ARGENTINA: THE NEXT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPORTER?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: REPORT

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Argentina: The Next Nuclear Power Plant Exporter?
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
By the early 1990s, Argentina should be tech-
nically capable of exporting a complete nuclear
power plant of the CANDU heavy water, natu-
ral-uranium type, including ancillary fuel-supply
services. If it exercises this capability, it will join
the small group of industrial states now supply-
ing power reactors. Among LDCs, only India
stands a chance of matching Argentina's
progress.
Argentina's nuclear effort began in 1950 as
part of the Peron government's drive for primacy
in Latin America and the Third World. All
subsequent governments have supported the pro-
gram, which fits the average Argentine's view of
his country as the natural leader of Latin Amer-
ica in science and technology. The cost of the
program has never been seen as particularly
onerous, largely because Argentina started early
(from an already good scientific and industrial
base) and stretched the work out over a long
period of time.
Much of Argentina's nuclear technology has
been developed domestically, including produc-
tion of research reactors, uranium exploitation,
and fuel fabrication. Foreign support neverthe-
less was-and is--needed for nuclear power proj-
ects. Buenos Aires has been very successful in
obtaining advanced technology from foreign con-
tractors. We believe that its efforts will be
equally successful in the future.
? Argentina supplied engineering, materials,
hardware, and labor amounting to 40 per-
cent by value of its first power plant, com-
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pleted in 1974 under contract with Siemens
A.G. of West Germany.
? Buenos Aires is supplying inputs equal to M0-
60 percent by value of its second plant, now
under construction under a contract with
Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited, (with
Impianti of Italy furnishing the conventional
power sections).
? We expect Argentina to supply as much as
60 percent of the equipment and 90 percent
of the engineering and installation work for a
third power plant, for which it is negotiating
with Canada and West Germany.
As Argentine capabilities have grown, Buenos
Aires has begun to export nuclear technology
and equipment to other Latin American nations
Argentina has contracted to furnish two research
reactors to Peru and is providing a research
reactor and a uranium ore treatment plant to
Bolivia. While these exports are being under.
taken primarily for reasons of prestige and re-
gional leadership, they are also necessary to
make full use of Argentine productive capacity
and trained manpower. We expect this trend to
accelerate.
Argentina's growing reputation as a depend-
able nuclear supplier in the Latin American
region can assist it in establishing a more sub
stantial role worldwide. This is especially true
among Third World countries, where its status a,
a developing nation enhances its acceptability as
an alternative to established nuclear suppliers.
whose policies may restrict dependable nuclear
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I I
supply. Moreover, supply contracts with its Latin
American neighbors permit Buenos. Aires to in-
fluence their nuclear programs heavily and give
Argentina a measure of control over their
uranium reserves.
Although foreign support remains indispens-
able for progress on Argentina's nuclear power
program, the country is not dependent on such
support for establishing a full nuclear fuel cycle.
Facilities are in operation or under construction
for all components of a complete fuel cycle free
of foreign controls: uranium refining, production
of zirconium-alloy cladding, fuel fabrication, and
spent-fuel reprocessing. Buenos Aires also is
currently attempting to obtain a foreign-supplied
plant to produce the heavy water coolant/
moderator for power reactors but is encountering
difficulties because of nonproliferation consider-
ations. We believe that even without major for-
eign help Argentina can complete its own heavy
water plant by the late 1980s.
By 1990 or soon thereafter, Argentina should
be able to produce domestically a heavy water
power reactor together with essential supporting
services. If it can find a customer, we believe that
Buenos Aires may opt to export the plant rather
than add it to its own power system, since the
country will still have ample hydroelectric poten-
tial to exploit.
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Argentina: The Next Nuclear Power Plant Exporter?
Introduction
Argentina, with a strong technical tradition
(including several Nobel Prize winners in the
sciences), has long considered itself the obvious
leader of Latin America in scientific matters.
Thus it was natural that it should enter the
nuclear field at an early date. Although the
initial decision to establish a nuclear program
reflected the Peron government's drive for Third
World leadership, the program has been strongly
supported by later governments and by the aver-
age Argentine citizen. Having achieved consider-
able success in establishing a sophisticated do-
mestic nuclear industry, Buenos Aires is now
beginning to export technology and equipment to
other Latin American nations.
