. in the cheating or the. abrogation
is as great as the risk of unlimited test-
ing.- That is what we are .really dis-
cussing. We are not living in a world
where we can say ,that no one is_really
going to test, or that no one. will. test
without a treaty, and therefore every-
thing will, be fine: If we do not have a
treaty; it is entirely probable that some
nation will test.
If the Soviets test under the treaty,
the argument goes, the testing ought to
be wide open, as if we were not under
a treaty. Would not that be. correct?
Mr. PROXMIRE. And so could we.
Mr. HUMPHREY. And so could we.
So all that would remain would be to
continue the race again. That was the
burden or the heart of the testimony.
Under such comp- etition, where we test,
they test, we test, and they test, no one
obtains a decisive advantage. In the
competition of testing, the gap between
our own superiority and the inferiority
of the Soviets has closed; ar~d the more
they test, the less security there will be
in the world.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
-the Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I should like to
discuss one point that I understood the
Senator from Wisconsin to make; name-
ly, that the Soviets, by small tests, might
develop an anti-ballistic-missile system.'
The testimony is-quite clear, from Dr.
York and_Dr, Kistakowsky, and others,
that the real problem in the field is not
the weapon itself-the nuclear warhead;
the real problem is in the field of detec-
tion or discrimination; of the weapon's
oncoming speed; of the explosion. The
actual warhead is no problem. At one
point it was said that we -have all the
warheads we need.
Mr. PROXMIRE. When I started my
questioning, I asked the Senator from
Minnesota about the possibility of sub-
kilotonic ,explosions, being used to dis-
tract our capacity to determine the path
of the incoming missile; of its being used
to destroy our ability to set up an anti-
ballistic-missile defense that would work.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was also testi-
fied that we will pursue work on the anti-
ballistic-missile system within the limits
of the -treaty, in order to test the pen-
etrability of our weapons. We have a
strong incentive to do everything we can
to develop an anti-ballistic-missile sys-
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15756 CONGRE~~SIONAL RECORD -`~ .>ENATE September 10'
tem that will have no less penetrability ence. The Joint Chiefs of Sta$' were distinguished scientific colleagues. So
than the Soviets have. very reassuring on this point. The ex- the question is, which scientists do we:
There is no intention on the part of cellent report of the Committee on For- believe?
our sci@ntists to desist from experiment- eign :Relations state, onpage 18: Furthermore, even if a test were to
ing to the limit of their capacity in the The dangers oP detection and the cost and be made, it takes time to obtain such a
development of techniques of an anti- difficultp of testing in Touter space would weapon. It takes from 3 to 5 years to
ballistic-missile system-the best we can tend to impose severe restrictions upon such develop a weapon, after the test is niade.
get. clandestine testing. Other clandestine tests This matter has been testified 1;0 in
Mr. PROXMIRE. But we would not in the atmosphere or underwater, depending the committee. If we assume that th.e
violate the treaty by testing subkiloton upon their size, would ixtvoive a fairly high Worst happens--that the Soviet Union
probability of detection Tay our conventional abrogates the treaty, makes a series o:f
bombs in the atmosphere. The Rus- intelligence or our atorr~lc energy detection
signs could. If they did, theq could do system. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff tests-Perhaps a great series of tests
so without being detected. consider the resulting prdgress which the so- such as the ones they made in 1961 anal
Mr. FULBRIGHT. If the Senator is viets might make clanae~tineiy to be a rela- 1962--and makes a significant break?-
making the efficiency of our own detec- tivelp minor factor in re anon to the overall through--we should realize that once
tion system a consideration, I can ,only Present and probable l~aiance of military they have that scientific information,
refer him to the testimony of Dr. North- strength iP adequate safeguards are main- they still must be able to put it into
ruP, who discussed the question in de- tainea. ! what is called a weapons system, for the
tail. It was necessary Por him to do so, That means that the Joint Chiefs are purpose of weapons delivery.
in executive session, because this is a saying to the Senate, in conservative Mr. PROXMIRE. But, as I ulider-
sensitive field, but the Senator might language, "We have, (developed a very stand, that is not the way Dr. 7Celler
read 1t if he wished to do so. reliable system of detection, verification answered the question. He said he as-
Dr. Northrop went into -great de- and identification, and this system serves sumed they would first develop the vreap-
tail, in executive session, about what as an additional protection in connection ons using tmdetectable subkiloton tests.
is being done, what has already been with our adherence Y,o the treaty." Then they would see whether they would
done, and what is being planned to If the Senator from Wisconsin will work. They would try them out; and,
be done in regard to detection. He read what the chairman of the Foreign if they dad work, they would strike im-
said that if there has been any Relations Committee lies suggested, I am mediately with them.. In other worcLs,
breakthrough in the whole gamut of ac- sure he will be very xTluch reassured by the weapon would be developed first;
tivities in this field, it has been in the the executive testimony. then a test would be run, to perfect grid
area of detection. Mr. PROXMIRE. 1!fs shown on page further refine the weapon. They test
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Sen_ 467 of the hearings, I'1r. Teller made an would be to determine whether the weap-
ator. That is a very helpful answer. It interesting reply to Se~tlator Loxc: ons would work; in fact. Once they
means that there is some question as to Senator Loxc. In the event they were able found that they worked, "`that would
whether a subkilotron explosion made ~ develop a missile defense against our bal- be it."
now might be detected by us. Russia listic missiles, atla theft proceed to breach Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let me interrupt
the treaty just long enough to prone it out,
could not safely cheat. And in the would there be time Pox us to ao the same at this point, to say that is not quite tkle
future any explosion of that sort would thing after we Pound ot#t that they had via- point, even under Dr. Teller's testiinort;y,
be increasingly more likely to be de- lateci the treaty. because the weapons must first be in-
tected by us. Dr. TELLER. I am virtually certain there stalled. As shown at the bottom Of pa?:e
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct. would not be time enqu3;h. we woma be 4B7, to which the Senator from W:iscon-
It would have to be very subkilotron if lucky to get off to meaningful testing ins sin has already referred, Dr. Teller said:
montY~s, whereas they, ',if they have indeed
it were to go undetected. I believe it I am virtually certain there would not be
would have to be much smaller than the e recut etd eirsant ball st~c~miss lepequipment, time enough. We would be lucky to get off to
kind, for example, that waS dropped in they could abrogate the treaty in a day, use meaningful testing in 3 months, whereas
the last World War. Dr. NoxthroP feels the next week for 100;. or 600 detonations, they, if they have indeed perfected, in-
that great prOgreS$ has been made and and if they then find I the results unsatis- stalled-
is being made in the field of `detection- .factory, they will have',lost a treaty. And so forth. Certainly such a sys-
both atmospheric, underground, and un- If they find it satisfactory, they wtil have tem would not be installed before it was
derwater. That, unfortunately, was one won t:he world. tested. That would be ridiculous. After
of the areas of testimony which they did That testimony seemed to me--tom- it is tested, it must be installed, by
not wish to make public. ing from Dr. Teller,', the father of the whatever means one might undertake to
Mr. HIIMPHREY. It should be made H-bomb=- use.
clear to the Senator from. Wisconsin NIr. HUMPHREY: I believe the Mr. PROXMIRE. Read again what
that he can. see this testimony. H-bo:mb has many, 'many parents. Dr. Teller said. He said : "If they have
Mr. PROXMIRE. I thank the Sen- Mr. PROXMIRE. ;Yes; but certainly indeed perfected, installed," he said "in-
ator. he is one of the principal parents, and stalled," then they may test 100 to :i00
Mr. HUMPHREY. The $erkner re- is a man of responsib~lii;y. detonations in a week. Then if it
port, of a few years ago, under the ad- Mr. HUMPHREY. Indeed he is. works, for us: Dooznsday. Dr. Teller's
ministration of President Eisenhower, 1V4r. PROXMIRE. 'His reply is very position is that they would be perfected
stated that a considerable amount of disi;urbing, and wouldd suggest that it is and installed before they were corn-
advance had occurred in the field of the passible-although likely-but possi- pletely proven.
detection of nuclear explosions. The ble that. Russia coul~be in a position to Mr. FULBRIGHT. Before they were
whole area of seismology has been up- testi during a period of a very few days, tested?
dated. We have devoted to this field and then fmd that t$leir system worked, Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes.
substantial amounts of our resources. and then initiate a war in which they Mr. FULBRIGHT. Let ine add. that I
This is one of the "hush hush" topics, wo~zld be fairly cert m to impose on us believe Dr. York's testimony is the real
and we can well understand why. far, i`.ar more destruction than we would answer. He pointed out i;hat the only
Mr. PROXMIRE. Of course. iml?ase on them. passibility, in his opinion, of perifecting
Mr. I3UMPHREY. Bat our Govern- I recognize that ! any .nuclear war an anti-ballistic-missile system is based
went had a very good record in detecting would be a terrible disaster for mankind. upon the assumption that the n issi es
nuclear testing by the S'w'at Union. Not But we are dealing with a different kind against which it was aimed rernai~o.ed
only do we know what tests have been of country in the SOvfet Union. These static over along period, so that we
made; ` we also know where they took people have for 45 `. years been brain- would know exactly what they were,
place, the times, the sizes, the chemical washed with the notion that Communist whereas, as a matter of fact, the nissiles
composition, the metallic construction, domination-by force and violence, if grid their delivery systems are being
the yield, and the other factors. This in- necessary-is the wave of the future. changed all the time. Certainly curs
formation was not obtained by us 7VIr. HUMPHREY. However, :[ point are-being changed. This is one of the
through any sort of mysticism; it was our, that Dr. Teller's theoretical objet- reasons why he feels quite strongly that
obtained through the processes of sci- tion has been answered by some of his an anti-ballistic-missile system can
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Y963 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD...- SE~TA'I'E
.: ~.
15757
never become effective. That.is why he It is the advantage oP people working ers. The President, the Secretary of De-
made tl~e reference t~ the tortoise and. many years to try to develop penetration aids fense, the Director of Central Intelli-
the hare.. In short, if the missile itself 'over a computer which moot solve the prab- genCe, the Secretary of State, and those
is changed, the system which would have lem in a matter of a few minutes. who preceded them in the 8
been effective against it iS, Of CQU1'Se, n0 People really are smarter than computers. years of the
Computers do things faster. But planners Eisenhower administration, have all
longer_ applicable.. There.. are new who work an penetration aids can succeed, come out on one side of the issue. They
guidance Systems, and a veiy compli- ana can succeed with relative ease, and by have said that a treaty banning nuclear
toted system of decoys. After a missile relative ease >: mean in terms of time or tests in these environments in outer
fs launched, a~t a certain point six or money, it is simply easier to baud devices space, under water, and in the atmos-
eight decoys go off from it.. How could that will penetrate a ballistic missile than ft phere is in our national interest.
We stop such a inissile when it was used is to build an antimissue which can cape. I cannot help believing that such a
under Conditions which he describes as ,with it.
The Canutn2nrr. They can be mare original, body of testimony merits our favorable
making it virtually impassible to stop it. I take it, too, than computers. consideration.
I believe his .testimony was that it is Dr. Yoax. Yes, that is right. People as Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
virtually impossible to perfect an anti- compared with computers. the Senator yield so that I may ask one
ballistic-missile .System; and that al- Dr. York went on to discuss the entire additional question?
though we shah develop one, we shall do subject of offensive capability. Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.
it for the purpose of testing the penetra- We could discuss the subject for weeks. Mr. PROXMIRE. Dr. Teller also ar-
bility of our awn missiles,. not because we The President of the United States, who sued -that it would be possible for the
.believe we will- stop theirs. is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Russians technically to abide by the
Mr. PROXMIRE. I presume, then, Forces of our country and has the pri- treaty, while violating its obvious spirit,
that we assume .that the Russians will mary responsibility as the Chief Execu- by having explosions a few feet or per-
work on this, and that in the meanwhile tive for the policies which relate to hags a few inches underground. These
we will cYlange cur missiles and will per- .defense and the security of our country, would be large explosions which wou]d
feet them and prove them, in under- test out their hardened missile sites,
must seek. advice an technical subjects.
ground tuts, and_will do everything else Lro ,a,,,,,, ?,.a ..__,_ .. _ enmat.hina Q,P ___a
- -.---, -, ._-~. _. ___? ,,,,,._? ,,,,.....,,...- questions from Democrats or from Re-
:~ary does perfect an anti-ballistic-mis- publicans or from nonpartisans. He
sale system, we will be prepared to seeks advice from those he believes to
breach it with a devastating new offense... be the best and most competent scien-
Mr, P'ULBRIGHT. That is one of the tists in the Nation. The advice which
reasons-,Why we are spending so much two Presidents have received, including
money on this work. . , _
- -'' _~""'"'"` ""' """` "" ""'?' "a" a paucy occasion by one President who
-hare of.U.S. nuclear offense will not go is one of the greatest generals this
to .sleep. It ayill keep on running
Mr. FTJ$,BRIGHT. We are spending
approximately $400 million on an anti-
ballistic-missile system, partly with the
idea we ax~ght stop theirs, but primarily
to prove.., the effectiveness of our own
missiles., rather than merely to build and
to stockpile them.
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator may
recall my reading the testimony of Dr.
Har~oid frown at the point at which he
said that even wself present knowledge,
recognizing that .the nuclear warhead
blast would have ,same effect upon an
anti-ballistic-missile system-we are try-
ixig =to build. into our missiles the so-
palled ABM system-those compensating
factors will not`overcame all thelack of
knowledge we may have relating to such
~lrbjects,, far example, as blackout, nu-
clear blast,- and other aspects that were
discussed in his testimony.
But Dr. York is not. to be shunted aside
as an incompetent witness. He is rec-
ognized as one of the outstanding men
in .the field of nuclear research and
weapon .development. He had .the fol-
lowing to Say, as shown on page 763 of
the hearings. He was talking about the
anti-ballistic-missile. system;
I think this Ls a keg question, because great
emphasis has been gfve~n the ABM as. being
the only solution to this whole problem and
one. ,oP the reasons we .have been urged to
reject t1.~is treaty by I?r. Teller and some
others.
Dr. Yo~,zs. Well,. what I tried to say, Mr.
Chairman, is that I dowbt very much indeed,
and I have tQStified in past years many times
an thin rank-tart f? +re u...,~e ,,..,a ,.. ,w_ ~___
try to victory on the field of battle, and
by another President, who has had to
come to grips-with some of the toughest
postwar problems our country has ever
had. The advice that those two men-
President Eisenhower and President
Kennedy-have received has led them to
what conclusion? It has led them to the
conclusion that the treaty is in our na-
tional interest and would lend itself to
the fulfillment of our national objet-
tives. They have listened to the paint
of view and advice of the apposition as
well as to the advice of those with whom
they find themselves in more receptive
relationship.
Dr. Foster, who is now the head of the
Livermore Laboratories, came in with
doubts about the treaty and I believe
expressed his opposition to it. Dr. Brad-
bury came in from Los Alamos. He is
for the treaty. The President of the
United States and the Secretary of De-
fense, both of wham have asked the
Congress for billions of dollars more for
defense, are confronted with the ques-
tion. Remember that we are spending
approximately $10 billion more for de-
fense this year than we did in 1960.
duct the same tests because we are more
conservative in applying the terms of the
treaty. While such tests might not be a
technical violation, obviously they would
violate the spirit of the treaty. The
tests would scatter all kinds of radio-
activity in the air.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I did not see Dr.
Teller's assertion of that point in his
testimony before the Committee on For-
eign Relations. However, earlier he
testified to that effect before another
committee. His testimony was printed
in the New York Times.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes, I read it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I wonder if the in-
terpretation of the treaty makes clear
that ariy explosion a foot or perhaps a
couple of feet below the surface of the
earth would be a violation of the treaty?
It .makes all the sense in the world that
it should be, because it would scatter ra-
dioactive materials over the ea1?th, and
such tests would violate the purpose of
the treaty.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Exactly. The Sen-
ator has answered his own question. A
definition of an underground test was
entered into the report and appears on
page 22 of the report.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the entire definition as printed
in the report be reprinted at this point
in the RECQRD.
