THE PEKING-HANOI-PHNOM PENH TRIANGLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00634A000900050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 30, 1978
• Content Type: LIST

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An Intelligence Assessment
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1 ne relxn.x-inol-
Phnom Penh Triangle
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The Peking-Hanoi-Phnom Penh
Triangle
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Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Judgments
The current Sino-Vietnamese quarrel over Hanoi's treatment of the
ethnic Chinese population in Vietnam is the most clear manifestation to date
of the fundamental differences between Peking and Hanoi. These differences
center on.Hanoi's ties with Moscow and the competition for influence in
Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia.
? Peking is deeply suspicious of Vietnam's regional ambitions, and also
its tilt toward Moscow.
? Hanoi resents what it sees as Peking's attempts to dominate Southeast
Asia as well as its support to Cambodia.
? Cambodia is pivotal in the rift between China and Vietnam since it is
the current focus of their rivalry for regional influence. Hanoi seems
determined to bring a more malleable regime to power in Phnom Penh,
while China shows no sign of willingness to soften its support of the
current Cambodian leadership.
? The prospect is for continuing fighting between Cambodia and Viet-
nam, which means that Chinese support to Phnom Penh and Soviet
assistance to Hanoi are also likely to increase.
? Although both sides realize that neither is likely to benefit from an all-
out confrontation, bitterness is . so deep that the situation could
deteriorate further, especially if ? the .Vietnam-Cambodia fighting
intensifies.
? Hanoi might eventually feel it necessary to permit a Soviet military
presence in Vietnam, long a major concern of Peking.
? The relationship between Peking and Hanoi already has moved into a
new and probably protracted stage of open political warfare and
heightened military tensions that could threaten the new equilibrium
that has developed in Southeast Asia since the end of the Indochina
war in 1974.
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? The deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations almost certainly will
prompt Hanoi to seek better relations with the United States, which
the Vietnamese believe could become an alternate source of economic
assistance.
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The Peking-Hanoi-Phnom Penh Triangle
Introduction
The current dispute between Hanoi and Peking over Vietnam's treat-
ment of its ethnic Chinese population is the latest and most spectacular
manifestation of serious Sino-Vietnamese problems that have emerged since
the Indochina war ended in 1975. The Vietnamese decision to "nationalize"
private trade in both the northern and southern sectors of the country in late
March was the immediate catalyst for the current problem. The Vietnamese
move, which affected most severely the overseas Chinese community in
Vietnam, was characterized by Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping as the
"11th step" against China, one which he said required Chinese "retaliation."
Although neither side probably was prepared for the mass exodus of refugees
from Vietnam to China that followed the implementation of nationalization,
the adversary relationship that already. existed between Peking and Hanoi has
made it impossible for either to make the kinds of compromises that would
ease the tensions significantly. In fact, mutual suspicions are so acute that
any mishandling of the refugee situatiorf'could quickly lead to a formal, open
break between the two most powerful Communist countries in Asia.
Background
For centuries China has believed that it should be the primary power in
Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese, for their part, have resented China's
dominance and have long hoped to carve out their own sphere of influence.
During the long Indochina war, this basic conflict was held in check by a
common desire to reduce first French and then US influence in the region,
and by Hanoi's great need for Chinese support.
When the Communist governments assumed control in Vietnam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos after the war, the wartime constraints that had muted the
Sino-Vietnamese dispute quickly evaporated. With the greatly reduced US
presence in the area no longer perceived as a. major threat and Hanoi no
longer in need of military support from China, a series of difficult problems
involving the national interests of both countries surfaced. Even before the
fighting had ended, Hanoi and Peking were disputing ownership of islands in
the South China Sea, principally the Paracels-which the Chinese occupied
in 1974, and the Spratlys-portions of which are controlled by Vietnam. For
the past three years there have also been sporadic reports of conflict-
including small-scale firefights this year-over the land border between the
two countries, a border that was demarcated in the 19th century.
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The issue of Soviet influence in Indochina has been a fundamental and
perennial source of Sino-Vietnamese tensions. The Vietnamese Communists,
who needed the support of both Moscow and Peking to gain control of all
Vietnam, skillfully played the two Communist powers against one another
during the war, tilting one way for a time and then the other in order to gain
maximum advantage from both. When the war ended, the USSR was in a
better position than China to provide the economic assistance Vietnam
needed to reconstruct and unify the country. Moreover, as the more distant
power, Moscow clearly represented a less direct potential threat to Vietnam
than did China. As a result, Hanoi's relations with Moscow in the postwar
years grew closer, just as Sino-Vietnamese tensions were increasing.