Argentina's Nuclear Background
With nearly 30 years of experience in nuclear
science and engineering, Argentina has devel-
oped a sizable cadre of competent nuclear per-
sonnel. Since the founding of the Argentine
Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEA) in 1950,
the country has established several nuclear re-
search and training facilities and now has the
only operating nuclear power plant in Latin
America. Its first research reactor, designed and
built entirely by Argentines, was completed in
1958. Construction of the first power reactor
began in the mid-1960s, with completion in
1974. Argentina now is striving for full nuclear
power self-sufficiency based on its large domestic
uranium reserves. Its choice of natural-uranium
power reactors permits it to exploit these reserves
without dependence on foreign enrichment
? services.
Argentina has done a large share of the work
on its nuclear power plants. For the first plant-
the German-built pressurized heavy water reac-
tor at Atucha-domestic industry provided civil
SECRET
The 10,000-kW RA-3 research reactor, Ezeiza Atomic
Center. Built entirely from Argentine resources, the reactor
was completed in 1967.
engineering, materials, electro-mechanical
equipment, and labor amounting to about 40
percent of the plant's total value, and Argentine
subcontractors directed about one-fourth of the
engineering and installation work. The contract
with Canada for a second plant, a CANDU-type
reactor now under construction at Embalse in
Cordoba Province, calls for a 50-percent domes-
tic input; the share may well reach 60 percent.
Buenos Aires intends to build a second reactor at
Atucha, to be completed in the late 1980s.
Admiral Castro Madero, head of CNEA, has
stated that domestic content of this plant will
amount to 60 percent,
Argentina also is taking steps to become self-
sufficient in heavy water and in the complete
nuclear fuel cycle. Construction is about to begin
on a pilot plant for heavy water-used as moder-
ator/coolant in its reactors-and a full-scale
facility is planned. A pilot-scale fuel-fabrication
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plant was completed last year. A few power-
reactor fuel elements have been produced, and
technology for producing mixed oxide fuels is
being developed. A full-scat.:: plant to produce
about 270 metric tons per year of power-reactor
fuel elements is being built and should be in
production by 1980. Chemical reprocessing of
spent fuel was conducted on a laboratory scale as
early as 1969, and construction of a pilot plant to
reprocess spent fuel element, from the Atucha
plant is scheduled for completion by 1981 (see
table 1).
Technical Capabilities
There are few gaps in Argentina's nuclear
technology base. CNEA has gained practical
experience by designing, engineering, construct-
ing, and operating most components of a full
nuclear program, from uranium exploration
through research reactor development, fuel fabri-
cation, and reprocessing. In moving into the
nuclear power plant field, the Argentines are
widening their nuclear construction and engi-
neering skills and are providing a growing array
of high-technology equipment and components.
These capabilities are emerging rapidly from a
modest beginning. During construction of the
Atucha plant, for example, Argentina's contribu-
tion was limited mainly to excavation and site
preparation, installation of some of the concrete
and nonnuclear-grade pipe work, and some elec-
trical equipment. Practically all the power plant
equipment-nuclear and nonnuclear-was im-
ported and installed by the West German con-
tractor, Siemens A.G.
Based on the experience gained from Atucha,
the Argentine contribution to the Rio Tercero
plant now under construction at Embalse is
much greater. In addition to providing most of
the nonspecialized electrical installations in the
plant and in the switchyard and substation, the
Argentines are assembling (from domestic and
imported components) and installing steam gen-
erators, turbogenerators, and much of the nuclear-
grade piping and valves. While the Canadian
contractor is providing and installing the nuclear
reactor and its critical linkages and controls,
even these operations are being carried out with
close Argentine support.
Argentine Nuclear Production and Export:
The Record and Prospects'
Research reactors ................. _.. _........................
First
1958
First
1978
Fuel-fabrication services for research reactors ......................................
1966
1979/80
Uranium prospecting, mining, and concentration services ..................
late 1950s
1977
Assistance in setting up nuclear research centers ............... _................