There being no objection, the defini-
tion was ordered to be priz3ted in the
RECORD, as follows: -
President Kennedy has not said, "Let U$ DEFINITSON OF UNDT'aGROUND TEST
pretend that the World is a jolly place The Secretary was asked if agreed criteria
and everybody is happy." President had been established to determine what con-
Kennedy has not Said, "We get al0 statutes an underground test. This fs a
~ complicated question; very shallow sub-
well with the Russians. Let us lay down surface tests may be more productive in
OUT arms and enjoy a happy picnic." terms of knowledge gained than deeper tests,
No.~ Thi cis a Presidlen"t^who has had to and they are obviously cheaper. Secretary
aac aaua 11.1'LCi1CU Lo Lne LeSLlmany Of 111C["C are potientiiauy, looking ahead over
a a ,ls impossible to build an anti- those Who are Worried about various the years, potentially. many dozens, perhaps
baAistic-misflile defense.. If .one is .looking things. He has listened t0 those who even hundreds, of contingencies which might
for salvation in than direction, one is looking develop through technical advance or other-
in the wrong direction, the reason simply be- maintain that the anti-ballistic-missile wise, which I think could not be spelled out
=lag the, great advantage of offense over de- system of the Soviets will overwhelm US, in detail in such a treaty; it would even be,
Tense. HP. h}]C if FtPn PI'1 Fn +hn Fne+; w....,., ,.r ..aL ~ ~._,_._
 15758
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 5epte~nber 1 G
in the enormous detail that would be re- surface, it would be a~ixxost Certain to Dr Brown was that he discussed fully
quired to try to anticipate all those things have that effect. and opexily both favorable-and uxifavor--
that we could think about now because we ~. HUMPHREY. The air currents able factors. We must differentiate be-?
would almost certainly not think about some would. Carry the debris. ' tween the information the Soviet Union
that are going to arise with technical Mr. FULBRIGHT. ,That language may have already acquired a.nd the in?-
advance.; ? ? would. take care of it. formation it might be able to acquire i:f
"Now obviously this treaty permits
a clear underground test where the explo- Mr. PROXMIRE. Except that in a it were able to test without the tests be-
?sion is underground, where the testing ap- territory as large as the territory of the ing discovered.
paratus is based on that phenomenon, and i Soviet Union it is possible that this might I invite the attention of t:he Senator
would think that we would not think that l~ dome. from Minnesota and the Senator from
it applied to a surface explosion which was Mr? la ULBRIGHT. xt is possible, but Wisconsin to page 530 of the hearixlgs, in
christened by a few shovelfuls of dirt. _ improbable. It depends upon the winds ?the testimony of Dr. Brown, in which he
tense is nixtuc wi~aa acnyo..,,-.~. ?~ ~~ ~?--? ------?? Mr. HUMPHREY.:The Senator is
about them and we will be able to take
whatever action is necessary in our awn secu- making a Very helpful Contribution to
rity, either with respect to insisting that it the record. We have ~iaw been able to
be stopped or the treaty collapses or + ? ' put unto the record they full comment by
resuming our own freedom of action ~' the Secretary of State anal the definition
Mr. HUMPHREY. The Secretary given. by Dr. Harold Brown, Director oP
said: Defense Research ands Engineering for
-0bviously this treaty permits a clear under- the Department of De#ense, that an eX-
ground test where the explosion is under- plosion. Which Was Subsurface with a
ground, where the testing apparatus is based modESi, covering, in Which the debris
on that phenomenon, and I would think that went into the atmosphere, would be con-
we would not think that it applied to a sur- sidered to be &n atmospheric explosion.
Yace explosion which was christened by a few This would leave the ~Tnited States free
shovelfuls of dirt. to make its own decision as to the most
Ii these marginal things occur or any pre- apprDpriate'U.S. response.
tense is made with respect to it we will know Ox:e advantage with respect to the
about them and we will be solo to take
whatever action is necessary in our own treaty is that it leaves the matter of
security, either with respect to insisting that what 'we believe to bE! in our national
it be stopped or the treaty collapses or ? ' ? interest t0 Our Own dECision. It ig true
resuming our own freedom of action. that it leaves that decision to the other
Mr. P)3,pXMIRE. We would regard parti~.es, also, but we have always been
that as a violation of the treaty. concerned lest the Soviet Uxxion exercise
Mr. HUMPHREY. That would be re- some kind of veto over the inspection
garded as a violation of the treaty. arrangements. That has been elixninatE>d
Mr. PROXMIRE. The point is clearly in the treaty.
understood. It is gene,Tally understood in the :~cien-
Mr. HUMPHREY. Dr. Harold Brown, tific community-that Our inspection and
Director of Science for the Defense De- detection system is far superior to that
partment, went into that question. The of amy other nation ixl the world. With
discussion is found on page 551 of the the scientific apparatus we now have-
hearings. In part, it was as follows: seismic, acoustical, and electrondc, plus
senator SAL'rON$TALL. NOW, Di. Brown, as our regular areas of :intelligence infor-
I recall, and I think one other witness was motion, I believe a test oP the nature
very emphatic that we should. have ground which. the Senator lass described as a
rules as to what is meant by ?undergrouna ~ limited subsurface tes# would be detected,
Have you, as the Director of science for and would give us grounds for axis action
the Defense Department, gone into that we wished to take. I believe we are fully
to determine what constitutes an unaer-_ T:he Senator's questions have-made tkie Dr. Brflwn contradicted by testimcny of
groans test? record much clearer.: \ ~
Dr. Baowx. This is, of course, partly a legal M'r. PROXMIRE. I thank the Senator other scientists.
question, senator SALTON6TALL. From the Mr. HUMPHREY. His tt',stimony bias
technical point of view, I think what I can from Minnesota and',. the Senator from beE;n substantiated 1)y the testimony of
say is that any teat, any large test, that is Arkansas for their :very helpful re- other scientists. Earlier today I' read
not underground will be_ detected as not spouses. They have 'enlightened me as the testimony of the famous Dr. E:istia-
being underground, and so then it is a mat- ~ liortions of the tr~aty and the testa- kowsky, who said that he considered L'ir.
ter of what policy the United States wants moray -which has beE7ri given about the Brown to be the foremost expert in this
to adopt. i would view a test that put most treF~ty. ' area and the most knowledgeable man,
of its energy into the atmosphere as an at- Mr. COOPER. Mr., President, will the .because he had available to him the m~o~st
mospheric test and it would be detected as Senator yield?
such, and so I would assume, as the Secre- up-to-date information, including SCi-
tary of Defense said, that a clearly atmos- Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Sen- entific and intelligence information. Y)r.
pheric test is illegal, even if there is a foot ato:r .from Kentucky. York also testified along similar limes.
of dirt over it. Sut from the technical point Mr. COOPER. I ~ould like to pur- Mr. COOPER. I note in the statement
of view, I have said all I can say on an expert sue, with a few qu stions, the subject that Dr. Brown says that our tests are
b~~? raised by the Senato>! from Wisconsin. comparable with respect to communica-
What it boils down to is that Dr.
Brown said that if the test should spew
up debris, the explosion spreads the de-
bris in the .atmosphere outside the bor-
ders of the nation holding the test, that
is an atmospheric test and not an under-
ground test.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I add, iP the
Senator will yield, that the Language of
article I(b) of the treaty is quite clear
on this point. If arty of the radioactive
debris "be present outside the territorial
limits of the' State" thg explosion is cov-
ered. If the explosion were close to the
who oppose the treaty is related chiefly he does not say that they are comparable
to 'the fear that the'; Soviet Union may with respect to nuclear weapons vulner-
have acquired, or maq acquire in the Pu- ability. I assume such tests relate to
ture, by clandestine; tests, information an antiballistic missile.
which we may not have about the effects Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes. A little lai`,er
of nuclear bursts, whfch would enable the in the statement, at the bottom of page
Soiriet Un3ori to develap an antiballistic 530, after the paragraphs which relate
missile ar a communications blackout. I to the "treaty's effect on development
am. sure that is the concern of all Sen- of ABM" Dr. Brown stated:
ators. In summary, my best judgment and the
IVir. HUMPHREY. Xes. judgment of those of. us who have the re-
Ivlr. COOPER. The thing Which im- sponsibility for antimissile development and
prE:s,sed me most about the testimony Of those who have the responsibility for mak-
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states his judgment about the tests
which have already been undertaken.
both by the Soviet Union and by thE:
United States. The subject is "17.5.-?
U.S.S.R. High Altitude Tests Compar??
able.," Dr. Brown states:
With respect to high altitude tests ca,rrie6l-
out for the purpose of determining the ef??
fects of nuclear bursts on corrununications
blackout, radar blackout, and nuclear weap-
ohs vulnerability, Soviet and Lfnited Statca3
experience appear to be comparacble.
Each side has had about the same number
of tests, over yield ranges and altitude range,a
which are comparable though :not ideiztical
the numbelr of nuclear tests carried out kry
related missile tests appears to be about this
same although dlHerent techniques for mak-
ing the measurements were used by the two
countries.
Enough has been learned by the Uhitey3
States, to verify the existence, nature, and
rough independence of blackout characteris-
tics on yield and on altitude, althoug]a im-
portant details still have not been expdorecl.
The same is probably true in the Soviet
Union on the basis of the teats whicbc they
have done.
Probably neither side understands thE~ var1.-
oua phenomena sufficiently wall to perttd~t
theoretical extension with complete co:o+-
fldence to some other altitudes, yield;, and
typf:s oY devices; but we have, and presurrc-
ably the Soviets also have, enough informa-
tion to enable us to take steps to design
around our uncertainties.
That is a statement by Dr. Browxi thfet
our tests with respect to communications
blackout and radar blackout are coxn-
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CONGRESSIONAL. R~~ORD -SENATE
'ii~g intelligence estimates on Soviet missile
elements,, is, fJ]at ..our ABM developments
? efCorts~ axQ ..comparable in magnitude and
11.1 suGIESS vPth those of trie Soviets. Any
deployed system which the Soviets are likely
to ktave_gQw?or.:7,i1.,the ,near .future does not
appear to ~e as e$'cctive, almost certainly not
more effective, thaw Nike-Zeus.
Mr. ~00PER. Dr. Brown state$ that
in ., the., hree areas of communications
blackout, radar blackout, and ABM de-
velopment, the .tests which the United
States Ylas conductefi, though they may
be.differe~lt, are comparable in magna-
tude a.nd siiccess with the tests conducted
by the soviets. It this correct?
Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.
Mr. COOPER, .I think it is important,
as does the Senator from Wisconsin; and
all other Senators, that every fact be
brought out in the debate, whether it is
fayo~able.or unfavorable, because we
must consider every factor in determin-
ing the effect of the treaty on the secur-
tty of ouz' country.
In tl}e statement made by General Le-
May, he said he was not satisfied with the
tests that.. Ylad been undertaken by the
Uxiited States. _Would the Senator say
that Dr. Brown, 1n his position, has ac-
Gess to every fact, every bit of informs-
Lion, fn connection with these tests, and
also, because of his cientffic background
Eldld txaining, has the capacity to eval-
Mate the., tests, in a way superior to that
oi? General LeMay? This is a difficult
question, but I would like an opinion,
Mr. HUNiPI3REY. I could not say
whether pxnot he would have more than
Genex~.1 ~,eMaY, although I believe in the
scientific, Se1d he .would be in a better
positonl tQ.evaluate the scientific aspects.
With .relation to the scientific witnesses,
there is. ng doubt. that Dr. Brown was in
ingre advantageous position. In this
connection, Lwish to read the testimony
of Dr. Kistiakowsky as ft appears at page
B55 of .the hearings. Dr. Kistiakowsky
said;
I aril not really intimately familiar with
this, 13srportant problem in all its technical
details, e _
And he was. referring to the ABM
problem-
Neither .have, .been most of the other wit-
iieeses who have been heard. I would. there-
fore urge that the- committee give special
we,lght to the testimony of Harold Brown,
'who, to my .knowledge, is the only witness
so"Par heard .who can speak with real au-
=thori?y regarding the total ABM problem, and
the related .developments in offensive sys-
terns. I3e has access to all of the intelligence
regarding Soviet activities and all of the ex-
pertise in. the .United States on our future
capabilities that relate to the problem..
"When Dr, Brown was before our com-
rilttee, Iasked the same question relat-
1ng to this very point. I put the question
directly to Dx, Brown. It was a little em-
baxrassng .and difficult for me to do it,
`,_,~ ~ -thou~ht~ we had to get down to
oases. Z read from page 578 of the
ilearixgs ;
Penator. HUMPHREY. There is not any ex-
pertise on tl}ese matters and, may I say
With. all-...due... Tespect to all the men who
appeared before. this. committee, many men
are making" what .are, I believe, statements
W~c~k.,.are not ,&cientiflc facts. They have.
't9 ded11CP Yrgm Sertain facts that they have,
...
atid; they have,.to_presume and. akSUme and
sap, "I believe and I hope or I would imag-
ine" and I believe and I imagine that it
will accelerate the arms race.
Here is the question:
Finally, did Dr. Teller have access. to in-
formation that is not available to you?
Dr, BROWN. No, I do not believe so.
Senator HIIMPHREY. Does h,e have access
to all the information that is available to
you, intelligence information as well?
Dr. BROWN. I believe not. In fact, I know
not.
Senator HurgPxREY. In other words, you
have access to all the information that is
available to Dr. Teller and there is no limita-
tion upon your getting that information?
Dr. BROWN. I have access to intelligence,
not only to intelligence information that,
I believe, that I know, is not available to
him, Senator HUMPHREY, but I also have
the benefit, and I believe it is a benefit, in
drawing my conclusions not only on my
years as a weapons laboratory member and
director, but on my subsequent experience
here considering the broad military research
and development problems and the military
capabilities involved in such matters as anti-
ballistic missiles, missile design, and so on,
which are part of my responsibility as Di-
rector of Defense Research and Engineering.
Mr. COOPER. This is one of the
points I wished to bring out. I recognize
that our military leaders and scientists
have individual views, but I thought it
important to put in the RECORD that Dr.
Brown had stated categorically in his
testimony that the tests which had been
carried out both by the United States
and the Soviet Union, with respect to
blackout and to nuclear weapon vul-
nerability connected with an -ABM sys-
tem, were comparable.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Xes.
Mr. COOPER. I also had known that
Dr. Kistiakowsky, who as the Senator
said, was the scientific adviser to Presi-
dent Eisenhower, had testified that in
his judgment Dr. Brown had more in-
formation upon all aspects of the anti-
ballistic missile situation than any other
person.
Mr. HUMPHREY. That was his testi-
mony.
Mr. COOPER. I make this statement
because I think it bolsters the credibility,
if it should be questioned, of the testi-
mony of Dr. Brown. I think, also, that
we must point out all the favorable and
unfavorable factors relating both to
tests which might have been made and
to the possibility of tests by the Soviet
Union.
As I read his testimony, Dr. Brown
has stated that any attempt by the Soviet
Union to conduct secret tests underwater
or in the atmosphere, of any size and
scope, could be detected. I believe he
stated, however, that there-was a possi-
bility that the Soviet Union could con-
duct tests of low yield, very near the
surface, which might not be detected,
I assume that would be because it might
not be possible to determine whether
they were underground or just above the
He also said it might be possible to
conduct a limited number of tests, of low
yield, in the upper atmosphere, at heights
of 10 to 20 kilometers, without detection.
Mr. HUMPHREY. As I said earlier,
that is within the realm of passibility.
I urge that Senators heed the sugges-
tion. of .the chairman o~ the _comnrlittee
~Ml'. FULBRIGHTl, and read the secret
testimony that was given by Dr. North-
rup, if they have doubts on this point.
This happens to be one of the most sen-
sitive areas of our scientific knowledge.
We have made improvements in our
scientific system of detection. I do not
think it would be well for me to do more
than to suggest that Senators review
the testimony within the confines of the
committee room. Many of the Senators'
doubts will be set at rest.
Mr. COOPER. Not doubts.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Concerns.
Mr. COOPER. I am raising these
questions because I think they should
be raised. I believe Dr. Brown said it
would be possible, for a time, at least
until we had developed a satellite sys-
tem, far the Soviet Union to conduct
tests in outer space without discovery.
Mr: HUMPHREY, To the scientific
mind all such things are possible. The
problem is, -How do we pay far them?
That is a bit of a problem, even in a rich
country like the United States. I think
this point was alluded to in some testi-
mony of other witnesses. We now know,
for example, theoretically, that space
platforms can be established, but the
costs are tremendous, and it is a ques-
tion of the commitment of resources,
both human and material,. to such proj-
ects: Furthermore, we have made de-
cided improvements in the detection of
explosions in outer space. The explo-
sions that are rather difficult to detect
in outer space are those many millions
of miles, hundreds of millions of miles,
away from earth,
Mr. COOPER. The Senator knows
the purpose of my question.
Mr. HUMPHREY. I know. I want
the record to be clear on this point.
The Senator is pointing out' potential
risks, iri a helpful discussion. I agree
that we ought to get these matters into
the public record. We ought to under-
stand exactly what this treaty would
and would not do. We ought to under-
stand that without the treaty all the
risks are still present, even to a greater
degree.
Mr. COOPER. I believe it was made
clear that if the tests were conducted in
outer space, there could not be a blast.
Therefore the effects of a nuclear blast
could not be studied, and it would be
purely a question of interception. Dr:
Brown pointed out that there are inhibi-
tions against this risk. First, .there is
the definite possibility of detection, and a
second is cost. A third is that a good
deal of the information that might be ob-
tained from such tests could be obtained
from underground testing,
Mr. HUMPHREY. He emphasized that
point. At page 541 of the hearings there
appears Dr. Brown's testimony relating
to his personal judgment on the extent
of cheating that is possible and the funds
and effort that have gone into the pro-
gram of detection and monitoring of
these situations. Later in his testimony
Dr. Brown states:
But in the worst passible case-that is, as-
suming as much cheating as I can possibly
believe would go undetected with any confi-
derrce-I do not believe that the Soviets
could obtain any substantial military gain
relative to,the UnitEd,States compared witkr
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15760 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE _ ~reptember 10
the situation in which both sides test with-
out restriction.
