RUSSIAN EMIGRE POLITICS

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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
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RUSSIAN EMIGRE POLITICS
GEORGE FISCHER
FREE RUSSIA FUND, INC.
NEW YORK
1951
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200 copies of RUSSIAN EMIGRE POLITICS
were published in this edition.
For general use, copies of RUSSIAN EMIGRE
POLITICS have been deposited, with each of
the following collections:
United States Library of Congress
New York Public Library
Harvard University Library
Hoover Archive, Stanford
University
Great Britain The British Museum
France Bibliotheque Nacional
Germany Russian Library of Munich
Copyright, 1951, by
George Fischer
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Preface by George Fischer 5
Chapter I Introduction 11
"America and the Russian Future"
by George F. Kennan (Foreign Af-
fairs, New York, March, 1951)
Chapter II From Old Emigration to New 33
"Russian Emigration After Thirty
Years' Exile," by R. Wraga (East-
ern Quarterly, London, January,
1951)
Chapter III World War II 51
"Vlasov and Hitler" by George
Fischer (Journal of Modern His-
tory, Chicago, March, 1951)
Chapter IV Post-War Developments 59
"Political Trends Among Russian
Exiles" (National Committee for
a Free Europe, New York, Febru-
ary 25, 1951)
Appendix New American Organizations for 79
a Free Russia (April, 1951)
Index 85
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. . .the Soviet rulers can only be the gainers
when by careless thinking and by careless expression
we imply an inner solidarity between the regime and
the people it rules -a solidarity that neither the
regime nor the Russian people feel and that can
only lead us into grievous mistakes of policy. . .
R. cordon Wasson, Toward a Russian Policy (1951)
"Do you really think we were right to come over -
all of us who left the Soviets for this life on a
dustheap, or should we have stayed with our own
people". . .
In the end one did not wonder that the defec-
tions, which might have crippled the Russians in
East Germany, have instead been reduced to a mere
trickle. One wondered, rather, why all govern-
ments nowadays, even with the best intentions,
seem to be so utterly incapable of generosity or
kindness or the fine gesture.. This seems, indeed,
to be one of the marks of our time.
Joseph Alsop, New York Herald Tribune
March 21_, 1951
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After years of unconcern, the free world has begun
to show some interest in a unique and little known group,
referred to as "non-returners" and "defectors." These
are the several hundred thousand Soviet citizens who
have left the USSR in the past decade, since Germany
attacked the USSR in 1941. But why, it may be asked,
should the free world take an interest in the subject of
this manual, Russian emigre politics?
The answer,. to begin with, is that such a vast de-
fection is unparalleled in recent history, and the full
significance and makeup of this Soviet exodus can be
understood fully only when its political evolution is taken
into account. Moreover, a knowledge of Russian emigre
politics becomes crucial as free society learns to ap-
preciate these Soviet exiles both as invaluable sources
on the USSR and as fervent and equally invaluable allies
in Freedom's resistance against Soviet imperialism.
As we turn to Soviet exiles for aid and counsel, it be-
hooves us to have a more than superficial insight into
the internal ideological and organizational groupings
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which claim their allegiance or sympathy. This is as
essential in order to command their respect as it is to
preclude avoidable misjudgments and indiscretions on
our part.
Lastly, knowledge of the political life of Soviet
exiles appears important in the terms of the long-range
future. In its own deliberation on a free post-Stalin
Russia, the outside world will turn in times both of
peace and war to the Soviet exiles for counsel as well
as for an indication of what the ideological trends might
be inside the USSR. This is probably unavoidable--and
not at all undesirable. But unless such a step is ac-
companied by a thorough grasp of the background and
extent of each emigre grouping, it can do far more harm
than good.
A consideration, such as the above, as to what in-
terest the Soviet exiles and their political evolution may
have for the outside world, inevitably leads to another,
no less vital question. This is the position free society
is to take in the broadest terms toward that time when
the Soviet exiles now in our midst will be able to return
to their homeland. For only when the free world has
evolved a far-reaching, clearly defined position on the
kind of post-Soviet Russia it hopes for, can the free
world adopt the required consistency and constructive-
ness in its ever increasing and ever complex relations
with the Soviet exiles. Therefore, to place the subject
of Russian Emigre Politics in its proper perspective,
this manual opens with an introduction by George F.
Kennan, "America and the Russian Future."
Until recently, it had been wellnigh impossible to
obtain an even approximate description of the political
life of exiles, recent and post-1917, from the Soviet
system. In the early months of 1951 three essays ap-
peared on the subject, however, which, taken together,
appear to succeed in presenting a general picture. It is
these three essays which form the bulk of Russian
Emigre Politics.
If Russian Emigre Politics presents - perhaps for
the first time - such a general picture, it could not hope
to fulfill several other, and closely related needs. Thus
Russian Emigre Politics neither affords popularized ac-
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counts suited for a wider public, nor is it a systematic
reference work with the required documentation and
bibliography. Perhaps most importantly, the essays
contained in Russian Emigre Politics were not able to
place the political life in the psychological context so
essential for the understanding of any body politic. All
these are shortcomings which can be remedied only as
more and more painstaking analysis and research is
undertaken and published; the same must be said, for
most errors in fact or interpretation which "may be
found in Russian Emigre Politics.
The reader of Russian Emigre Politics is doubt-
lessly aware of the classical characteristics of emigre
life in general, portrayed so memorably in Alexander
Herzen's memoirs of the nineteenth century, Life and
Thoughts: the striking isolation from the environment
and the inflamed emotions, as well as the unceasing
intrigues and controversies made the more important
by the other characteristics of such exile existence.
But at least two special features should be mentioned
regarding the period of greatest current interest which
is covered in Russian Emigre Politics, the period fol-
lowing World War H. One of these added ingredients of
emigre life, particularly among recent exiles from the
USSR, has been the near-paranoid dread of Soviet agents
and of Soviet invasion of Western Germany, which re-
mains the center of Russian emigre politics. Uppermost
also is the exiles' immense, embittering hardships and
isolation--individual as well as organizational- -in the
face of what the exiles fervently believe to be of crucial
importance to the free world: a sustained, large-scale
anti-Stalin campaign by the exiles themselves. Adum-
brated by such uniquely contemporary factors, the
emigre existence of exiles from Stalin's Russia has led
to frustrations and deformations which form an essential
background to the material in Russian Emigre Politics.
Lastly, two qualifications. One of these qualifica-
tions pertains to the unusually complex and controversial
nationality question. The political life of exiles from the
Soviet system may be said to flow in two currents, cur-
rents which to date have seldom if ever merged or even
met. One of these currents might be termed the "na-
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 tional," and is in reality itself a number of separate
currents representing various nationalities incorporated
into the USSR. The "national" current encompasses
those emigre political groupings which now, in exile,
demand more or less -total independence from Russia
proper once the Stalin regime is overthrown. The other
current in emigre politics may be called, in part for
lack of a better term, the "Russian" one. This current
embraces those groupings which are made up to a con-
siderable extent but not exclusively of exiles of "Great"
Russian origin. Adherents to this "Russian" current
either favor a united (some a loosely federated) post-
Stalin Russia or advocate that this explosive and presently
divisive nationality issue be settled by free popular
plebescite after the overthrow of the Soviet regime,
preferably under the auspices of the United Nations.
A habit has grown up in the West of describing all
Soviet nationalities within the USSR as well as in the
emigration by the single term "Russian". On the whole,
this habit is totally innocent and merely a semantic
short-cut. But emigre adherents to the "national cur-
rent", often hostile to "Great" Russians as the "oppress-
ing race", strongly object to the practice. The title,
Russian Emigre Politics, calls for an explanation in
view of this- -particularly since its publisher, the Free
Russia Fund, Inc., is concerned with aiding exiles of all
Soviet nationalities and not solely Russians. The reason
this title was selected is simply that it deals with only
one of the described currents in emigre politics, the
"Russian" one. Far greater American knowledge of the
other, the "national" current is not an iota less impor-
tant. But unfortunately even greater paucity exists in
factual Western studies of the various national groupings
--each to be explained by immensely complex and in
every case different historical, psychological and ethnic
factors. It is to be hoped that this void on the "national"
current in emigre politics will be filled soon. Mean-
while it appeared important, as a badly needed first
step, to publish a collection on Russian emigre politics.
Secondly, in a subject as intensely controversial to
its participants - and as ever perplexing to outside ob-
servers - as emigre politics, differences are apt to
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arise in the interpretation or selection of even the least
significant fact or statement. Paucity of published ma-
terial makes this still more likely in the case of a
collection like Russian Emigre Politics. Therefore it
should be made particularly plain that the publisher of
this manual, Free Russia Fund, Inc., does not accept re-
sponsibility for the views expressed in any part of the
volume. The Free Russia Fund believes, however, that
the publication of a manual such as Russian Emigre
Politics will contribute to a better understanding of the
entire subject.
The attention of the reader is called to the ex=
tensive index of Russian Emigre Politics. The
index was prepared to correlate the separate
contributions to the manual, and to spell out
and translate names of organizations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE
George F. Kennan
The author: George F. Kennan had extensive service in
the U. S. Embassy in Moscow before, dur-
ing, and after World War II, and subse-
quently held the posts of Counsellor of the
U. S. Department of State and Chief of its
Policy Planning Staff. He is at present
serving as Consultant to the Ford Foun-
dation and President of the Free Russia
Fund.
. Reprinted from
Foreign Affairs (New York), March, 1951
Copyright, 1951,
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
II
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTL; RE
By George F. Kennon
HE very virulence with which Americans reject the outlook
and practice of those who now hold power in the Kremlin
implies in the strongest possible way the belief in, and desire
or, an alternative-for some other Russian outlook and some
her set of practices in Russia to take the place of those' 'e know
oday. Yet we may be permitted to ask whether there is ali clear
image in our minds of what that outlook and the Practices
might be, and of the ways by which Americans might promote
progress toward them. At the present time, in particular, \vhen the
`coexistence of the two systems on the same planet has kri tt) such
immense strains and anxieties everywhere, and to so much despair
of its successful continuation, there is a tendency on the part of
many people to permit the image of a different and mare ac-
Russia to become eclipsed by, or even identified with,
the question of victory or defeat in a future war. Some Americans
are already reverting, merely in contemplation of a possible war,
to the American bad habit of assuming that there is something
final and positive about a military decision-that it is the ending
of something, and the happy ending, rather than a beginning.
There could, of course, be no greater error than this, quite apart
from any consideration of the blood and sacrifice which war
involves. A war against Soviet power which could be said to be
relatively successful militarily (and we would do well to remem-
ber that no such war could be more than relatively successful)
would in itself assure little or nothing in the way of progress
'toward the achievement of the sort of alternative we might wish;
at the most it would only make more immediate various aspects
of a problem which already exists and which every American
who objects to Soviet behavior must, in consistency, have in
mind anyway, war or no war. That is the problem of the kind
of Russia which we would prefer to see; the kind with which we
ourselves could, let us say, live easily; the kind which would per-
mit the existence of a much more stable world order; the kind to
which it would be both realistic and suitable for us to aspire.
This problem of the possibility of a different and preferable
Russia is not really a question. of war or peace. War in itself will
not bring about such a Russia. Indeed it would be most unlikely
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
to lead in that direction unless accompanied by many wise and
strenuous efforts besides the military one. And a continued ab-
sence of major war will not preclude the coming of a different
Russia. All of that depends upon a great many other things which
would have to be done by a great many people, either in war or
in peace. Not all of these things can be done by Americans. So far
as direct action is concerned, the bulk of them cannot be. But
our possibilities for influencing the outcome are significant; and
we must remember that there may be times when our efforts may
be capable of swinging the balance one way or the other. For
that reason our own relationship to the Russian future is some-
thing worth our most strenuous thought and attention. And in
our efforts to determine it, two things are of major importance: i,
that we should know what we want; and 2, that we should know
how to conduct ourselves in order to facilitate, rather than to
impede, the coming into being of what we want. The word "fa-
cilitate" is used advisedly; for we are dealing here with a foreign
country, and our role can be at best a marginal one, supplemen-
tary to a far more important role which others must, play.
What sort of Russia would we like to see before us, as our part-
ner in the world community?
Perhaps the first thing to get straight here is the sort of Russia
there is no use looking for. And such a Russia-the kind we may
not look for-is easy to describe and envisage, for it would be
a capitalistic and liberal-democratic one, with institutionsclosely
resembling those of our own republic.
If we look first at the question of the economic system, we see
at once that Russia has scarcely known private enterprise as we
are familiar with it in this country. Even in pre-Revolutionary
times the Russian Government always had a close hold on a num-
ber of economic activities, notably transportation and the arm-
ament industry,' which in our country have traditionally, or at
least normally, been private. There were, to be sure, in the earlier
period of Russian history, distinguished families of private Rus-
sian entrepreneurs, famous for their bold commercial: pioneering
in the undeveloped areas of the realm. But by and large in-
digenous private capital remained more conspicuous in the ex-
change than in the production of commodities. The great domes-
tic business was trade, rather than manufacture.: And business
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE
353
did not stand in so high repute as in the West. There was a tradi-
tional, and deeply Russian, merchant class; but it was not gen-
erally noted or respected for breadth of outlook or for any en-
lightened concept of its own responsibility to society., The
portrayals of it in Russian literature are generally negative and
depressing. The members of the landed gentry, whose tastes and
prejudices were authoritative in the social field, often looked down
on business, and themselves tended to avoid participation in it.
The Russian language, in fact, never acquired a word comparable
to our expression "businessman;" it had only the word for "mer-
chant," and this term did not always have a pleasant connotation.
As Russia became industrialized, in a sudden rush of activity
which took place around the turn of the century, there were
clearly apparent the absence of an adequate tradition of responsi-
bility and restraint on the part of the capital-owning class and a
general lack of preparedness, on the part of the state and of
society generally, to cope with the new strains. This industrial
development, proceeding largely on a basis of individual enter-
prise rather than of widely distributed corporative ownership, was
marked by sudden accumulations of fortunes in the hands of indi-
viduals and families not always well prepared for such affluence.
Often the mode of expenditure of wealth appeared to other people
as little creditable as the means by which it had been accumulated.
Individual capitalists and workers lived in close proximity-
indeed, many of the factory owners lived in the compounds of
their factories. Such conditions often bore greater resemblance
to the pattern of early Industrial-Revolution capitalism, as Marx
had described it, than to conditions in advanced Western coun-
tries. This fact may well have had something to do with the suc-
cess of Marxism in Russia. The Russian industrial capitalist was
generally visible in the flesh, and as often as not he had the
rotundity, and sometimes (not always) the vulgarity and callous-
ness, of the capitalist of the early-Communist caricature.
All these things go to show that whatever private enterprise
may have been in Tsarist Russia, it had not yet come to hold
anything resembling the respect and significance in the eyes of
the people that it had acquired in the older mercantile countries
by the beginning of this century. Perhaps with time it would
have. The prospects were steadily improving. Examples of effi-
cient and progressive industrial management existed in Russia
before the Revolution, and were increasing.
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354
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
But all this, it must be remembered, was a long time ago.
Thirty-three years have elapsed since the Revolution. Those
years, in the strenuous conditions of Soviet life, have witnessed
the passing of a full generation. Of the people capable of influenc-
ing the course of events in Russia today only an insignificant
minority recall the pre-Revolutionary days at all. The younger
generation has no comprehension or concept of anything but the
state capitalism that the Soviet regime has enforced. And what we
are talking about here is something not even in the present.but in
the indefinite future.
Bearing all this in mind, we see that there is no Russian national
understanding which would permit the early establishment in
Russia of anything resembling the private enterprise system as we
know it. This is not to say that some such understanding will not
some day develop. It may, if circumstances are favorable. But it
will never be a system identical to our own. And no one will use-
fully be able to force the pace, particularly no one from outside.
It is true that the term "Socialism" has been used for so many
years in close intimacy with the term "Soviet" that it is now hate-
ful to many people, both within and without' the borders of the
Soviet Union. But it is easy to draw wrong conclusions from this
phenomenon. It is conceivable that retail trade and the perform-
ance of the small individual services which have so much to do
with the pleasantness of daily life may some day return in large
measure to private hands in Russia. In agriculture, as we shall see
presently, there will certainly be an extensive return to private
ownership and initiative. There is a further possibility that the
system of mutual production-cooperation by groups of artisans
(artels)-a system peculiarly rooted in Russian tradition and
understanding-may some day point the way to economic institu-
tions which could represent a highly important and promising
innovation in the approach to modern problems of labor and
capital. But large sections of economic life known to us as the
normal provinces of private enterprise will almost certainly re-
main in national hands for a long time to come in Russia, regard-
less of the identity of the political authority. This should surprise
no American, nor should it offend any. There is no reason why
the form of Russian economic life, beyond certain major ex-
ceptions that will be mentioned below, should be considered a
matter of vital concern to the outside world.
Agriculture deserves a special place in our thinking on this sub-
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 355
ject. Agricultural enterprise is the Achilles heel of the Soviet sys-
tem. Left in private hands, it constitutes a concession to human
freedom and individual initiative-a concession which the true
Bolshevik finds abhorrent. Forcibly collectivized, it requires an
elaborate apparatus of restraint if the farmer is to be made to stay
on his land and to produce. The forced collectivization of the
farming population is probably today the greatest single cause of
discontent in the Soviet Union, except possibly the excessive
cruelty of the police, with which it is intimately connected. It
may be taken for granted that one of the first acts of any future
progressive authority in Russia would be to abolish this hated
system of agricultural serfdom and to restore to the farmers the
pride and incentives of private land ownership and free disposal
of agricultural commodities. Collective farms may continue to
exist; and they probably will, for the most abhorrent feature of
the present system is not the concept of producer-cooperation it-
self but the element of restraint that underlies its application. The
collectives of the future will be voluntary cooperatives, however,
not shotgun marriages.
Turning to the political side, it was said above that we could
not expect to see the emergence of a liberal-democratic Russia
along American patterns. This cannot be too strongly empha-
sized. It does not mean that future Russian regimes will neces-
sarily be unliberal. There is no liberal tradition finer than the
strain which has existed in the Russia of the past. Many Russian
individuals and groups of this day are deeply imbued with that
tradition, and will do all in their power to make it the dominant
element in the Russian future. In that effort, we may wish them
well without reservation. But we will be doing them no favor if
we permit ourselves to expect too much to happen too fast, or
look to them to produce anything resembling our own institutions.
These Russian liberals will have no easy road to walk. They will
find in their county a young generation that has known nothing
but Soviet power and has been trained to think subconsciously in
the terms of that power even when it has resented and hated it.
Many features of the Soviet system will stick, if only for the rea-
son that everything has been destroyed which might seem to have
constituted an alternative to them. And some features will de-
serve to stick, for no system that lasts over decades is entirely
without merits. Any program of government for a future Russia
will have to adjust itself to the fact that there has been this Soviet
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and to national realities. There.is great good in the Russian na-
tional character, and the realities of that country scream out to-
not in the vacuum of theory.. They respond to national character
Forms of government are forged mainly in the fire of practice,
to whom they are applied."
the original circumstances and the social conditions of the people
that there is nothing absolute in the, theoretical value of political
institutions, and that their efficiency depends almost always on
this country the more I admit myself penetrated with this truth:
from the United States, correctly observed: "The more I see of
this realization should shock us. In 1831 de Tocqueville, writing
social structures and forms of government in no way resembling
our own and yet not deserving of censure. There is no reason why
people living in other climes and conditions and that there can be
erate tendency to judge others by the extent to which they con-
trive to be like ourselves. In our relations with the people of
Russia it is important, as it has never been important before, for
us to recognize that our institutions may not have relevance for
repress, and if possible to extinguish once and for all, our invet-
356 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
interlude, and that it has left its positive marks as well as its nega-
tive ones. And no members of future Russian governments will
be aided by doctrinaire and impatient well-wishers in the West
who look to them, just because they are seeking a decent alterna-
tive to what we know today as Bolshevism, to produce in short
order a replica of the Western democratic dream.
Above all, it behooves us Americans, in this connection, to
presently, certain features of the future Russian state that are of
genuine concern to the outside world. But these do not include
eign interference can do less good. There are, as we shall see
nothing less understandable to foreigners, nothing in which for
enlightenment in government. are things that constitute the
deepest and most intimate processes of national life. There is
manner. The ways by which peoples advance toward dignity -and
swer to our concept of "democratic." Give them time; let them be
Russians; let them work out their internal problems in their own
the ultimate outcome could be one or the other), let us not hover
nervously over the people who come after, applying litmus papers
daily to their political complexions to find out whether they an-
Let us hope that it will come. But when Soviet power has run its
course, or when its personalities and spirit begin to change (for
day for a form of administration more considerate of that good.
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;a-
'ill
!st
.a-
'rt
AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 357
the form of government itself, provided only that it keep within
certain well-defined limits, beyond which lies totalitarianism.