NA
1977
Fuel-fabrication services for power reactors
Pilot-scale ......_._..__ ................._......._.............................................._.
1977
NA
Full-scale ......... _... .... ._._ ........ ................... .............. ....... ...................
1980
1990
Heavy water production
Pilot-scale ........ . _ ................ ........... ......... ................ ....... ...................
1980
NA
Full-scale. ...... _............. -....... ..._ .....................................................
1984
1986
Full-scale' ...... .... _.... _ ..................... _.... ........... .. ..........................
1987/88
1990
Heavy water power reactor .._......... .... ........................................
1990/92
1990/92
Reprocessing services
Laboratory ...... .............. _........ _....................................... _.................
1969
NA
Pilot-scale ........ .................. .......... _...... ............................. ................
1981
NA
Full-scale ........ ............... .......... _....................................................
1988
1992
' Future dates are C[A estimates.
2 With purchase of a foreign-built plant during 1978.
s Using Argentina's own resources.
` 100-percent Argentine-contracted.
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For Atucha II, Argentina expects to assemble
and install the bulk of the reactor under supervi-
sion of the foreign contractor still to be selected.
Negotiations are in progress with both Canada
and West Germany. The Argentines plan to
manufacture many components themselves and
will also be responsible for installing much of the
imported equipment, such as high-pressure
valves, pressure tubes, and control-panel compo-
nents. The main items that will still have to be
provided and installed by the contractor will be
pressurizers, custom automatic refueling equip-
ment, and the large nuclear-scale turbines. Table
2 shows the key items Argentina can now pro-
duce and those it should be able to manufacture
by 1985.
Argentina is accomplishing all this despite an
industrial base that, while strong by Latin
American standards, is quite narrow when com-
pared with that of developed countries. Although
the construction industry is well developed, pro-
duction of sophisticated equipment is limited and
remains heavily dependent on imported compo-
nents and specialty steels. For example, Argenti-
na still imports a sizable share of its electric
power equipment needs. Argentina's nuclear ac-
complishments reflect mainly the relatively nar-
row focus of the effort and the country's basic
strength in the sciences.
Manpower Resources
The critical element in Argentina's nuclear
accomplishments has been the large cadre of
trained nuclear personnel that the nation has
been able to acquire. Since the nuclear program
was launched in the early 1950s, the stock of
Constituyentes Atomic Center near Buenos Aires, devoted to research and training.
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Argentina: Production Capabilities for Key Elements
of Nuclear Power Stations
Conventional construction and power system
High-quality welding ................. ... _........ ....... ........................ ._...........
Yes
Yes
High-stress concrete .... ............ _.............. ...... .............. _......... _..........
Yes
Yes
Electrical contractinc ............... _ ......__........... .............. ........ ._............
Yes
Yes
Major electrical
Switchyard equipment ._..... ........ ....................................... ............. .
Yes
Yes
Turbo-generators ......................... .............. .. _ ...................... .............
Yes
Yes
Nuclear-scale turbines (megawatt) ............ ...... ..................... .............
No
No
Nuclear steam-supply :system
Conventional large-diameter steel piping ._.. _ ................. ........ .........
Yes
Yes
Valves and pumps, auxiliary _ .......................... _ ................. _.........
Yes
Yes
Large pumps and valves for reactor coolant .. ..........
No
Yes
Nuclear steam -generators .......................... ...... _ ..................... ..........
No
Yes
Internal equipment
Pressure tubing .. ........................................ ............ ...._,..__...........
No
No
Control rods/drivfs ........... .......... .......................... ..... .......... .._........ .
No
Yes
Pressurizers ......... .............. ..... ..................... ........... ........................
No
No
Support equipment
Fuel-reload machinery ......... ........................ ...... ........ ......................
No
No
Fuel-storage racks _ ...................................... . ..
No
Yes
Control panels ..... ...... ........... ...._................................. .._..................
No
Partial
Technical skills for reactors
Operation .._ ......... ....... ............. _................................... _......__..........
Partial
Yes
Safety .................... .................. ..... .............. ........... ................_..........
Partial
Yes
Design and engineering .......... ................ .................... ........ ..... ........