I do not believe that the Soviets can im-
pair to an important degree our strategic
superiority.
I believe that such gains would be small.
statement, at Aage 273'of the hearings.
In the, conclusions reached by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, there is this conclusion:
In theantiballistic missile field, develop-
ment of the U.S. system does not depend on
atmos;,pY;.eric testing and hence this treaty
that we are in danger of losing sight of
the risks that we would doubtlessly face
without the treaty. Some of these are
military ri:>ks.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President,
will the Senator froln Idaho yield''
Mr.. CHURCH. I yield.
Mr, HUMPHREY. The questions
raised by the able Senator from 1::en-
tucky iMr. CoorEel were not questions
in the form of opposition, but were ques-?
bons, as the Senator from Idaho welli
knows, related to getting informatioci
into the RECORD.
Mr. CHURCH. Yes. In that con: -
nection, the Senator from Kentucky has
performed a real service. Would, the
distinguished Senator from Minnesota
permit me t0 .read iIltO the RECORD as
exchange I ha,d with the chairmlui of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General T;Lylol~,
on the question of military risks that
would definitely face us, if we were to
continue unrestricted testing in the ab-
sence of this treaty with the f>ovi.et
Union?
Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.
Mr. CHURCH. My exchange with
General Tlf$*ior, when he appeared k~>-
fore the committee, begins at pa?;e 3Q9
and continues to the bottom of page 3~a0
of the printed record of hearings:
NO GVA.RANTEE IINITED STAyI'E;S BE ALWAYS
F`IR$T Ip' TESTI:NG CON'CINVED
Senator Cxvacx, Let us assume that there
were no treaty and Hutt unrestricted nucl~r
weapons testing continued oa both sides. >Y
such testing were to continue, 1s there any
guarantee that; you know of that would ;as-
sure us that we, our side, w~nxld always be
first Sn achieving new technological break-
throughE:?
General TASx.oa. No, there is no such as-
surance that I know of.
Senator Cxvacx. I:n tact,. the Ftusalans
have Shawn cansidera,ble com.getence in t,hL3
field, have they not?
General TAXLOR. Yes. I tYdnk that either
side, in concentrating on a single sector and
putting great resources behind !t, could
probably forge ahead.
Sehator Cxvacx. Then one dangers wlr3ch
has militaary significance in continxxing the
testing would be the possibility that it would
be the Russians ratlcer than ourselves, 'who
might achieve some important nevv break-
through in this technology?
General TAYLOR, IS we did not tea>t. 7Chat
was our great objection to the eomprehecusive
test ban treaty. wr, felt the Sovie:ta could
test clandestinely underground and we could
not, and hence, there would be a sei~tous
difficulty.
Senator E:H:URCx. 'Yes. Brit even if we: were
both to test., as I understand your answer
to my previous question, there is no guaran-
tee---?
General TAYLOa. No positive guarantee.
Senator Cllvacx. That the Russians nnight
not be the first to achieve some eigxsjficant
breakthrough.
General T,4YLOR, Of course, I have personal
confidence 1xx our great scie:ntiflc commxmity,
and axn confident that we would make many
or most of the breakthroughs, bt',t I could
not guarantee it.
Senator Cxvacx. I do, too. Even our
scientists would admit that there is no guar-
antee against this possibility. This waizld be
one of the dangers we would have 1a~ face
up to if we continued to test on both. sides;
is that not a fair statement?
Gexxeral TAYLOR. Yes, sic.
Senator Cxvaclx:. Now, supposing that if
both sides were to continue to test, !t was
the United States? as we would hopes, that
He then lists the reasons why he feels will nc~t significantly influence any imbalance
the gains would be small. that may exist.
Finally lie points out:
The Iirnited effect of the treaty on ous
strategic superiority means that the benefits
to our security 1n the broader sense, which
Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have dis-
cussed in detRil, will not be outweighed by
the mllitary-technological factors.
Mr. COOPER. Is it not correct to say
that most of the scientists argued that
even with the possibility of these risks,
the greatest advance in nuclear weapons
can be made in the penetrating weapons;
that ian imbalance that
may exist, but they safd it was not rieces-
sary to have atmospheric tests, thE: need
for which had been 3?eferred to by one
or two other witnesses prior to that time.
I thank the distinguished Senatol? from
Kentucky ipr his questions. I hone that
the discussion between us is worthy of
the attention of our colleagues i.n the
Senate and of the people of the country.
We are trying to hate the record made
clear., so that the people may know what
the treaty means and what its impact
should be on our foreign policy., upon
our military policy, and upon our general
national security policy.
P+ir. COOPER. I 'leave one further
question to ask. Is'' there anything in
thE: treaty which would prohik>it the
United States conducting antiballistic
missile tests with missiles not armed
wi1;h nuclear warheads; for example, to
test their ability for interception?
:Mr. HUMPHREY. There is Nothing
in the treaty which in any way lim-
its, inhibits, or prohibits the testing of
rockets or missiles so long as such mis-
sile:; and rockets do not involve the ex-
plosion of a .nuclear warhead. We
could us conventions,l TNT, for example.
iV[r. COOPER. Yes. I was thinking
of an antiballistic missile without a nu-
clear warhead which could be used to
ai;hieve the interception of an enemy
missile,
Mr. HUMPHREY, The Senator fs
correct.
Mr. COOPER. ~ thank the Senator.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will
title Senator yield?
Mr. HUMPHREY'. I yield to the
E'~e,aator from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH. Y have been listening
with great interest to the exchange be-
tween the Senator from Minnesota and
fienator from Kentucky.
This exchange has prompted. to mind
t:he strong emphasis which has been
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CdN'GRESSIONAL Tt~CORD =SENATE
first achieved some important new technolog-
lcal advantage over' the Soviet Union. Do
you think i{i' wouTd lie conssten?witFi'Arneri-
~Ca1a poiley "or' the~rnission of onr-7'.rmed
Forces, as you have stated that mission here
today, to'seize upon this advantage for the
,purpose 'ai initiating some nuclear- attack
upon the Soviet Un3on7
. c~ener~l: 'TAYLOa. I can -only point to the
past when we had a complete monopoly in
these weapons. We never contemplated such
ail attack then. .
Senator Cxvacx, That is right. When we
had total advantage we did not contemplate
nor initiate such an, attack.
General TAYL034. !'hat is right, sir.
senator qxvRCx. All right.. _
suppose the reverse. 'You have already in-
dicated that 1~ ie. a passibility that the Rus-
'slans might make the first breakthrough,
Which Would give them some new'and impor-
tant technplogical advantage over the United
States, Assuming that, would you be confi-
dent that the Russians might not use this
]3ew-found advant',a~e to imperil the security
qi' this country or, perhaps, even to initiate
an attack u`^ n this country?
Gene ~snox. I would say: "no"; if it is
,pOSSi'ble to conceive of such a clear advantage
-th ~t ~they could attack us without the cer-
taint~y oP a reprisal that would be.completely
destructive to them, Frankly, f cannot vis-
ualize that situation but obviously, one xiever
vi~suali~&s ll the possibilities`of the future.
~enator~xuncx. $ut it fs a'possibility.
' Gener&1 TAYx.oR.:,s a conception; it could
.:exist. _
_.
Senator CxvRCx, And even _ if they were
never to achieve flirough a new breakthrough
sd great or so preponderant an advantage,
nevertheless, .any substantial advance would
be cause-for concern with respect to our na-
tional security, would it not?
.. .
Geners,l 'I'A7CLOR. Yes, sir; if made by the
soviets,
t3er{ator Cxuacx.' Then, I see, General, that
there are very definite military advantages
-tor us which I tYiink this exchange has
spelled 'out' _ to limiting this testing at the
...present point, while our general position is
a favorable one, and I want to thank you for
.your testimony... .
General TAYx,oR. `t'hank you.
I think this exchange clearly, demon=
strates that there are no guarantees,
- should unrestricted testing continue,
that the United States would always be
first in achieving _some new brea~tlirougli
that might give an advantage iri-the pre-
carious balance of terror which is the
nuclear,.arm$ race. It also demonstrates
that one of the, greatest ns"'k`s of contin-
uing such tests, in the absence of a
-treaty, would be that the ftussian?scien-
tistS, instead of our own scientists might
pull ahead. After all, the Russians have
demonstrated .great competence in the
$eid'of'nuclear research, in the field of
nllcleax. warheads, in the field of space.
? Who c&n deny it? Therefore, I-say that
even from the military standlioint a very
strong argument can be made to the ef-
fact thaw the greater risk lies in reject-
,ing the treaty, than in confining future
testing to underground areas, where
everyone concedes than the "United
~tates~has had the most experience, is
the most proficient, and is most likely,`
therefQreA to keep ahead. The alterna-
- tiv~,~,,,~xpose_ us, it seems to me, to
tale v~ definite possibility of the kind
of brea~lr`ougli'that could one day give
the Russians enormous ,leverage on the,
'United~States, ~ .
Since.l~ll t~le.tcstimony before the com-
lriittee..illdicatec~, that our general nu-
Clear position With respect t0 warheads, Soviet point of view the picture is similar,
wcak+vaao ar~~~????,, "" """- Soviet Union has,since it became an atomic
knowledge, is favorable, vis-a-V1S the So- power in 1949, been steadily increasing, but
Viet Union, the time t0 impose S11Ch a Soviet national security has been steadily
restriction upon testing is now. It seems decreasing.
to me that no better time fs likely to Hypothetically, -the United States could
Come along, unilaterally decide to destroy the Soviet
Mr. HUMPHREY. To my mind, the Union and the Soviet IInion would be abso-
Senator's questioning of General Taylor lutely powerless to prevent it; it could only,
WaS One of the most impressive CT'OSS- at best, seek to wreak revenge through what-
examinations Ihave witnessed lri any ever retaliatory capability it might have left.
committee. It brought forth informs- It is my view that the problem posed to
both sides by his dilemma of steadily in-
tlOri Of great Value to the Committee. creasing military power and steadily decreas-
The Senator has read that cross-exami- ing national security has no technical solu-
nation into the record. I am confident tion. If we continue to look for solutions in
it did much t0 give a proper perSpeCtlVe the area of science and technology only, the
t0 What We are d1SCUSSlrig. result will be a steady and inexorable worsen-
We repeatedly emphasize the risks in- ing of this situation.
volved in the treaty. There has been Mr. President, Dr. York was saying
underemphasis of the risk in case there that we did not spare on money. We
is no treaty. Several scientific witnesses poured hundreds and hundreds of bil-
testified to that effect, as well. The Sen- lions of dollars into our defense struc-
ator from Idaho may again recall the ture. We armed nations around the
testimony of Dr. York. I just noted in world. We have spent over $100 billion
the record of the hearing some of that in foreign aid, most of it for military
testimony on gage 78.1. It fits in with assistance. We have formed alliances.
what the cross-examination of General We have built the mightiest military ma-
Taylor by the Senator from Idaho re- chine the world has ever known. To-
vealed. The testimony of Dr. York re- d.ay we have so much destructive power
lates to the military power of the United at our command that we could literally
States and the security of the United obliterate this earth.
States. But all that does not give us any secur-
Dr. York said:- ity, Instead, we worry ,about whether
Ever singe shortly after Woria War II; ` the Soviets wlh get ahead of us. Today,
the military power of the United States has we are more insecure that we were 10
been steadily increasing; over the same pe- years ago. So is the Soviet Union. We
rioa the national security of the United are ending money, at the rate of $14
States has- been rapidly and inexorably ~p
diminishing. million a minute, for arms throughout
In. the early 195o's the Soviet Union, on the the world. This year we shall spend $135
basis of its own sole unilateral decision, and billion for armaments throughout the
if it had been willing to accept the inevi- world.. Yet. no oils is moms secure. 'We
table retaliation, could have launched an at= have. given or spent several billion dot-
tack against the United States with bombers lays in South Vietnam; yet that country
carrying atomic or fission bombs. 1S today ri0 more secure. All Over the
Some of these bombers would have pene- world we find the same situation.
tatted our defenses and_the number of Amer-
ican casualties` would` have been some Dr. York was saying that Something'
millions. "' more than science and technology are
In the later 1950's; again on its own sole required, in order to solve the problems
.decision, and again if it had been willing to of the world and to assure peace and
accept the Inevitable massive retaliation, the Security.
Soviet Union could have launched an attack I read now from page 768 of the hear-
against the United States using -more and ings:
better bombers, this time carrying hydrogen
bombs. Senator SPARKMAN. YOU Said the national
Some of these bombers would have pene- security, was diminishing while power, mili-
trated our defenses and the number. of Amer- tart' power, was increasing. Do I understand
icon casualties could have been in the tens correctly you mean that on both sides?
of millions. Dr. Yoax. Oh, yes.
By the mid-1960's, the Soviet Union, again Senator SPARKMAN. Applicable to the
solely on the basis of its own decision, and U.S.S.R. as well as to the United States?
again, if it were willing to accept the inevi- Dr. Yoax. Yes. It is worse in their case.
table retaliation, could launch an attack Senator SPARKMAN. Would you elaborate
upon the United States .using interconti- on that?
nental missiles and bombers carrying thermo- ~?? Yoax. Yes. What I meant by that,
nuclear weapons. and perhaps I have taken a somewhat special
This time, the number of American casu- definition of national security, what I meant
alties which would result from such an at- by that is what one side could do to another
tack. could be in the neighborhood of, per- of its own sole volition and despite anything
Naps, 100 million. which the other side did; and, as I said, as
This steady decrease in national security time has gone on, the capability of the
was not the result of any inaction on our U.S.S.R. to unilaterally inflict damage on the
part, but simply the result of the systematic United States, despite anything we might do,
exploitation of the products of modern sci- .has steadily increased. ~
ante and technology by the Soviet Union. Senator SPARKMAN. And vice versa.
Dr. Yoax. Similarly, the capability of the
The air defenses we deployed during the United States to inflict damage on the Soviet
1950's would have reduced the number of Union, despite anything the Soviet Union .
casualties which we would have otherwise could do, has increased, and it has been
sustained, but their existence did not sub- worse from their point of view than ours;
stantively modify this picture. that is, what we could do to them has al-
Also, nothing else that we could have done ways been more severe than what they could
in the clef@nse_ilrea, but which for one reason do to us. We have always been way ahead
or another we may not have done, would have of them in this matter.
significantly altered this picture further. Senator SPARKMAN. Would a partial test
I should add at this pointthat from the ban treaty such as is proposed before us have
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15762
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
an adverse effect on us or would ft have any
effect on them?
Dr. Yosx. it would, ail by itself, at most,
slightly diminish the rate at which our na-
tional security is diminishing.
Mr. President, we should study that
statement by one of the world's fore-
most scientists.
?, Mr. ~ROXMIRE. Mr. President,
would the Senator from Minnesota
yield?
Mr. HUMPHREY. I am glad to yield.
Mr. PROXMIR,E. I believe. die Sena-
tor has reached the crux of the situation,.
and I am very glad he stresses that point.
I believe that too many try to`"oversell"
what the treaty will do. What Dr. York
said-and he was right about t-is that
the treaty would, at most, "sightly di-
minish the rate-at which ou_r national
security is diminishing."
In other words, we stlll will tend to
lose our national security, as will the
U.S.S.R., also. In short, this. treaty is
not the end of the arms race.
Mr, HUMPHREY. Indeed it is not.
Mr. PROXMIRE. It slightly dimin-
ishes, it; it slows it down. But it does
not end it. So I believe that what the
Senator is stressing is most important.
Dr. York said the treaty wi1F diminish
the rate at which our national security
is diminishing. It will not remove the
need for further steps.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Will the Senator
from Wisconsin please read Dr. York's
testimony on that point?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes. He said:
If it leads to other steps 1n the same or
similar directions, other steps in arms con-
tmI and disarmament 1t might &ctuaily re-
verse this present trend. I mean, I think it
would reverse it if we went far enough,
Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe Dr. York
has given us one of the most. thought-
ful presentations-in terms oP what is
really happening to national security-
that was given by any witness who came
before us.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Minnesota yield?
Mr. HUMPHREY. I am glad to yield.
Mr. PROXMIRE. One paint is both-
ering me a great deal, and I hope the
Senator can help me ,on it. Dx. John S.
Foster, who, I understand, is director
of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,
at Livermore, Calif., and is considered
to be one of the top men in this field,
testified about what the treaty will do
to our scientific capabilities, ix, terms of
continuing to develop our skills in this
area; and he testified against the treaty.
I shall read brief excerpts from pages 614
and 615:
in science just as in other specialties, one
must practice continually to be? effective.