What, then, do they include? To what kind of a Russia may we
reasonably and justly look forward? What attributes are we, as
responsible members of the world community, entitled to look for
in the personality of a foreign state, and of Russia in particular?
We may look, in the first place, for a Russian government
which, in contrast to the one we know today, would be tolerant,
communicative and forthright in its relations with other states
and peoples. It would not take the ideological position that its
own purposes cannot finally prosper unless all systems of govern-
ment not under its control are subverted and eventually de-
stroyed. It would dispense with this paranoiac suspiciousness we
know so well, and consent to view the outside world, ourselves
included, as it really is and always has been: neither entirely good
nor entirely bad, neither entirely to be trusted nor entirely to be
mistrusted (if only for the simple reason that "trust" has only a
relative significance in foreign affairs). It would consent to recog-
nize that this outside world is not really preoccupied with diabol-
ical plots to invade Russia and inflict injuries on the Russian
people. Viewing the outside world in this way, the statesmen of a
future Russia could approach it with tolerance and forbearance
and practical good humor, defending their national interests as
statesmen must, but not assuming that these can be furthered
only at the expense of the interests of others, and vice versa.
No one asks for a naive and childlike confidence; no one asks for
a fatuous enthusiasm for all that is foreign; no one asks that the
genuine and legitimate differences of interest which have always
marked, and will always continue to mark, the relations between
peoples be ignored. We must expect Russian national interests
not only to continue to exist but to be vigorously and confidently
asserted. But in a regime that we could recognize as an improve-
ment over what we know today we would expect that this would
be done in an atmosphere of emotional sanity and moderation:
that the foreign representative would not continue to be viewed
and treated as one possessed of the devil; that it would be con-
ceded that there might be such a thing as innocent and legitimate
curiosity about a foreign county, which could be permitted to be
gratified without fatal detriment to that country's national life;
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358 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
that it would be recognized that there might be individual foreign
business aspirations which did not aim at the destruction of the
Russian state; that it would be admitted, finally, that persons
desirous of travelling across international borders might have,
and are even apt to have, motives other than "espionage, sabo-
tage and diversion"-such trivial motives, in fact, as the enjoy-
ment of travel or the peculiar impulses that move people to wish
to visit relatives from time to time. In short, we may ask that the
grotesque system of anachronisms known as the Iron Curtain be
lifted from the world, and that the Russian people, who have so
much to give and so much to receive as mature members of the
realities behind the Iron Curtain, the regime depicts "abroad" to
its own people in every lurid hue of hideousness, as anxious
mothers attempt to intimidate their children and fortify their own
authority by embroidering the image of that sinister "something"
which "will get you if you don't watch out."
In this way, excess of internal authority leads inevitably to un-
social and aggressive conduct as a government among govern-
world community, cease to be insulted by a policy that treats
them as children, too immature to have normal contact with the
adult world, too undependable to be let out alone.
Secondly, while recognizing that. the internal system of govern-
ment is in all essential respects Russia's own business and may
well depart drastically from our own, we are entitled to expect
that the exercise of governmental authority will stop short of that
fairly plain line beyond which lies totalitarianism. Specifically,
we may expect that any regime which claims to contrast favorably
with that which we have before us today will refrain from enslav-
ing its own labor-industrial and agricultural. There is a reason
for this: a reason even more solid than the shock we experience at
witnessing the sickening details of this type of oppression. When
a regime sets out to enslave its own working population in this
way, it requires for the maintenance of the arrangement so vast
an apparatus of coercion that the imposition of the Iron Curtain
follows almost automatically. No ruling group likes to admit that
it can govern its people only by regarding and treating them as
criminals. For this reason there is always a tendency to justify
internal oppression by pointing to the menacing iniquity of the
outside world. And the outside world must be portrayed, in these
circumstances, as very iniquitous indeed-iniquitous to the point
of caricature. Nothing short of this will do. Carefully hiding the
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 359
ments, and is a matter of concern to the international community.
The world is not only heartily sick of this comedy by reason of the
endless and wearisome falsehoods it involves, but it has learned
to recognize it as something so irresponsible and dangerous that,
maintained for any length of time, it easily becomes a major
hazard for world peace and stability. It is for this reason that we,
while recognizing that all distinctions as between freedom and
authority are relative and admitting that 9o percent of them are
no business of ours when they affect a foreign country, still insist
that there is an area here in which no government of a great coun-
try can move without creating the most grievous and weighty
problems for its neighbors. That is precisely the area in which the
regime of Hitler found itself at home, and in which the Soviet
Government has moved for at least these past 15 years. We may
state bluntly that we can recognize no future Russian regime as
one with which we could have a satisfactory relationship unless it
keeps out of this danger area.
The third thing we may hope from a new Russia is that it will
refrain from pinning an oppressive yoke on other peoples who
have the instinct and the capacity for national self-assertion. In
mentioning this matter, we are entering upon a delicate subject.
There is no more difficult and treacherous one in the entire lexicon
of political issues. In the relationships between the Great-Russian
people and nearby peoples outside the confines of the old Tsarist
Empire, as well as non-Russian national groups that were included
within that empire, there is no conceivable pattern of borders or
institutional arrangements which, measured against the concepts
prevailing to date, would not arouse violent resentments and in-
volve genuine injustices in many quarters. If people in that part
of the world are going to go on thinking of national borders and
minority problems in the way that they have thought of them in
the past and continue to think of them today, Americans would do
well to avoid incurring any responsibility for views or positions on
these subjects; for any specific solutions they may advocate will
some day become a source of great bitterness against them, and
they will find themselves drawn into controversies that have little
or nothing to do with the issue of human freedom.
What is plainly necessary, and the only solution worthy of
American encouragement, is the rise of such a spirit among all the
peoples concerned as would give to border and institutional ar-
rangements in that troubled area an entirely new, and greatly
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36o FOREIGN AFFAIRS
reduced, significance. Whether that spirit will actually arise, we
cannot tell. And precisely because we cannot tell this, Americans
should be extremely careful in committing their support or en-
couragement to any specific arrangements in this sphere; for we
cannot know what they mean until there is clarity as to the spirit
which Will underlie them. How can we know whether a given na-
tional group will require an independent status, or a federal status,
some special brand of local self-government, or no special status
at all, until we know something about the psychological climate
in which these arrangements would operate? There are peoples of
non-Russian ethnological character on the borders of the Great-
Russian family whose economic existence is intimately bound up
with that of the Great-Russians. The future should see a mini-
mum of disruption of these economic ties, and that in itself would
normally warrant a close political connection. But its nature
would always have to depend on what sort of attitudes prevailed
on both sides of the line: on the degree of tolerance and insight
which the peoples involved (and not only the Russian people)
might be able to bring to the establishment of these relationships.
We are all agreed, for example, that the Baltic countries should
never again be forced against the innermost feelings of their peoples
into any relationship whatsoever with a Russian state; but they
would themselves be foolish to reject close and cooperative ar-
rangements with a tolerant, nonimperialistic Russia, which
genuinely wished to overcome the unhappy memories of the past
and to place her relations to the Baltic peoples on a basis of real
respect and disinterestedness. - The Ukraine, again, deserves full
recognition for the peculiar genius and abilities of its people and
for the requirements and possibilities' of its development as a
linguistic and cultural entity; but the Ukraine. is economically as
much a part of Russia as Pennsylvania is a part of the United
States. Who can say what the final status of the Ukraine should
be unless he knows the character of the Russia to which the ad-
justment will have to be made? As for the satellite states: they
must, and will, recover their full independence; but they will not
assure themselves of a stable and promising future if they make
the mistake of proceeding from feelings of revenge and hatred
toward the Russian people who have shared their tragedy, and if
they try to base that future on the exploitation of the initial diffi-
culties of a well-intentioned Russian regime struggling to over-
come the legacy-of Bolshevism.
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 361
There is no use underestimating the bitterness of these terri-
torial problems, even assuming the utmost of goodwill and re-
laxed tolerance on the part of the peoples concerned. Some of the
dispositions taken at the close of the Second World War (made
even worse today by the deliberate policy on the part of certain
governments to turn the provisional prematurely into the per-
manent) represent distinctly unhealthy situations, not conducive
to a peaceful future. Some day these dispositions must be
changed; and it will admittedly require tact on the part of all
concerned, and forbearance bordering on the miraculous, if these
changes are to. be effected without a further compounding of vio-
lence and bitterness. For that unhappy situation the peoples of
Europe have to thank the calculating cynicism of the Bolshevik
leaders and the amiable indulgence of the Western Powers.
But one of the greatest of the German oppositionists in the time
of Hitler, writing at the risk of his life to a friend in England
during the recent war, said:
For us Europe after the war is less a problem of frontiers and soldiers, of top-
heavy organizations and grand plans than . . . a question of how the pic-
ture of man can be restored in the breasts of our fellow-citizens.'
Would that the Nazi gallows had spared this man for the
present and the future; he was both right and courageous, and
such people will be desperately needed if the future of the region
from the Elbe to Bering Strait is ever to be happier than it has
been in the. past. An American who wishes his influence to be
beneficial in that part of the world would do well to impress on any
friends he may have from the Iron-Curtain countries the folly of
a continuation, by them or anyone else, of these dreary and profit-
less manipulations with so-called national boundaries and with
the naive loyalties of bewildered linguistic groups which have
passed for statemanship in that area in the past. There are more
important things than where the border runs, and the first of these
is that on both sides of it there should be tolerance and maturity,
humility in the face of the sufferings of the past and the problems
of the future, and a realization that none of the important prob-
lems of the future for any of the peoples of Europe is going to be
solved entirely, or even primarily, within the country's national
boundaries.
These, then, are the things for which an American well-wisher
"'A German of the Resistance. The Last Letters of Count Helmuth James von Moltke."
London: Oxford University Press, 1948.
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24
36z FOREIGN AFFAIRS
may hope from the Russia of the future: that she lift forever the
Iron Curtain, that she recognize certain limitations to the internal
authority of government, and that she abandon, as ruinous and
unworthy, the ancient game of imperialist expansion and oppres-
sion. If.she is not prepared to do these things, she will hardly be
distinguishable from what we have before us today, and to hasten
the arrival of such a Russia would not be worth the care or
thought of a single American. If she is prepared to do these things,
then Americans will not need to concern themselves more deeply
with her nature and purposes; the basic demands of a more stable
world order will then have been met, and the area in which a
foreign people can usefully have thoughts and suggestions will
have been filled.
fusing ourselves with grandiose and unrealistic, or even meaning-
1 h
can avoid, this time, the tyranny of slogans. We can avoid con-
nurse ves
be diverted by irrelevant or confusing concepts of war aims. We
The first part of this task is a negative one: not to let
men t e enrage of the kind of Russia we would like to see and
assure that military operations are shaped in such a way as to
a more desirable Russia? we can hold steadily and clearly in
d h
If war comes, what we can do directly to promote the emergence
f
tenuateon of the present state of "no major war." The first of these
contingencies must unfortunately be discussed first, for it has
action by Americans toward the ends discussed above must be
examined both in terms of a possible war and in terms of the con-
Most regrettably, as the world is today, the possibility for direct
of er t engs-with respect, let us say, to ourselves or to our rela-
tions with other people-and affecting the Soviet world only
va++ ~aa+a, allu ILL_
direct action, by which we mean action taken with respect to
h h?
tw
e een erect action, i.e. action on our part directly affecting
nproe%- .,.,A ems.,.-.~_ t.-L!- -1 , - ? -
In our thinking on this subject we must be careful to distinguish
A:
b
should we, as Americans, conduct ourselves in order to promote
So much, then, for the kind of Russia we would like to see. How
Iv
ess, p rases designed simply to make us feel better about the
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 363
bloody and terrible business in which we are engaged. We can
remember that war-a matter of destruction, brutalization and
sacrifice, of separations, domestic disintegration, and the weaken-
ing of the deeper fabrics of society-is a process which of itself can
achieve no positive aims: that even military victory is only the
prerequisite for some further and more positive achievement
which it makes possible but by no means assures. We can have
the moral courage, this time, to remind ourselves that major in-
ternational violence is, in terms of the values of our civilization, a
form of bankruptcy for us all-even for those who are confident
that they'are right; that all of us, victors and vanquished alike,
must emerge from it poorer than we began it and farther from the
goals we had in mind; and that, since victory or defeat can signify
only relative degrees of misfortune, even the most glorious mili-
tary victory would give us no right to face the future in any spirit
other than one of sorrow and humbleness for what has happened
and of realization that the road ahead, toward a better world, is
long and hard-longer and harder, in fact, than it would have
been had it been possible to avoid a military cataclysm altogether.
Remembering these things, we will be less inclined to view mili-
tary operations as ends in themselves, and should find it easier to
conduct them in a manner harmonious with our political purposes.
If it should fall to us to take up arms against those who today
dispose over the Russian people, we can try not to give that people
the impression that we are their enemies, or consider them ours.
We can try to make them understand the necessity of such hard-
ships as we cannot avoid inflicting on them. We can endeavor to
hold constantly before them the evidences of a sympathetic under-
standing for their past and interest in their future. We can give
them the feeling that we are on their side, and that our victory,
if it comes, will be used to'provide them with a chance to shape
their own destiny in the future to a pattern happier than that
which they have known in the past. For all of this it is important
that we bear in mind what Russia has been, and can be, and not
permit political differences to becloud that picture.
National greatness is a difficult thing to define. Every nation
is made up of individuals; and among individuals, as is known,
there is no uniformity. Some are charming, others irritating; some
are honest, others not exactly so; some are strong, others weak;
some command admiration, others, by general agreement, are
anything but admirable. This is true in our own country; it is true
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364 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
in Russia. Just what, in these circumstances, national greatness
consists of, is hard to say. Certainly it rarely consists of those
qualities in which a people thinks itself great; for in nations, as in
individuals, the outstanding virtues are generally not the ones for
which we fancy ourselves distinguished.
Yet that there is such a thing as national greatness is clear;
and that the Russian people possess it in high degree is beyond
question. They are a people whose progress out of darkness and
squalor has been a painful one, marked by enormous sufferings
and punctuated by heart-rending setbacks. Nowhere on the face
of the globe has the tiny flame of faith in the dignity and charity
of man flickered more precariously under the winds-that tore at it.
Yet it has never gone out; it is not extinguished today even in the
heart-of the Russian land; and whoever studies the struggle of the
Russian spirit through the ages can only bare his head in admira-
tion before those Russian people who kept it alight through their
sacrifices and sufferings.
The record of Russian culture to date has proven that this
struggle has a significance far wider than the confines of the tradi-
tional Russian territory; it is a part, and an extremely important
part, of. the general cultural progress of mankind. We have only
to look at the people of Russian birth or origin living and working
in our midst-the engineers, the scientists, the writers, the artists
-to know that this is true. It would be tragic if our indignation
over Soviet outlooks and policies led us to make ourselves the
accomplices of Russian despotism by forgetting the greatness of
the Russian people, losing our confidence in their genius and their
potential for good, and placing ourselves in opposition to their
national feelings. The vital importance of this becomes even
clearer when we reflect that we in the outside world who believe
in the cause of freedom will never prevail in any struggle against
the destructive workings of Soviet power unless the Russian people
are our willing allies. That goes for peace, and it goes for war. The
Germans, though not fighting at that time in the cause of freedom,
learned to their sorrow the impossibility of combatting simulta-
neously both the Russian people and the Soviet Government.
The greatest difficulty here, of course, lies in the mute and help-
less position in which the Russian people find themselves as sub-
jects of a totalitarian regime. Our experiences with Germany
have demonstrated that we have not succeeded very well, as a
nation, in understanding the position of the man who lives under
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 365
the yoke of modern despotism. Totalitarianism is not a national
phenomenon; it is a disease to which all humanity is in some de-
gree vulnerable. To live under such a regime is a misfortune that
can befall a nation by virtue of reasons purely historic and not
really traceable to any particular guilt on the part of the nation
as a whole. Where circumstances weaken the powers of resistance,
to a certain crucial degree, the virus triumphs. If individual life is
to go on at all within the totalitarian framework it must go on by
arrangement with the regime, and to some extent in connivance
with its purposes. Furthermore, there will always be areas in which
the totalitarian government will succeed in identifying itself with
popular feelings and aspirations. The relationship between citizen
and political authority under totalitarianism is therefore inevi-
tably complicated: it is never pat and simple. Who does not
understand these things cannot understand what is at stake in our
relations with the peoples of such countries. These realities leave
no room for our favored conviction that the people of a totali-
tarian state can be neatly divided into collaborators and martyrs
and that there will be none left over. People do not emerge from
this relationship unscathed: when they do emerge they need help,
guidance and understanding, not scoldings and sermons.
We will get nowhere with an attitude of emotional indignation
directed toward an entire people. Let us rise above these easy and
childish reactions and consent to view the tragedy of Russia as
partly our own tragedy, and the people of Russia as our comrades
in the long hard battle for a happier system of man's coexistence
with himself and with nature on this troubled planet.
So much for what we do if, contrary to our hopes and our
wishes, a war so much talked about should prove impossible to
avoid. But supposing we are faced with a continuation of the
present state of absence of major warfare? What should our
course of action be then?
First of all, have we any grounds to hope, in these circum-
stances, that there might be changes in Russia of the kind that we
are here envisaging? There are no objective criteria for the answer
to this question. There is no "proof" one way or another. The
answer rests on something which is partly a matter of opinion and
judgment, but partly, admittedly, an act of faith. The writer be-
lieves the answer to be a positive one: that we are indeed justified
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succeeding generations. The cruelties, the untruths, the endless
deriding of man's nature practised in the concentration camps:
all these institutions of the police state, though they may first
see themselves reflected become progressively uninteresting to.
struggle to those of their close associates who inherit their power.
But the process of inheritance cannot be carried much further.
People can move along, themselves, as by some force of habit, on
the strength of an emotional drive acquired at second hand; but
it is no longer theirs. to transmit to others. The impulses that
thrust men of one generation into so despairing an attitude toward
themselves and toward the popular masses in whom they like to
366 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
in hoping, and holding it possible, that there may be such changes.
But in substantiation of this view it is possible to say only the
following.
There can be no genuine stability in any system which is based
on the evil and weakness in man's nature-which attempts to live
by man's degradation, feeding like a vulture on his anxieties, his
'capacity for hatred, his susceptibility to error, and his vulner-
ability to psychological manipulation. Such a system can repre-
sent no more than the particular frustrations and bitterness of the
generation of men who created it, and the cold terror of those who
have been weak or unwise enough to become its agents.
I am not speaking here of the Russian Revolution as such. That
was a more complicated phenomenon, with deeper roots in the
logic of history. I am speaking of the process by which something
claiming to be a hopeful turn in human events, claiming to lead
toward a decrease rather than an increase in the sum total of
human injustice and oppression, evolved into the shabby purga-
tory of the police state. Only men with a profound sense of per-
sonal failure could find satisfaction in doing to others those things
which are always involved in such a system; and whoever has had
occasion to look deeply into the eyes of a Communist police
officer will have found there, in that dark well of disciplined
hatred and suspicion, the tiny gleam of despairing fright which is
the proof of this statement. Those who begin by clothing a per-
sonal lust for power and revenge with the staggering deceits and
oversimplifications of totalitarianism end up by fighting them-
selves-in a dreary, hopeless encounter which projects itself onto
the subject peoples and makes- of their happiness and their faith
its battlefield.
Men of this sort can bequeath something of the passion of the
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The modern police state does not have these qualities. It rep-
an obligation to the future, as well as to the present and the past.
and degradation. Dynastic continuity compelled it to recognize
tive interest in the people over whom it ruled and from whose
labors it fed. It could not afford to live by their total intimidation
AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 367
have something of the lurid fascination that manifestations of
danger and anarchy always exert in a well-regulated and com-
posed society, sooner or later end up-like some stale and repeti-
tious pornography-by boring everybody, including those who
practise them.