Partial
Yes
Nuclear fuel cycle
Fuel technology
Mining .................................. _ ..... _ .. ................ _ .......................
Yes
Yes
Concentration ...... _................ _ ............._....................._....................
Yes
Yes
Chemical and machine processing for UO, _ ..................................
Yes (pilot)
Yes
Zirconium cladding (extrusion) ..................._....................................
Yes (pilot)
Yes
Fuel assembly .... ........... ........... .................. ............................._........
Yes (pilot)
Yes
Heavy Water
Distillate columns _ ...............__......................................................
No
No
Valves .................... ............... ............ ........... _..............._.................
No
No
Design and engine. ring ....... .......... .................................................
Yes
Yes
Reprocessing
Chemical process ......... ........ ..._............. ...................... ._.........
Yes
Yes
Fuel-chopping machines ......... .__ ............. ............................ _.........
No
Yes
domestic nuclear personnel has. been greatly aug-
mented by sending large numbers of students to
Western Europe and the United States for train-
ing in nuclear science and engineering. Largely
by this means, CNEA by 1974 had accumulated
a body of some 600 nuclear scientists and 1,600
professional-level technicians.
The number of nuclear personnel employed by
CNEA has since declined substantially, reflect-
ing both a dispersion to private industry and
research and a "brain drain" of several hundred
who went abroad to obtain higher pay or to
escape political repression during the Peron ad-
ministration and following the 1976 takeover by
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Pressure chamber for Atucha arriving from West Germany (1971).
the military government. Current CNEA em-
ployment of nuclear scientists and professional-
level technicians is estimated at 1,200 persons.
Close to another 1,500 professional-level person-
nel are employed by private Argentine firms,
mostly on government nuclear contracts. Many
of the several hundred still working abroad may
eventually be attracted back to Argentina as the
a country's nuclear program gains international
prestige. An estimated 250 Argentines are cur-
rently working in Western Europe, Canada, and
the United States. In addition, a sizable but
unknown number are employed in Iran.
Academic training and extensive research ex-
perience are adding to both the stock and the
capabilities of nuclear personnel. Some students
still are being sent abroad for training in nuclear
science and engineering. The most important
domestic academic facility is the University of
Cuyo, which conducts a joint educational pro-
gram with the Balseiro Atomic Institute at Bari-
loche. It is now graduating some 15 nuclear
engineers yearly and awarding doctorates in
nuclear science. Nuclear research centers at the
Universities of Cordoba and Rosario, both of
which have research reactors, also provide aca-
demic training. Research experience for the bulk
of CNEA personnel-as well as increasing ex-
perience in practical applications-is obtained ai
the three large government nuclear research
facilities:
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? Ezeiza Atomic Center, near Buenos Aires
(at which fuel-fabrication and chemical re-
processing facilities are now under
construction).
? Constituyentes Atomic Center, in Buenos
Aires (where a prototype plutonium fuel-
fabrication line recently his been installed).
? The Bariloche Atomic Center (where the
main production facility for zirconium
sponge is being constructed).
Capabilities of CNEA nuclear personnel are
being further enhanced by a program under
which some 150 Argentines have received practi-
cal training on the CANDU reactor in Canada.
Touching Base Abroad
Although Argentina began supplying nuclear
technology and equipment to other Latin Ameri-
can countries as early as 1970, such contacts
have mushroomed since the military government
came to power in 1976. The main purpose of
these contacts is not to increase foreign trade-
though this aspect will become increasingly im-
portant in the future-but rather to cement
relationships with neighboring countries and in-
crease Argentine prestige. Argentina's military
government, realizing that the country has little
hope of catching up with Brazil militarily or
economically, hopes to maintain some degree of
Latin American leadership through these
contacts.
The nuclear relationship is most. advanced
with Peru. Under a March 1977 contract, Ar-
gentina is providing a complete research center
including a zero-power research reactor and a
10-megawatt (thermal) reactor for producing
radioisotopes. Also included in the project will be
equipment and training in radiation protection,
uranium prospecting, ore treatment, and prep-
aration of isotopes for industry and research.