Ultimately the present generation of wea-
pons technologists must be replaced , by
younger scientists who, through experiments
and theoretical studies, will also develop the
required skills. With a not too restrictive
underground program I believe weP_can main-
tain our capability in warhead design.
Without atmospheric tests, however, I
doubt that we can develop and maintain the
requisite skill in the important area of the
effects of nuclear weapons.
Even our theoretical effort in this area Ss
likely to deteriorate without the incentive
of meaningful experiments.
Missile systems for offense or defense are
extremely complex, yet must function not
only under the ideal lathoratory Conditions
in which they are usually tested, but also
under the most adverse conditions-chase of
nuclear war.
I know of simpler systepns which have not
performed as expected-dr whieh have act-
ually falIed-when proof-tested in environ-
ments which are far bet r understood than
that of a hostile nuclear~ituation.
On page 616 he con~hldes:
To pu.t it simply, the bjxrden on the tech-
nical community is to protiide the technology
needed to maintain the Military security of
the United states in the face of botYi tha
secrecy of the Soviet Uniap and the explosive
growth of scientiSc knobledge.
That is what makes'. the situation so
diflicillt.
Were it not for Soviet Secrecy, we could-
throu,3h. continual assessDnent of their capa-
bility--determine what level of arms urould
be necesary to preserve qur security.
New I am skipping. continuing-~
Moreover, we have to reckon with the fact
that in an expanding tedhnology vigorously
pursued, there frequently result abrupt in-
crease in scientific knowledge-rapidly re-
flected in military capallllity-which could
upset the balance of poser.
While we cannot guarantee even without
restrictions that these akjrupt increases will
occur on our side, it sums clear that we
must provide a scientific !climate which will
not discourage such developments.
The proposed treaty weui.d limit not only
our knnowledge of the actual state of Soviet
military development, but would also re-
strict our knowledge of what may even be
technically possible. Specifically, this re-
quires. that the IInited S ates explore vigor-
ously ail areas of techno ogy critical to our
security. Failure to do fs would ad:d to
the uncertainties conceatn~ing our relative
stren~;t11,, and force us w choose between
either an increase in risk to our security or
a further increase in our ~tevel of armament.
Thus, from purely techinical-military con-
siderations, the proposed treaty appears to
me disadvantageous.
Th.xt statement camd from Dr. 'F'oster,
who is i:he head of the Lyivermore Labora-
tory. Perhaps the max; most responsible
in this Nation for giving us the superior
of nuclear research that will protect our
national security. He 'did not stress so
much. in his testimony' though it seems
to me to be very important-that we rely
in our free system not only on monetary
Incentives but, more irl~ortant, prestige,
and even more important than that? op-
portunities for scientists to test and. de-
velop their skills and to make all kinds
of brE;akthroughs in their. areas without
Hmitatioxls on knowledge. On the other
hand, the Soviet Union'can command its
scientific manpower, diirecting it and
channeling it, because fit is an authori-
tarian satiety. It seems to me that pos-
sibly in this area we have a very serious
problem.
Dr. Foster has opposed the treaty. I
undex?sts,nd that he operates for the
agency that controls Plowshare as well as
some vital military '.experiments. It
seems i;o me that whexX we couple that
with ~~the fact that the soviet Union has
an advantage in directinjg and controlling
their scientific manpower, the treaty
might leave some disadvantage for us.
What is the Senator's >j,nswer?
Mr. HUMPHREY. ~r. Seaborg re-
sponded to that questi n in relation to
that very concern. ~. Seaborg dis-
,'~epte-mber 1 eT
cussed it in his testimony, It was also
discussed by Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr,.
Kistiakowsky pointed out that during
the moratorium period, which lasted a
little over 2 years, there was no letdlown.
in our scientific efforts. The team of
scientists was maintained. -Our Tabora-
tort' facilities were increased. Thenum-
ber of scientists was expanded.
Dr. Seaborg also pointed out to us that.
it is the express contention that respon-
sible officials of our Government, if the
Congress will lend its cooperation and.
maintain laboratories, expand, develop
and modernize facilities, will engage in.
underground testing to the degree that is
needed-aIl of which will give scientific
minds the opportunity for a, good deal.
of experirnentatian. But I also add that.
the treaty is limited to nuclear explosions
in the three environmE;ntossessing them. A note by the editor of his special assistants that the Soviiet
Sixteenth. An article Written by Rev. of Iis:inhua the Chinese news agency, in ex- Union was in an "accommodating mocKi."
Richard GirideT which was published in plainl.ng the pact, indicated this when he The record shows, the newspaper said, tl':at
Our Sunday Visitor on August 11, 1963. claimed it would restrict Socialist countries the President accepted this assessment and
not now possessing nuclear weapons." set about trying to seek an "accommodation"
There being no ob9ection, the material sincerely, with the Soviets. The "accommodations" ef-
Was ordered to be printed in the R>;CORn, " ' I. V. HORNER. iected by the Kennedy admfxxistration, 1>e-
a5 fO110WS' '--!' ginning in its first months, have now be-
TULBA,. OR:LA., [From the Knoxviil? (Tenn.) Journal,, Dome a substantial list. It will ,be: nui:ed
August I0, Y963. Aug. 23j 1983] that these "accommodations"' in every rase
Hon. STROM THURMOND, BE KIND To aor.IblUNr&T5 actually xepresent concessions made to world
Senator, South Carol4na, Senate O~fce Build- communism. This policy o2 appeasemmeni% is
Ong, Washington, D.C. The greater pgx't of this page !s devoted paw 'to be capped off 'by axgTeement to a nu-
DknR SENATOR: John Foster Duilea had this today to a listing of t$xe concessions-under clear test ban treaty that depends solely
to say about a test ban treaty New :Frontier semantics '"accommodations"- u wn the "word of honor" of the Rusaia,ns.
' wh'icll have been made by the- Keni}edp A list of these concessions, made within 'the
"A GR.EAx AclrzEVEMENT FoR PEACE brothd'rs during. a little more than 2 y2 years almost 3 years of the Kennedy administra-
"$ince a (test ban) treaty is what the in office. tion follows,
Russians want, it wouldn't be difficult to SVe hope a few readers, at least, will take 1. Three times refused to follow the di-
come up with one whigh would look good on the; 1;ime to wade through these listings be- rections of Congress to specify in the PTes-
the surface. We could include in it all the Douse fn the aggregat8 i;hey make clear the ident's annual "Captive Nations" proclama-
fuzzy language of diplomacy-and believe adoption of a policp o:[ appeasement into bons that formerly free nations taB:en over
me, I know some of the phrases--and present which the Khrushchev treaty now before the by the Communists be given their independ-
it to the world as a great achievement for Senate fits perfectly. In other words, some ence (an the grounds that the conl7res-
peace. All of this would result in a relaxa- such climatic "accominrJdation" to the ag- sional wording would "offend" the'Sovie~ta);
tfon of world tensions, generate a feeling of gressive character of tijvorld communism was 2, Authorized the shipment and. sale of sub-
international good will, and probably elect a. to have been expected,:now that we look back sidized farm products to Coxnmuni%a coun-
Republican President in 1960. on this record, as a sort of capstone fora tries; 3. Approved the sale of grain uniaad-
"But we're not going to do it. If we long succession of vital concessions. ing equipment to Red China through Can-
' signed such a pact with the Soviets, there It is noteworthy than the instances oP ' giv- ads in order to evade U.S. laws prahibf tfng
would develop a tremendous pressure to cut ini3 in" to communism are not confined to trade with Communist Chinese; 4. Delayed
back on our defenses, reduce the size oY our the Kremlin iself. T~xe slogan of `"Be Kind for a full year the cutoff of remaining U.S.
Armed Forces, and curtail our armaments: to Communists" has been lived up to pat `trade with Cuba, therebp helping to keep
And we'd have only the word of the Russians only where Moscow q+a.^, directly concerned, Castro', wobbly economy shored up.
that they were doing the name. Our?'NATO, but in numerous other parts oP the globe 5. Suressfully pressed for greater aid for
SEATO> and other alliances would be endan- where Communist dictatorships are operating Communist Poland and Yugoslavia,; 8. Re-
gered, perhaps to the point o~ deterioration. their customary police state regimes, notably fused an official greeting for the Sam Remo
As a result, within a few years, we could be Cuba. . ~ (Italy) Festival group appearing at Wash-
as asitting duck for the Comzriunists to pick The adoption of a', policy of appeasement ington's Constitution Hall on March 21> 7.983.
THROUGH 6ENATg'
"(By Daniel Mason)
"Nose counting in the Senate last week
revealed that, while only 1D to 20 of its
Members had openly come out in opposition
to the nuclear teat ban treaty initialed in
shortly after Mr. Kennedy tools office. A Poznan Choir from t;ommxxnxsL roiauu; ,.
front-page story in `that publication said Oidered the issuanre of passports, accordixYg
president Kennedy h d been advised by some to Passport Director Frances Knight, to
oi' his special assistants that the Soviet Union known Communists to travel to tixe Soviet
was in an "accommodating" mood. 17nfon and other countries; 8. Allowed the
I does not require too much imagination release of military space information to the
to identify at least one of these advisers as United Nations, including its Camm.unist
Dr. Walt Whitman Rpstow, Chairman of the members, while barring it to the American .
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_~..~
people as "top secret"; 9. Financed construe- for Communists to attend U.S. schools at troops to move in on the northern and east-
tign of,a I}ighway in Afghanistan which will taxpayer expense; 33. Tacitly approved the ern flanks of anti-Communist Thailand by
.provide the Soviets with a.>irst-Hass-military appointment by the Organization of Ameri- defaulting northern hall of Laos to Reds;
xoute to the Igdian subcontinent; 10. Ins- can States ai Dr. Robert Oppenheimer (who 54, Provided a red carpet reception at the
dated negotiatign to .establish .diplomatic had been dismissed from the Government White House to admitted Communist Pre-
;relations with Qommunist Outer Mongolia, for security reasons) as "traveling professor" mier Chedi Jagan of British Guinea and gave
halted them gniy when public protests in Latin America and later approved Oppen- him vast sums in economic assistance, prom-
mountetl, :hefxner as recipient of the $50,000 Fermi ised more if needed.
i` fiOL$TERED Ecgrrpnar Award. 55. Abstained in the U.N. vote on recogni-
1~. Bolstered the Soviet economy and cut 34. Made an even-up swap of Soviet Mas- tfon of the credentials for representatives of
Ynto the rparket oI ,American. producers by ter Spy Rudolf Abel for U-2 reconnaissance the bloody Kadar regime in Hungary 56. In-
lifting the ban qn imports of .Russian crab- Pilot. Francis Gary Powers; 36. Dropped legal augurated discussions in Budapest meant to
meat; 12. Approved the Moscow-New York actions against several Soviet agents picked lead to the "normalization of relations>' with
air route, which. wQUld give the Reds a "spy up in this country for espionage, allowing the Cgmmunist Hungarian Government, in
route" b,etweenxth@~ two nations but held up them to return to Russia as an expression of effect abandoning hopes of the people of that
-heal implementatign because of congressfon- our good will; 36. Ordered the' release from country for eventual freedom; 57. Allowed
aI protests; 13. Misled the U.S. public about prison of Communist Party Organizational the Communists to erect the Berlin Wall in
.President Kennedy's Vienna meeting with Secretary Harry Winston, one of 11 Reds con- flagrant violation of Western rights obtained
KhrushGhey until the Soviet press revealed victed of conspiring to overthrow the United in flue separate agreements with the Soviets,
the Rug tan leader, had laid down a 1-year States (on grounds he was dying of cancer, halting free access within bhe city, and issued
uItimatumyto sett],e the status of Berlin; although 2 years later, as a citizen of the So- only a mild and meaningless protest.
34. Actively supported the election of Presi- viet Union, he is still alive and actively 68, Touched off Berlin riots with a policy
dent Juan Bosch pf the Dominican Republic, attacking the United States); 37. Relaxed which forbade U.S. Army medical personnel
? aithou~h he had- the solid gaeking of four security provisions on Federal employment, from going to the assistance of a mortally
pro-Comm~xnist parties and. since has per. ignoring security reports in order to appoint wounded S8-year-old shot by Red soldiers
alitted Communist exiles. to return to the hundreds to high posts. while attempting to scale wall; 69. Ordered
equntry. , 38. Proposed abolition of the Securitq Di- the public relations representative of pro-
? 15. I?xgyided a red carpet reception and aid vision of the Justice Department, but with- Western Katanga, who had registered as
tt? the pro-Communist ruler.-of Algeria, Ben- drew plan because of protests from public agent of that country, to leave United States,
Bella, who then Ordered canflscatfan of U.S. and press; 39. Sought funds. to'construct but allowed the firm representing the leftist
property; . 16. Extended- heavy foreign aid to Government-operated steel mill in India to Central Congolese Government to neglect
"+~urma, 7~1.N. ,Secretary General U Thant's compete with privately owned facilities in registration until 20 days past legal limit;
11A.tive land,, which was the first in Southeast that country; 40. Idly stood by while India 60. Supported with U.S. equipment and funds
.Asia to sign a "peaceful coexistence" pact took over Goa and other Portuguese en- Communist efforts to oust pro-Western Ka-
with th,e C.h,~nese Reds and ordered American cloves; made only mild protest in U.N. con- tango leader, Moire Tshombe, and end that
b'usinessi~en expelled; 17, Granted a passport cerning Nehru's aggression. country's independence.
#or travel tq Cgnamnniat Outer .Mongolia t0 ATTACKS SUPPORTED
dwen Lat~imare, who had been termed b a SUSPENDED SAN
Senate y 41. Supported the Communist-led attacks 61. Used its executive power to suspend
tiqulate Ggmmittee as a "conscientious, ar- on Portuguese Angola, then sided with the the ban on free delivery of Communist
ipstrument, of the Soviet conspir- Communist bloc in attacking Portugal in propaganda through the U.S. mails, argued
~,cy' ; 18. Authorized. the shipment of scrap V.N. for colonialism; 42. Extended military against congressional action to enforce the
metal, which can. be used in the manufacture aid to pro-Communist Cambodia, despite ban, and failed to halt the flow of Red mail
of arms, to Iron _Curtain countries, includ- 'protests of its neighbor, anti-Red Thai= even after Congress reinstituted the ban;
~1.11g Russia; 19, Agreed to Khrushchev's de- land; 43. Provided U.S. materials to construct 62. Programed the vast majority of aid under
~iands.,to Gut ba4~ Yaice ai America broad- , a Soviet hospital in Cambodia and dismissed the Alliance for Progress to Latin American
oosts to Tror} ,9urtllin countries in exchange from?Government service the foreign aid in- nations which aided with Fidel Castro and
for a CgnilnunLst pledge to reduce jammings; veatigator who uncovered the deal; 44. against the United States.
26. Defused t-0,reveal the contents or subject Pushed pro-Western Pakistan toward the 63. Tied Alliance for Progress funds to
lxTatter of 40 secret 3nessagea exchanged be- Communists by extending to "neutralist" Castro-style "land reforms," Marxist tax pro-
twee~ President Kennedy and Nikita Khru- .India heavy military aid which -was then grams and socialized projects which forced
shchev. concentrated on Pakistan border, private capital investment to flee the con-
FAVOa~n Tx~AxMENT 45. Approved $37 million in aid for a Volta tinent; 64, Failed to protest to the Vene-
21? Ignored congressional prohibition and River dam and other economic assistance for zuelan Government the burnin of U.S. mill-
gave favored-nation treatment to trade with pro-Communist Ghana, whose delegate to tary mission in Caracas andgrobbery and
Cglxununlst -Yugoslavia and Poland; 22. the U.N. promptly denounced the United humiliation of American personnel by Com-
Trained, at U.S. ta6payer expense, Yugoslav- States for its criticism of Fidel Castro; 46. munist terrorists; 65. Provided heavy U.S.