Still, for obvious reasons, neither Hanoi nor Peking seemed to want a
complete rupture of relations. From Peking's point of view, a break would
push Hanoi even further toward Moscow and almost certainly result in an
increased Soviet presence in Vietnam. Hanoi would find itself with a powerful
antagonist on its northern border, and nearly totally dependent on Moscow
and its East European allies for vital assistance.
The Importance of Cambodia
Despite the interest of both sides in holding their differences in check,
frictions continued to mount during the postwar period. With the outbreak of
serious fighting between Vietnam and Cambodia last December, these
frictions became acute.
The attitudes of China and Vietnam toward Cambodia demonstrate the
stark conflict of interests in the region. Peking wants a sympathetic govern-
ment in Phnom Penh that will serve both as a counter to what the Chinese see
as Vietnamese regional ambitions and as an obstacle to the growth of the
Soviet presence in the area. Hanoi, on the other hand, wants a Laos-type
regime in Cambodia that will be responsive to Vietnamese direction and thus
enhance Hanoi's aspirations for a "federation" of Indochinese states dominat-
ed by Vietnam. Peking's deep involvement in Cambodia-especially its
military aid to Phnom Penh since the fighting began-has been especially
nettlesome to Hanoi. From Peking's point of view, however, the support is
essential if Cambodia is to remain an effective counter to Hanoi.
Peking became increasingly outspoken about its displeasure with Hanoi
as the Vietnam-Cambodia fighting intensified early this year. Party Chair-
man Hua Kuo-feng's criticism of "regional hegemony" at the fifth National
Peonle's Congress in February was aimed directly at Vietnam.
]Chinese o icia s have ecome
increasingly critical of Vietnam's ingra. i u e" for the support China gave it
during the war.
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At the same time, Vietnamese frustration with Peking's continued
support for the Cambodian regime was growing. After the Vietnam-Cambo-
dia fighting increased, Vietnamese officials raised the level of their private
attacks on Chinese support for the Cambodians, revealing their conviction
that China was encouraging the Cambodians to stir up trouble on the
Vietnam-Cambodia border. While it is extremely difficult to assess hrw much
Peking is able to influence Cambodian policies, there is little doubt that
Peking would not be disappointed if Cambodia-Vietnam tensions led to a
drain on Hanoi's energies. At the outset of the Vietnam-Cambodia fighting,
Peking adopted a relatively evenhanded public stance, calling for a Vietnam-
ese withdrawal from Cambodia and a negotiated settlement. During the first
four months of the year, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien was
frequently in Peking. While the talks probably covered a broad range of
problems, the Vietnam-Cambodia dispute was discussed. The talks, however,
seem to have broken off in late April without any resolution of the
fundamental disagreement between the two sides.
This growing frustration with Peking probably ended whatever misgiv-
ings the Vietnamese had about proceeding with "nationalization" measures
they knew would most affect Vietnam's ethnic Chinese community in both
the North and South. Although economic considerations were the most
important factors in the decision to "nationalize," the Vietnamese also knew
that the planned measures would be deeply resented in Peking. Whether or
not the Vietnamese fully anticipated the mass exodus to China that followed
these measures, their frustration with Peking seems to have led them to
accept the further deterioration of bilateral relations that was almost certain
to follow implementation of the plan. In fact, as early as March Vietnamese
officials were saying privately that there was little hope of any improvement
in relations with Peking.
Peking's Likely Approach
Peking is likely to pursue a two-pronged approach toward a hostile
Vietnam that has close links with the USSR. The Chinese probably will
increase their support to Cambodia in an attempt to prevent Phnom Penh
from coming under Hanoi's dominance. Besides continuing efforts to improve
relations with other countries-especially in Southeast Asia-Peking also is
likely to play on the already healthy fears in the area about Hanoi's and
Moscow's intentions. The Chinese are portraying the Vietnamese as Soviet
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pawns and aggressive regional "expansionists" who require united Southeast
Asian resistance. Peking has built good relations with Thailand. Malaysia,
and the Philippines since 1975, but it has not yet normalized ties with
Indonesia or Singapore.