Many of the servants of totalitarian power, it is true, having
debased themselves more than their victims and knowing that
they have barred themselves from any better future, may cling
despairingly to their unhappy offices. But despotism can never
live just by the fears of the jailers and hangmen alone; it must
have behind it a driving political will. In the days when despotic
power could be closely associated with a dynasty or an inherited
oligarchy, such a political-will could be more enduring. But then,
by the same token, it had to take a more benevolent and construc-
cannot be foreseen. If there are, indeed, such things as laws of
But how those changes are to come about is something which
other manifestations, manages to deposit on the shelf of time.
corded history and partly in the sediment of constructive, organic
change which every great human upheaval, however unhappy its
as a-living reality, but only as something surviving partly in re-
people's progress back for decades and has lain like a shadow over
the aspirations of all civilization will be distinguishable no longer
wise-when that terrible system of power which has set a great
come-soon or late, and whether by gradual process or other-
These, then, are the reflections which give the writer, for one,
faith that if the necessary alternatives are kept before the Russian
people, in the form of the existence elsewhere on this planet of a
civilization which is decent, hopeful and purposeful, the day must
begin to assert itself.
this way indefinitely. The violent maladjustments which caused
the convulsion will eventually begin to lose their actuality, and
the instinct for a healthier, less morbid, more interesting life will
marked by change and renewal and adjustment-will not remain
stimulus of a given historical moment. Society may be grievously,
agonizingly ill from it. But society-being something organic,
resents only a fearful convulsion of society, springing from the
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 political development, they will surely play a part here; but then
they would be the laws of development peculiar to the phenom-
enon of modern totalitarianism, and these have not yet been ade-
quately studied and understood. Whether such laws exist or not,
developments will be modified both by national character and by
the tremendous part which the fortuitous unquestionably plays
in the shaping of human events.
These things being so, we must admit with respect to the future
of government in Russia, we see "as through a glass, darkly."
Superficial evidences would not seem to leave much room for hope
that the changes we would wish to see in the attitudes and prac-
tices of government in Moscow could come about without violent
breaks in the continuity of power, that is, without the overthrow
of the system. But we cannot be sure of this. Stranger things have
happened-though not much stranger. And, in any case, it is not
our business to prejudge the question. It is not necessary for us,
merely in order to shape our own conduct in a way conducive to
our own interests, to decide what we admittedly cannot really
know. We should allow, here, for all possibilities, and should ex-
clude none. The main thing is that we keep clearly in mind the
image of what we would like to see in the personality of Russia
as an actor on the world stage, and let that be our guide in all
our dealings with Russian political factions, including both that
which is in power and those which are in opposition to it. And
if it should turn out to be the will of fate that freedom should
come to Russia by erosion from despotism rather than by the
violent upthrust of liberty, let us be able to say that our policy
was such as to favor it, and that we did not hamper it by pre-
conception or impatience or despair.
Of one thing we may be sure: no great and enduring change in
the spirit and practice of government in Russia will ever come.
about primarily through foreign inspiration or. advice. To be
genuine, to be enduring and to be worth the hopeful welcome of
other peoples such a change would have to flow from the initia-
tives and efforts of the Russians themselves. It is a shallow view of
the workings of history which looks to such things as foreign
propaganda and agitation to bring about fundamental changes in
the lives of a great nation. Those who talk of overthrowing the
Soviet system by propaganda point, by way of justification of
their thesis, to the intensive workings of the Soviet propaganda
machine and to the various facets of subversive activity con-
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AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE 369
ducted, inspired or encouraged by the Kremlin throughout the
world. They forget that the outstanding fact about such activities,
on the record of the 33 years over which they have been assidu-
ously conducted, has been their general failure. In the end, mili-
tary intimidation or invasion has been generally necessary for the
actual spread of the Soviet system. It may be argued that China
is an exception to this statement; but to what extent China can
really be said to be part of the Soviet system we do not know, and
to attribute the revolution which has taken place in China in these
recent years primarily to Soviet propaganda or instigation is to
underestimate grievously, to say the least, a number of other
highly important factors.
Any attempt at direct talking by one nation to another about
the latter.'s political affairs is a questionable procedure, replete
with possibilities for misunderstanding and resentment. That is
particularly true where spirit and tradition differ and the political
terminology is not really translatable. This appreciation in no way
weakens the importance of the "Voice of America," the function
of which, with respect to Russia, is to reflect as faithfully as pos-
sible the atmosphere and attitudes of this country, in order that
the Soviet citizen may form a fair judgment of them. But this is
an entirely different thing from urgings toward this or that
political action. We may have our own hopes or ideas as to the
implications for the Soviet citizen of the view of American reali-
ties which is apparent in the broadcasts of the "Voice" and in such
other evidences of American life as reach his consciousness; we
may think we know what we would do in the light of this evidence;
but it would be a mistake for us to be too explicit and to make these
things the basis of suggestions and promptings to him about what
he should do in the internal political life of his own country. We
are too apt to talk in our terms rather than his, and from an im-
perfect understanding of his problems and possibilities. And our
words, accordingly, are apt to convey meanings entirely different
from those which we meant them to convey.
For these reasons, the most important influence that the United
States can bring to bear upon internal developments in Russia
will continue to be the influence of example: the influence of what
it is, and not only what it is to others but what it is to itself. This
is not to say that many of those things which are now preoccupy-
ing the public mind are not of unquestioned importance: such'
things as physical strength, armaments, determination and soli-
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370 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
darity with other free nations. It is not to deny the urgent and
overriding necessity for a wise and adroit foreign policy, designed
to release and make effective all those forces in the world which,
together with our own, can serve to convince the masters of the
Kremlin that their grand design is a futile and unachievable one,
persistence in which promises no solution of their own predica-
ments and dilemmas. In fact, there can be no question but that
these must remain major preoccupations if war is to be avoided
and time is to be gained for the working of more hopeful forces.
But they can only remain sterile and negative if they are not given
meaning and substance by something which goes deeper and looks
further ahead than the mere prevention of war or the frustra-
tion of imperialistic expansion. To this, there is general agree-
ment; but what is this "something"? Many people think it only
a question of what we urge upon others, in other words, a ques-
tion of external propaganda. I would submit that it is primarily
a question of what we urge upon ourselves. It is a question of the
spirit and purpose of American national life itself. Any message
we may try to bring to others will be effective only if it is in ac-
cord with what we are to ourselves, and if this is something suffi-
ciently impressive to compel the respect and confidence of a world
which, despite all its material difficulties, is still more ready to
recognize and respect spiritual distinction than material opulence.
Our first and main concern must still be to achieve this state of
national character. We need worry less about convincing others
that we have done so. In the lives of nations the really worth-
while things cannot and will not be hidden. Thoreau wrote:
-M There is no ill which may not be dissipated_ like the dark if
ou let i
n a
y
stronger ugut upon it.... It the light we use is but a paltry and narrow
taper, most objects will cast a shadow wider than themselves.
Conversely, if our taper is a strong one we may be sure that its
rays will penetrate to the Russian room and eventually play their
part in dissipating the gloom which prevails there. No iron curtain
could suppress, even in the innermost depths of Siberia, the news
that America had shed the shackles of disunity, confusion and
doubt, had taken a new lease of hope and determination, and was
setting about her tasks with enthusiasm and clarity of purpose.
32
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CHAPTER II
FROM OLD EMIGRATION TO NEW
RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER
THIRTY YEARS' EXILE
R. Wraga
The author: Ryszard Wraga is at present a political
writer in Western Europe. He describes
himself as chief for many years of the
Russian section of the Polish General
Staff.
Reprinted from
Eastern Quarterly (London), January, 1951
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J
The growth of the part played by the Soviet Union in international
politics and the continuous Bolshevik aggression in the domestic
affairs of all nations of the world have increased the interest of public
opinion in Communism and Soviet policy. The international biblio-
graphy devoted to Russian affairs during the last thirty years greatly
exceeds, both as to number of items and variety of subjects dealt
with, the bibliography on the same problems for the period begin-
ning at the end of the eighteenth century (reign of Catherine the
Second) and ending in the year 1917. But there is still a gap in this
vast literature consisting of many dozens of thousands of items and
written in all the languages of the world : namely there are no com
prehensive studies on Russian emigration. Russian emigration is
not only interesting to research workers as an international political
problem in itself ; it also deserves thorough study because the history
of this emigration is the history of the struggle of different Russian
political and social groups against Bolshevism and the Soviet Govern-
ment. Moreover the methods of Soviet policy within the last thirty-
three years appear nowhere else more strikingly and revealingly than
in the history of this contest.
An unbiassed and comprehensive study of Russian emigration
might be most valuable for European and American politicians who,
it seems, would be able to find amongst other interesting features
many traces of their own mistakes and ill-advised steps. The neces-
sity for such a study is especially great nowadays, as the number of
people emigrating from the ever-expanding territories of the Soviet
Empire is continually growing, and new emigrations start the struggle
against Bolshevism without realising that preceding emigrations
such as the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Tartar, Caucasian,
Turkestanian, and others from the European and Asiatic territories
invaded by Russia have acquired very valuable experience in this
matter.
The subject of Russian emigration is so wide and so important
that it cannot be exhausted in this essay, which is only a modest at-
tempt to recall some events and give some relevant guiding ideas.
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II
Both the origins and structure of Russian emigration are very
intricate matters. Its core was formed in 19zo-1922, and at that time
it could be roughly divided into. two main groups :
- Partisans of the old Tsarist regime and adversaries of any kind of revolution.
- Partisans of the February Revolution of 1917-disparagingly called by the Bolsheviks
a " bourgeois-democratic revolution " being at the same time adversaries of the Bol-
shevik upheaval in October, 1917. 35
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RLY
In time, as well as these two groups, a third began to grow, to
which belonged those who at the beginning had adopted a conciliatory
attitude towards the Bolshevik upheaval, or were even its partisans
and only opposed it later when Bolshevism began to evolve into a
totalitarian police regime (the so-called " Communist Fascism ")
and State capitalism.
The last war brought into being a fourth numerous group : that
of the enemies of the state of things existing in Soviet Russia, enemies
of 'the final political and social forms imposed on Russia by Stalin
and his clique during twenty years of his dictatorial rule.
Thus, while the first group in its struggle against Bolshevism
rallied to the programme of restoring Russia's former status, the
second set as its target " the defence of the achievements of the Febru-
ary Revolution of 1917 " and democractic principles, and the third
took up the defence of " Leninist principles of the dictatorship of the
proletariat," considering them to be the safeguards of democracy and
progress. The overwhelming majority of the fourth group advances
first of all a negative target-"Away with Bolshevism."
I stress the fact that this classification is very rough and over-
simplified, but it gives an idea of the strong and weak points of the
ideology and aims of the particular groups.
The strength of the first group was due to the fact that its out-
look was backed by the concrete vision of the Russian monarchy, with
ifs social, economic and administrative structure and its traditional
policy in domestic, foreign and alien nationalities' affairs. Its weakness
came from the unqualified defence of the past and the aim for the
restoration of the monarchy, which was a desperate and utopian enter-
prise. For the whole Russian Empire and for the Russians themselves
the 1917 Revolution was an absolute necessity, and it was impossible
to put back the clock. This revolution had been developing in the
course of the last two centuries, corresponding to the inmost feelings
of the Russian masses. and being the only progressive way of cutting
the Gordian knot tied by the military and imperialistic policy of Tsardom
and Russian autocracy to bind together the fate of the many nations
who had nothing in common with each other.
The strength of the second group arose from the conviction that
the revolution was an accomplished and positive fact, corresponding
to the interests of the Russian nation. Its weakness was due to the
fact that although the majority of its members had been responsible
for the outbreak of the revolution and had taken an active part in it,
the group was not prepared to establish the theory of revolution and
organise it for constructive purposes. The group consisted mainly
of the intelligentsia, with all the inherited tragic features of the pro-
gressive and revolutionary Russian intelligentsia which could not
control the government and never had real access to the people.
The strength of the third group was due to having lived through
the experience of the chaotic February Revolution, adrift without a
clear programme. Moreover this group was well acquainted with
the theory and practice of the Leninist revolution. Its weakness was
its inability for a long time to take a definite line so far as the struggle
against Bolshevism was concerned, from fear that together with
Bolshevism some " basic achievements of revolutions " might be
destroyed.
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RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE 19
The fourth group, mostly formed in recent years, possesses by
far the widest knowledge of the theory and practice of Bolshevism.
On the other hand, having no possibility of setting up a positive pro-
gramme (or programmes) and the framework of an organisation while
staying in the home country, only in exile did it begin to establish the
lines of a programme and to constitute a compact political and social
organisation.
These circumstances also determine the existence of two gener-
ations within the present Russian emigration : the old (which either
took an active part in the 1917 Revolution or witnessed it) and the
new one (brought up politically in Bolshevik surroundings).
III
The great bulk of the old Russian emigration consists of former
partisans of the so-called " white movement," the overwhelming
majority of whom had served as officers and other ranks in the armies
of Denikin, Wrangel, Judenitch, Koltchak and others fighting against
the Bolsheviks in 1918-192o on all possible fronts, wherever such
fronts might have materialised. The core of this war emigration,
being its elite, was formed from these 13 5,000 "whites " who left
from Crimean ports for Istanbul in the middle of November 19zo.
The abundant documentation on the civil war in Russia during
the revolution enables us to state the main causes of the defeat of the
"white movement." Not only was it led by partisans of the old
regime, but its main bulk was of men who took an absolutely hostile
stand towards the revolution as such and aimed at restoration. Their
programmes were purely reactionary. The responsible leaders were
professional soldiers who were incapable of bringing to accord the
purposes of dictatorship in Purely military- matters and the require-
ments of the civil administration and policy. The aims of restoration
and the reactionary programmes of individual military dictators
opened a rift between the armies and population, a rift which kept
increasing on account of the predatory behaviour of these troops.
Because of that the greater part of the working population, both in
town and country, sided with the Bolsheviks.
The same aims for restoration caused the hostile attitude towards
the " white movement " of all separatist national movements, to
which the revolution promised or guaranteed the winning of full
independence (Poland, Finland, Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Caucasian
and Turkestan peoples), or self-government. The " white movement "
pursued two targets at the same time : the destruction of Bolshevism
and the reconstitution of " one, indivisible Russia." (The first aim
was wofded in a deliberately insincere way : it was not only the destruc.'
tion of Bolshevism which was aimed at, but the destruction of any
form of revolution). As we have said above, the dymanic revolutionary
forces in Russia were (and are) infinitely stronger than those of the counter-
revolution. In the struggle against Russia the victory belongs to those who
succeed in gaining control of these revolutionary forces. It was the Bolsheviks
who scored the victory in 1919-19zo.
The leaders of the " white movement," as usually happens with
professional soldiers, depended entirely on military forces in trying
to destroy Bolshevism. Such estimates, which unfortunately con-
tinue to be made by some Western politicians, are fallacious and ill-
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A TERN QUARTERLY
advised. Carrying on the war against Bolshevism by purely military
means, the " whites " left the Bolsheviks complete freedom so far
as political and social ideology were concerned.
IV
The stand taken by the Western powers towards the "white
movement" forms a separate chapter in the enumeration of the
reasons for its defeat. These powers had no definite programme,
nor did they pursue any political aims in relation to either " Whites "
or " Reds." The official or semi-official statements made by these
powers from time to time could not do any harm to the Bolsheviks.
Just the opposite-they roused the feelings of the Russian masses
on the Bolshevik side. When Lenin proclaimed the programme of
spreading revolution all over the world, the West started to back up
the most reactionary elements in order to weaken Bolshevism if it
was impossible to destroy it completely.
The " intervention of the capitalistic countries " conceived in
this way, being also belated and too weak so far as technical and
material assistance was concerned, gave the opposite result : it strength-
ened Bolshevism, at the same time undermining the confidence and
trust in the West of the nations of the Russian Empire. It also had
a very serious bearing on the subsequent feelings of the "white move-
ment " partisans towards Europe, when they had already settled in
the West as political exiles. These feelings were by no means friendly
or sympathetic. In the eyes of the Russian emigres Europe stood for
political selfishness, materialistic outlook and indifference. Com-
pelled by circumstances to disperse amongst European communities,
the Russian emigration kept aloof from them for a long time ; feeling
uneasy in new surroundings and finding no understanding there for
its words of truth about Bolshevism, it grouped and organised within
its own " ghetto," which of course weighed heavily on its political
outlook, possibility and prospects. of. action.
In this respect some emigrations of other nations of the former Rus-
revo1utionary period ; the second and main drawback was the lack
of an indisputable State central authority brought from the home
social strata did not correspond either to their proportional strength
in post-revultionary Russia or even to that which existed in the pre-
destitute social elements. This enabled the Russian emigration to
foster the feeling that it really represented the whole nation. The
drawbacks were due first to the fact. that the strength of the particular
classes, from members of the Ruling House to the lowest and most
it did not consist of only one social class or stratum. Within each of
stitute tor the State which they were forced to leave. The most
valuable asset of the Russian emigration was the circumstance that
They try to set up a political organisation which may serve as a sub-
It is a constant phenomenon of all political emigrations that they
V
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RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE 21
The problem of " legitimism " in the struggle against the Bolsheviks
is of great importance. Bolshevism made impossible any organised
mass movements of resistance both in political and social spheres, and
therefore is afraid of the existence beyond the frontiers of political
organisations in exile, particularly of those preserving'the character
of State organisation, possessing legal titles for action and recognised
as such by the oppressed nations.
This problem was most complicated so far as the Russians were
concerned. The monarchy was overthrown by the revolution. The
monarchist cause was compromised not only by the subsequent set-
ting up of a few provisional governments and the recognition of the
revolution by the people in the form of elections to a " constituent
assembly " (Utchreditelnoie Sobranje), but also by the existence of
many doubts which arose in relation to the dynastic titles in exile,
this issue being very confused even for the monarchists themselves.
The members of the last provisional government, headed by A.
Kerensky, " did not pass the historic test " according to general
public opinion, even in the eyes of the most fervent partisans of the
February Revolution, and for that reason they would not claim to
act as representatives of State legitimism. The democratic groups
(headed by Mi]yukov) brought forward schemes for replacing the
State organisation by a very wide understanding between the represent-
-ations of the democratic parties.
The parties of the Left, Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) and Social-
Revolutionaries (Eser) kept aloof : the first because they believed in
the evolution of Bolshevism in a democratic direction and could not
decide to pass to a decisive fight against it-the others, unwilling to
abandon their revolutionary tenets, refused to look for allies amongst
other Russian political bodies.
None of the former Russian military dictators had established on
Russian territory any leading political body which might be attractive,
if only for a part of the Russian emigration. Those who were still
alive joined the political camp of the monarchists.
A so-called " Committee of Russian Ambassadors " acted for
some time in exile, but it could not of course replace a supreme legitim-
ate State authority. For these reasons the problen, of legitimism
could not be solved in a way which might win the approval of a
relatively large proportion of the emigres. Even the monarchists
were unable to agree amongst themselves, and there were two pre-
tenders to the throne for several years : Grand Duke Nicholas Nicho-
layevitch (uncle of Emperor Nicholas the Second), who died in 19zz,
and Grand Duke Cyril Wladimirovitch (first cousin of the Emperor
Nicholas the Second) who died in 1939. Even the deaths of both
pretenders and the recognition as " head of the dynasty " of Grand
Duke Vladimir (son of Grand Duke Cyril) did not solve the problem
of legitimism amongst the monarchists. Today they are grouped
much more under the banner of the monarchist idea than around, a
person.
V,
1
The acts of recognition by the Western powers, quickly follow-
ing one another, of the Bolsheviks as the legitimate rulers of Russia,
the definite consolidation of the Soviet government and administration
39
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inside the home country, constituted a great setback for the whole
Russian emigration. Hopes. of the repetition of Allied intervention
in Russia-fostered for some time in military circles-vanished,
giving way to the conviction that the defeat of Bolshevism could
occur only through domestic developments in Russia itself. Because
of that the grudge against Europe, which originated at the time of
the ill-starred policy of " intervention," was increased on account of
the backing given to the Bolsheviks by the former " interventionists."
Like the initial anticipations of repeated interventions, the sub-
sequent beliefs in " co-operation with the nation in overthrowing
Bolshevism " relaxed more and more the framework of political
organisation of the emigres. The main issues discussed in exile were :
" Monarchy or Republic ?" " Is Bolshevism capable of evolving.
in the direction of State nationalism ?" " Should the struggle against
the Bolsheviks be carried out by any means, including provoking
intervention from outside, or should it remain a domestic Russian prob-
lem, while the emigration takes the defence of the Russian State in
spite of its being ruled by the Bolsheviks ?"
Side by side with lively political discussions, the splitting of
political groups kept increasing. When the First Assembly of Mon-
archists was held in Reichenhall on the and June 1911, and a Supreme
Monarchist Council was set up, which still exists, it was attended. by.
the representatives of 75 Monarchist groups. At the second Assembly
of Monarchists in Paris in November 19zz the number of these
groups had risen to izo.
The attempts of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, (the so-
called "Cadets," headed by Professor P. Milyukov) to set up. the
National Committee only caused the disruption of this party also,
which played a great part in the last year of the Russian Monarchy
and in the period of the February Revolution. The Republican-
Democratic Union (R.D.O.), organised by the same Milyukov, be-
lieved in the " evolution " of Stalinism and propagated the principle
of leaving the problem of Bolshevism to the Russians themselves
as a problem of Russian domestic policy. This Union was in fact
a body torn by internal dissensions. The so-called " populist social-
ists " split into two groups : the group of S. Melgunov who, until
the present day, has unreservedly advocated a relentless fight, based
on a broad front of democratic parties against Bolshevism, and the
group of A. Peshenov, who opposed any form of action by the emi-
gration. Disagreements started also amongst the Social-Democrats.