Ian troops. at the Army General Staff School, Classified as "secret" information on U.S. aid to the pro-Communist Goulart gavern-
Fort Leavenworth,_Kans., and Yugoslavian military aid to Indonesia's pro-Communist ment in Braafl, despite vast confiscations
pllgts at US. fir Fgrce bases; 23. Shipped vast dictator, Sukarno, and other Communist and of U.S. property; 68. Apologized to the pro-
q'i;antities of jetplanes to Yugoslavia? 24. Led pro-Communist rulers, while allowing release ' Communist Brazilian Government for testi-
the campaign. tq have U Thant appointed to public of similar statistics on non-Com- mony of a State Department official who
secretary General, of the U.N., a move hailed munist countries; 47. Refused aircraft land- said that the Goulart administration was in-
l~y Khrushcltev. as_,'_`~tetterthan the troika" ing permission on U.S. Pacific territories to filtrated by Reds; 67. Continued U.S. assist-
pIan he hoc( proposed; 25. Banned the show- our long-tim.e slip the Netherlands, which ante to Great Britain, Greece, Ita1\y and
ing. of HOUSe Un-American Activities film, was transporting replacements for Dutch Norway, whose ships were engaged in the
`_Ogeration Abolition," on military bases be- under assault by Indonesians in West New transportation of strategic materials to Cuba,
cau8e of protests fFaSYl leftist groups; 26. Guinea. and sailed to advise Congress of U.S. aid
Turned over ta, Communist Poland a $2,500,- 48. Further offended the Dutch and Papuan given to 23 other nations, whose ships car-
OQO steel galvanizing production line. natives of West New Guinea by refusing to' ried economic materials to Castro, in clear
27. Reduced the. SLlktversive Activities Con- send diplomatic representation to the first violation of the 1963 Foreign Aid Appropria-
trol Board, whicix was .charged with protect- session of the native parliament; 49. played tion Act.
ing the Gover}~ment against disloyal persons, a leading role in forcing, dgainst the will of 68. Sought to mislead the American peo-
to the status of a "ghost agency"; 28. Inds- the Papuan natives, the surrender of Dutch Pie that equipment had been developed
dated in statements by the President and New Guinea to Indonesia? 50. Failed to pro- which could detect underground nuclear ex-
other high .administration officials that we test moves by Indonesian President Sukarno Plosions, thus making on-site inspections
would not defend offshore island of Quemoy obviously aimed at further territorial ag_ unnecessary; 69. Prohibited criticism of com-
and Matsu ixam, a. Red Chinese invasion; 29. grandizement in Portuguese Timor and munism or references to free world "victory"
Called for asigption bf a "two-China" policy Borneo. over Reds in speeches by U.S. military lead-
in ~ ~;Gport which_.wa:s_ quickly cloaked in 51. Negotiated with pro-Communist Presi- err; 70. Successfully battled up through
of$clal secxecy when public protests mount- dent Sukarno the installment-plan expropri- New Frontiersmen on House Committees
ed; 30. Lifted .U,S. travel restrictions on So- anon of U.S. oil properties in Indonesia and legislation which would cut off the flow of
,Viet.. visitprF and. embassy personnel, al- agreed to give him $19,700,000 more aid in Communist Chinese trade with Cuba through
thqugh Russia still _restricts movements of addition to $700 million he has alread re- the Panama Canal; 71. Perpetuated a Com-
Americans there. Y munist base in this hemisphere by with-
- ceived: 52. Used economic coercion to force drawing promised air support of the Cuban
$1. Drastlgally slashed economic assist- a Red-dominated coalition government on invasion which military authorities main-
anoe and xt~jitax?y aid to Nationalist Chinese; pro-Western Laos, as Khrushchev had de- taro could have brought down the Castro
? 8;:..-5.1d.CCP,plly pressed for deletion of loy- manded, resulting in anear-complete take- government.
airy oath requirements in the law granting over of the country by the Communists; 53. 72. Renounced the Monroe Doctrine be-
loans to students, thu$ making it possible Allowed North Vietnamese and Rar7 rr,;,,o~e
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Septer~2ber 10
15772
We have
nt;
action against Cuba while Khrushchev de- military experts our "ultimate weapon"; 94.
Glared his own "Moscow Doctrine" in which Shut dioarn B-~7 and B-b2 bases built around
he pledged Soviet protection to the Castro the Soviet periphery under the Piisenhower
regime; 73. Sponsored the "Tractors for Free- administration; 95. Canceled the Skybolt
dom Committee" to ransom Cuban invasion air-to-,ground missile program. which w+>uld
prisoners, and, after that failed, twisted the have given Great Britafnr nuclear striking
arms of U.S. drug producers to provide some power icr defense against; Russia.~eCu~
$53 million in supplies to meet Castro's ran- tolled U.S. mAitary space progr P
som demands; 74. Refused to recognize a Russia's 2 to 4 years lead in this area; 97.
Cubari Government in exile, admittedly for Ordered a reduction of radar defense instal-
fear it would antagonize Castro into grab- lotions which Warn UniteH States of enemy
bang our Guantanamo base; 75. Misled the attack.
American people over the size of Russian 98. Declared unilaterally a moratorium an
forces in_Cuba and the installation of Soviet atmos;pY:+eric tests well before the test ban
missiles on the island; 76. Effected a "block- treaty was concluded i~1 spite of eccrller
ode" of Cuba and hastily withdrew it before pledges against such action; 99. Proposed as a
obtaining on-site inspection to guarantee next step to a test ban treaty the signing of
removal of the Soviet missiles and with- a nona~;grassion pact with the Communists
drawal of Rvssiaa troops. which would mean the abandonment of the
77, Apposed firm economic sanctions and ~ptive nations behind th.e Iron Curtain;
other actions against Castro during ameet- 100. Canceled reconnaissance flights over
ing oY Latin American presidents of San Cuba seed halted all anti-Castro activity by
Jose, Costa Rica, in March 1983, and quieted Cuban exiles to minimize the possibility of
protests with pledges of $600 million in aid; an incident before the'. nuclear. test ban
78. Flatly rejected demands by represent- treaty was concluded.
atives of Latin American governments of a [From the Cincinnati (O~Yxio) Enquirer, Aug.
meeting of the OAS Organ of Consultation
that the U.S. order removal of Soviet troops 4, 1983]
from Cuba and called, instead, for "diplo- HERE WE Go AGAIN
matic" measures; 79. Banned exile raids on Something for the books-the history
Cuba, and with British assistance, hunted b~ks--is the assertion Of W: Averell &iarrf-
down and seized exile vessels on high seas; .man, vvho initialed the' secretly arrived at
80. Refused to carry out pledge to "inter- artial atomic-test ban; that "ti we don't
vene" if Castro were to export communism to ratif;7, there will be an uproar ` ' ` we will
rest of hemisphere. lose our leadership in' the world ' " ' I
81. Forced the resignation of Miro Car- thin] 'we will lose our position everyw'here."
dons, Cuban exile leader, and threatened to Mr Harriman was si;ill warm from the
cutoff funds to refugee groups if Cardona thueiastic embrace of Nikita Khrushchev,
en
.
tion of the occupation agreeme
a stone of that wall, despite
not touched
.
murder after murder of those att;emptinp, to
escape Communist despotism. In fact we
have condoned this aggression by inaction.
What did we mr ks clear in Quba? That
we would not support any attempt to restore
the freedom of the island, and that we would.
tolerate its :fortification and developmeDt as
th
e
a prime Communist military base in
Western Hemisphere. The Post; Office De-?
partmentr--on whose suggestion we can only
guess-even stopped printing the 5-cent
President Monroe stamp, lest it remind peo-
ple of the forgotten Monroe Doctrine.
Mr. Harriman was kind enough to 'indi-
cate that hr, was not trying to put a nuclear
gun at the head of the U.S. SenatQ. ]3ow-
ever, he and the administration he repre-
sented have made it extremely awkward far
the Senate to turn down this secretly nego-?
bated treaty that suddenly sprang Into ex-
istence after so many years of fruitless nega??
tia,tions with the Russians.
But it is, we ixisist, a mere scrap of paper.
It is no victory for us in the minds o1 men.
Wasn't it President Kennedy himself who
said twice: "Let him who thinks we can do
business with the Russians corrie to Berlin."
Why, -so soon, was Mr. Harriman sent too
do business with the Russxs chcdo cal ever-
With the political and p. y gi
age it can command, the admIni the iSenaii9
achieve this ne:w victory
But we dread the thought that; the security
of this Nation and the free world is com-
manded by amateurs and political adven-
turers who have made blunder after blunder
after blunder--and that the advf ce of
knowledgeable military men is brushed' acidic
so casually.
Already the sun never sets on the Soviet
empire.
NA'PO AND THE TEST BAN TR75ATY-QDSEFCV-
ERa FEAR THE FAILURE OF AZLIANCEa WITH
THIa AND OTIIER ACCOMMODATIONS
(By Constantine Brawn)
PARIS.--The nuclear test ban treaty acid
the inevitable subsequent accommodation
revealed that the administration had re-
la ed the United I States for a sucker
neged on a promise to finance and- support whop y
a second invasion of the island; 82. Financed, on tihe informal test moratorium, using the
through the United Nations special funds, intewrning time to seir up new and more
a variety of protects in Communist Cuba poweri:ul atomic test explosions.
and helped, in effect, to paq much of Mr. Harriman, of coullse, is a Russian "ex-
Castro's overdue debt to the U.N. pert." (He was at Ya~ta.) But the men
83. Failed to tak-e legal action against 73 expert Sn the defense lot this Nation-the
American citizens who went to Cuba via Joint Chiefs of Staff1-have, according to
Mexico in violation of U.S. law, studied sub- U.S. News & World Report, twice flied writ-
version and sabotage techniques and re- ten, formal dissents from the proposal for
turned iri 1982; 84. Allowed Castro to per_ the test ban.QaTv e whir:] Rutssiaa could and
sonelly select 60 percent ox tine n _
who could be repatriated and withheld the would. violate at any t~tine-wxix xmpa~r '~`+` sux? rise attacxs ana true nuvy~.v., ... ?-
informatidn from the public untfI exposed development of our defexxse, and. will effec- sli htl modified Rapacki plan continue to
1Jy GOP Representative WILLIAM C"iRAMER, of tively freeze our nucle~x' capacity while the worry political circles in Bonn and ]?arts.
Florida; 85. Blocked GOP attetripts to prove Russians catch up or forge ahead. French sources close to the Elysee Palace
possible secret deals made with Castro in Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara intimate that the troubled internal condi-
behalf of the Kennedy administration by believes the gains wild outweigh the risks. bons in the United States, coupled with our
Attorney James Donovan. He and his staff of so-iraaled whiz kids have external difficulties, may Piave been tl e main
8$. Pledged to Premier Khrushchev that halted or phased out a great bulk of Amer- reason which decided President Kemaedy to
the Vnited States would -not invade Cuba, scan offensive and defensive weapons. We yield to the advice of his advisers. 'I7xese
thereby assuring communism a permanent have effectively given 'up work on an anti- men firmly believe that coexistence vvith
base in this hemisphere; 87. Closed down at missile missile, new lox}g-range bombers, air- Russia-even an her awn terms-is the only
cost of $277 million, as Khrushchev had in- borm; intermediate-ra,'nge missiles, atomic expedient solution for our present-day ills.
sist~d, Jupiter missile bases in Italy and propulsion of aircraft, ~nIIitary spy satellites, Hence the signing of the :iNIoscovv Treaty
Turkey on the grounds they were obsolete, Navy carriers oversee bases and production without anq quid pro quo from the Soviets
although later congressional testimony dis- of new atomic bombs. ' and the likelihood that the next steps to-
closed they could have been made practically Mr. McNamara boasffi that he hasr.?.'t made waLd accomme>dation will folaow suit.
invulnerable by emplacing them in hard a mistake yet. ' "America is just not in a position to fii;ht
sites; 88. Failed to develop a single new ]:n his case, one would be enough. Or one under existing conditions," said one of the
weapons system during first 81 months in too many. French Elysee consultants. "As a ' conse-
office, while Russia pressed ahead 3n ail de- ]?resident Kennedy'. has made a homely quence of your delibilitated condit.on," he
fence areas; 89. Proposed to cut back nuclear little appeal for the g~,rtial test ban-which continued, "the Russian general staff has
stOCkplle for weaponry further than Russia gives up on our previous insistence for any already won a spectacular victory which ren-
if Reds would agree; 96. Proposed that the on-site inspections. ders the NATO powerless"
Soviets be allowed to develop a second [ie has said that the treaty is not the mil- He want on to trace the history of the
strike force second to none In the world lenium, but that, in the words of the Chinese Russian strategy since the end of World
so that Communists could feel secure proverb, a journey of a thousand miles be- Wax. II and the beginning of the cold over:
against attack by the West. gins with-but a single_step? "Even after the Soviets managed to exp ode
ASANnoNEn PoLlcsr So does a fall over $ precipice. tihe A- and H-bombs; even alter the!7 created
91. Abandoned the Elsenhawem policy of The President said:;"This treaty is in part a formidable nuclear force of their awn
massive retaliation in the event of an th.e product of Western patience and vigi- (which in th.e opinion of the French spe-
enemy attack for one of "controlled re- lance. We have made clear-most recently oialists still does not match that of the
sponse," meaning we would only fire on care- in :Berlin and Cuban--our deep resolve to iJnited States) , the Russian general staff
fully selected targets a.nd may even pass up proi;ect our security and our freedom against from 'Lhukov to Malinovskp have been
strikes at Russian cities, no matter how large any form bf aggression." against a nuclear war"
or devastating a Soviet attack might be; 92. The public should be indebted to Mr? with-
draw from the treaty but only after giving
3 months' notice in advance. Yn terms, of
modern warfare, this would be fas t'~o late.
This part of the treaty is an efl'ectiVe manacle
upon our aid in time of crisis.
We have been told that this cIauae does not,
in fact, mean what it appez~rs to say sand
that a re?ervation to clear up this axnbigu.ity
will be unacceptable to the Soviets and gnat
the treaty, in consequence, vrill be cvreek:ed.
The Eisenhower proposal was not flesigned
to prevent us from coming to the aid of our
allies, and it is not proper to equate his
proposal of 1959 with the present treaty.
ANOTHER FALLACY
There is another :PalIaxcy connected vrith
the advocacy of the treaty. It is the state-
ment that it will prevent the spread of nu-
clear weapons to other nations. This l.e: an
area of opinion which cannot be affirmatively
supported, brit it is not explained how the
existence of the treaty will in the least in-
hibit the intent of China to secure atomic
bombs. It is, of course, beyond t;ne capa-
bility of the great majority of the nations
which are now signatories to the. treat}~.
Early ratification. of the treaty now ap-
pears probable on the premise. that It 'ts in
the public interest on balance---a value
judgment, insupportable by proof, and with
which I wish that. I could see m,y wa.y to
agree. I am concerned as a private citizen
that there a,re risks to our country which
'the present Joint Chiefs oi' StaB and other
treaty advocates concede to exist and vrhich
some former members of the joint chiefs,
among them Admiral Radford, General
Twining, and Admiral Burke, regard as in-
acceptable risks. To reduce these ri:3ks as
far as possible, witnesses have proposed
various reservations which the Senate might
make and which do not require rejection of
the treaty.
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,, - CQN~RESSION.AL RECO$D - S~1vATE
- ------- ----- --------- wo ~a=~=u++y ~ u+tio tine treaty before it was initialed in Mos-
One O,f -these .re~.ervations is to the effect I could and concluded that, in good con- cow, a su estion which the Chronicle itself
that we,u~dpuld__preserve the right to con- science, I cannot sunnnrl: thw +,.oe+., ~~ .....a_ _~ ~g
- n?v .~=Q, ..?,a++~~tt, ttuu vtaer peaceful
works by the use of nuclear explosives, ei-
they within our .,pwu .territory or on the
territory of friendly nations requesting or
permitting such peaceful applications of
_ nuclear engineering.
Another and mare important reservation
offered ky .General Eisenhower would pro-
vide that . in the event of .any armed ag-
gression;endangering avital interest of the
United States, this Nation would be the sole
? judge of-the kind and type of weaponry
and equipment it_ would employ, as well
as the timf,~ig of their use, _
In conclusion, may I note that, because
civilized, roan abhors war, he is attracted
by any apparently reasonable. proposal that
.bears she label oY, peace. Too often, how-
-"ever, and recognized too late, a pact hailed
by a hopeful: majority as signaling peace
in our time actlaaliy turns out to be a first
step on the path to disaster. Since the birth
oY .our Nation, it .,has been our strength,
which lia6_,preservgd our freedom.. ~ far
as' oile can see ahead, our strength is our
most dependable, if not our only, assurance
oY peace.
__
[From the Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle,
Sept. 9, 1963 j
TxE Issvg Is U.S. SECVxrry
Senator RrC$A&D $. RvasELL has placed the
7111c1ear test ban issue back in proper per-
spective.
oscow in .July, America's Joint Chiefs of
national interest "our Government would PresidentuKennedy and Premier~Khrushchev.
13taff Voicgd their. opposition .to such a pact not have worked for and then signed" it. The death of the Pope made that timing
oIl military grounds._ A treaty would not This reasoning by the liberal Democrat impossible. But Mr. Harriman was imme-
Serve America's best interests, they said, be- from Minnesota attributes to the White diately dispatched to Moscow and the Treaty
cause it grould subject our national defense House and the State Department an omnis- of Moscow was brought forth.
to unnecessary riisks. - cience which we _ doubt they deserve. But Debate on this test ban treaty may be the
While the treaty was being negotiated and more Importantly, it obviates the historic most important debate ever held in the U.S.
immediately after it was signed, other Amer- advise and consent" role of the Senate in Senate.
loans well versed in the requirements of our matters brought before it by the executive
defense structure and the status of the arms branch of the Government. nfssErrTrrrc oPixforr
race camp-forth t0 oppose the treaty for se- It presupposes that any treaty offered on The executive branch today has an army
Curity reasons, Imposing testimony was of- any subject and with any nation is a flawless of experts, political, military, scientific, vir-
Yered tg, support the view that file U.S. Sen- document and a consummate instrument and tually ail of whom can be brought forward
ate should reject the treaty because of the ~ to be blindly rubber-stamped by Members to testify that this treaty Ls a giant step to-
m111tarv diF?.rlvan to..~ ,+ w,.,~_ a__ ... _ of the Senate. warn nn~ne w,r,...- a-Y___ .