Buenos Aires won the contract in competition
with France, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
The value of the entire deal has been reported as
just under $50 million. It is to be financed by a
long-term Argentine loan.
Argentina also recently signed nuclear assis-
tance agreements with three other South Ameri-
can countries-Uruguay (March 1977 and April
1978), Ecuador (April 1977 and April 1978),
and Bolivia (April 1978). The agreements with
Montevideo, whose research reactor-acquired
from the United States-was recently activated
by CNEA specialists, covers information and
personnel exchange, cooperation in radioisotope
production, and preparation of studies for a 1-
megawatt (thermal) research reactor. The agree-
ments with Ecuador focus on personnel training
but also look to the possible installation of a
research reactor. The agreement with Bolivia
updates and expands a 1970 accord under which
Argentina built a pilot concentrating plant at a
Bolivian uranium mine. The new contract covers
training of Bolivian technicians, planning and
possible construction of a research reactor, devel-
opment of uranium mines and ore-processing
facilities, and planning for possible future nucle-
ar power plants.
Argentina also has nuclear exchange arrange-
ments with several other Third World countries,
some of which may eventually become customers
for Argentine nuclear goods or services. In early
1977 Buenos Aires signed a generalized agree-
ment with Chile providing for personnel ex-
changes and technical assistance. Argentina also
has nuclear cooperation agreements with Para-
guay, Venezuela, and Mexico; at present these
apparently cover only personnel exchanges but
they are likely to be expanded in the future. No
official nuclear cooperation exists with Brazil,
but personal contact among experts is fairly
extensive. Argentina also is discussing possible
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Atucha-first nuclear power plant in Latin America, completed in 1974.
arrangements with several countries in Europe,
the Middle East, and Asia.
The Continuing Foreign Role
While developing its own capabilities, Argenti-
na remains dependent on foreign support to
master the technological skills needed to build its
nuclear power plants. For example, although
Argentine subcontractors on Atucha II are to
assume responsibility for the design, procure-
ment, and installation of much of the equipment,
they will need close day-to-day guidance and
supervision from the foreign contractor to dis-
charge this responsibility effectively. Argentina
is not dependent on foreign support for full-scale
facilities for fuel fabrication or for chemical
reprocessing of spent fuel, although it is getting
some West German help for the former and is
studying Indian and Italian technology for the
latter. It also is not dependent on such support
for its planned full-scale heavy water plant, but
foreign help would substantially speed its
completion.
Buenos Aires is obtaining the necessary for-
eign technology for its nuclear power plants
primarily from Canada and West Germany. In
current negotiations for the Atucha II contract,
CNEA is insisting that the contractor provide
whatever training and support is needed to assure
that Argentina will be able to produce most of
the components and assemble all but a few. For
some sophisticated items, such as pressurizers
and pressure tubing, CNEA plans eventually to
acquire the needed skills through a combination
of bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with
such countries as Spain, India, and Italy and the
hiring of foreign specialists by Argentine subcon-
tractors. At present Argentina has reciprocal
nuclear cooperation agreements with at least a
dozen countries.
Argentina's footdragging in adopting interna.
tional safeguards' has so far not hampered prog
ress in its domestic nuclear program or its export
contracts. Exported research reactors are sale-
guarded because the enriched fuel they use must
Argentina has not signed the Nuclear Proliferation Treats
Although it has signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, designed to keep
Latin America free of nuclear weapons, this treaty is not yet
binding on Argentina because, like Brazil, it has not yet waived thr
provision that all Latin America countries must ratify the treat;
before it becomes operative.
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come from a third country. The Argentine goal
of nuclear self-sufficiency, however, is encoun-
tering snags on the safeguards issue. The United
States and Canada refuse to supply the full-scale
heavy water plant that Buenos Aires wants until
it adopts full-scope safeguards and, more impor-
tant, renounces its plans for reprocessing. Al-
though Buenos Aires is likely to give in on the
safeguard issue, it almost certainly will not alter
its reprocessing intentions. Other countries tech-
nically able to supply heavy water technology
will probably also refuse aid. Although Argenti-
na has reportedly been negotiating with a West
German firm, in the end it will probably be
forced to build the heavy water plant itself,
relying on such technical assistance as it can
acquire by hiring technicians from countries such
as West Germany and Italy.