In Czecho-Slovakia in 1922 a separate group was formed, organised
by the Social-Revolutionaries S. Maslov and A. Argunov, but this
also split into two groups in 1934. Social-Democrats (headed by
L. Martov, F. Dan and A. Abramovich) for a long time (even after
Martov's death in 1924) advocated only an internal fight for the realisa-
tion of democratic forms by all mass-movements, and otherwise
preached " obedience to the Soviet constitution." In time disagree-
ments started amongst them also : between the partisans of the con-
ciliatory attitude, represented by O. Bauer on the one side, and the
followers of K. Kautsky who recommended the struggle against
Bolshevism by all available means, on the other. It must be pointed
out that the group of Social-Democrats gathered round the paper
40 " The Socialist Courier " (Sotsyalisticheskiy Vestnik), founded is
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RUSSIAN EMIGRATION-AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE 23
1921 and still appearing, is the group of emigres which distinguished
itself by a perfect understanding of the international situation and
a thorough knowledge of Soviet problems. For a long time it main-
tained great cohesion and consistency in carrying out its programme.
The discrepancies between the different organisations of the right,
centre and left have been so considerable that the establishment
of a supra-national body including all groups, even for purely re-
presentative purposes has been out of the question. Even charitable
and social welfare bodies were torn by great discrepancies in views
and programmes. Their number rose to 18o in 1932.
In time new political organisations and groups appeared, which
considered that the old ones, originated in pre-revolutionary times,
were unable to deal with the task of the fight against Bolshevism.
The first of these, calling itself the " Confraternity of Russian Truth "
(headed by Prince G. Leuchtenberg, Sokolov-Kretchetov and. General
Krasnov) was founded in Berlin in 1921 and was active until 1932.
In 1923 anenergetic group, " Struggle for Russia " (Borba za Rossiyu),
headed by M. Fedorov and S. Melgunov and consisting of members
of moderate opinions, was founded. Its activities ceased in 1931.
In later years societies of emigre youth came into being, such as that
of the right wing and Monarchist camp, " Union of Young Russians "
(leader Kazim Bek), that of the centre, " National-Labour Alliance
of the' New Generation " (Natsyonalno-Trudovoy Soyuz Novago
Pokolenya), led by V. Baydalakov and M. Georghievsky ; and a
definitely Fascist " Union of.Russian Fascists," (A. Vonsiatsky). The
"Russian All-Soldiers Union" (R.O.W.S.) organised in 1933 by
General Baron P. Wrangel, was intended to be a body above parties,
a kind of Order of Knights, which was to take the place of the dis-
banded " white " army. The official doctrine of this body was sum-
med up in a slogan: " Nepredreshenstvo "-which means that all
decisions referring to the future political and social status of Russia
had to be reserved. Nevertheless, " R.O.W.S." stood for " a great,
national Russia," and in practice was controlled by Monarchists,
like the whole " white " movement in the past. For many years
" R.O.W.S." arrogated to itself the right to take all action for military
sabotage and intelligence on Russian territory, and also, so far as the
Monarchist camp was concerned, the monopoly of political and
organisation activities.
VII
After some years an interesting feature appeared in the social and
political outlook within Russian emigration, gradually undergoing
Fascist influence. There were many reasons for this evolution :
- Awareness of the necessity for discipline amongst the organisations and groups to
carry out the struggle against Bolshevism.
- The attractiveness (especially to the younger generation) of the Fascist ideas ever more
fashionable in Europe, and the hope that a Fascist Europe would be able to oppose to
Bolshevism a serious political and military threat.
Realisation that Communism in Russia itself was being transformed into Communo-
Fascism and, taking their bearings from this, the forces gathered against Bolshevism
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This Fascism appeared mostly in a half camouflaged form, but
slowly infected not only the right wing Monarchist organisations but
also the moderate ones, and even some of the leftist groups. Only
Socialist organisations were free from Fascist influence. Fascism
also spread in the purely military circles of R.O.W.S.
42
also had to pursue a most flexible policy.
vantage or family ties between the Ruling Houses, etc. The R.O.W.S.
political trends, co-operating in Germany in the destruction of the
Versailles Treaty, working in France for the revival of Russo-French
friendship (directed against Germany), in Great Britain taking ad-
from the Socialists of other countries. The most intricate was the
policy of the Monarchists, as they had to adapt their tactics to opposed
Socialists (both S.R. and S.D.), as they took their bearings from the
Second International and found relatively disinterested assistance
The most straightforward and direct line was adopted by the
in military quarters, the intelligence services, and not always reliable
state of things forced the Russian emigration and its political leaders
to take some complicated-and frankly not always straightforward-
from the government of the country on whose territory this faction
or group of emigres was settled. It is superfluous to say that such a
relations amongst its groups. It was not always political considerations
which prompted the search for assistance from some quarters : very
often it depended on the necessity for winning some sort of protection
extent for the disintegration of the Russian emigration and the mutual
ppwers or amongst international bodies was responsible to a great
The necessity for seeking support amongst the various great
IX
In spite of splitting into many organisations, in spite of internal
friction due to different political and social outlooks, the Russian
emigration had great value and importance as an anti-Bolshevik
factor. First of all its number was imposing : in 1930-1939 the total
number of Russian emigrants amounted to one million, of which more
than 400,000 were in France and more than i5o,ooo in Germany.
For the above mentioned reasons the Russians, apart from a few
exceptions, were seldom assimilated. Their homesickness and desire
to return to their motherland and fight Bolshevism, their activity
and energy in this respect, not only did not diminish as the years
passed but on the contrary rather increased. It must also be kept in
mind that this emigration had amongst its leaders men of world re-
nown, having wide connections in international political, industrial
and financial quarters, in international social and scientific organisa-
tions. Although it was beyond their power to provoke a change in
the international conjuncture, they could still influence the views of
some statesmen of the world and even of whole countries.
For all these reasons, from the very beginning the Bolsheviks made an
enormous effort to destroy the Russian emigration as a political force. They
continued abroad the same action which they had carried out against
the " white movements," democratic opposition, S.R.'s and S.D's
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during the civil war. The " amnesty " proclaimed in 1921 by the
Bolsheviks gave some quantitative results (1 z 1,000 emigres returned
to the Soviet Union in 1921 and 6o,ooo in the next nine years), but
these results were very poor so far as quality was concerned. They
therefore started propaganda action " from inside," within the emi-
gration itself. They inspired two trends in 19z1-19zz-one political,
" Change of signposts " (Smyena Vekh), headed by Professor Ustrya-
lov, and the other pseudo-scientific, with Prince Trubetzkoy, Pro-
fessor Alexeyev, Professor P. Savitsky as its leaders. The " Smye-
novekhovtsi," spread propaganda mostly amongst the Russian intel-
ligentsia, recommending a change of attitude towards Bolshevism
and a return to the motherland " in order to work with the whole
people for the reconstruction of the country." This was at the time
when Lenin introduced the "NEP" policy, and Ustryalov's theories
found many adherents. Amongst them was Count Alexy Tolstoy,
who afterwards became one of the most prominent Soviet writers.
The Eurasian theories were more perfidious : for instance, their
followers asserted that it was Bolshevism which created ideal con-
ditions for the perfect merging of two elements within the Russian
State, European and Asiatic, and eliminating the Western influence.
They violently opposed any struggle against Bolshevism either by
military force or by revolution.
But the greatest destruction in the ranks of Russian emigration
has been due to continuous direct Soviet provocation, today more
intense than ever. It was directed mainly against the organisations
which showed the highest spirit and energy and had the greatest
possibilities for underground activity on the territory of the Soviet
Union. Such were above all, as we know, the R.O.W.S. and the
Monarchist organisations.
In 19zz the Bolsheviks founded in the Soviet Union a sham Mon-
archist organisation (M.O.S.R. or M.O.R.), which they put in touch
with the central monarchist bodies and R.O.W.S. As the latter or-
ganisation had in turn been interconnected with different European
General Staffs, the Soviet intelligence service obtained chances.to in-
fluence and insight into the greater part of the Russian emigration
as well as many foreign intelligence services. This organisation,
known later as " Trust," continued until 1927, when the Bolsheviks
themselves disclosed what they were doing, and this compromised
many political and military leaders of the emigres in the eyes of the
West. " Trust " also caused great confusion in European intelligence
services, as for several years it had supplied them with false and bias-
sed information.
Unfortunately the leaders of Russian emigration did not draw
the necessary conclusions from the " Trust " incident. Above all
they did not understand that no emigration acting on foreign soil can be safe
from agents provacateurs and enemy plots. " Truth " was not liquidated
by the Russians, but only hushed up. Many spies and enemy agents
remained in the ranks of R.O.W.S. and political organisations, especi-
ally monarchist ones, often holding high posts. New batches of
spies kept arriving. With the assistance of their agents, the Bolsheviks
in 193o, kidnapped in Paris General Wrangel's successor, General
A. Kutepov, and in 1937 the latter's successor, Chairman of R.O.W.S.
General E Mill 19 C
f
on
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also a victim of enemy plots. Soviet influence also penetrated the
organisation of " Young Russians." Nor were the organisations
of the centre and left wing spared in this respect. The Soviet action
had the most harmful consequences for Russian emigration, causing
still greater disruption and dissension, and discouraging and demoralis-
ing many people. It also undermined the trust of international
political quarters in Russian emigration.
Nevertheless it must be pointed out that Western policy towards
this emigration to a great extent helped the Soviet practices of cor-
ruption. Very soon, after the defeat of the " white movement,"
the emigration began to be considered as a " malum necessarium."
Official political contacts with it were considered rather embarrassing,
and were left to lower, less responsible officials or to the intelligence
services-the only purpose of the latter being to obtain information
about Soviet Russia.
44
X
We should add to the above picture of Russian emigration on the
eve of the Second World War, very rough and incomplete, that in
spite of its great shortcomings so far as organisation was concerned,
this emigration performed a great work in the matter of the direct
struggle against the Bolsheviks, notwithstanding the Soviet penetra-
tion and plots.. It showed a great spirit of self-sacrifice, patriotism
in the masses and self-denial in the service of the cause of its country.
There was no lack of volunteers for the most daring and dangerous
anti-Bolshevik enterprises from amongst both the older and younger
generation. Even the relative ease with which the Russian agents
provacateurs gained access to the emigration organisations can to
some extent be explained by the daring eagerness which characterised
the Russians on any occasion when the liberation of Russia from
Bolshevism was at stake. The importance the Bolsheviks themselves
attached to the problem of " White emigration " may be found in
the fact that for thirty years of Soviet rule in Russia it never happened
that a political trial.failed to implicate, directly or indirectly, the Rus-
sian emigration in anti-Soviet plots.
The action of Boris Savinkov (who did not hesitate to go to the
U.S.S.R. in 1924, where he was arrested a. couple of years later, and
committed suicide), the activities of S.R.. organisation, the strenuous
work of the " Mensheviks," the deeds of R.O.W.S., " Struggle for
Russia " and " Peasant Russia " groups, besides the intensive efforts
of the emigre organisations of other nations of the Soviet Union-all
these were responsible for considerable setbacks for the Soviet Union,
and above all for fostering the spirit of resistance and anti-Bolshevik
feelings amongst the masses in Russia. In the last years before the
war, N.T.S.N.P. (National Labour Alliance of the New Generation)
started energetic work both abroad and in the home country, apply-
ing revolutionary methods and drawing the necessary conclusions
from the experiences of the R.O.W.S.
The work done by the Russian emigration in matters of propa-
ganda and information on Russian affairs abroad was by no means
less considerable, and perhaps it was relatively even greater. Russian
philosophy, literature and art were made popular in the West.
Russian scientists occupied many Chairs of Slavonic. and Russian
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RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE 27
studies- (especially in the U.S.A. and the U.K.) This emigration
also greatly contributed to rousing the interest of the West in Bolshev-
ism as an international problem, and gathered vast documentation
about Soviet Russia.
But we must not overlook some shortcomings in this sphere of
activities of Russian emigration. The greatest was due to the fact
that scientists, writers and publicists (apart from Socialists perhaps),
in venting their hatred of the Bolsheviks gradually became incapable
of taking an unbiassed and dispassionate view of Russia's past. This
past and its constitutional, social and economic structure appeared to
their eyes in ever brighter colours, especially as the Bolshevik tyranny
was tightening its grip on the homeland. Russian historiography
has always been under State control, and primarily served State in-
terests. The work of the Russian-historians in exile brought no change
in this respect. Fighting on every front to defend the past, the State
interests and nationalistic aims, Russian emigration began to lose sight
of its main political aim-the destruction of Bolshevism.
XI
International tension in the years 1935-1937 gave a new lease of
life to Russian emigration. Hopes of a new world conflict revived,
together with the belief-as is usual in any emigration-in the radical
change of the destinies of the motherland. The greater part of the
Russians realised the inevitability of a clash, sooner or later, between
Germany and Russia. The pro-German trend of the Right and
Monarchist wing of the emigration gathered momentum, and at the
same time the " resistance " feelings in democratic quarters became
more active. Milyukov, leader of the Russian democrats, was quickly
approaching the definition of " Soviet patriotism " which was pro-
fessed by a considerable proportion of the moderate democrats both
during and after the war. On the contrary, the left-wing of the
emigration, without changing its attitude towards Stalinism, took a
relentless attitude towards Nazism.
The war, and especially the second stage after Hitler's invasion
of the U.S.S.R., roughly speaking divided Russian emigration into
two camps : those collaborating with the Germans, and those who
sided with the Western Allies. There were many shades and variations
in each camp. Some sided unreservedly with Hitlerism, and others
considered such collaboration incidental, an opportunity to deliver
a deadly blow to Bolshevism and set up a Russian military force allied
to Germany. There were some who wholeheartedly joined the Allies
against enemy No. i, National Socialism ; but there were others who
counted on the effects of war and contact with the West as factors which
might drive Stalinism, if not into complete surrender, in any case into
a momentous evolution, and therefore wished to be " on the side of
the Russian nation fighting against the invader." Certain organisa-
tions were split by the front lines, and often the same political bodies
broke into two groups, depending on geographical position, one
collaborating with one side and the other with its adversary.
The position became extremely complicated when the Germans
organised the so-called " Russian Liberation Army " (R.O.A.) under
General A. Vlasov's command, and in the last stage of the war set
up the "Committee of Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" (K.O.N.R.).
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The history of the formation of Vlasov's army is beyond the scope of
this essay, but it is worthwhile to emphasise that it is still under
lively discussion not only by Russian emigration but also by world
opinion. Without entering into closer examination or stating our
views on General Vlasov's action, we wish only to stress that it was the
best proof of how much hatred of the Bolshevik rule and system, how
much utter despair, was stirred up by Bolshevism amongst all the
peoples of the Soviet Union. Vlasov's Army was unquestionably
a spontaneous, popular move, and it is extremely tragic that the victor-
ious West helped the Bolsheviks to liquidate the leaders and the greater part
of the partisans of this movement.
46
XII
The old Russian emigration was still further broken up and
weakened as the outcome of the war. Some outstanding personalities
and leaders, such as General A. Denikin and Professor Milyukov,
were no longer alive. A short-sighted move by " Soviet patriots,"
initiated by Liberals and headed by former Ambassador Maklakov,
played havoc in the ranks of the old guard. The part played by the
Soviet Union during the war, the great publicity staged by British and
American propaganda for " Stalin's democracy," the belief in post-
war changes in Russia itself in the direction of democracy, bowed
many of the staunchest personalities (such as I. Bunin, W. Berdyaev,
etc.). The ranks of R.O.W.S. thinned and its adherents had the im-
pression that they had missed a historic opportunity, from which it
had expected so much. Even the Mensheviks who for many years
had remained a most coherent and united group were weakened by
passing over in 1940 to the specific " Soviet patriotism " of one of
their most outstanding leaders, F. Dan.
The Orthodox Church abroad was also disrupted. Before the
last. war it had played a very considerable part as a co-ordinating factor
for the major part of the Russian emigration. After the Moscow
patriarchate became an obedient servant of Muscovite imperialism,
some of the clergy abroad swelled the ranks of the Soviet agents.
But at the same time Russian emigration received a strong and
valuable reinforcement from the former soldiers of Vlasov's army
who had survived Soviet destruction, from Soviet prisoners unwilling
to return home in spite of the Soviet terror and strong pressure from
the Allies, as well as from other refugees who have kept on arriving
until the present day from Soviet Russia and the Russian occupied
territories. They brought a perfect knowledge of the Soviet system,
based on personal experience, great intrepidity and endurance as well
as readiness for a relentless fight. They did not possess schemes for
organisation nor complete political programmes, as was only natural.
Very quickly the old and the new emigration began to merge.
The new emigres were attracted by the moderate and left wing, but
more by the first of these. The new structure of. Russian emigration
is therefore totally different from the old one. The Monarchist organi-
sations, thinning more and more, have lost their influence, trying in
vain to make closer contact with the new emigres. R.O.W.S. is
dying, in spite of trying every means to establish new ex-servicemen's
associations, in which only a few of the new emigres have enlisted,
mostly former soldiers of Vlasov's army. The sparse ranks of the
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RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE 29
Mensheviks and S.R. are also thinning, and occupy the political
stage only thanks to the personal ascendancy of some leaders' great
political experience and knowledge of Soviet problems. The names
of A. Abramovitch, W. Czernov, B. Nikolaevsky, S. Shwarz, W.
Zenzinov and D. Dallin today enjoy world renown. But with the
Popular Socialist, S. Melgunov, they are the only outstanding figures
in exile. Neither the left nor the moderate wing have any such
authoritative personalities.
Active Russian political emigration can be reduced nowadays
to four groups :
- " Union of Struggle for Freedom of Russia," beaded by S. Melgunov and A. Kartashov,
operating in France and Germany.
- " League of Struggle for Freedom of the People," 'headed by A. Kerensky and B.
Nikolaevsky, with headquarters in the U.S.A. and branches in France and Germany.
- " National Union of Labour " (Russian solidarists), headed by W. Baydalakov, S.
Poremsky, E. Romanov and others, operating mainly in Germany and the U.S.A.
- " Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" (S.B.O.N.R.), oper-
ating primarily in Germany.
The first two bodies consist -of a restricted number of persons,
forming an elite ; the members are mostly old emigres. "National
Union of Labour," formed from a former National Union of Labour
of the New Generation, and S.B.O.N.R. are mass-organisations, the
new emigres being in the majority in both of them, especially in
S.B.O.N.R.
At present the active part of the political emigration is passing
through a great crisis regarding the framework of organisations.
The policy of personalities and political authorities is giving way more and
more to the policy of organised teams, within which common ideas and
programmes for the struggle for liberation are crystallised. The
extremist groups of both right and left are vanishing.
Two subjects amongst those at present discussed in Russian
emigration circles deserve special attention : the problem of the
responsibility of the Russian nation for Bolshevism, and the problem
of a " one and indivisible Russia."
XIII
Russian emigres are indignant if one identifies Bolshevism with
the Russian nation, or considers the period of Soviet rule as an integral
part of the history of the Russian Empire. There is the same indigna-
tion when one states that the Soviet Government enjoys the support
of the Russian nation. It is of course true that the publicists of other
nations subjugated by Bolshevism, like Western publicists, are some-
times guilty of excessive simplification. The machinery of totalitar-
ian regimes such as I itlerism or Bolshevism is totally different from
every regime of despotism and tyranny so far known in history. The
means of terror are so overwhelming that the passivity of the people
does not necessarily mean that the tyrant should be considered as
the genuine representative of the national will. Moreover the passiv-
ity of the Russian population is rather relative. In the Soviet Union
Bolshevism is acting against the interests of the Russian nation, as it is against
the interests of other nations subjugated by it. Russian hatred of the
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Bolsheviks is immense, and the revolutionary passions accumulated
in the Russian masses against the Government and its agencies are
infinite. The question which arises today is not how to stir up or rouse this
force, but how to organise and direct it.