The Chinese also seem determined to "punish" Hanoi by bringing their
remaining leverage to bear on the Vietnamese. Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping
told visiting Thai reporters in early June that China had watched "tolerantly"
while Hanoi took "10 steps" against China, and had retaliated only when the
Vietnamese took the "llth step"-the "expulsion" of Vietnam's ethnic
Chinese. Teng added that Peking is prepared to take additional retaliatory
measures if Hanoi does not moderate its overseas Chinese policies. Peking has
already terminated some of its economic assistance projects and is undoubted-
ly prepared to end others. While we do not know the precise levels or kinds of
Chinese assistance to Vietnam, Peking clearly has less economic leverage over
Hanoi than it had during the war. Even if Peking halted all its projects in
Vietnam, the effect would be nettlesome but not catastrophic, since the
USSR could make up the difference.
The Chinese already have demanded the closure of three Vietnamese
consulates in southern China, where a small Vietnamese minority resides.
The move will force Hanoi to deal through Peking on virtually all its business,
presumably including low-level trade and other essentially regional business
that had been handled between the consulates and China's provincial
authorities. The Chinese also have engaged in some military posturing along
the border and in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although there has been no major troop
buildup near Vietnam, Peking doubtless wants to remind Hanoi that it
already has considerable military forces in the region.
The Chinese probably will try to press Phnom Penh to adopt more
reasonable domestic and foreign policies, especially toward neighboring
Thailand. This may prove to be a difficult task. The same xenophobia that
drives the Cambodians to provoke the Vietnamese appears to lie behind their
persistent aggressiveness on the Thai border, where Cambodian attacks on
Thai villages and police outposts occur frequently.
Hanoi's Options
The continuing deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations, coupled with
increased Chinese support to Phnom Penh, presents Hanoi with a series of
interrelated policy problems. Since the end of the Indochina war, Hanoi has
seen rapid economic development as its primary national objective. Problems
with Cambodia have diverted Vietnamese resources away from this objective.
Furthermore, the Vietnamese realize that China has the economic leverage to
put additional strains on the development effort. In the past, the Vietnamese
had hoped to negotiate their differences with Phnom Penh and, if necessary,
try to obtain Chinese cooperation in seeking an end to Cambodian provoca-
tions. With both of these avenues blocked---at least for the time being-and
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 with China and Vietnam arguing bitterly over other issues, Hanoi's options
are limited. One fundamental decision it must make is whether to attempt to
resolve the Cambodian matter by forcing a change in leadership in Phnom
Penh or to try to alleviate tensions by seeking a negotiated settlement with the
Cambodians.
Although another limited military thrust into the border area would
offer no guarantee of forcing Cambodia to the bargaining table and would
again mark Hanoi as an aggressor, continuing Cambodian provocations could
generate increasing pressure from the Vietnamese military for a punitive
attack such as that conducted last December.
I Hanoi may be pursuing another option-that
ambo ian resistance force to fight the present Phnom Penh
of training a Cambodian'
regime. The chances of a Vietnam-based resistance movement developing a
viable base of support in Cambodia seem slim at best. Although Hanoi played
the key role during 1970-73 in developing the ragtag Khmer Communist
insurgent movement into an effective. organization and developed close
associations with a broad range of Khmer Communists, it is unlikely that
many pro-Hanoi cadres have survived the widespread purges in Cambodia.
Nonetheless, there is an outside chance that there are still some who-if given
an opportunity-would cooperate with the Vietnamese. In any event, in view
of the risks involved in overt military operations, Hanoi may now see the
mounting of an increased subversive challenge to Phnom Penh as a relatively
low-cost gamble that could in time pay off.
We cannot rule out other, more dramatic destabilizing developments. If
fighting flares up again, a major Vietnamese offensive, much larger than the
intrusion last year, could conceivably lead to a rout of Cambodian military
units and pave the way for the introduction of a pro-Vietnamese puppet
regime in Phnom Penh. Although our extremely limited knowledge of
political and security conditions in Cambodia suggests that the present
Cambodian leadership remains firmly in control, an open breakdown of
political unity in Phnom Penh and/or large-scale popular uprisings in the
countryside might tempt Hanoi to move with whatever force necessary to
install a friendly regime. Nonetheless, the capture of the capital would
probably be a Pyrrhic victory, leaving the Khmer Government at large in the
jungle to continue guerrilla warfare against long, exposed Vietnamese supply
lines.