Looking Ahead
CANDU Capabilities
About 1990, Argentina plazas to start building
a fourth heavy water power plant, presumably of
the CANDU type, that is to be entirely Argen-
tine contracted and about 90 percent produced
from the country's own resources. Assuming
continuation of foreign support, we see no reason
why Argentina should not be able to carry out
these plans. Technology and components for
CANDU-type reactors are less complex than
those for light water plants. The engineering of
pressurizers and refueling equipment should not
prove a major obstacle within this time frame,
although the country probably will still have to
buy nuclear-scale turbines abroad.
Producing Heavy Water
We believe Argentina can complete by the late
1980s a plant to produce the heavy water re-
quired to operate its power plants even if Canada
and the United States refuse to supply it. Al-
though Argentina lacks the technology needed to
produce the high-pressure valves and distillation
columns required for a full-scale plant (250 to
300 tons per year), it should be able to acquire it
abroad-possibly from Italy or India. A plant of
this size would be able to provide the initial
The State National Shipyards (AFNE) in Rio Santiago. In addition to building ships of up to 60,000
dwt, the plant is supplying equipment for the Rio Tercero nuclear power plant at Embalse.
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charge for a new 600-MW power reactor every
one to two years as well as to replace the normal
losses of about 2 percent annually.
Fabricating and Reprocessing Fuel
Argentina will greatly expand its capabilities
for fabricating natural-uranium power-reactor
fuel and for reprocessing spent fuel. CNEA
already has produced prototype fuel elements for
Atucha and expects to complete facilities to
produce zirconium-alloy cladding material this
year. By 1979 it expects to be able to use the
cladding material in a plant that will be able to
produce 40,000 meters per year of tubing for fuel
elements, using West German technology. Ar-
gentina also is expanding its reprocessing capac-
ity to develop a capability that would permit
eventual production of plutonium and mixed-
oxide fuels for breeder reactors. Despite the
sophistication of some reprocessing equipment,
such as spent-fuel chopping machines, the coun-
try should have little difficulty achieving full-
scale operations by the late 1980s.
Selling Nuclear Equipment
Over the next decade, the Argentine export
effort will concentrate on research reactors and
assistance to other LDCs in setting up nuclear
research centers. Argentina also will likely step
up assistance in uranium exploration, mining,
and ore processing and concentrating. This will
be done primarily for reasons of prestige and to
gain further experience in nuclear technology.
To support research reactor sales, Buenos
Aires is in the process of developing its capacity
for fabricating the fuels required to operate such
reactors. At present, these fuels must be fabricat
ed from highly enriched uranium, which has high
nuclear proliferation potential and is, therefore,
difficult to obtain from the London Supplier~4
Group. To facilitate fuel acquisition and thus to
increase the attractiveness of Argentine reactor
to potential customers, Argentina is now consid-
ering shifting to production of research reactors
designed to use low-enriched uranium (LE U)
fuels. It is currently exploring possibilities for
cooperating with Spain or the United States in
developing LEU fuel elements.
Looking farther down the road, Argentina
should by the early 1990s have achieved suffi-
cient experience in nuclear construction and en-
gineering and in producing high-technology
equipment to consider exporting a complete nu-
clear power plant. It also might consider partici-
pating with an established nuclear supplier in
selling a nuclear plant to a third country. Wheth-
er or not it will do so will depend heavily on how
Buenos Aires evaluates the prestige to be gained
from an export sale, which probably would resuit
in a delay of several years in construction of its
fourth domestic nuclear power plant. If a market
can be found, export would be a practical option,
since the country has ample unexploited hydro-
electric potential that could be harnessed. Alter-
natively, a fourth plant could be installed domes-
tically and exporting delayed, perhaps until the
mid- to late-1990s.
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are welcome and should be directed to
This publication is the joint product of the
Office of Economic Research and the Office of
Scientific Intelligence. Comments and queries
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 Secret
Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0
Approved For Release 2003/03/06 : CIA-RDP80T00702A000400090008-0