But at the same time there are in Soviet Russia some phenomena
which show that in certain respects the line of conduct of Bolshevism
towards the Russian nation is different from that pursued in relation
to other nations of the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks consider them-
selves to be the historical continuation of the Russian State. By their
policy and insistent propaganda they have succeeded in convincing
the Russian masses that their main preoccupation is the maintenance
of the unity and integrity of the Russian Empire which, thanks to
them, has been greatly expanded . In this mattef, as happened at the
time of the Tsarist imperialistic policy, they have won the support,
above all, of the Great Russian element, which for centuries has been
accustomed to sacrificing individual and social interests for the benefit
of the State. The truth is that the Soviet Government is based on the
Party, bureaucracy and political policies, consisting mainly of Russian
elements. The truth is that the national slogans of Soviet propaganda
are agreeable only to Russian ears. The truth is that the Soviet army,
trained in the aggressive spirit, is commanded above all by Russians
who took over the tradition of the late Tsarist army. The truth is
also that both the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union
follows the traditional paths traced by the Russian Empire. And it
is further true that although Bolshevism treats in the same ruthless
way all the nations of the Soviet Union, the strength of resistance
against Bolshevism is much greater amongst othernations of the Soviet
Union : the Baltic peoples, Ukrainians, Tartars, Caucasians and
Turkestanians, and even amongst the long suffering and quiet Bye-
lorussians-than amongst the genuine Russian population. And if
Stalin could state after the end of the war that the Russian nation was
the only one of the nations of the Soviet Union which did not betray
the trust of the Soviet Government, we are bound to state that there
was some truth in this, in spite of all the perfidy and demagogy of
this phraseology.
. But the bitter truth finds confirmation not only in the statements
made by Stalin and his minions. In spite of everything, it is in the
ranks of the Russian nation that Bolshevism, in its present form of
State Fascism, has enlisted the greatest number of partisans and fol-
lowers. Unfortunately confirmation of this fact may be found only
too often in the circles of Soviet emigration itself. We well know the
declaration of the most prominent representatives of the Russian
Monarchists, according to which Bolshevism continues the old policy
of the Russian Empire and that the only thing which should be done
is to replace the " Bolshevik hierarchy " by a " popular Tsar." Many
political bodies of Russian emigration, and moreover the reactionary
ones (such as the " Young Russians ") used to state joyfully that the
" Socialist regime of Bolshevism " is evolving in the direction of
State centralism. Even the democratic leaders, the most absolute
adversaries of Bolshevism at the period of Militant Communism,
such as Professor P. Milyukov, considered that the tactical moves of
Soviet policy meant surrender for the benefit of State and nation.
4 8 As we see, the problem of the " responsibility of the Russian nation "
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RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY YEARS' EXILE 31
for Bolshevism and the interdependence. between Bolshevism and the Russian
nation is a rather intricate matter, and it is no wonder that it is discussed
in Russian emigre circles.
XIV
This problem is closely connected with another of paramount
importance from the point of view of the universal struggle against
Bolshevism. I wish to speak here of the attitude of Russian emigration
towards the so-called " unity and indivisibility of the Russian State."
The whole emigration is agreed on the necessity of the utter extirpa-
tion of Bolshevism. It also shares the view that there is only one
universalistic idea which might appeal to the masses of the Soviet
Union or Soviet bloc-the idea of freedom. But at the same time not
one group of the Russian emigration is ready to consent to the de-
finition of freedom which refers not only to the freedom of man-
individual-but also includes the complete freedom of all nations, great
and small.
It looks as though the Russian emigration considers itself as the
guardian of the " one indivisible Russian Empire," estimating that
the integrity of this State should not be sacrificed even for the sake of
destroying Bolshevism. What is more, reading the press and listening
to the statements of the Russian emigres, one has the impression that
they consider the Bolshevik achievements, so far as they concern
territorial expansion and the administrative and economic centralisa-
tion of the Soviet Empire, are positive historical assets which must be
saved from destruction.
The political programmes of the Russian groups are as like as
two peas. At the best some vague and chaotic schemes for a kind of
federation, lacking any precision, are fearfully put forward. If a
far-sighted politician or thinker (such as Professor G. Fedotov)
raises a timid protest against a continuation of the policy of Russian
imperialism, more or less camouflaged, immediately a united front from
left to right rises up against it. The complete unanimity on this point
between the old and new emigration is really striking.
There is no need to underline the extent to which such an attitude
of Russian emigration reduces and sometimes even suppresses al-
together the value and meaning of the programme for the struggle
against Bolshevism. As mentioned above, such an attitude was one
of the main reasons for the defeat of the " white movement." The
idea of freedom can play its part only if no reserves or conditions restrict
its scope. How could it be possible to appeal to the idea of freedom
for a nation while at the same time imposing on it some specific forms
of relationship with other nations ?
Russian emigration, both old and new, does not seem to be aware
of the deep changes which have taken place in the national and political
conscience of the nations subjugated by Soviet Russia. The two-
faced policy of the Bolsheviks (fostering the outward peculiarities
of particular nations and a simultaneous ruthless centralism and
tightening of the State authority) has stirred the ambitions of these
nations for national and political independence and roused in them the
strong desire to decide their own destinies in full independence. The
Russian emigres are too inclined to over-simplify these issues and
qualify them as " preposterous attempts of chauvinistic nationalisms
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32 EASTERN QUARTERLY
aiming to dismember Russia." Such an attitude, which is in its
turn a blatant example of Russian chauvinism, renders impossible
any understanding between the Russian forces and the ever-growing
anti-Bolshevik forces of other nations for the purpose of fighting
Bolshevism.
It is very characteristic of the present time that while all the
emigres of the nations subjugated by Bolshevism advocate a relentless
struggle against it, mutual national antagonisms-especially those
between the Russian emigration and the emigrations of other nations
-have deepened to such an extent that the formation of a united
anti-Bolshevik front by all these nations is much more difficult now
than it was in the first post-revolutionary years. There is no need to
remark that such a chauvinistic attitude on the part of the Russian
emigration provides many opportunities for Soviet plots and intrigues.
XV
In the present position of the world, when the "cold war" is
in full swing and the continuous aggression of the Soviet Union is
driving us into a third world war, Russian emigration faces immense
tasks. Stalin's policy puts the Russian nation in mortal danger. It appeals
to the Asiatic nations to destroy capitalism. Whatever may be the
final issue of this experiment in relation to the Asiatic nations, this
policy relegates the Russian nation to the background. Having been
used as Category I serfs, the Russians are now down-graded to Cate-
gory II serfs. The fate of Russia and of the Russian nation will be at stake
in the future world war.
The bulk of the Russian emigration is well aware of the trend of
events and of its own duties and tasks. But it is insufficiently pre-
pared for the emergency from the point of view of organisation and
programme. There are too many remnants of nationalism and the
worship of a " great, strong State " in theories and programmes.
Western indifference towards the struggle against Bolshevism in
many cases justifies the attitude of the Russians and their distrust of
the Occident. But this should not affect their position. Concur-
ring in the view that only revolutionary methods can bring positive results
in the struggle against Bolshevism, the Russians should expurgate from
their programmes all reactionary, chauvinistic, conservative and
imperialistic features.
Russian emigration is split into different factions and coteries
and torn by internal dissensions. It unfortunately failed to find a
common language with the emigrations of other nations from behind
the iron curtain. It also seems that so far it is incapable of producing
enough strength to get rid of the old and new Soviet cells. The latter are
numerous, and will undoubtedly keep increasing.
The common foe gains ever greater experience in this matter :
he understands much better than the West or the emigrations them-
selves the danger which might arise from the emigres of the subjugated
nations if they became united in organisation and action.
s^
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CHAPTER III
WORLD WAR U
VLASOV AND HITLER
by
George Fischer
The author: George Fischer spent a dozen years in the
USSR, before and during World War U, as
a student and as a U. S. Air Force officer.
For the past three years he has been en-
gaged in research at Harvard University
and in Europe on war-time and post-war
exiles from the USSR. Mr. Fischer is Di-
rector of the Free Russia Fund.
Reprinted from
Journal of Modern History (Chicago), March, 1951
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DOCUMENT
W HILE documents, memoirs, and
other data on the second World
War. are being made public at
an ever more dizzying pace, one of its
aspects remains largely shrouded in mys-
tery. This is the nature and extent of
wartime defection from the U.S.S.R.-
the largest from any country in the second
World War-and official German reac-
tion to it. Despite the continuing sparse-
ness of specific data and research, how-
ever, one general conclusion is becoming
ever more accepted. This conclusion-
dramatically substantiated by such Nazi
propaganda classics on the Soviet popu-
lation as the pamphlet Der Untermensch
-has been summarized by the military
editor of the New York Times: "Hun-
dreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers sur-
rendered with little fighting, and scores
of thousands-including the Soviet gen-
eral Vlasov--deserted to the German
side in the first months of the war; but
instead of encouraging this spontaneous
revulsion against Communist totalitari-
anism ... instead of acting as liberators,
not conquerors, the Nazi Party, by its
war of annihilation and its cruelty to
Soviet prisoners and to the conquered
areas of Russia, consolidated the opposi-
tion of all Soviet peoples and kindled the
' The author is greatly indebted to the Society of
Fellows and the Russian Research Center of Har-
vard University. Together, in the last three years,
they have made possible extensive research as well
as five surveys of Soviet refugees in Europe. The
complete results of the research by this writer are
to be published in a forthcoming study, "Soviet
defection in World War II."
flame of hate, which later devoured the
Reich. 112
All studies of Soviet defection in the
second World War devote much space to
what is unmistakably its most tangible
and significant manifestation. This is the
German-backed Russian Army of Liber-
ation, headed by ex-Soviet Lieutenant
General Andrei A. Vlasov. The Russian
Army of Liberation and its "civilian
arm," the Russian National Committee
(in 1944 enlarged into the Committee for
the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia),
are together commonly known as the
"Vlasov movement." It was based on a
massive agglomeration of Soviet prison-
ers of war as well as forced laborers and
voluntary exiles, military and.civilian,
from the U.S.S.R. No precise figures are
known. But German documents indicate
that, by the spring of 1942, some 200,000
Soviet volunteers were serving in the
German armed forces-some undoubt-
edly, at first at least, to escape starva-
tion-and that by 1943 the total mounted
to 8oo,ooo. Vlasov's surviving chief of
chancery has stated, furthermore, that
when the Russian Army of Liberation
was at last authorized by Adolf Hitler's
Germany, it received over one million
voluntary enlistment offers.'
2 Der Untermensch (Berlin, 1942); Hanson W.
BALDWIN, "What kind of a war?" Atlantic, July
1949, p. 24. See also the firsthand account of the
outbreak of the Soviet-German war by a Soviet gen-
eral, now a refugee in the West (Alexei MAxxoFF,
"How Russia almost lost the war," Saturday evening
post, May 13, 1950, PP. 31, 175-78).
58
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VLASOV AND HITLER
What was the real nature and scope of
this Vlasov movement? Five years after
the end of the second World War, we
know pitifully little of the answer. Today
many think of the Vlasov movement
mainly in terms of its symbolization of a
twisted, Soviet-bred morality. To them
Vlasov's morality is likely to seem re-
pugnant-they cannot conceive how a
decent person could in the second World
War have fought alongside Hitler, even
against Stalin. But the story of Vlasov
and Hitler-the story of mass Soviet de-
fection and the vital Nazi failure to ex-
ploit it wisely-is also as revealing and
important a case study of twentieth-cen-
tury authoritarianism as any accessible
to date.
General Vlasov's past is that of an ex-
emplary Soviet career as a regular army
officer, a Communist party member, and
one of the heroes of the Red Army's de-
fense of Moscow.4 Vlasov's two major
early statements on his startling change-
over emphasized that, while evading cap-
ture to the last as commander of the
Soviets' Second Assault Army near Len-
ingrad, he "reached the decision that it
was my duty to call upon the Russian
people to destroy the Bolshevik sys-
3 Wallace CARROLL, "It takes a Russian to beat
a Russian," Life, Dec. 19, 1949, pp. 82-85; Colonel
K. G. KROMIIADI, Posev [Sowing] (Limburg; Ger-
many, August 20, 195o); and Vladimir PETROV, My
retreat from Russia (New Haven, 1950). A detailed
personal account of this topic is also presented by
Karl MICHEL in Es begann am Don (Bern, 1946),
and Ost and West: der Ruf Stauffenbergs (Zurich,
1947). Michel was a German officer on the eastern
front during the second World War.
4 Pravda [Truth], Dec. 13, 1941 and Jan. 24,
1942, as well as a homily by Ilya EHRENBURG in the
Red Army's Krasnaia Zvezda [Red star] of Mar. 11,
1942; C. L. SULZBERGER, in New York Times, Dec.
.19, 1941; Eve CURIE, Journey among warriors (New
York, 1948); V. OSOKIN, Andrei Andreevich Vlasov:
kratkaia biografia [Andrei A. Vlasov: a brief biog-
raphy] (Dabendorf b./Berlin, 1944), trans. in George
FISCHER, "General Vlasov's official biography,"
Russian review, Oct. 1949, pp. 290-301.
59
tem."' A Russian expert of the German
foreign ministry soon after Vlasov's cap-
ture concluded that "he is not ... a
mere seeker after political glory and ac-
cordingly will never become a purchas-
able hireling and will never be willing to
lead hirelings."6
On the ideology of the Vlasov move-
ment, revealing evidence can be gleaned
from its two major doctrinal statements.
The first, Vlasov's own "Smolensk pro-
gram," of December 1942, came out for:
(1) replacement of collective farms by in-
dividual ownership of land, (2) private
trade and handicrafts, (3) elimination of
forced labor and repression, and (4) free-
dom of religion, conscience, speech, and
assembly.' The second programmatic
statement, the November 1944 "Prague
manifesto" of Vlasov's Committee for
the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia,
called for: (r) overthrow of the "Stalin
tyranny," (2) return to the liberties of
the February 1917 "people's" revolu-
tion, (3) immediate and honorable peace
with Germany, and (4) the creation of a
new, free, Russian state, "without Bol-
sheviks and exploiters."8
Only after many more firsthand docu-
ments become available will any over-
all conclusions be warranted. But on the
German policy toward Soviet defection
in the second World War the picture
a For full text of these Vlasov statements see
B. DvnNov, Vlasovskoe dvizhenie v svele dokumentov
[The Vlasov movement in the light of documents]
(New York, 1950), PP. 79-81; and W. WLADIMIROW,
Dokumente and Material des Kommittees sur Befrei-
ung der Voelker Russlands (Berlin, 1944), pp. 47-53-
These two collections, together with the two Ndrem-
berg trial series, represent the richest available ma-
terial on this subject.
6 CARROLL, loc. cit., p. 85.
7 FISCHER, loc. Cit., Pp. 285-86.
I Volia Naroda [The will of the people] (Berlin),
organ of Vlasov's Committee for the Liberation of
the Peoples of Russia, Nov. 15, 1944.
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emerging from the available evidence is
approximately the following.9
From the outset, elements in the
wehrmacht and in the German foreign
office were intent upon demoralizing
Soviet resistance by sponsoring a "free
. Russia" movement. This group for a
time grew stronger, as Soviet resistance
stiffened in 1942-43, and gained such
narrowly utilitarian converts as Propa-
ganda Minister Joseph Goebbels. Also,
Alfred Rosenberg, as minister for eastern
(i.e., Soviet) occupied territories, was in-
terested in this, but he was dominated by
a driving urge to see the Great Russians
enveloped by a German-backed "cordon
sanitaire" of separatist border regions of
the U.S.S.R. Opposing both the "free
Russia" and the "cordon sanitaire"
schemes was a powerful Nazi party hier-
archy, notably Rudolph Hess's succes-
sor as chief of Hitler's chancery on party
affairs, Martin Bormann, and Ernst
Koch, gauleiter for East Prussia, who
became the omnipotent and brutal Reicks-
kommissar for the occupied Ukraine. This
9 A special factor which complicates conclusive
judgment on Vlasov and wartime Soviet defection
in Germany is the intense controversy which has
raged on this question throughout the Russian
emigre press during the past years. This controversy
has served to permeate all eyewitness accounts with
an undeterminable amount of excessively partisan
"whitewash" or, in a few cases, animosity. Notable
examples of the Russian emigre controversies are
x
- ovie genera s and colonels associ-
shurnal (New York, 1948), XVIII, 209-34, and
XIX, 211-48; and Grigori ARONSON, Pravda o Vla- 10 Trial of the major war criminals before the inter-
sovtsakh [The truth about the Vlasovites] (New national tribunal (Nuremberg, 1949), XI, 477-509,
York, 1949). Some support is lent to Aronson's XIX, 117-23, XXVI, 614-16, and XXIX, 117-20;
emphasis on the movement's antisemitism by a Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Washington, 1946),
smattering of Julius Streicher-like articles in the III, 61-65, 83-89, 126-46; 242-51, 716-17, IV, 55-
wartime Vlasovite organs, for example, Dobrovolets 58, 65-75, 655-59; and Joseph GOEBBELS, The Goeb-
[Volunteer], Feb. 2 and Apr. 23, 1944. The counter- bels diaries, ed. Louis LOCHNER (New York, x949),
argument is that these publications were Nazi- pp. 226, 261, 284, 302, 328, 331. See also CARROLL,
controlled but that neither Vlasov himself nor the loc. Cit., WLADIMIROW, and Memoirs of Alfred Rosen-
movement's major statements espoused antisemi- berg, ed. Serge LANOE and Ernst von SCHENK (Chi-
tism. cago, 1949).
exiles: : __B__. _I_._-NICOLAEVSITY,._.-..... ~ "....,'Pora %z-he"nhes'chestvo liberator of Prague, before Allied troops
1941-1945 godov i Gen. A. A. Vlasov" [The defeatist arrived. General Vlasov and eleven other
movement in 1941-45 and Gen. A. A. Vlasov] Novy e
S ; t 1
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group-which included Goebbels at first
and Heinrich Himmler, chief of the
Schutzstaffel, the Gestapo, and later also
all-powerful minister of the interior, until
1944-insisted on adhering to the Unter-
mensch policy toward the U.S.S.R. This
policy held that since Slavs generally,
and the Soviet nationalities as well, were
Untermenschen, their land, resources, and
manpower were to be used solely and
wholly as German needs dictated it 10
This policy means that, even if sympa-
thy for Vlasov was apparently wide-
spread among the millions of Soviet na-
tionals under Hitler's wartime control,
one other fact is also clear: German of-
ficial distrust, minute supervision, and
occasionally outright suspension of ac-
tivities at no time enabled the Vlasov
movement to unfurl its banner, anti-
Stalin and yet non-Nazi, to any impres-
sive extent. As Hitler's Germany crum-
bled, the Vlasov movement was prom-
ised, at last, a full-fledged "free Russian"
army and organization. But none of the
Soviet-manned German units, including
the SS, ever served under Vlasov's com-
mand, despite German and Soviet propa-
ganda to the contrary; and even at the
end Nazi suspicion and obstruction kept
the Russian Army of Liberation down to
one division. Disgusted, this division, af-
ter only one battle on the Oder, marched
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VLASOV AND HITLER
ated with him were executed in Moscow
in 1946 after capture by United States
Army units, while thousands of his fol-
lowers were seized by the Soviets or
turned over to them by the West.- Thus,
aside from the movement's propaganda
role among front-line Soviet troops, its
one other role is probably in the realm of
considerable ideological crystallization
among Vlasovite leaders and followers.
Despite continuing intellectual flux and
isolation, this is an aspect which has
made the Vlasovite survivors the politi-
cally most purposeful and integrated ele-
ments in the vast and amorphous post-
war Soviet emigration.12
What was Hitler's position on war-
time Soviet defection? Only recently has
a unique document become available to
"Cf. Pravda and New York Times, Aug. 2, 1946;
V. PozDnnAxov, "Pervaia Pekhotnaia Divizia Voo-
ruzhennykh Sil Komiteta Osvobozhdenia Narodov
Rossii, po vospominaniam komandira 2-go Polka"
[The First Infantry Division of the Armed Forces
of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples
of Russia, based on the memoirs of the commander
of the Second Regiment] (Cambridge: Russian Re-
search Center, Harvard University, 1949); and
Tretiia silo: istoria odnoi popytki [The third force:
the history of one attempt], by A. S. KAzANTsEv,
managing editor of the Vlasovite central organ in
1944-45, Volia Naroda (appearing in serialized form
in the "solidarist" 6migr? weekly newspaper in Ger-
many, Posev, beginning Apr. 23, 1950), Volia Naroda,
Nov. r5, 1944 and Jan. 31,1945; and Ivan H. PETER-
MAN, "Prague's four fantastic days," Saturday eve-
ning post, July 14, 1945.
'? On the postwar Soviet refugees-"defectors"
and "nonreturners"-see George FiSCEER, "The
new Soviet emigration," Russian review, Jan. 1949;
0. Arnsmiov, "Sovetskoe pokolenie" [The Soviet
generation], Novy zhurnal (New York), Vol. XXII
(1949); Merle FAINSOD, "Controls and tensions in
the Soviet system," American political science re-
view, June- 1950, pp. 266-82. For the revealing
creeds of the two Emigre political organizations most
influential at present among Soviet refugees see the
neo-Vlasovite SBONR's [Movement for the Libera-
tion of the Peoples of Russia] Borba (Munich), Nos.