US Angle
Vietnam's deteriorating relations with China will probably increase
Hanoi's interest in establishing diplomatic ties with the United States as an
alternative political and a possible economic counterweight to the Soviet
Union. The reduction and potential cessation of Chinese aid already threaten
to push Hanoi into a more dependent and thus less flexible relationship with
Moscow-a position Vietnam's leaders have been anxious to avoid. The need
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 for other sources of aid-a major consideration from the beginning in Hanoi's
desire for diplomatic relations with the United States-undoubtedly will now
be an even more explicit motive.
Increased political pressure on Hanoi by Peking and Moscow may also
produce a more flexible approach to Washington. Hanoi clearly sees intrinsic
political value in an American presence in Vietnam. Vietnamese Deputy
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has remarked that Hanoi was trying to
stay out of a Sino-Soviet squeeze and would be better off in a tripolar world.
Even without prior assurances of US aid, then, the Vietnamese might regard
an American embassy in Hanoi as a useful symbol of Vietnam's basic
independence from Moscow. Signs that China and the United States were
moving toward full diplomatic relations would increase Hanoi's fears of
isolation, moreover, and generate even stronger pressure for modification of
its own conditions for normalization. There already are tentative signs that
Hanoi may be considering dropping its demands for reparations.
The non-Communist states of Southeast Asia have drawn some comfort
from the open fighting between Cambodia and Vietnam. Aside from the
deflection of Vietnamese attention and resources, the conflict provides the
most dramatic evidence to date of a new and welcome political equilibrium in
the region that pits the Communist states of Indochina and their Great Power
backers against each other. Without exception, member countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regard a Vietnam-
controlled Indochina as a threat to the stability of the area. Attempts to
implant a friendly regime in Phnom Penh would severely undermine Hanoi's
postwar diplomatic efforts to establish an image as a nonaggressive power
seeking peaceful relations with its neighbors. Nonetheless, there clearly is
some sympathy for Hanoi's treatment of the overseas Chinese problem, one
that most ASEAN countries share. Some, especially Singapore and Indone-
sia, which have not yet established normal diplomatic relations with China,
are wary of Peking's connections with the ethnic Chinese. In fact, Singapor-
ean officials have expressed their concern about the possibility that China's
handling of the ethnic Chinese problem in Vietnam indicates that Peking is
determined to take a stronger hand in "protecting" overseas Chinese
throughout the region.
For Thailand, the neighbor most immediately concerned with the
conflict and its outcome, the view is considerably more complicated. From
Bangkok's perspective, Hanoi's military strength and its aspirations for
regional influence make Vietnam a much more serious potential threat than
Cambodia. The Thai, in fact, are inclined to accept the Chinese and
Cambodian charge that Hanoi intends to establish an Indochinese "feder-
ation." This would be the worst of all possible Cambodian outcomes for
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Bangkok, since Vietnamese-controlled forces would then confront the Thai
directly along their border with Cambodia.
In short, the status quo, with a Chinese-oriented Cambodia serving as a
buffer between Vietnam and Thailand, would seem the best possible situation
for Bangkok. Other ASEAN states would also quietly approve a stalemate
between Cambodia and Vietnam.
The View From Mosocow
The USSR has fully supported Hanoi in the Vietnamese-Cambodian
fighting, while accusing Peking of encouraging Cambodian mischief along the
border. Soviet press coverage of the Sino-Vietnamese imbroglio over the
ethnic Chinese issue also reflects Moscow's readiness to exploit the rapid
deterioration of relations between Peking and Hanoi. Moscow has been quick
to label the issue as one involving Chinese "interference" in Vietnam's
internal affairs, implicitly warning all Southeast Asian leaders that China
might use the overseas Chinese to stir up problems in their countries as well.
While the USSR has no major economic stake or vital strategic
objectives in Southeast Asia, it has long sought-with limited success to
date-to counter Chinese influence in the region. Moscow, of course, will
welcome continuing polemics between Peking and Hanoi and will use the
opportunity to bolster its own influence and presence in Vietnam. Over the
longer term, the Soviets almost certainly see closer ties with Hanoi as the key
to extending their influence deeper into the region. At the same time, Moscow
views the potential development of a second "front" against China in
Vietnam-complementing the Soviet front in the north-as a new contribu-
tion to its strategic interests vis-a-vis Peking.