But then. proponents of the treaty suc-
ceeded in &hifting the spotlight away from
military aspects of the pact. They ham-
mered away at the diplomatic and political
implications. 9f the forthcoming Senate vote.
ebullpientiin ~erxlationailspirits at the t me of
the. treaty signing was produced to `'prove"
that 73 percent of the American people fav-
ored Senate _ratification. Treaty advocates
forecast reelection trouble for any Senator
whu Voted, against the treaty and dire inter-
national consequences. for the United States,
1f the-Senate failed to approve it.
-Even the- Joint Chiefs of Staff were per-
suaded to glace 'political considerations
ahead of military risks in their testimony
before Senate, committees. As a result, they
gave their qualffied approval to ratification,
although one. of them-Air Force Gen. Cur-
tis hbMay-made it clear he would not have
sanctJoned the treaty before 3t was signed.
,With most of the emphasis centered on in-
teruati9nal axld domestic. politics, the treaty
appeared Beaded for smooth sailing through
the Senate,
But now comma Senator RUa6ELL, with an
assist from Senator Joax STEivrrfa, of Missis-
sippi, and Senator STROna TauRnsoriD, of
SoutYi Carolina, to get the teat ban debate
back On thetraCk. -
5peaking as the unquestioned leading Sen-
ate autl~,prity on national defense, the emi-
rcn+ h......,_,_~ ._ _ _ _
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SeYore the test ban. treaty was negotiated in
the Senate the responsibility and obligation sentative~ structure, c xifirrorin Loose repre-
to scrutinize all treaties .negotiated in behalf shades of opinion as there were~n the oun9
of the United States, and to turn down any try to a tight monolithic structure, under
that it might feel is not in the national which it is nearly impossible for dissenting
inttlerest. opinions to reach the public. This control
11IIMPHREY'S argument on this point is as extends in fact to private firms dependent on
specious, incidentally, as le another he ad- Government contracts, and to university ex-
vances. He claims it should be adopted be- Perts dependent upon Government subsidies
cause a poll has shown that the treaty for research. Near unanimity in favor of the
is supported by 73 percent of the American treaty is therefore to be expected. The least
people. expression of dissent is highly significant.
A cogent point raised by Senator BARRY Hearings are being held before the Senate
L"TOLDWATER in one of his statements answered Foreign Relations Committee, whose chair-
that latter claim, so far as we are concerned. man, Senator FVLBRIGHT (Democrat of Ar-
The first week after the treaty was initialed kansas) , is wholly committed to the philos-
in Moscow, said the Arizonan, a distinct ophy of coexistence on which the treaty rests.
volume of mail coining to the Senate favored The Senate Armed Services Committee and
the treaty proposal. As he said, that was the Atomic Energy Committee were persuaded
natural. The negotiators, the President, to hold joint hearings with Foreign Relations,
Premier Khrushchev, all were pictured in under the chairmanship of FULHRIGHT.
such high spirits over the treaty. That These committees allotted 3 weeks for hear-
spirit, Baid GOLDwATEa, was contagious, inga, 2 weeks for supporters and a third week
Last week, however, he said, another check (the week of the civil rights march) for
of mail showed that support for the treaty oPPonents. One Congressman who asked for
was dwindling throughout the Nation, an hour to present his objections was told
We suspect a more current poll of people that the limit was 10 minutes, but as a mat-
would show the same results, ter of congressional courtesy he could have
In fact, a national poll most likely would, 15 minutes.
in our opinion, reflect strong support for Impressive military and technical testi-
GOLDWATER'S suggestion that the United mony is now coming out against the treaty,
States require Russia to remove its troops even from Government experts. Gen. Curtis
from Cuba as a condition of the test han T'. TaT.'.,.. w, -
aamlttedly, this should have been written politically a net advantage. dLeMay said Sect
bets of RUaSELL'6 Armed Services Committee, always ignore its own selfiinterestseSnoruis
also formally announced their opposition to the time too late i~w,
the treaty on the eve of the Senate floor de- That many Americans seem willing to find
bate, which begins today. fault with the proposal that this country
STENN'Ia, 1n a short floor speech, cited the place its welfare in the balance in its nego-
"serious and formidable" treaty. RII3SELL tiations with the deceitful Soviet Union
said he would wait until this week to dis- smacks. of a timidity and a naivete ill befit-
close his reasons in a detailed Senate speech, tang a nation of ?aur strength and integrity.
but ha made it clear that national security is
the basis for his opposition. [From the Economic Council Letter, Sept. 1
The Nation owes a debt of gratitude to 1963)
RU$aELL for restoring the vital aetP?a,+ ~,,,,_ D_-___ __ ,,
hence. Even as he announced his opposi- The Moscow Treaty, for cessation of nu-
tion-which automatically changed the vot- clear testing, except underwater, is the first
ing outlook considerably, RVSSELL conceded step in implementing the program for total
that treaty proponents probably have disarmament usually referred to as 7277.
enough votes committed to insure ratification This program was approved in essence by
of the pact. President Kennedy before the II.N. Assembly
Whether they have or haven't, the Geor- in 1961. The detailed agreement for dis-
gian has clarified what should be the pars- armament in three stages was submitted to
mount issue at stake. If as many as 33 Sen- the United Nations the same day by the
ators are not willing to join him in defeating U.S. Government as the official document
the treaty when the vote comes, it will be recording the terms of the agreement ac-
because they placed political considerations cepted by our Government and the Soviet
ahead of maximum llatlonal security. Union. It may, as we said recently, have the
legal status. of. an executive agreement and
[From the Augusta (Ga.) Chronicle, Sept, 7, therefore be part of the Constitution. The
1963 ] purpose of the present treaty then would be
WrLL TaE SErrAxE ymLno to get the Senate's approval on record.
Senator HUBERT IIIIMPHREY advances as one 1nOCouncill Letters b12, thatpsome tmajor
of the principal reasons for the Senate to agreement was in the offing between the
support the proposed nuclear test ban treat.. c....~e+ ...._.__-___ __
1~i775
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15776 CONGRESSIONAL RE~URD -.:SENATE ~>epte~nber YO
retary McNamara had, never consulted him- treaty between the Gbmmtiniat States and the far more 'ability than they, over a much
the Air Force Chief of Staff-on the treaty. NATO countries. Note that such a pact is longer period.
Air Force Gen. Thomas S. Powers, Chief Of a commitment by the United States to the President Eisenhower had an excellepent Se~'
the Strategic Air Command, said the test present deadly division w~xich runs through retary of Defense in Charles Wilson, rho
ban treaty was not in the best interests of the heart of Europe, including the Berlin the ablest man ixi the world or.~ the indus-
the United States. He d not have confl- wall. The new treaty will sanctify the Soviet tr1aI side of war preparation. ',Fie also had
dente that the United St es would maintain conquest of the captive nations and end. for- a brilliant Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
its nuclear superiority if the treaty were ever .uly chance tar rex~niflcation of Ger- s~Y rnan, Eisenhower had mangffriends who
signed, and our nuclear superiority was, he manq.
believed, "the only present deterrent to war." On the Asian side, th? same end as the could reach him outside of official channels,
All honor to General Powers a7nd General Warsaw Pact will be aghieved by cutting and let him know what wars going- on.
LeMay. It takes almost unbekieva"b1e courage down military aid to anti-Communist na- Nevertheless major steps were i:aken in the
for any individual in high office to obey his bons, Pike free China aA,d free Korea? and reduction of American military dependence
conscience and take a stand against the Gov- then making them into an atom-free or de- on stxength. The long-term policy of glvin~;
ernment monolith. militarized zone. There is an air of contrived Stato Department officials top responsibility
We call your attention to the fact that theatrical effects even in tike troubles 4f Viet- decisions- wenta forwardsrapidly. o Stated D 3,
General LeMay was not appointed Air. Chief nom.
for a full term, but only Por 1'year. It is Warsaw Pact demilitarized zones-at our partment types moved into top positions in
reported that Adm. George Anderson, Former expense:--have long beer} the policy of the the highly centralized Defense Departmernc
Chief of Naval Operations, was not re- leftists in England. They have been put for- and exerted their influence through financial,
appointed because he was opposer! to the test ward subtly at many coxjferences by Ameri- legal, and other cobwebs.
ban treaty. We will watch with interest to can delegates, but the ~tme was not ripe. Parallel steps in weakening our militaa~;y
see how long it is before General Powers is The minds of the American people had not independence were the atoms-for-peace. pro-
promoted Prom command of SAC to-some job been softened up enough. But we are get- gram urged by Senator Hx7MPHREY and tkxe
ADA, the invitation to Khrushchev to visit
which has prestige but no defense respons- tang nearer.
abilities. There has been much talk of why I~hru- the United States, the synthetic spirit of
If Congress served no other 'purpose, it shchev finally agreed to9thls treaty. Khru- Camp David, the furor over the U-2 incident,
would be a priceless safeguard for our coun- shchev has been for disAixnament far years. .and the craven advice to the President to give
try, because it delays and makes more fliffi- The Soviet economy ca$not stand the cost up a state visit to Japan bevcause of Commu-
cult the punishment of Government officials of keeping up with AmeYlcan defense spend- nist riots [n Tokyo.
who think they should tell the American fog ec)nomic advancerx}ent.uHe hknowsnhe the fightingln Kogeatin su h a way as to free
people the dangerous truth.
The honor roll of good public servants cannot? "bury" us until lLs economy makes a the part tion ioi V etnam (movingl the Corr.~-
must also include Dr. Teller, famous expert better showing.
in nuclear science, who said the treaty would In addition, Khrushc,~xev had two other munist frontier nearer to the free world 1,
be a dreadful and tragic mistake for the aims. Soviet policies in Europe have; been and the mutual defense treaty, barring free
United States. We wish we coi'Cld name all directed to keeping a grip on the captive China from moving back onto the mai.nlac.d
the men of honor who are trying to give the nations and preventing the rearming of without the consent of the Securitq Council.
American people their best judgment on wea~>onna~FtheyhaveesuCCeedediinbotkuaims, Castro wastnot ~ Commun st tlxough his~rcca
these difficult matters.
THE POLITICAL rssuL but Western Europe is getting restlea:>, as it ord was well known, and insist that the dkc-
gets xrtore powerful. It must be checkmated tatorship of aging Batista, who supported us
We shall confine our analysis to one area before it knows its strenh, at the U.N. was more immoral tend dangerous
which we think is least likely to be exam- The Soviet quarrel wi h Red China has all than the dictatorship of a ruthless Commu-
lned-the political. Our concedrn is this; Is the appearance of a Mo ow Art Theater pro- nist supported 'by Soviet power.
the test ban treaty a complete package, to duct;ion. Khrushchev not going to fight We should ad.d to this itst tlxe destruction
be judged in itself, or is it an innocent- China. He would prefer to let us do it?. One of Senator Joseph Mcf`ari;hy with the help
appearing part in a carefully designed long- important suggestion, trade by Philip 'Horton of our Government. Remember that Sena-
range plan for ends about which we are not of the Reporter, is that the Soviet leaders for IvIcCat^thy had moved from his exXrosures
told? We are certain the Senators will care- wish t,o weaken Mao's mime so that they can of communism 1n the State I)epartm.ent to
;ally examine the words of the treaty itself, replace it with a Commtnist leadership under the horrified discovery that i~tfluences were
but we are not so hopeful they. will examine strict Soviet control. powerful enough in the Defense Department
this treaty as a critical link in a much larger, BLUEPRIIIT Fozf, suxRExgnER to promote Dr. Peres and protect subversion
more ambitious design for shaping American at Fort Monmouth.
foreign and military policies. "We shall try A curious effort is berg made to blame the The same story runs through the ZYUnt,an
to define the questions, li not the answers. Kennedy administration Yor the test ban administration, beginning with the dismissal
if, as we believe, this treaty. is only part treater, Why? Is this another red herring, of the highest American millitary oflicet' 1.It
of a' grand design, then the other parts of it the deadliest weapon 'of those who would the Paciile, ixi the midst of w war, becattse
are already prepared and ready' for adoption destr~~y us? he wanted to fight the Communist C'htnese.
at a predetermined pace. The policy implicit #n the Moscow treaty 'Phere are many more examples. 'Co sum
The architects of this grand design have is the; policy which ha8 dominated our mill- up, the present pattern of American rnilit,ary
really been quite frank about the next steps. tar; and political decisions over many years. policy, as illustrated today toy the reco:m-
It is obvious that this test ban treaty will be This treaty must be bonsidered in connec- mendations of Wiesner and Rostov, l~ic-
#ollowed first by the successive steps listed tion with .other military policies with which Namara and Yarmoiinsky, is :not neR~. It is
in the United States-U.S.S.R. agreement, or it is interwoven. Thelse include the aban- a continuation and fulfillment of tl~e rn'ili-
7277. These include further abandonment doxurxent of Nike-Zeus; the TF% plane con- tarq policies followed under President 75:'U-
of. military bases, demobilizing of missile- tracts, abandonment ?f our oversew bases, man and in ;act growing ever more pcaver-
carrying equipment (the Strategic Air Com- gradual abandonment; o:f manned bombers, ful under President Eisenhower.
mind?) , reduction of military training, and the: no-win policy in 1 troop indoctrination, These apparently separate but cloaely in-
abolition of West Point, Annapolis, and the and many others. Wp should also include terwoven threads are the same as the foreign
Air Force Academy. the. ;President's curious statement that we policies carried on, behind the. presidential
We do not believe our Armed Forces are cannot achieve an ahtimissile missile, no facade, during all poatwar administrations.
going to be seriously reduced. The services mz.tt!er hOW much we hest. In other words, .all. of these #orei.gn and
will be transformed into a gigantic peace l;n this connection it is useful to read an military movea could be auxr~med up as the
corps to teach industrial and farming skills ari;icle by Earl IIbell etirtd Stuart S. Loory in Yalta .program, or even bettcar, the `L'ehrran
to underdeveloped nations. The Peace Corps the Saturday Evening', Post for June 1, 1983, program, for peaceful coexistence. U~oder
idea is no naive qne. Defenses budgets will on how Secretary Mc~amara did away with vecrious aspects the design includes getting
be cut only slightly because most of the the IJike-Zeus missile.' the American Nation tightly locked into world
;ands will be spent. in a greatly enlarged pro- Ct is the fashion bf the moment to tie government, with a world military force
gram for helping backward' nations. In- these developments tothe conference in Mos- stronger. than that of any nation.dl state,
credible as it sounds, we confidently predict cow at the end of 198b, when W. W. Rostov world law, world government jurisdicaion
we shall before long be engaged in a vast anal Jerome Wiesner I represented incoming over the individual, world powers of taxation,
uxulertaking for aid to Red Qhina, probably president Kennedy. ?We apparently agreed and world con.tral of the economy.
on the theory that that will soften Red to end the use of provocative weapons be- The institutions oP the Urdted States ;and
China's rulers and make them willing to caue;e theq made the Communist leaders the Soviet Union are to be gradually mcxli-
accept aban on atomic war. What a stra- nervous. fled so they will look and fuxtction afore :and
tegic leap forward for Soviet military power. W e do not believe either of these rnen were more alike while we are persuaded by peo;pie-
THE WARSAW PACT principals or that th@ program of softening to-people programs that the Soviet ',peolile-
Another spoke in the wheel of which this up our defenses orig;Hated with tYtem. So left alonE`would not choose war. This is
treaty is an innocent-appearing part is the subtle and effective a policy for the lose of what Khrushchev means when ho said. he
Warsaw Pant. That Ss the. nonaggression American freedom Was contrived by ~nen with will "burg" txe.
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Y963 ~ CONGRESSIONAL RECORL)-SENATE l~'/'/'~
l
u-
THE `rvRx To r-ESTY - ~ ~4. In the past each time we have"met,` -with Communist governments. The conc
ith Russia they sion Ss correct but the reason for it is super-
Those people should support the treaty talked or made agreements w
who like the curious policies -our Govern- have gained something and we have lost and flcial. The Communists have broken these
mend has. Yollowed since' Yalta and who like experience has proved that when they are agreements when it suited their purpose to
the policies projected for the immediate anxious Yor something it is the best sign that do so for the reason that being Communists
future; Those people who do not like the I know of that it is not good far us. they could not and cannot do otherwise.