6-7 (1949) and 3-4 (1950) and the 58-page Pro-
gramma Nalsionalno-Trudovogo Soiusa [Program of
the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists] (Lim-
burg, 1948).
provide a satisfactory answer. It is the
original German transcript, in full, of a
lengthy meeting of Hitler and top mili-
tary aids on German policy regarding
Soviet disaffection, interlarded with re-
vealing digressions by Hitler on disagree-
ments within his own hierarchy. The
document is entitled "Conference of the
Fuehrer with Field Marshal Keitel and
General Zeitzler, 8 June, 1943, in Berg-
hof."13
In short, the story told by the docu-
ment establishes that Hitler, in 1943, had
rejected all schemes to exploit Soviet dis-
affection for anything but demoralizing
propaganda within the Red Army. Re-
currently harking back to Erich Luden-
dorff's "mistake" of consenting to the
creation of Josef Pilsudski's Polish Le-
gion in the first World War, Hitler in-
sisted on limiting General Vlasov's func-
tion to that of front-line propaganda,
narrowly prescribed by German super-
vision, Any German promises regarding
Russia's future were to be made both re-
luctantly and with tongue in cheek. Con-
trary to Vlasov's plea for an autonomous,
all-Russian army under his command
and with Russian officers, military use of
Soviet- deserters would be either in small
national detachments within German
units or as Hilfswillige, i.e., noncombat
volunteer helpers.114
13 The 22-page typed German original of this
document was kindly made available to me by B.
Gourewitsch, Russian emigr6 writer in New York.
Three brief extracts in English from the document
may be found in Nazi conspiracy and aggression, III,
959-6o. These were presented at the war crimes trials
at Nuremberg as United States Document No. 1384-
PS. For a Russian translation of the document see
Dvrxov, pp. 89-202.
'4 That Hitler did not change his 'views on Vlasov
toward the end of the war is brought out by his
statement on January 27, 1945i as described by
Felix Gu.BERT in Hitler directs his war: the records of
his daily military conferences (New York, 195o),
p. xu: "Hitler speaks very contemptuously [of the
Vlasov army], regretting that its members wear
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What does the content of this docu-
ment add to existing data? Above all, it
confirms earlier evidence that Hitler had
rejected the possibility of defeating the
Red Army through dramatically exploit-
ing widespread Soviet disaffection. That
this decision by Hitler proved to be a
grave error, which changed the entire
course of the war, is underscored by a
second conclusion derivable from the
Hitler conference document. Hitler not
only failed to encourage further Soviet
disaffection, but he decisively turned his
back on the mass of Soviet defectors al-
ready willing to fight with him against
Stalin. Vlasov was the outstanding repre-
sentative of this group. Thus the docu-
ment tends to establish clearly that the
movement was never given the oppor-
tunity to provide large-scale assistance
to Hitler. In turn, this shows Vlasov's
wartime undertakings to have been a
largely frustrated effort.
Bred in the U.S.S.R., Soviet defection
in the second World War appears to most
Western students pathetically disori-
ented both morally and politically. And
yet today something else remains as its
principal significance. On the one hand,
there is its phenomenal size and, on the
other, the continued insistence of its
leaders, even under Nazi control, on na-
tional independence and on the demo-
cratic symbol of Russia's February igi7
revolution. The Hitler conference docu-
ment provides a unique insight into the
inability of Hitlerism to appreciate or in-
telligently support the unprecedented
and unmatched Soviet defection in the
second World War.
RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
German uniforms.... 'Every wretch is put into a
German uniform. I have always been opposed
to it.' "
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CHAPTER IV
POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS
POLITICAL TRENDS AMONG RUSSIAN EXILES
The author: The National Committee for a Free Europe
is a private American organization whose
present focus of activities are the Eastern
European Countries under Soviet rule.
Its activities include Radio Free Europe,
the Mid-European Studies Center in New
York, and the Crusade for Freedom under
General Lucius D. Clay. The committee
does not sponsor activities in the Soviet
area, aside from occasional studies such
as the following.
Reprinted from
National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. (New York)
February 25, 1951
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POLITICAL TRENDS AMONG RUSSIAN EXILES
The international tension has presented the Russian
exiles on both sides of the ocean with the necessity of
integrating their forces within some sort of united front.
However, Russian consolidation efforts are confronted
with difficulties even more complicated than those ex-
isting within other Eastern and Central European exiled
groups.
The obstacles can be found not only in the existence
of innumerable groupings but also in the wide gaps sep-
arating them, which in some cases seem insurmountable.
The emigres who left the country following 1917 were
unanimous in their condemnation of the October (Bol-
shevik) Revolution, but at the same time were divided
into two warring camps, from the very outset, in their
attitude toward the earlier February Revolution, when
the Tsar had abdicated. The situation became still
more complicated after the appearance of new waves of
Soviet emigres who for various reasons found them-
selves abroad during and after the second World War.
From 1947 on efforts to consolidate Russian exiled
groups were initiated from various sides, but led only
to short-lived combinations which could not withstand
the test of reality. Up to date, there have been about a
dozen of various inter-group "unions," "centers,"
"movements," etc.--most of them originating in Western
Germany, particularly in Munich; some in other coun-
tries--but none of them solved the problem of consoli-
dation. However, there is a noticeable trend in these
efforts which show the direction where the solution may
be found in the future. Despite all the failures, Russian
emigre life seems to be undergoing a slow crystalliza-
tion of some currents around which a unification of
relatively broader dimensions may be achieved.
GENERAL TREND
The end of the war found the monarchists- -the elite
among the old emigration- -in the controlling position of
Russian emigre life in Western Europe, a position
which was uncontested for some time because of their
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long-established connections. But the changing inter-
national picture soon created the need for movements
with a mass following and with political platforms which
would better serve the purpose of cooperation with the
West. Thus the remnants of the Vlasov army soon be-
came the subject of contention among various exiled
political groups, with each trying to exploit the so-called
"Vlasov Movement" as a springboard in the struggle
for power.
It is interesting to observe how the evolution of the
contest in the past four years developed from an almost
complete domination of the officer corps of the Vlasov
army by the intransigeant monarchists to gradual eman-
cipation of large sections of the Vlasovites from such
control and to formation of anti-monarchist trends
amongthem with democratic and republican tendencies.
This caused the monarchists to change their political
face--at least in public statements- -from traditional
restorationism to a more timely constitutionalism as
well as to professions of readiness to recognize the
will of the people after the liberation of Russia.
A popular vehicle for this adjustment was found in
the so-called Fourteen Points of the Vlasov Movement's
Manifesto, adopted in Prague in November, 1944, which
permit various interpretations to suit the purposes of
all groups. However, these maneuvers did not secure
a controlling position for the monarchists, whose su-
premacy in Russian exiled life now appears to belong
to the past. The formation of groups with democratic
programs such as SBONR and SVOD can be viewed as
an influential factor in Russian exiled life.
At present there are three general political trends
among Russian exiles which seem unlikely ever to be
brought within one fold. At the extreme right are the
restorationists who abhor all revolutionary changes
which have occurred since 1917 and insist upon a return
to an absolute monarchy in Russia. On the left are
those groups which recognize the February Revolution
and are even willing to accept some of the changes
brought about by the Bolshevik Revolution. The middle
sector of so-called "non- predetermination" (nyepredre-
shenchestvo) consists of a large number of factions
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which for various reasons--some sincere, and some
for purposes of disguising their true identity--avoid
taking a clear stand on the question of the future order
in Russia, leaving its determination to the Russian
people themselves. From this sector--which has be-
come the hiding place for many reactionary groupings- -
have come most of the unsuccessful consolidation cam-
paigns in recent times.
THE MONARCHISTS
The predominant position of the monarchists during
the first post-war years had its source in the close
contacts of their leaders with the occupation adminis-
tration. in Western Germany. They were old-timers
acquainted with the life of the country, were entrusted
with administrative posts in the DP camps and else-
where and were employed by the intelligence and in-
formation services. Their leader, General P. Glasenap,
succeeded in gaining influence over a large part of the
Vlasov officers by offering them minor jobs and finan-
cial support. It is said that a "silver fund," transported
abroad after the Revolution by General Wrangel, was
released to General Glasenap with the approval of the
American authorities, and to-date this still constitutes
the basis of his influences, now on the wane.
Glasenap was also the first to tie the Vlasovites
with the older monarchists by establishing two centers
in which both elements had to be united. These were:
the Union of the St. Andrew Flag (SAF), deriving its
name from the Vlasov army flag, which was designed to
serve as a joint military center for the officers of both
the Vlasov army and the White armies; and the Russian
All-National State Movement (RONDD), intended as a
political front.
Glasenap's campaign--now relegated to the role of
extreme rightist opposition in the monarchist movement
--at the beginning of 1948 became a stimulating organi-
zation which attracted about one-half of Vlasov's officers.
Its aim was military dictatorship in Russia, imposed
with the aid of foreign force. It was interested only in
the military aspect, leaving the political program to
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64
emerge later in accordance with the situation. At one
time Glasenap promised in an interview to organize
twenty full divisions from among the exiles.
Glasenap and his colleagues were removed to the
background, where he became the leader of the diehard
absolutists, after other monarchist leaders realized the
necessity for making concessions to the feelings of the
exiled masses and, still more, to the Western World in
order to retain leading positions for themselves. The
center of these new tendencies became the Highest
Monarchist Council (VMS), an old-time directing body
of the monarchist movement. In 1948 the Council was
placed under new leadership, headed by P. Skarzhinsky,
which soon declared itself for "constitutional monarchy."
On November 5th, 1949, the Congress of monarchist
organizations throughout the world took place in Munich,
at which a broader ideological foundation was adopted
for the modernized monarchist movement. A declara-
tion was issued by the Congress--voted unanimously
and without discussion- -which reiterated the movement's
aim to restore the monarchy in Russia under the sceptre
of Grand Duke Vladimir Cyrilovitch. However, the
declaration stressed that the movement does not aim
at the "forcible restoration of the monarchist regime,"
and would recognize "any expression of the people's
will." Amplifying this new idea, the declaration said
further:
The monarchists will loyally serve a re-
publican Russia, reserving for themselves the
right for lawful propaganda for the monarchist
ideals. However, they expect the same loyalty
from their adversaries in the event the mon-
archist order is re-established.
The declaration caused in Glasenap's faction an out-
burst of indignation against the "revisionists-liberals."
On the other hand, it was met with little credence in
democratic exiled circles, as it was viewed as a camou-
flage merely intended to deceive the exiled masses. As
a matter of fact, the Congress itself gave reasons for
such suspicions by adopting an amendment to the con-
stitution of the Monarchist Movement, in which the
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absolute authority of the Grand Duke was proclaimed
in these words:
The orders of the Legitimate Successor of
the Russian Tsars are obligatory upon all or-
gans and members of the Movement.
Simultaneously with these program changes, new
tactics were adopted by the "constitutional monarchists,"
represented by the Highest Monarchist Council. In the
last few years the Council is concentrating its efforts
toward the creation of a mass organization, using for
these purposes intermediaries and avoiding publicity by
direct action. In particular, attempts to make use of
the Vlasovites as the core of an organization with a
mass following- -about which a few words will be said
below--revealed themselves as designed and directed
by the Council.
Since the beginning of the campaign by the "consti-
tutional monarchist" faction, the rightist opposition in
Germany has held itself to bitter criticism in publica-
tions allegedly financed by Glasenap. Some of his closest
political friends--like the journalist N. Chukhnov, and
V. Karalin- -appeared in the United States, where they
found sympathetic groups in the Russian Anti- Communist
Center (RAC), organized in 1949 by Prince Sergei Bye-
loselsky-Byelozersky and around the New York daily
Rossiya. N. Chukhnov, who edits a mimeographed
sheet here called Znamya Rossii (The Banner of Russia),
assures his readers that Byeloselsky-Byelozersky could
unify around himself about eighty percent of the Russian
emigres. A strong bulwark of the extreme monarchist
movement can be found here in the Russian Orthodox
Church heirarchy.
Another center of this extremist trend is the Council
of the Russian Soldiers Abroad (SRZV or ROVS), with
headquarters in Paris, which is headed by General
Archangelsky. It is regarded as the nucleus of the future
Russian national army by its. adherents.
THE VLASOV LIBERATION MOVEMENT
The continuous efforts of the monarchists to build
up their prestige by gaining the mass support of the
65
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 former members of General Vlasov's Russian Libera-
tion Army (ROA), carried on by the Highest Monarchist
Council since early 1948, have not brought the expected
results. Instead, they contributed greatly to hasten the
process of differentiation among the Vlasovites and to
rally democratic elements among them within a separate
group. Soon it became evident that the so-called Vlasov
Movement consisted of various trends which could not
be treated as a single political entity.
The first attempt to create a monarchist-controlled
large-scale organization through a compromise between
the old emigration and the Vlasovites led in April, 1948,
to the formation of a center known as the Anti- Communist
Center of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of
Russia (ACODNR), with headquarters in Munich. The
new center unified for awhile on the basis of the fourteen
points of the Vlasov 1944 Manifesto- -interpreted as a
non-predetermination program--a large segment of the
emigration, beginning with Glasenap's Union of the St.
Andrew Flag (SAF) on the right to the younger Vlasovite
elements on the left. The latter were originally or-
ganized in the Union of the Youth of the Peoples of Russia,
the later SBONR.
The leaders of the center played for a while with the
idea of becoming an "equal contracting partner" of the
Western. Allies and spoke of organizing an army and-
preparing an administrative apparatus for Russia. But
soon afterwards the unity broke up, when, first, the ex-
treme monarchists of General Glasenap's brand left
the center and then when the youth group followed suit
for reasons of its own. Neither was satisfied with the
center, which had revealed itself to be a tool of the
Monarchist Council.
Last July the attempt was repeated in the creation
of a new rallying center of all "non-predetermination"
groups under the name of the United Vlasovites (KOV).
A new feature was the proclamation of the "Leader" of
the United Vlasovite movement in the person of General
Andrei Turkul--a former White Army officer who also
served in Vlasov's army during the last war.
After his election to the new position on August 8th,
1950--the fourth anniversary of Vlasov's death--at a
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meeting in a DP camp near Munich, reportedly attended
by 700 old and new emigres. Turkul immediately re-
ceived the blessings of the Highest Monarchist Council
in an address given by the Council's head, P. Skarzhinsky.
This tipped the hand of the real wire pullers behind the
action.
From the beginning the new center was boycotted by
General Glasenap's extremists and by the younger ele-
ments among the emigres who in May, 1948, assumed
the name of the Union to Fight for the Liberation of the
Peoples of Russia (SBONR) and who in the latter part of
1948 gave up all cooperation with the monarchists. This
appears to have put an end to all attempts to bring
together all emigre trends within one group by the ex-
ploitation of Vlasov's fourteen points as a platform.
Recognizing this final split, the monarchist bi-weekly
Nasha Strana (Our Country) of Buenos Aires wrote on
November 25th, 1950:
The personnel makeup of the Vlasov move-
ment in the last years has undergone a tremen-
dous political evolution. Its Zhilenko elements
(G. Zhilenko, one of Vlasov's generals) left for
the SBONR, its Chukhnov elements (Chukhnov
--General Glasenap's principal publicist) ap-
parently remained with Glasenap. The sound
center grouped itself around General Turkul.
It is utterly clear that the February Revo-
lution, to say nothing of the October Revolution,
is unacceptable to any monarchist. But it is
also utterly clear that the orientation upon the
old ruling class is unacceptable to any sensible
monarchist.....In one word, as the Romans said,
tempora mutantur.....
THE SBONR AND THE SVOD
By turning their backs upon the Anti-Communist
Center in 1949 and upon General Turkul's United Vlaso-
vites in 1950, the SBONR and the SVOD--two organiza-
tions representing the democratically minded younger
elements among the new emigres- -determined to go
their own way and to seek their own connections.
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The SBONR (Union to Fight for the Liberation of the
Peoples of Russia) and the SVOD (Union of Soldiers of
the Liberation Movement) are two arms of the same
movement among the new Russian emigration, the first
being its political and the second its military branch.
The membership of both organizations largely consists
of the same people.
The history of both organizations, reaching back to
1947, impresses one as a period of searching for new
ways which gradually resulted in their drift from the
old White movement to political independence and the
recognition of the February Revolution. Both regard
themselves as true followers of the Vlasov movement.
However, they interpret this movement as a revolt of
former pro-Soviet elements and a return to the February
Revolution program, while the monarchists try to present
Vlasov as the successor to Denikin and Wrangel, the
leaders of the White movement.
Toward the end of 1947 the SBONR (then known as
the Union of the Youth of the Peoples of Russia) was
still publishing in its monthly organ, Borba (Combat),
the directives of the -Highest Monarchist Council. Early
in 1948, when the monarchist-inspired Anti-Communist
Center was formed, SBONR and SVOD applied for ad-
mission as the center's "mass organizations" and re-
mained within it until August, 1949, when SBONR was
excluded for "abandoning the position of non-predeter-
mination."
On November 13th, 1949, SBONR held a congress
which summed up the evolution within the group during
the preceding two years and defined its new political
outlook. The SBONR spokesmen declared the group's
position to be against monarchism, fascism and the
Fuehrer principle, as well as against the separatist
tendencies among Russian national groups. The aims
of SBONR were formulated as follows: "To build up
Russia on republican-democratic and federalistic foun-
dations." An "ideological doctrine" was presented
to the congress along these lines and was approved.
The congress took a negative stand toward coopera-
tion with the monarchists, but. assumed an unbiased
position toward the socialist movement, stressing that
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"it was following with due attention the role of the so-
cialist parties in Western Europe as a center of struggle
against bolshevism."
Around the same time the SVOD held its congress,
at which the breach with organizations of "restorationist-
monarchist" trends was proclaimed.
Last November a conference of the German division
of SBONR was held in Munich under the slogan, "With
the people and for the people." The speakers described
the group's program as: "A struggle for a free Russia
for democracy, social equality and national self-deter-
mination." They stressed the necessity for "consolida-
tion of all progressive, genuinely democratic forces,"
"
and also
and they condemned "non-predetermination
"blocs and coalitions without principles."
In addition to Germany, SBONR has branches in the
USA, Canada, Argentina, Britain, Brazil, France, Vene-
zuela. Besides the monthly organ Borba, published since
1947 in Germany, the group prints bulletins and other
publications -in Canada, Argentina and Brazil.
The SBONR leaders claim that the group conducts
propaganda work among troops of the Soviet Occupation
Army in Germany and Austria. SBONR's last report on
activities in Germany stresses that last November, on
the anniversary of the October Revolution, the group
distributed 12,000 anti-Soviet leaflets among Red Army
men.
SBONR reports point to a recent increase of pro-
fessional and cultural workers of the new emigration in
its membership rolls. Upon this element it bases its
hopes for developing publications and other propaganda
weapons.
THE NATIONAL FREEDOM LEAGUE
An important factor in turning away the younger
elements of the now emigration- -represented by SBONR
and SVOD--from cooperation with the monarchists and
in guiding them toward the adoption of a new democratic
program, was the establishment of contacts with their
leaders by spokesmen for the League to Fight for Na-
tioi l Freedom, a political group formed in March,
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1949, in New York by Alexander Kerensky 'and old-
time Socialists.
The League calls itself "a union of groups and in-
dividuals of various political trends for the purpose of
fighting for a democratic-republican federation of the
peoples of Russia." It bases its program upon the
"achievements of the February Revolution" and leaves
the details of the future order in Russia to a constituent
assembly. Its membership includes persons known for
their part in the February Revolution and the provisional
government which emerged from it. However, the
League's influence seems to have reached some seg-
ments of the new emigration through its own bulletin,i
published from time to time as a section in the New
York daily Novoye Russkoye Slovo, and through the
monthly Socialist magazine, Socialitichesky Viestnik,
also issued in New York.
The contacts between the League and the SBONR
began in 1948, when the latter was still a part of the
monarchist-led Anti-Communist Center in Munich. In
fact, the revelation of these contacts caused the final
breach between SBONR and the Center. After protracted
negotiations as well as internal disputes on both sides,
the League and the SBONR last Spring entered into co-
operation. Their first joint public appearance took
place at the mass meeting in the New York Manhattan
Center on November 5th, 1950.
Cooperation between the two groups was achieved
not without difficulties on both sides. In particular,
opinions were divided within the Socialist faction in the
League concerning the attitude toward the Vlasov move-
ment. Boris Nikolaevsky, who worked the most for
cooperation, took the position that the Vlasov movement
should be vindicated. In one of his articles, printed in
the Socialistichesky Viestnik of February 28th, 1948, he
wrote:
The Vlasov movement, from the very be-
ginning, was an attempt to create an anti-
bolshevik movement on the basis of a democratic
program, a federalistic and all-Russian pro-
gram.....