Prospects
While the brouhaha over Vietnam's Chinese population will leave a
bitter aftertaste in both Peking and Hanoi-as well as increase apprehensions
in other Southeast Asian countries with large overseas Chinese communi-
ties-this specific issue will probably subside if the Chinese refugees from
Vietnam are resettled without major delays or problems.
Even if the overseas Chinese issue is resolved or pushed aside, however,
Sino-Vietnamese relations are not likely to improve in the near future.
Cambodia remains a far more important bone of contention between the two
countries, and the prospects are for continued fighting. Hanoi now seems to
have abandoned all hope of reaching an acceptable modus vivendi with the
present Cambodian leadership and probably is embarked on a long-term
effort to bring a more malleable regime to power in Phnom Penh. Under these
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circumstances, Peking wit
hegemon ist."
continue to denounce Hanoi as a "regional
In addition to strong propaganda commentary, Peking can and probably
will resort to a number of other measures to remind Hanoi of China's
influence and capabilities in the region. These are likely to include further
reductions in economic assistance and trade, military posturing along the
border, increased diplomatic attempts to convince other countries-especially
in Southeast Asia-to reduce China's dealings with Vietnam, and perhaps a
more aggressive assertion of its claims to islands in the South China Sea,
which are disputed by Vietnam as well as other countries.
One possible outcome of the current downward spiral in Sino-Vietnam-
ese relations is increased Soviet influence in Vietnam. If the Chinese follow
through on their threats to terminate economic assistance to Vietnam, now
about one quarter of Hanoi's foreign aid, the Soviets and their East European
allies almost certainly will pick up the Chinese portion. In return, Moscow
undoubtedly will anticipate political and perhaps military concessions from
Hanoi. At a minimum, Hanoi could be expected to become a firmer supporter
of Moscow's side in the Sino-Sovict dispute and of other Soviet foreign policy
objectives.
If the present leaders in Phnom Penh were to be replaced with others
subservient to Hanoi, the impact would be far reaching. Hanoi's image of
restraint, which has been carefully nurtured since the end of the Indochina
war, would be badly tarnished. In Bangkok and other Southeast Asian
capitals, apprehension about Vietnamese intentions would increase sharply
and probably would create heightened interest in joint security arrangements.
Hanoi's dominance of Indochina and Moscow's presumably closer ties to
Vietnam would be a sharp blow to Peking's interests and would set the stage
for an even more intense confrontation with Hanoi. If Hanoi felt it was under
intolerable pressures, it might accede to a Soviet military presence in
Vietnam, long one of Peking's major fears about Soviet intentions toward the
region.
Whatever the fate of the current regime in Phnom Penh, the rancor and
bitterness that have developed between Peking and Hanoi over the past year
will not die quickly. In fact, Sino-Vietnamese rivalry is likely to intensify.
While fundamental but largely contained tensions between Peking and Hanoi
have up to now been the central element of the postwar political equilibrium
in Southeast Asia, a prolonged confrontation between the two states could
work to disrupt regional stability. The ASEAN states may over the shorter
term take some comfort from the fact that Vietnam, already preoccupied with
internal problems and a frontier war with neighboring Cambodia, is further
distracted by its dispute with China. At the same time, however, regional
hopes to keep the lid on Great Power maneuvering and rivalry in the area over
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 the longer run have been set back by the open political warfare between
China and Vietnam.
ASEAN capitals already are concerned about the possibility of a more
aggressive and supportive Chinese approach to overseas Chinese populations
in the wake of Peking's intervention on behalf of local Chinese in Vietnam.
Southeast Asian leaders probably also realize that the stage may be set for
more direct Sino-Vietnamese rivalry for influence within the Thai Commu-
nist party and for insurgency, a development that ultimately could result in
the rebels posing a much more serious threat to Bangkok. Finally, the Sino-
Vietnamese split seems certain to further strain relations between China and
the USSR as the two countries maneuver for position and influence in the
region.
The author of this paper is East
Asia - Pacific Division, Office o egiona and
Political Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be directed to
I
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