~blueprin? for coexistence should oppose the 5. I am Par more afraid of a sellout than I Unless he is restrained by some Pavlovian
- am a fallout. perversion of his nature, a wolf will grab a
treaty or insist on amendments based on the 6 How can you possibly do honorable busi- piece of meat when he is hungry, and by the
principles of the Atlantic Charter, news with dishonorable people such as gang- same token Communists must and will do
We .propose one such amendment. Amer- stern, blackmailers, saboteurs, or people whose what is immediately expedient for commu-
ican interests can best be served, by an main ambition is to destroy you? It is sui- nism. When Communists cease to do that
amendment providing that before the treaty cide to try. they are no longer Communists.
goes into effect, the Soviet Union grant free 7 In my opinion no one in his right mind No human being in his right mind would ,
elections in all captive nations on the ques- can be for this treaty and still be a patriotic hire a hungry wolf to guard his meat be-
tlnn whether they are for. or against national American. cause human beings understand the nature
- independence free from Soviet or Iron Cur- 8 I am bitterly opposed to the campaign of of wolves. The fact that we made 50 agree-
Lain military occupation. These votes will ressure and sear being used by those who ments with Communists and are shocY.ed
be conducted bq the U.N. in the presence P
of the press of the world. In East Germany ax'e wishing to pass this agreement. Presi- because they broke them proves simply t a
" the question should be for or against reun- dent Kennedy in his inaugural address said we do not understand the nature of Com-
"Let us never negotiate out of fear"; now he munists and/Or the nature of communism.
ion with tNes~t Germany. is asking ua to do just that. The recent agreement made in Moscow un-
president .Roosevelt, President Truman, 9. Our Congress. and Senate were not given derscorea the persistence of that fatal mis-
g,epublicans in Congress, and many oY our the chance'to participate in drawing up this understanding.
distinguished men have said that the United a Bement. Once upon a time our Government officials
States could never make an agreement with g10. Russia could go ahead with her testing knew better. Back in 1920, the Italian Am-
,'L7.S.S.R. until the captive nations were free. in China or some other, Communist country bassador to this country asked our then
Today we must add Cuba to the captive which had not signed the treaty and say that Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, why
nations. she had notliing to do with it. the United States refused to recognize the
Some better amendments may be offered Approving this test ban treaty could go a Communist Government of Soviet Russia.
in the Senate, but this proposal will keep long way in helping the downfall of the Mr. Colby's reply is a classical explanation
ppen the debate on our security as a nation. United States. People who give up their of the impossibility of establishing orderly
-.:Thirty-four Senators can save our country freedom for peace no longer have either. treaty relationships with Communist gov-
'from disintegration. It will be a political An old-fashioned American, ernmenta.
ullracle 1Y the American .people can arouse pAVL D. CON$AD, Sr. AaK your Senator to get this masterpiece of
themselves and tell the Members of the? truth from our State Department and read
Senate they will tolerate no surrender of [From the Manion Forum, Sept. 1, 1963] it into the RECORD during the debate on rati-
American self-defense. flcation of the Moscow Treaty.
Tt will be a miracle. But we believe in THDEATH AND AN AGREE ENT WrrH HEWITH Among other things, Secretary of State
miracles. Colby said this:
(By Dean Clarence E. Manion) ~We;.~A,13~ at_ our SiRUnLry taking of gaining strength." There are the words And they do their work well: "It would be
~~fld?place n,the Nuclear race, protecting of Stalin that treaties; like nuts, are made a pleasure to be bombed by dancers with
'astro, fi'n,ancin~ Communist-leaning gov- to be cracked. ~ such technique."
ernlneflts, refusing the contract of_the air- '`A diplomat's words," said Stalin, "must NEUTRALrrY IMPOSSIBLE
craft carri&f ~authori2ed by Congress, reins- have no relation. to action-otherwise, what Back in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson
Sng to gut into production Nike-Zeus. and kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one told Congress:
,Skybolt-and, the average citizen Sa war- thing, actions another. Good words are a "Neutrality is no longer feasible or desira-
ranted in wondering if his leaders are com- mask for the concealment of bad deeds. ble where the peace oP the world is involved
'~etent to maintain ,~hg, vigilance they say Sincere diplomacy Ss no more possible than and the freedom of its
eo
les
d th
p
p
-an
e
Y - . not.st9
the will maintain. We ha9e Aped dry water or ironwood, ,, ,- _,_,_ .... ~,ox7,aCe,. t0 tl~a~t;,peace and freedom lies. ,in ,
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Castro, yet. We haven't even slowed him
up. But, we stopped the Cub n patriots.
Are the test ban ass>rances on~any firmer
foundation.-than .the. others?, The test. ban
could be our last. -failure, , to meet our . re-
sponsibilities with acts-not, words.,.
[From the Chicago Tribune, Sept._ 3, 1963]
_~ ~ THE TREATY IN THE SENATE
The 16 to 1 vote by which the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee indorsed the
Kennedy-Harriman partial nuclear test ban
treaty with the Soviet Union and sent it to
the Senate -floor for debate does not fully
reflect the sentiments of the committee mem-
bers. Several who entertain the gravest
doubts about this undertaking were ready
to move it out of committee without giving
up their right to vote against it later.
Yet we expect that the Senate in the end
will give its consent to ratification. As soon
as the treaty was signed by the Secretary of
State in Moscow, the Senate was presented
.with an accomplished fact. Then a whole
raft of other countries signed up, and an ad-
ministration which is always mare concerned
with the good opinion of bush league states
than with the interests or security of the
United States began arguing that we couldn't
betray them.
Much emotional propaganda has been
cranked up about how the treaty could be
a step toward a new era of international gaud
feeling, while the accommodation-with-
Khrushchev lobby Ss busy magnifying the
hazards of radioactivity in babies' milk-
which, it is true, has yet to inconvenience
any babies.
We certainly should not choose to deny
Khrushchev the chance to indulge in a dance
:,15779
Let the Senators not say that they have
not been forewarned. Let each Senator re-
member, in Isaiah's phrase, that "God doth
instruct him to .discretion." '
_ _..-_ _
[From Our Sunday Visitor, Aug. 11, 1963]
/-RIGHT OR WRONG-A FRESH FOCUS _
- - (By Rev. Richard Cinder)
With all the discussion of the nuclear pact
betcyeen Kennedy, Macmillan, and Khru-
shchev, it becomes necessary again to step
back and focus- on the whole picture.
De Gaulle did not Join ixI the pact, but
no one is alarmed, for he is not hostile.
Adenaizer did not sign, nor Franco. No-
keep your eye on the short baldheaded man
with the wart beside his nose. He is the
enemy, the dictator of the U.S.S.R., the man
who can break any pact any time he wants
and send millions to their death.. He has
announced time and again that he is out
to "get" us.
if you read your periodicals thoughtfully,
you are bound to observe two very different
points of view about this menace. The one
holds Khrushchev for a cunning barbarian
and demands immediate liberation of Russia
and the captive nations.
The other counsels patience, believing
that time is on our side: "All tyrannies pass
away eventually. Granted Khrushchev is
evil, he will die sooner or later. The Com-
munist system is bound to mellow."
TIME Z6 AGAINST US
But time is not on the side oP freedom.
it.is on Khrushchev's side and he well knows
it. His system has, in a very short time,
enslaved one-third of the earth, and now he
wants the perpetuation of this outrage rec-
ognized by the free world as a stable affair.
After all, Hitler enioyed that pleasurg when He wants the abnormal made normal.
he -did a, jig. in 1940 at Compiegne when Hence, although he is as wicked as and
Fiance collapsed. " tar more dangerous than the late unlament-
8ut, lest Joy be uncon$ned, there area ed A. Hitler, he walks about~osing as a cvll-
few sour notes. Clarence Manion, former ized person and inviting nice people in to
dean of the Notre Dame Law School, spoke dinner-people like Avereli Harriman and
on his radio forum Sunday, discussing the Viscount Hafisham. These affairs are then
moral character of this made-in-Moscow con- played up in the Soviet press as proof of how
tract. He cited the awesome words oP the the Western nations esteem this latterday
prophet- Isaiah: Hitler, treating him as their equal and the
"We have made a covenant with death, freely chosen representative ai a great nation.
the overflowing scourge Shall pass through, it
shall not come unto us: for we have made
lies our refuge, and under falsehood have we
hid ourselves.
'.'And your covenant with death shall be
disannulled, and your agreement with hell
shall not stand; when the overflowing
scourge shall pass throu
h
then
e sh
ll b
CIA-RDP65B00383R000100210001.=9
gory, ^it is perfectly normal for your country
to be garrisoned by Russian troops and run
from the Kremlin. Otherwise, do you think
the Goverrunents aF the United States and
Great Britain would send their representa-
tives to treat with me?"
To quote again what Secretary of State
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15780 CONGRESSIONAL RI~CORll-SENATE September Yl)
the existence of autocratic governments between the. distinguished Senator from Mr. HILL. The idea was to have it
backed by organized force which is con- Delaware LMr. WILLIA14SS7 and the Chair- COVET Only a relatively few positions. 'I
trolled wholly by their will, not by the will ~~ o:f the committees the distinguished shall ask the .conferees to recede, as I
of their people. Senator from Alabaxra [Mr. HILL]. have said to the Senator from 17e1a-
`A steadfast concert for peace can never
be maintained except by a partnership of Mr. HILL. Mr. President, I call the ware and to the Senate. However, there
democratic nations. No autocratic govern- atterlt:ion of the Senate to the remarks is a compelling need to act in this situa-
ment could be trusted to keep faith within of the Senator from Delaware yesterday tion. More and more eminent scientists
it or observe its covenants.- It must be a with reference to ail}endment No. 25, and outstanding men in 1;he fielld of
league of honor, a partnership of opinion. which appeared on p9.ge 25 of the ap- medicine and health are being lost t+a
Intrigue would-eat its vitals away; the plot- propriation bill. Thtl, amendment was the Government. We shall continue to
tings of inner circles who could plan what numbered 25 and appears in italics on lose them unless something is done too
they would and render account to no one
would be a corruption seated at its very pages 25 and 26 of ', the bill, just as Provide better salaries, better reniune-
heart. Only free peoples can hold their pur- ame:nclmeritS are printed in appropria- ration, for them.
pose and their honor steady to a common tion bills. Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. That
end and prefer the interests of mankind to Tile amendment was also printed on may well be, but as I have said t~ the
any narrow interest of their own. page: 13442 of the COl3GRESSIONAL REC- Senator, that problem should be Consid-
Now, instead of these futile discussions oxn ~~f August 6, 1963, which was the day ered on its merits, even if it affect., only
over nuclear weapons, proposals for sum- before: the Senate acted on the bill. one employee.
mit talks, suggestions for the control of In. his remarks Yestu~rday, the Senator Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, wial
outer space, and the like, all of which imply the Senator from Alabama yield?
that we have written off and forgotten about from Delaware stated frankly, as he is Mr. HILL. I yield.
East Germany, the Baltic states, Poland, always candid iri thE! Senate, that he Mr. CARLSON. The distinguished
I3ungary, and the rest of the Russian sates- had read the amendmlelit before tYie bill
liter-this attitude is known as being "real- Was passed by the Senate. It was not Senator from Alabama, ii7 his usual, fine
istic," as though Abraham Lincoln had just the intention of the eprnmittee that the manlier, has agreed to do something
eat down one day in 1880 and said, "well, amendment should cover any such num- that should be done, regardless e~f tine
there goes south Carolina"-suppose that, need for increased salaries. I shaa?e
for a change, instead of always talking about ber of persons as the Senator from Dela- that view. I hope his committee will
what Khrushchev wants to talk about, we ware suggested yesterday. The infor- refer this question to the Committee on
would concentrate world attention on Rus- oration from the Department of Health, post Office and Civil Sel-vice, which
scan imperialism, slavery in the Baltic states, Education, and Welfare furnished the usually deals with questions of this kind.
the wretched division of Germany, the Ber- Senator from Delaware was that the
tin wall-"and whatever happened to Ru- ~E,ndment would make 150 persons ell- As one member of that oommft,tee, I
mania, Albania, Hungary, and Poland?" gible The intent a d thought of the assure the Senator from Alabama, that
We could have Broken Treaty Week, with a
proclamation from President 8ennedy, ex-
pressions of regret, and appropriate lists of
all the treaties broken by the Bolsheviks
since they came to power.
We could have exchange lecturers on de-
mocracy, with our men touring Russia and
her colonies explaining the American system,
and Russians touring the United states to
tell us how they run their conventions, how
they campaign, how they settle hotly con-
tested elections, etc.
The possibilities are endless, but they are
not likely to be exploited, for the other
school of thought is in control: the let-bp-
gones-be-bygones opinion, "accept the statu$
quo." "we must assume that the Commu-
nist threat will continue into the distant fu-
ture and that its removal is not within our
control."
it
be relatively few. ditions.
There is a compell~n?; need for action Mr. HILL. The Senator :from Kansas
to :raise the salaries of scientists and is not only a member of the comniitte~e;
medical men, not only at the NIH but he is one of the strongest and mast in-
in other branches of, the Public Health fiuential members of the committee. I
Ser'~ice. More and lanore of these fine, am pleased to have the assurance he Yeas
capable, outstanding,; eminent scientists given us.
and, medical men are being lost to the Mr K.EATING. Mr. President, vrill
Government. the Sene~tor from Alabama yield?
I3iowever, the amendment goes further
than it was intended it should go, Mr. HILL. I yield to the Senator
Therefore, I say to` the distinguished from New York.
Senator Prom Delaware that when the Mr. SEATING. I express my en-
conferees of the Senate and the House thusiastic approval of the action taken
meet on the bill, I shall ask the Senate by the distiln?;uished Senator from Ala-
con.ferees to recede ;from the amend- bama. It seems to me that this is exacd;ly
meat. what should be done under the ci.rcurn-
1\Zr. WILLIAMS Of Delaware. Mr. stances.
In the meantime, while the Commun s
dictators consolidate their grip over their President, I appreciate the statement by
respective conquests, acquiring recognition, the Senator from Alabama. It was
a fictitious respectability, and in some cases Representative GROSa, of Iowa, who $rst
our foreign aid, the zeal of the free world raised-the question, and I wish t Com-
Sags, and people becx>me bored from the sheer plilnent him for his diligence. I followed
duration of the problem. through and found ttlat the amendment
But whether we are- interested or not, it's did. give. authority fA the Secretary of
there-the wolf at the door (does that make Health, Education, nd Welfare to ap-
you think of Cuba?)-and we wail have to oint 150 employees~a number of whom
face up to !t sooner or later by positive p
action, could be scientists ,, and a substantial
As for the nuclear pact: even ii the Reas number of whom Could be administra-
couId be trusted, it would solve very little, tors, at salaries of $0,000 a year.
for it does not affect the stock on-hand. It ]t there iS to be ':any change in the
only outlaws testing. ~ sa]a]y scale, it certainly should be con-
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY JOBS AT
$30,000 FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF_
LABOR AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE
As in legislative session,
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, there
is an item in conference on the appro-
priation bill for the Departments of
Labor and Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, which inhibits consummation of
the conference report on that appropri-
ation bill. There is an understanding
SAOSisrr TAEATY wEEB committee was that he number would we shall be most anxious t0 do anythl:r.+g
we can to assist in improving the+ con-
sidered openly and bn its merits rather
ths~,n. hidden in such a manner as was
As one Member of the Senate, I aliso
feel that the Senate owes a debt to the
distinguished Senator from Delaware for
digging into this question. We study and,
vote on appropriation bills on the basis
of committee reports, yet there a'as not
one thing in the report on the bill on 1;l~is
point. When I read in the RECORD today
the statement of the distinguished Sen-
ator from Delaware yesterday, L then
turned to the report on the bill and found
.not one word about the action which lead
been taken to authorize the appoir.+tment,
apparently, by the Secretary of ]~Iealth,
Education, and Welfare of 150 persons. to
here proposed. I feel certain that the hags every one of us could be said to be
Senator from Alabama agrees with me at fault for not having' caugkit this item
on that point. I appreciate his assur- before. But the Senator from Delaware,
ante here today tY~at the amendment with his characteristic ability and stirk-
vii11 be deleted whin the bill goes to toitfveness, has really performed a service
conference. for.all of the Senate by bringing it. up
Mr. HILL. I wish again to empha- and clarifying it. I personally. express
size two propositions. First, it was my gratitude to him, because I--and I
never the intention to have the amend- daresay .every other Member of this
ment to cover any g11Ch number as 150 body-had no idea when we voted for
pcsitions. the appropriation bill that we were vot-
M:r. WILLIAMS Qf Delaware. I am ing for any such proposal as was appar-
sure of that, ently contained in the bill.
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at Erie and, put Oliver Hazard Perry in
charge_ of the building. The construe-
tion of ,that fleet .was little less than a
miracle. ,The shipbuilders, recruited
from Philadelphia and New 'York, had to
make their wayY through a trackless
wilderness. Guns`and ammunition were
hauled hundreds of miles by sled and ox-
- cart over almost impassable trails. Ev-
erything iron was melted to f urnish hard-
ware for the ships. Within 6 months of
the time they stood as trees of the forest,
..the vessels were finished and floated.