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The Socialist minority, represented by B: Dvinov
and G. Aronson on the other extreme, condemned Vlasov's
activities during the years 1942-1944 and branded the
1944 Manifesto of the Vlasovites as a crude attempt to
whitewash themselves in the last moments before Hitler's
downfall. Dvinov, who wrote a strongly critical book on
the Vlasov movement, came out recently against ex-
aggerated statements about the proportions of the Vlasov
army. It is his claim that the army never exceeded
25,000 men.
The majority in the Socialist group took a compro-
mising position, namely, that a large part of Vlasov's
followers did not sympathize with Hitler and that "co-
operation with them is advisable provided that they now
sincerely aspire toward democracy."
Another small gathering of intellectuals--which has
some influence, through its publications, upon political
trends among the exiles--is the Union to Fight for the
Liberation of Russia (SBOR), with headquarters in Paris.
The group, identified with Professor S. P. Melgunov,
campaigns in its publications for a democratic Russia,
but takes no stand on the future form of the Russian
order. Besides, it is at odds with the Socialists be-
cause of its campaign for consolidation with the inclusion
of the so-called "constitutional monarchists."
Besides the SBONR and the SVOD, another group with
claims to a "mass following" among Russian exiles is
the National Labor Union (NTS), known in recent times
as the Russian Solidarists.
Because of its ideological and organizational pecu-
liarities, the group appears to stand apart from other
camps, reactionary or democratic, and represents a
camp of its own. It is attacked by the Socialists for the
fascist-like features in its program, and by the mon-
archists for other program features allegedly borrowed
from the bolsheviks. The SBONR congress of 1949
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placed the Solidarists among those groups it con-
sidered "unfit for cooperation for democratic- republican
groups."
The organization, originating about fifteen years ago
in Yugoslavia, was the result of a rebellion against
White emigration politics by its frustrated children who
saw their fathers drifting away from realities. It be-
came the largest Russian youth center between the wars.
The original program of the NTS was based upon the
ideas of Mussolini's corporate state. The organization
built upon this program had the character of an "order"
with members divided into various "degrees of dedi-
cation."
After the war, NTS underwent and is still undergoing
ideological changes in the direction of democracy, but
its program, published in its most recent form in 1948,
still retains many traces of fascism. It sees the future
Russian society built upon national-labor units with an
"elite" layer in the leading position and a "state head"
with wide authority at the top.
The Solidarists succeeded in bringing a considerable
number of new emigres within their fold after the war,
which fact is also recognized by their adversaries. But
the core of the group reportedly remains the same as
before the war, and its leaders are charged with pro-
ceeding in the same authoritarian manner as before.
Much talked about are the attempts of the Solidarists
to establish contacts with the Societ population. The
claims of the group itself in this respect, as contained
in the Look magazine interview with K. Boldirev, head
of the Solidarist division in the USA, drew strong criti-
cism, particularly for such statements as the alleged
participation of the group in the assassination of Kirov
and its promise to organize a revolution in the USSR for
$100,000,000. However, even its adversaries acknowl-
edge the group's contacts with the Soviet population
during the war and its present campaign among mem-
bers of the Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Germany.
During war time the NTS people were permitted by
the Germans to work among Russian slave laborers and
Russian prisoners and, as they assert, sent agents into
German-occupied territory on their own account. The
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latter activity caused German reprisals against the
group in 1944, with arrests of some of their leaders,
including the international chief of the group, V. Bay-
dalakov, now in the USA.
Sources outside of the Solidarist group dismiss as
false its assertions concerning the existence of a wide-
spread organizational network in the USSR at present--
as claimed by E. Romanov, editor of the group's organ,
Possev, in his interview published in the July 25th, 1950
issue of the Christian Science Monitor. But they admit
that the group is active among the occupation armies in
Eastern Germany. Charging that the Solidarists plan to
secure for themselves a monopoly over the material
and moral support of the Western Powers, (R. Abramo-
vich) wrote in the August-September issue of the So-
cialistichesky Viestnik this year:
Mr. Romanov asserts that in 1949 the NTS
sent three million proclamations and leaflets
behind the Iron Curtain. Of course, the NTS is
printing some proclamations and leaflets and
is dispatching them "to the East." Actually,
such leaflets (sent over not only by the NTS
but also by other organizations) go only as far
as the Eastern Zone of Germany, and that only
in small quantities. There they sometimes
land in the-hands of Russian soldiers and of-
ficers--whichis very well. But to present this
useful but modest work as flooding Soviet Russia
with millions of NTS leaflets is intolerable
bragging.
The monarchist writer, N. Melnikov, criticizing the
Solidarist platform, conceded in the Bulletin of the
ACODNR of March-April, 1949, that the group has a
"useful part in the anti-Communist struggle" and that it
has succeeded in rallying a "considerable number of
devoted fighters for freedom." Another monarchist
writer, I. Solonevich, wrote in the Buenos Aires Nasha
Strana of September 16, 1950:
I demand from the Solidarists answers to
the questions (concerning their program)...but
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it would be a crime to interfere with the work
of their R. Redlich, who is causing the Soviets
a great deal of trouble in both zones of Berlin.
In general, the Solidarist organization has apparent-
ly achieved a considerably disciplined and effective
state. Its organ, Possev, published in Limburg a.d.
Lahn (Germany), now a weekly, has appeared regularly
since 1945, a unique achievement in Russian exiled life.
In addition, the group publishes a quarterly literary
magazine, Grani, and also issues mimeographed bulletins
and pamphlets for internal use.
An internal revolt among the Solidarist youth was
recently reported, caused by the departure of several
leading persons in the movement to the USA, including
President V. Baydalakov and the movement's ideologist,
S. Levicky, now reportedly in Washington, D. C. They
were charged with "desertion" at the youth conference
held last December in Bad Homburg, near Frankfurt.
(A) The "Free Russia Congress" Plan
Simultaneously with the monarchist-inspired cam-
paign for a new "mass organization"--which last Summer
led to the formation of the United Vlasovites group with
General Turkul as its head--another campaign was
started in Munich for a Russian all-emigre congress.
A "non-party" committee emerged in Munich, which
announced a plan of a "Free Russia Congress" and in-
vited the participation of all groups, from General
Glasenap's faction on the right to Kerensky's League
on the left. The establishment of the Committee's
headquarters in a reportedly luxurious mansion in
Munich and the American jeeps given to the disposal of
its members gave rise to speculations that the campaign
has the backing of the U. S. occupation administration.
The composition of the Committee showed that the
Highest Monarchist Council was again the controlling
power in the project.
Kerensky's National Freedom League refused to
participate in the enterprise from the outset, branding
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it in its Bulletin (Sept. 10, 1950) as "a resurrection of
old White schemes." Glasenap's intransigeant mon-
archists took also a negative attitude, when its spokes-
man, N. Chukhnov, wrote in his Znamya Rossii that the
congress was being organized "with foreign money."
The SBONR and SVOD answered the invitation with the
demand that a majority in the Committee be given to the
new emigration.
According to latest available reports, the Committee
succeeded thus far only in the organization of a mass
rally in Munich last November 6th, the anniversary of
the October (Bolshevik) Revolution. The rally, called
the Intransigeance Manifestation, was attended--ac-
cording to the report in Volya Naroda (The People's
Will), the Munich organ of the United Vlasovites--by
700 people. The list of nine participating organizations
included, in addition to several groups, controlled by the
"constitutional monarchists", also the Solidarists as
well as SBONR and SVOD. However, the report re-
marked that the speeches of SBONR and SVOD repre-
sentatives "disturbed the prevailing atmosphere by
introducing some elements of polemics with those who
think differently."
According to the same report, the manifestation
proved that "the masses of the Russian political emi-
gration insist upon the creation of a united and wide
Russian Front' Abroad against Communists." But the
meeting offered no evidence that this consolidation
scheme would be more successful than similar attempts
made previously by the same circles.
(B) The "Russian Democratic Bloc" Plan
The Solidarist Possev of December 17th, 1950 car-
ried a joint declaration, signed by Professor S. Melgunov
in behalf of his Union to Fight for the Liberation of
Russia (Paris) and by V. Baydalakov in behalf of the
Solidarist group (National Labor Union), in which an ap-
peal was raised to build up a "Russian Democratic Bloc."
The appeal was directed to six groups, including--in
addition to both initiating groups--also Kerensky's Na-
tional Freedom League, SBONR, "Vlasovite non-pre-
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 determinationists," and "Constitutional Monarchists."
It excluded from participation in the bloc the organiza-
tions "based on the platform of totalitarianism, both
absolutist and Marxist."
The appeal met critical comments in an article by
Boris Nikolaevsky, the Socialist leader, printed in the
Bulletin of the National Freedom League of December
24th, 1950. Nikolaevsky objects to the plan because, in
his opinion, its wording appears to block the participa-
tion of the Socialists while holding open the way to
undemocratic rightist groups. The denial of admission
in the projected bloc to all groups standing on the
Marxist platform," he says, would exclude all Socialist
parties in Western Europe, parties which represent an
important factor in the European anti-Communist move-
ment. In its application to Russian groups, the plan
would deny entry to anti-Communist Socialists, he as-
serts.
On the other hand, according to Nikolaevsky, the
project would admit monarchists who call themselves
"constitutional monarchists," as in the case of the High-
est Monarchist Council in Munich, although they are in
fact adherents of, the absolutist regime. The same ap-
plies to the Vlasovite group under General Turkul, he
says.
Another defect in the project, in Nikolaevsky's view,
is its failure to make room for other nationalities of
Russia, such as the Ukrainians. The author insists that
no consolidated body can ignore the nationality prob-
lem.
Nikolaevsky's article found a visibly irritated reply
in an article by S. Melgunov, printed in the New York
Novoye Russkoye Slovo of January 15th. Melgunov
states that he never intended to exclude the Socialists of
Nikolaevsky group from joining the bloc because, in his
opinion, they do not stand on a Marxist platform in their
fight against Bolshevism. It would be a different thing,
he adds caustically, if the Socialist returned to their
partly pro-bolshevik position of 1920s, or "if Nikolaev-
sky again fell victim to his illusions, expressed a few
years ago in Paris, that Marxism has won in the whole
world."
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The Socialistichesky Viestnik carried in its Decem-
ber 1950 issue an article by S. Schwartz presenting the
group's view on the consolidation issue.
Schwartz sees the necessity of limiting admission
to the consolidation center only to certain political
groups. He denies participation to all groups which de-
sire to restore the monarchy and the social order of
Tsarist times. All compromise is rejected with groups
playing with the idea of a Fuehrer. "Only groups about
which there can be no doubt as to their democratic and
republican character and their progressiveness in so-
cial and economic problems could enter such a body,"
Schwartz points out.
Additional requirements of the proposed center,
raised in Schwartz's article, are: it should not pose as
an exiled government or a nucleus for the future govern-
ment of Russia; it should not concern itself with the
organization of an armed force; and it should seek ways
to attract representatives of nationality groups.
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NEW AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS
FOR A FREE RUSSIA
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NEW AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS
FOR A FREE RUSSIA*
1. FRIENDS OF FIGHTERS FOR RUSSIAN FREEDOM
A. Officers
Chairman, Organizing Committee:
Mrs. Henry Hadley
Secretary and Treasurer:
Mrs. Ivan Tolstoy
B. Address
15 West 67th Street, New York 23, New York
C. Background
The formation of this group was announced in the
"New York Times" and other newspapers on
February 19, 1951. In program and sponsors, it
resembles an attempt in 1949 which did not ma-
terialize- -the FRIENDS OF RUSSIAN FREEDOM,
with Professor George S. Counts as Chairman
Pro Tem of the Organization Committee. The
objective of the Friends of Fighters for Russian
Freedom, as stated in its "Statement of Principles
The closest published approximation to a complete
listing of organizations in the United States of and for
exiles from the USSR.is contained in Russia 96er This
Calendar-Guide, 1951 (New York, 1951), pp.
volume is published by Nicholas Martianoff, 1326 Madison
Avenue, New York 28, New York. No comparable source exists
for Western Germany, which remains the political center
of recent exiles from the USSR. Specific inquiries may
be addressed to the Institute for Research on the History
and Institutions of the USSR, Augustenstrasse 46, Munich,
Germany. This is a non-partisan venture of Soviet exile
intellectuals. Its director is Boris A. Yakovlev, for-
merly Vice-President of the Soviet Academy of Architecture
and co-editor of a collection of autobiographical accounts
by wartime Soviet exiles, Thirteen Who Fled (New York,
1949).
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and Purposes," are as follows: "At home, it will
resolutely point out that it is not the Russian
people, but rather the Soviet regime and the Com-
munist conspiracy that are the enemies of all
people and threaten world war ... Abroad . . . it
will organize practical support and guidance, re-
ception centers, etc., for Soviet citizens fleeing
from their native land." The group held a lun-
cheon-meeting in New York on March 20, 1951.
U. S. Senator Brian McMahon spoke at the meeting,
of which Dr. Harry Gideonse, President of Brook-
lyn College, was Chairman.
II. AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM FOR THE
. PEOPLES OF THE U.S.S.R., INC.
President: Eugene Lyons
Vice-President: Allan Grover
Secretary: William L. White
Other members: William Henry Chamberlin, Pro-
fessor William Yandell Elliott,
Isaac Don Levine
B. Temporary Address
c/o The President, 40 East 54th Street,
New York 22, New York
C. Background
The account of the formation of this group, in the
"New York Times" of March 7, 1951, stated that
it "will give Russian refugees 'moral and material
support' in their fight against the Stalin regime
... The committee said it would channel its sup-
port through a centralized body, representing 'all
democratic elements' among emigres from the
Soviet Union. Negotiations forthe creation of this
body, with headquarters in Western Germany have
begun."
B2
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The committee's description as "a newly formed
American Committee for a Free Russia", by David
J. Dallin in the February 12, 1951 "New Leader,"
-called forth a rejoinder in the March 26, 1951
"New Leader" from Albert C. J. Simard, M.D.
(40 Central Park South, New York). Dr. Simard
described himself as Chairman of the Board of
Directors of an entirely different group, the
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FREE RUSSIA,
Inc. He stated that the "Appeal" of his group had
first been published in "Commonweal" on De-
cember 31, 1948, and that it was incorporated in
the State of New York on March 9, 1949.
President: George F. Kennan
Treasurer: R. Gordon Wasson
Other members, Board of Trustees:
Frank Altschul, Professor Philip E.
Mosely, John E. F. Wood
Director: George Fischer
B. Address
542 Fifth Avenue, New York 19, New York
C. Background
This group was formed at a. meeting on March 23,
1951. Its immediate purpose is "to increase the
usefulness to free society" of exiles of all Soviet
nationalities through the support of their cultural,
academic and mutual aid organizations in the
United States.
83
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85
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ABRAMOVICH, R . .................... 40,47
article in "Socialistichesky Viestnik" 73; see
also: Liga; Social Democrats
ACODNR (Germany) ............... 66,67,68,70
Anti- Communist Center of the Liberation Move-
ment of the Peoples of Russia; Anti- Kommunis-
ticheckii Centr Osvoboditelnogo Dvizhenia Na-
rodov Rossii; see also: "Bulletin" of ACODNR;
Monarchists; Vlasov Movement (Post-war)
ALEXEYEV, Prof. N. N . ................. . 43
see also: Eurasian Movement
"AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FUTURE"
see: Kennan
"AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW" (maga-
zine) see: Fainsod
ANISIMOV, O.
article: "Sovetskoe Pokolenie" (The Soviet
Generation) n56.
ALL-RUSSIAN FASCIST ORGANIZATION ....... 16
(Union of Russian Fascists); (Vserossiiskaia
Fashistskaia Organizatsiia); see also: Vonsi-
atsky
ALSOP, Joseph
article in "New York Herald Tribune" 3.
ALTSCHUL, Frank ..................... 83
see also: Free Russia Fund
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FREE RUSSIA .... 83
appeal in "Commonweal" 83; see also: Simard;
Simard ("New Leader" letter)
AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM FOR THE
PEOPLES OF THE USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 82
"New York Times" (account) 82; see also:
Chamberlin; Elliott; Grover; Levine; Lyons
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87
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ENTER OF THE LIBERATION
MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA
see: ACODNR
ANTI- KOMMUNISTICHECKII CENTR OSVOBODITEL-
NOGO DVIZHENIA NARODOV ROSSII
see: ACODNR
AR CHANGE LSKY, General .... .
see also: ROVS 65
ARGUNOV A. ..
see also: Social Revolutionaries
ARMED FORCES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE
LIBERATION OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA
see: KONR Army
ARONSON, Grigorii ... .
"Pravda o Vlasovtsakh"; ("The Truth about the 55,71
Vlasovites") n55; see also: Social Democrats
"ATLANTIC" (magazine)
see: Baldwin ("What kind of a war?")
BALDWIN, Hanson W.
"What kind of a war?" n53.
"BANNER OF RUSSIA" (newspaper)
see: "Znamya Rossii"
BAUER, Otto .. .... .
see also: " " ' 40
Second International
BAYDALAKOV, V. ' .. . .
41,47,73,74,75
see also: NTSNP; NTS; Russian Democratic
Bloc
BERDYAEV,W.....................
BOLDIREV, Konstantin
"Look" Magazine (article) 72; see also: NTS
"BORBA" (magazine) . . . ..._
("Combat"); 56,68,69
see also: SBONR; SMNR
BORBA ZA ROSSIYU
....... ...... 41,44
(Struggle for Russia); see also: Melgunov;
Federov.
. ee
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BORMANN, Mariitdr . . . .................... 55
BRATSTVO RUSz PRAVDY
see: Confratee~ of Russian Truth
"BULLETIN" of ' :.a 70
September 10~_.:-izw~0 (article) 75; see Nicolaev-
sky (article),, also: "Novoye Russkoye
Slovo"; Liga.
"BULLETIN" of._DNR ................. 73
see: Melniko (cry-ticle) see also: ACODNR
BUNIN, Ivan , . . . . .. .......... ? 46
BYELOSE LSKY; = ELOZERSKY, Prince Sergei .. 65
see also: IVAkZ-
CADETS
see: Constit'.t=--,1 Democratic Party
CARROLL,
"It takes a to Beat a Russian" n54,n55
CATHERINE T -4M SECOND ................ 35
CHAMBERLIN.. WUliam Henry .............. 82
see also: AL ^elri an -Committee for Freedom
for the Peop t s 'f the USSR
CHANGE OF SW~\ POSTS
see: Smyens*L ye''h
CHERNOV, Vir; t,,,r (Czernov) ............... 47
see also: L=id.. Social Revolutionaries
"CHRISTI2sN S`Z'IRNCE MONITOR". (newspaper)
see: RomzuTiov
CHUKHNOV, NN . .. .. . . .............. 65,67,75
see also: "'t'nanmya Rossii"; Glasenap
COMITTEE' POR THE LIBERATION OF THE
PEOPLES OR RUSSIA
see: KOIU
COMMITTEE llr RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS . . . . .
"COMMO-s- ?A L" (magazine)
see: z=rTjk'+t" Committee for Free Russia
(pew)
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CONFRATERNITY OF RUSSIAN TRUTH ..... 41,43
(Bratstvo Russkoi Pravdy); see also: Leuch-
tenberg; Sokolov-Kretchetov; Krasnov
CONGRESS OF MONARCHIST ORGANIZATIONS
(1949) ............................. 64
see also: Monarchists
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY ...... 40
(Cadets); see also: National Committee; Mil-
yukov
"CONTROLS AND TENSIONS IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM"
see: Fainsod
COUNCIL OF THE RUSSIAN SOLDIERS ABROAD
see: ROVS
COUNTS, Prof. George S . ................. 81
see also: Friends of Russian Freedom
CURIE, Eve
"Journey Among Warriers" n54
CYRIL Wladimirovitch, Grand Duke .......... 39
see also: Monarchists
CZERNOV see: Chernov
DALLIN, David J . ...................... 47
"New Leader" (article) 83; see also: Social
Democrats; Liga
DAN, F ............................ 40,46
see also: Social Democrats
"THE DEFEATIST MOVEMENT IN 1941-1945 AND
GENERAL A. A. VLASOV"
see: Nicolaevsky
DENIKIN, General .................. 37,46,68
see also: "White" Leaders
DE TOCQUEVILLE ..................... 18
"DOBROVOLETS" (newspaper) .............. n55
("Volunteer"); see also: ROA
90
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~-1 - D MATERIAL OF THE C0bEmI"FTEE
OF Imo.. k Z\ OF THE PEOPLES OF RL Lk-
see: M ,ate-'-=`+r
'-I -TE. tD MATERIAL DES K0METEES ZUR
BEFREXvG D VOELKER RUSSLANDS"
see:
DVINOV, rB 71
"Vla_ ze D+rizhenie v Svete Doku=erztov"
n54,n5 ; (1 rlasovMovement in the Ligti of
Documen^ : -.e also: Liga; Social Democrats
"THE EASTEBti QUARTERLY" ."'
see: Wrs,m ('Russian Emigration. .