No crews of seamanship were avail-
able-negro slaves, boys, and soldiers
became sailors, Y?erry's fleet command-
ed only 54 guns; the British fleet had 63
guris of longer range and well-trained
crews,. .. ..
At 10 in the morning of September 10
.Perry sighted the British fleet. It was
the beginning of a day of frightful battle
so Well portrayed by the brush of the
artist. 'The tide of victory seemed
against the Americans. ferry's flagship,
the Lavprence, was almost shat to pieces.
But. its motto for the-day was "Don't give '
up the ship." Desperately, the Ameri-
can ships closed in and gave fearful
battle at close range. At 4 that after-
'noari the proud British flagship lowered
its flag in token of defeat. On the deck
of the Lawrence; Perry received their
surrender, but refused the surrender of
their swords. His`warm desire was to
- treat such worthy foe with all honor and -
euurtesy. The British deeply appreciated
= his generous gesture, and so one may
'.find even a richer meaning. to the mes-
sage of than day: "We have met the
' enemy:'and they are ours."
Mr, President, T know many visitors
have gone through the corridors of the
Capital, particularly the wing of the
Senate; and as they gazed, at the paint-
ing a? the top of the staircase about
25 or 39 feet from where I now stand,
they may have wondered what it-was
about. It portrays the victory of-Com-
rnedore Oliver Hazard Perry, a Rhode
Islander, on Lake Erie.
Mr; LAUSCFIF. _Mr, President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr, PAS'TORI{ I yield.
Mr. LAtTSCT~E. I am delighted to join
the- distinguished Senator from Rhode
Islands [Mr. PnsTOxEI in paying tribute
to the great nad'aT hero of the 'War of
1812, The battle about which the.. Sen-
ator from RhodQ Island has spoken took
.place near Put-in-Bay, Ohio. There is
a monument at Put-in-bay in honor of
tills distinguished American.
I Cannot help thinking `at this time
that, while we speak of the great achieve=
menu of Perry; we also should have in
mind the great ,heroism shown by so
-, many Americans in the War of 1812.
'~'liere is in Ohio, Fort Stephenson,- which.
W~s~o2~ilnanded by a Maj. George Crog-
'ha~ i=lls was alb extraordinary achieve-
';iieh!t rand he 'displayed heroism to the
='+uilest.~Q.~ree. ..
~ &1X,) delighted to join the Senator
from bade Isld_in his rex!iaarks about
Perry., _,I wish a so at this time_to pay
"trjbtlte to all t~e~men of our Nation who.
fRUj;ht nobly in that war to preserve our
CoUiltry.
::
1VIr. President, I as`k unanimous con-
sent to have printed at this point in the
RECORD a letter I wrote t0 Mr; William
M. Haynes, chairman of the Guests
Committee in connection with the Fort
Stephenson Sesquicentennial.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECOan,
as follows:
Mr. WM. M. HAYNES,
Chairman, Guests Committee,
Fort Stephenson Sesquicentennial,
Fremont, Ohio.
DEAR MR, IIAYrrES: I am very grateful for
your letter of June 28 in which you invite
me to attend the -Fort Stephenson Sesqui-
centennial Celebration being held July 27
to August 3, 1983, inclusive.
I recognize that you are, in this year oP
1983, paying tribute to the heroic spirit of
the rank and file of the military and the
nonmilitary citizens in fighting for the
preservation of the freedom of our country.
In your county of Sandusky, on the river of
that name, stands the town of Fremont,
formerly named Lower Sandusky. In that
town lived a band of Wyandottes called the
neutral nation, Their area was called the
.place of refuge. Sanctuary was always found
by the tormented and oppressed in the his-
toric lands of the United States in which
your celebration is now being held.
Your county is the birthplace of the three
times Governor oP Ohio and later President
of the United States, Rutherford B. Hayes.
When the name oP Lower Sandusky was
sought to be changed to Fremont, your dis-
tinguished citizen, Mr. Rutherford B. Hayes,
opposed the suggested change; in the name
and in support of his position he offered the
following argument in verse:
__ ,._
"There is a prayer now going round
Which I dislike to-hear,
To change the name of this old town
I hold so very dear.
"They pray the court. to alter it,
I pray to God they won't;
And let it stand Sandusky yet
And not John C. Fremont.
_..
"Sandusky ia,a pleasant name;
'Tis short and easy spoken,
Descending to us iiy a chain
That never should be broken.
"Then let us?hand it down the stream,
Of time to after ages,
And Sanduskybe the theme
Of future bards and sages.
"Won't the old honest sagums rise,
And say to us pale faces,
'Do you our ancient name despise,
And change our resting-places?
" `Our fathers, slumbered here;
Their spirits cry, "Oh, don't
Alter the name to us so dear'
And substitute Fremont!" '
American soldiers: "Iri that fort'were scarcely
200 men commanded by Maj. George
Croghan. He was only 21 years of age but
came of the finest fighting stock to be found
anywhere. The mere mention that he was
a nephew of George Rogers Clark bespeaks
excellently of his fearless and heroic back-
ground.
It was believed generally that Croghan
could not hope to hold out through a siege
imposed by the British and the Indians be-
cause of the smallness oP the number of men
within the garrison and because of the be-
lief that Croghan and those men could not
sustain a siege or an attack. He was di-
rected to set fire to -the stockade and retreat
through the woods when the British and
the Indians appeared. Patriots of our coun-
try are moved to greater courage when they
read the answer given by Major Croghan:
"Order for retreat received too late to
carry into execution. We have determined
to carry this place, and, by heaven, we can."
Came August 1, 1813, Proctor, the English '
general, and Tecumseh, the Indian chief,
reached the fort with 1,200 men, more than
half of whom were Indians. Proctor ar-
rogantly sent a message demanding sur-
render and warning that if the Port were not
given up the Indians would massacre the
garrison. But read and listen to the words
oi. Croghan:
"When this fort surrenders, there will be
nobody lest to massacre: '
Proctor and Tecumseh began their attack;
their battering kept up all night but with
little effect. Croghan had only one cannon
and it was a small one, "Old Betsy." When
the signs of battle were growing ominous,
"Old Betsy" began to speak more vigorously,
"Old Betsy;' now renown and supported by
heroic men, sent the Indians fleeing into the
woods and the British to their boats. Fort
Stephenson was safe and triumphant. Ohio
in _1813, through Major Croghan and his 200
men, was made safe against the invasion
from Canada.
If only the spirit and patriotism of 1963
were that of Major Croghan and his intrepid
men in 1813,'how much mare respected and
safe our Nation would be.
For the spirit of manliness, patriotism,
courageous and not cowardly political action,
our leaders in Washington ought to study
and follow that of,the men of Fort Stephen-
son in '1813. -Tf that were done, our country
would be in a much safer position, more
respected-not only at home but throughout
the world
I want very much to be with you during
your celebration of this important and heroic
_. event in the history of our country; I will be
present unless my duties in Washington
m0ke it 4mPcesible.
Whether I am present or not, I join with
the citizens, of amour ,area and those of Ohio
in paying tr ute to the heroic men who at
Fort Stephenson in 3813 participated victor
iously in the battle which contributed con-
spicuously in the preservation of our coun-
"Therefore m ra er shall still remain, try. It is a year in which the citizens of
Y,.A Y your area justifiably rejoice and sing praises
UntiTm
oi
h
o
ky
y v
ce gr
ws
us
: to the heroes oP the past.
Oh, change the people, not the name Sincerely yours,
Of my old home, Sandusky!" FRANK J. LnuscxE.
In this celebration of 1963, in the midst
of speeches, music; and prayer; you will be
reminded of the heroic deeds oP Maj. George
Croghan and his Intrepid men. On July
20 of the year of 1819, the British General,
Henry Proctor, and Tecumseh with their men
appeared near Fort Meigs to besiege that
mlli~t~,ry base. The alertness of the then
Governor, William Henry Harrison, reco~-
nized that the real `goal of the enemy was
Fort Stephenson on the Sandusky River
where your. distinguished town of Fremont
stands today.
St is a rather ~ommoniy accepted tact that
tli,e defense of k'4rt,Stephenson deserves to
be ranked among the great achievements of
Mr. SCOTT. This week the Senate
began debate on one of the most im-
portant issues to face the United States
in recent history. The nuclear test ban
treaty and, all of its ramifications. wiil_ _
acid should be fully discussed and con-
sidered during the next 2 weeks.
As one who is most anxious to support
the foreign policy of the United States,
I am presently uncommitted but favor-
a-bl~ inclined to su~~ort ratification of
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CONGRF;SSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 1 D
this treaty. Such leading Americans as
General Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and many others have recom-
mended ratification.
However, I share the reservation as
expressed by General Eisenhower:
That in the event of any armed aggres-
sion endangering the vital interests of the
United States, this Nation would be the sole
judge of the kind and type of weaponry
and equipment it would employ as well as
the timing of their use.
This reservation was addressed to that
provision in article I of the treaty which
reads:
To prohibit, to prevent, and not to carrg
out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or
any other nuclear exgloston, at any place
under .its jurisdiction or control.
- The Foreign Relations Committee, in
its report, seems to be satisfied that "the
treaty in no way impairs the authority
of the Commander in Chief" in this re-
spect.
Although I do not reject the position
taken: by this distinguished committee,
I do feel that the views and reservations
expressed by the immediate past Presi-
dent of the United States should not be
dismissed as lightly as I feel that they
have been in the .report. I cannot
wholeheartedly agree with the overly
casual assumption that the situation en-
visioned by a man with General Eisen-
bower's military and diplomatic experi-
ence could not happen.
Should such a situation develop our
security would be in jeopardy. I under-'
stand -that we would not be limited in
defending ourselves ff an enemy overtly
attacked tho' United States. But. what
would be the situation. if the United
States determined that it was 3n its in-
terests to use tactical nuclear weapons
in the defense of one of our allies, for
instdnce? Would our agreement to stop
"any other nuclear explosion" mean that
we were abrogating this treaty?
This situation demands a clear inter-
pretation. I hesitate to support a Sen-
ate reservation written into the treaty,
becati~e this might require renegotiation
of the'treaty itself. Any other action by
she Senate, in the nature of a "sense of
the Senate" resolution, or the establish-
ment of the Senate's understanding of
the treaty by making "legislative history"
through debate and agreement on Ares-
ently doubtful situations would greatly
clarify the boundaries of the treaty. But
these actions would not be binding on
the signatories.
Therefore I urge the President to make
a statement indicating his understand-
ing of this provision of the treaty, since
it is the Chief Executive himself who
must-make the interpretations of treaties
when >i question arises of the type under
discussion here.
There .,are two other points which I
believe must be raised at this time. We
are being asked to ratify a treaty which
gives formal assent to a moratorium
on nuclear testing which already
is ixx effect among the United
States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union. Therefore, while this treaty and
its ratification might not have any real
effect on the number of nuclear tests
conducted in the future because the sig-
nator;~ countries can coiatinue the_mora-
torium even without this treaty-the fact
that the United States ~ signing a major
agreement with the Soviet Union could
affect :at Ieast two other situations
around the world.
Fir.a, I hope the Sexia,te would .make
it clear that ixl ratifyi this treaty the
United States has notost sight oi` the
fact that the Government r!f the Soviet
Union has not changed in the slightest
degree :its intent to "bury" the United
State.. and the free world. The basic
philosophy of the Kremlin is materialis-
tic, atheistic commurisxn and it is
piedge:d to stamp out !free institutions
throu3;hout'the world. '.
From time to time we have witnessed
an apparent "thawing"' in the cold war.
But always the Soviet leadership re-
turned to its imperialistic objectives and
created new crises through the world.
There are still millions upon millions
of once-free people enslaved by Soviet
imperialism. At the very times that
there have beem apparent relaxatior.~s of
tensions between East and West, repres-
sive measures were increased by Com-
munist puppet leaders: in some of the
captive nations.
Mr. President, we are signing an agree-
ment with a nation whose leaders have
a philosophy alien to ours, a philosophy
repugnant to our concept of interna-
tional morality.
We must be satisfied that we are sign-
ing this agreement in vur own interest.
Let us never forget that when the Soviet
leaders signed, the mere affixing. of a
signai;ure changed nothing in their atti-
tude toward the United States or their
determination to destroy freedom wher-
ever they .could lay gppressive hands
upon it.
The second point that should be dis-
cussed is that, bluntly, we cannot trust
the So~det Union. Their word today is
a broken promise of tgmorrow. If this
treaty should be ratified, the Urdted
Stater should be constantly on guard
against any of its propisions being ab-
rogated by the Soviet Government.
Treaties are generally based on mutual
respect and understanding. This treaty
shoulii be based on our hopes Por the
future, our knowledge ?,af the past, our
awareness that one oi' the signatories
must be constantly uxtder surveillance
for pI axlned violations. !The security and
the prestige- of the United States could
hardly be more urgentjy involved.
It is the desire of each of us to sup-
port the President of tike United States,
to support the foreign policy of the Unit-
ed States. It is my hop that I can. But
I would not be fulfil~ixlg my respon-
sibilities as a Senator finless I publicly
voiced some of the reservations which
have gx?eatly concerned. me in consider-
ing this treaty.
This could be a major step toward
peace, which all of us earnestly desire.
It should not be a faltering step ixx that
direction. To make it a firm one, and
one i:n which we have' faith, we in the
Senate need some furt;rier information.
This .must come from~h a Chief Execu-
tive who is charged with conducting our
foreign policy.
PLOWING THE SEA
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I in-
vite the attention of Senators to a very
forceful column entitled "Plowing the
Sea," written by our distinguished Chap-
lain, Dr. Frederick Brown Harris, and
published in a recent edition of the
Washington Sunday Star.
In the article Dr. Harris points out the;
dangers that beset a people when they
become indifferent to their responsibil-~
ities 'to government, to their fellow men?
to themselves, and to their families.
Dr. Harris discusses the prophecies of
Amos, who diagnosed the ills of an ailing
social order, which was shot through.
with trickery, bribery, exploitation, and
injustice.
He further pointed out that any at-
tempt to build a stable nation when the
individual citizens of the Nation are
selfishly feathering their own nests
through injustice and dishonesty, and.
with methods that degrade the dignity
of the individual, is like trying to plow
the ocean with oxen. It simply carmot
be done.
Dr. Harris stated:
What avails anything prominent meal in
State or National posts of public service may
advocate regarding our society iri general if,
in their personal lives they strike selfish
blows at the foundation of the home, the
institution of marriage, the fountainhead oi'
all in our common life which 3s high and
holy. Ixi the words ai a well-known col??
umnist, who sees the truth in the ancient;
words of Amos. "Such men reveal insti~bil-?
fifes of behavior which scholars have found
to be historically characi:eristic of advance_ d
societies on their way down."
Dr. Harris' words are worthy of the
gravest coxlsideration. I ask. unanirfious
consent that the article be printed ixx
the RECORD at this point as a part of my
remarks.
There being no objection, the arliicle
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PLOWING TIIE SEA
(By Dr. Frederick Brown Harris, Chaplain of
the U.S. Senate) ?
As the end of the vacation season hover in
regretful sight, cars often bumper to bumper,
are headed toward the se.i. For jaded spiritE>
and tired bodies what a resistless magnet les
the ocean. How one long landlocked yearns
for the sight of it, the smell of it, the elixir.
of it. There is magic in the sea as we hear
!ts mighty waters rolling evermore.
But there are some things that sfrnply
cannot happen on the surface of the sea. .
One sees cars heading for the open water
laden with boats, but never a car aeaivard
bound with a plow or a tractor. The
prophet of old, Amos, fearless social reform-
er, coined a haunting phrase to suggest the
ultimate in futility. Hs was ;apeakln~; to
farmers as he said: "AS you gaze at the
numberless acres of the ocean, there is one
thing that is not within the bounds of pos??
sxbility. You cannot plow the sea witri
ORBn."
Now the discoveries of .science have made
our modern world, in many ways, the sort;
of world that Alice was looking at in her
wonderland. As the little lassie was :pur-
suing a white rabbit it was said in that:
topsy-turvy book: "You see so many out;-oi-
the-way things h.ad happened to her that:
Alice had begun to think that very fear
things indeed were really impos:~ible," .But,
even in our modern, acientiiic wonderland
tkiere is nothing our bewildered day needs
to be told more sternly and solemnly i;han
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SIGNATURE
Remarks
Attached are three excerpts from yesterday'
Congressional Record. The first has to do with
Senator Scott's remarks on the test ban treaty.
(Mr. Houston. took the bulk of the test ban debate
to the 9:00 a. m. meeting.) The other two
items are comments by RepresentativesRyan
and Rogers tying in the Viet-Nam situation with
their proposals for a Joint Congressional
Committee on Intelligence. (Note that Rogers
inserted into the Recor in ton P st
editorial of yesterda
FOLD HERE TOR URN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
25X1