EERENBURG, fly
article in "Krsnaia Zvezda" n54
William Yandell . .. . . . . . . . . 82
ELLIOTT, Pra.
see also: A:.erican Committee for Freedom
for the Peop1ez- of the USSR
"ES BEGAT AM DON"
see: Michel
EURASIAN MOVEMENT .................. 43
see also: Trubetzkoy; Alexeyev; Savitsky
FAINSOD, Merle
"Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System" n56
FEDOROV, M .................... .. .... 41
see also: "Borba za Rossiyu"
FEDOTOV, Prof. G . .............. ... .. .. 49
see also: Liga
.
"FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION OF.
see: Pozdniakov
FISCHER, George . . . . . . . . . ..... . . ..... . 83
biography: 59; Preface of "Russian Emigre
Politics" pages 5-9; "The New Soviet Emigra-
tion" n56; "Soviet Defection in World War ll"
n53; "General Vlasov's Official Biography" n54;
"Vlasov and Hitler" 51-57; see also: Free
Russia Fund.
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"FOREIGN AFFAIRS" (magazine)
see:
Kennan ("America and the Russian Fu-
ture")
"FOURTEEN POINTS"
see: Prague Manifesto
FREE RUSSIA CONGRESS ... . . .. 74,75
FREE RUSSIA FUND
see also: Altschul; Fischer; Kennan; Mosely; 8, 9, 83
?
Wasson; Wood
FRIENDS OF FIGHTERS FOR RUSSIAN FREEDOM 81
"New York Times" (announcement) 81; "State-
ment of Principles and Purposes" 81-82; see
also: Hadley, Mrs. Ivan Tolstoy; Friends of
Russian Freedom
FRIENDS OF RUSSIAN FREEDOM . ....... . 81
see also: Counts; Friends of Fighters for
Russian Freedom
GEORGHIEVSKY, M . .................... 41
see also: NTSNP
"A GERMAN OF THE RESISTANCE"
see: Moltke
GIDEONSE, Dr. Harry ............... ? 82
see also: Friends of Fighters for Russian
Freedom
GILBERT, Felix
"Hitler Directs his War; the Records of his
Daily Military Conferences" n56
GLASENAP, General P............... 63-67,74,75
see also: RONDD:' Chukhnov; SAF; Karalin
"GOEBBELS DIARIES"
see: Goebbels
GOEBBELS, Joseph ....... 55
"Goebbels Diaries"
edited by Louis Lochner n55
GOUREWITSCH, B...................... n56
(J z
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G R O V E R , Allen .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
see also: American Committee for Freedom
for the Peoples of the USSR
HAD LEY, Mrs. Henry .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
see also: Friends of Fighters for Russian
Freedom
HERZEN, Alexander
"Life and Thoughts" 7.
HESS, Rudolph ......................... 55
HIGHEST MONARCHIST COUNCIL
see: VMS
HIMMLER, Heinrich ..................... 44
HITLER ..................... 21,54-57,n56,71
HITLER CONFERENCE,'8 June, 1943 ......... 56
"HITLER DIRECTS HIS WAR"
see: Gilbert
"HOW RUSSIA ALMOST LOST THE WAR"
see, Markoff
INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH on the History and Insti-
tutions tutions of the USSR (Munich) .... . . . . . . . .
see also: Yakovlev
INTRANSIGEANCE MANIFESTATION RALLY, 75
NOVEMBER, 1950 ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"IT TAKES A RUSSIAN TO BEAT A RUSSIAN"
see: Carroll
"JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY" (magazine)
see: Fischer ("Vlasov and Hitler")
"JOURNEY AMONG WARRIORS"
see: Curie
JUDENITCH .......................... 37
see also: "White" Leaders
93
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KARALIN, V. . .
see also: Glasenap ? ' ? ' 65
KARTASHOV, A. ..... .
see also: SBSR ' ' ? ? ' ' ' 47
KAUTSKY, Karl ..... .
see also: Second International ' ' 40
KAZANTSEV, A. ..... .
"Tretiia Sila: Istoria Odnoi Popytk'i"; ("The ? ? n56
Third Force: the History of One Attempt") n56;
see also: "Volia Naroda" (Berlin)
KAZIM BEK, Alexander
see also: Mladorossy ? ' ? ' 41
KEITEL, Field Marshal
KENNAN, George F...................... 6,83
graphy: 11; "America and the Russian Fu-
ture" 11-32; see also: Free Russia Fund.
KERENSKY, Alexander .............. see also: Liga, Social Revolutionaries 39, 47, 70, 74
KERENSKY'S LEAGUE
see: Liga
KIROV ......
KOCH, Ernst
see: Erich Koch
KOCH, Erich ...... .
KOLTCHAK ....
see also: "White"? ? ' ' ' ' ' ' 3?
Leaders
KOMITET OSVOBOZHDENIA NARODOV ROSSU
see: KONR
KONR .......................
for the Liberation of the Peoples4of 53,54
Russia; Komitet Osvobozhdenia Narodov Rossii;
(Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of
Russia); see also: "Dokumente and MateriaIdes
Kommittees zur Befreiung der Voelker Russ-
lands"; KONR Army; Prague Manifesto; Vlasov
Movement (war-time); "VolieNaroda" (Berlin);
Zhilenkov
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KONR ARMY (1944-1945) 46,5
Armed Forces of the Committee for the Lib-
eration of the Peoples of Russia; Vooruzhennye
Sily Komiteta Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii;
see also: Turkul; Pozdniakov (article); Vlasov
Movement (War-time); Vlasov army; KONR
KOV ....................... 66,67,74,75,76
Committee of United Vlasovites; Komitet
Obiedinennykh Vlasovtsev; (United Vlasovites);
(United Vlasovite Movement); (Turkul's Vlas-
sovite Group); see also: Turkul; Vlasov Move-
ment (post-war); "Volia Naroda" (Munich)
"KRASNAIA ZVEZDA" (newspaper)
("Red Star"); see: Ehrenburg (article)
KRASNOV, General ..................... 41
see also: Confraternity of Russian Truth
KRESTIANSKAIA ROSSIIA ...... . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Peasant Russia; T r u d o v a i a Krestianskaia
Partiia-Krestianskaia Rossiia
KROMIADI, Colonel K. G.
"Posey" article n54; see also: Vlasov
KUTEPOV, General A . ................... 43
see also: ROVS
. n55
LANGE, Serge ....................... .
editor: "Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg"
LEAGUE TO FIGHT FOR NATIONAL FREEDOM
see: Liga
LEAGUE OF STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM OF THE
PEOPLE
see: Liga
LEAGUE FOR FREE RUSSIA
seer Liga
LENIN ............................ 38,43
LEUCHTENBERG, Prince G ................ 41
see also: Confraternity of Russian Truth
95
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LEVICKY, S.
see: S. Levitski
LEVINE, Isaac Don ..................... 82
see also: American Committee for Freedom
for the Peoples of the USSR
LEVITSKI, S. (Levicky) ................... 74
see also: NTS
LIGA BORBY ZA NARODNUIU
SVOBODU ............... 47,69,70,71,74,75,76
League for Free Russia; (League to Fight for
National Freedom); (National Freedom League);
(League of Struggle for Freedom of the People);
(Kerensky's League); see also: Abromovich;
"Bulletin" of Liga; Chernov; Dallin; Dvinov;
Fedotov; Kerensky; Nicolaevsky; Schwarz; Zen-
zinov
"LIFE AND THOUGHTS"
see: Herzen
LOCHNER, Louis ...................... n55
editor: "Goebbels Diaries"
"LOOK" (magazine)
see: Boldirev (interview)
LUDENDORFF, Erich .................... 56
LYONS, Eugene .............. ........ 82
see also: American Committee for Freedom
for the Peoples of the USSR
MAKLAKOV, Ambassador ................. 46
MARKOFF, Alexei
"How Russia Almost Lost the War" 53
MARTIANOFF, Nicholas .............. . . n81
editor: "Russian-American Calendar Guide"
MARTOV,L ........................... 40
see also: Social Democrats
MARX, Karl .......................... 15
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MASLOV, A. ........ ................ 40
see also: Social Revolutionaries
M cM AHON, Senator B . ................... 82
MELGUNOV, S. P ............... 41,41,47,71,75
letter in "Novoye Russkoye Slovo 76; see also:
Borba za Rossiyu; Populist-Socialists; Russian
Democratic Bloc; SBSR
MELGUNOV GROUP
see: SBSR
MELNIKOV, N.
article in ACODNR "Bulletin" 73
"MEMOIRS OF ALFRED ROSENBERG.......... n55
editors: Ernest von Schenk and Serge Lange;
see also: Rosenberg
MENSHEVIKS
see: Social Democrats
MICHEL, Karl
"Es Begann am Don" n54; "Ost and West: Der
Ruf Stauffernbergs" n54
MILLER, General E . .................... 43
see also: ROVS
MILYUKOV, P . ................ 39,40,45,46,48
see also: Constitutional Democratic Party;
National Committee; Republican-Democratic
Union
MLADOROSSY ..................... 41,44,48
(Union of Young Russians); (Young Russians);
see also: Kazim Bek
MOCR
see: "Trust"
MOLTKE, Count Helmuth James von
"A German of the Resistance: The Last Let-
ters of Count H. J. von Moltke" 23
MONARCHISTS
First Assembly of, (1921) 40; Second Assembly
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of, (1922) 40; Congress of Monarchist Organiza-
tions (1949) 64; see also: Grand Duke Cyril
Vladimirovitch; Grand Duke Nicholas Nichol-
ayevitch; Grand Duke Vladimir Cyrilovitch;
"Nasha Strana"; RAC; RONDD; "Rossiya";
ROVS; SAF; "TRUST"; VMS
MONARCHIST ALLIANCE OF CENTRAL RUSSIA
see: "Trust"
MONARCHIST COUNCIL
see: VMS
MONARKHICHESKOE OBEDINENIE CENTRALNOI
ROSSII
see: "Trust"
MOR
see: "Trust"
MOSR
see: "Trust"
MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE
PEOPLES OF RUSSIA
see: SBONR
MOSELY, Prof. Philip E ................... 83
see also: Free Russia Fund
"MY RETREAT FROM RUSSIA"
see: Petrov
"NASHA STRANA" (newspaper) ............. 67
("Our Country"); see: Solonevich (article); see
also: Solonevich; Monarchists
NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF RUSSIAN SOLIDARISTS
see: NTS
NATIONAL COMMITTEE ......... .... 40
see also: Constitutional Democratic Party;
Milyukov
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE
account of: . . . 59; "Political Trends Among
Exiles" 59-77
98
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 NATIONAL FREEDOM. LEAGUE
see: Liga
NATIONAL LABOR ALLIANCE OF THE NEW
GENERATION
see: NTSNP
NATIONAL UNION OF LABOR
see: NTS
NATSIONALNO-TRUDOVOI SOIUZ (Rossiiskie Solidar-
isty)
see: NTS
NATSIONALNO - TRUDOVOI SOIUZ NOVOGO POKO-
LENIIA
see: NTSNP
"NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION" . n54,n55,n56
see also: Nuremberg Trials
NAZI PARTY ....................... 53,55
"NEW AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS FOR A
FREE RUSSIA ...................... 79-83
see also: Free Russia Fund; Friends of Fighters
for Russian Freedom; American Committee for
Free Russia; American Committee for Free-
dom for the Peoples of the USSR
"NEW LEADER" (magazine)
see: Dallin (article); Simard (letter)
"THE NEW SOVIET EMIGRATION"
see: Fischer
"NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE" (newspaper)
see: Alsop (article)
"NEW YORK TIMES" (newspaper)
issue Aug. 2, 1946 n56; see: American Com-
mittee for Freedom for the Peoples of USSR
(account); Friends of Fighters for Russian
Freedom (announcement); Sulzberger (article)
NICHOLAS Nicholayevitch, Grand Duke . . . . . .. . 39
see also: Monarchists
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 NICOLAEVSKY, Boris .. .
"Porazhenchestvo 1941-1945 Godov i Gen. A.A. 47, 76
Vlasov" ("The Defeatist Movement in 1941-
1945 and Gen. A. A. Vlasov") n55; article in
"Bulletin" of Liga 76; article in "Socialisti-
chesky Viestnik" 70; see also: Liga; Social
Democrats
"NOVOYE RUSSKOYE SLOVO" (newspaper) ... 70,76
("The New Russian Word"); see: Melgunov
(letter); "Bulletin" of Liga
"NOVY ZHURNAL" (magazine) n55,n56
("New Review"); see: Anisimov: ("Sovetskoe
Pokolenie"); Nicolaevsky ("Porazhenchestvo
1941-1945. . .")
NTS ............... . n6lF,47,71-75
National Alliance of Russian Solidarists; Natsi-
onalno-Trudovoi Soiuz-Rossiiskie Solidaristy;
(Solidarists); (National Union of Labor); see
also: Baydalakov;Boldirev; "Grani"; Levitsky;
NTSNP; Poremsky; "Posev"; "Programma
Natsionalno-Trudovogo Soiuza"; Redlich; Rom-
anov; Russian Democratic Bloc
NTSNP ...... .......... 41,44,47
National Alliance of Russian Solidarists of the
New Generation; Natsionalno-Trudovoi Soiuz
Novogo Pokoleniia; (National Labor Alliance
of the New Generation); see also: Baydalakov;
Gierghievsky; NTS
NUREMBERG TRIALS
see: "Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression"; "Trial
of Major War Criminals"
ORTHODOX CHURCH ...............
? 46,65
OSOKIN, V.
"Andrei Andreevich Vlasov: Kratkaia Bio-
grafia" n54; ("Andrei Andreevich Vlasov: a
Brief Biography")
"OST UND WEST"
see: Michel
100
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"OUR COUNTRY"
see: "Nasha Strana"
PARIS LIBERATION UNION
see: SBSR
PEASANT RUSSIA
see: Krestianskaia Rossiia
"PEOPLE'S WILL"
see: "Volia Naroda" (Berlin); "Volia Naroda"
(Munich)
"PERVAIA PEKHOTNAIA DIVIZIA..."
see: Pozdniakov
PESHEKHONOV, A. ................. 40
(Peshenov); see also: Populist- Socialists
PESHENOV, A.
see: Peshekhonov
PETERMAN, Ivan H.
"Prague's Four Fantastic Days" n56
PETROV, Vladimir
"My Retreat from Russia" n54
PILSUDSKI'S POLISH LEGION ............... 56
"POLITICAL TRENDS AMONG RUSSIAN EXILES"
see: National Committee for a Free Europe
POPULIST-SOCIALISTS ................. 40,47
see also: Melgunov; Peshekhonov; Socialists
"PORAZHENCHESTVO 1941-1945 Godov i Gen. A. A.
Vlasov"
see: Nicolaevsky
POREMSKY ........................... 47
see also: NTS
"POSEV" (magazine) ............. n56,73,74,75
("Possev"); see: Russian Democratic Bloc
(declaration); Kromiadi (article); Kazantsev
("Tretiia Sila. . ."); see also: NTS; Romanov;
Russian Democratic Bloc
101
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POZDNIAKOV
"Pervaia Pekhotnaia Divizia Vooruzhennykh
Sil Komiteta Osvobozhdenia Narodov Rossii,
po Vospominaniam Komandira 2-go Polka";
("The First Infantry Division of the Armed
Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of
the Peoples of Russia, based on the Memoirs -
of the Commander of the 2nd Regiment") n56;
see also: KONR Army (re Pozdniakov article)
PRAGUE MANIFESTO .......... n54,62,66,67,71
("Fourteen Points"); (Vlasov Movement's Mani-
festo); see also: KONR
"PRAGUE'S FOUR FANTASTIC DAYS"
see: Peterman
"PRAVDA 0 VLASOVTSAKH"
see: Aronson
PREFACE of "RUSSIAN EMIGRE POLITICS"
see: Fischer
"PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF
RUSSIAN SOLIDARISTS"
see: "Programma Natsionalno-Trudovogo
Soiuza"
"PROGRAMMA NATSIONALNO TRUDOVOGO SOIUZA"
(pamphlet) .......................... n56
("Program of the National Alliance of Russian
Solidarists"); see also: NTS
RAC (USA) ........................... 65
Russian Anti-Communist Center; Rossiiskii
Antikommunisticheskii Centr; see also: Mon-
archists; Prince S. Byeloselsky- Byelozer sky
RDO
see: Republican-Democratic Union
REDLICH, R. 74
see also: NTS
REPUBLICAN-DEMOCRATIC UNION ......... 40
Respublikansko-Demokraticheskoe Obiedinenie
(RDO); see also: Milyukov
102
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RE SPU BLIKANSKO-DEMOKRATICHESKOE
OBIEDINENIE
see: Republican-Democratic Union
ROA (1943-1944) ......... 45,46,53,55,56,63,66,71
Russian Army of Liberation; Russkaia Osvo-
boditelnaia Armiia; (Russian Liberation Army);
see also: "Dobrovolets"; Vlasov Movement
(war-time); Vlasov Army
ROMANOV, E ........................ 47,73
"Christian Science Monitor" (interview) 73;
see also: NTS; "Posev"
RONDD 63
Russian All-National State Movement; Ros-
s i i s k o e Obshchenatsionalnoe Narodno-Der-
zhavnoe Dvizhenie; see also: Glasenap; SAF
ROSENBERG, -Alfred .................... 55
see also: "Memoirs of Rosenberg"
ROSSIISKII ANTIKOMMUNISTICHESKII CENTR
see: RAC
ROSSIISKU OBSHCHE-VOINSKII SOIUZ
see: RAC
ROSSUSKII OBSHCHENATIONALNOE NARODNO-DER-
ZHAVNOE DVIZHENIE
see: RONDD
ROSSIISKIE SOLIDARISTY
see: NTS
"ROSSIYA" (newspaper) .................. 65
("Russia"); see also: Monarchists
ROVS ......................... 41-44,46,65.
Russian All-Soldiers Union; Rossiiskii
Obshche- Voinskii Soiuz; (ROWS) ; (S R Z V) ;
(Council of Russian Soldiers Abroad); see also:
Archangelsky; Kutepov; Miller; Monarchists;
Wrangel
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 104
ROWS
see: ROVS
"RUSSIAN-AMERICAN CALENDAR GUIDE" 1951
see: Martianoff
RUSSIAN ALL-NATIONAL STATE MOVEMENT
see: RONDD
RUSSIAN ALL-SOLDIERS UNION
see: ROVS
RUSSIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST CENTER
see: RAC
RUSSIAN ARMY OF LIBERATION
see: ROA
RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC BLOC .. . . 75,76
"Posev" (declaration); see also: Baydalokov;
NTS; Melgunov; SBSR
"RUSSIAN EMIGRATION AFTER THIRTY
YEARS' EXILE"
see: Wraga
"RUSSIAN EMIGRE POLITICS"
mention of: 6-9
RUSSIAN LIBERATION ARMY
see: ROA
RUSSIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE ........... 53
see also: Vlasov movement (war-time); "Smo-
lensk Program"
RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER, Harvard University n53
see: Pozdniakov ("Pervaia Pekhotnaia..")
"RUSSIAN REVIEW" (magazine)
see: Fischer ("New Soviet Emigration") ; ("Gen.
Vlasov's Official Biography")
RUSSKAIA OSVOBODITELNAIA ARMUA
see: ROA
SAF ... 63,66
Union of, the Flag of St. Andrew; Soiuz Andreev-
skogo Flaga; (Union of the St. Andrew Flag); see
also: Glasenap; RONDD; Monarchists
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"SATURDAY EVENING POST" (magazine)
see: Peterman ("Prague's Four Fantastic
Days"); Markoff ("How Russia...")
SAVINKOV, Boris . ... . .. . .. .. . . . . . . .. . . 44
SAVITSKY, Prof. P. 43
see also: Eurasian Movement
SBONR . . . . . .. . . . . . ... . . . . 47,n56,62,66-71,75
Movement for the Liberation of the Peoples of
Russia; Soiuz Borby za Osvobozhdenie Narod-
ov Rossii; (Union of Struggle for the Liberation
of the Peoples of Russia); (Union to Fight for
the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia); see
also: "Borba"; SBONR Congress; SMNR; SVOD;
Vlasov Movement (post-war); Zhilenkov
SBONR CONGRESS 1949 .................. 71
see also: SBONR
see: SBSR
SBSR ..................... .... 40,47,71,75
Union of Struggle for a Free Russia; Soiuz
Borby za Svobodnuiu Rossiiu; (Union to Fight
for the Liberation of Russia); Union of Struggle
for Freedom of Russia); (SBOR); (Paris Lib-
eration Union); ("Melgunov Group"); see also:
Melgunov; Kartashov
SECOND INTERNATIONAL ................ 42
see also: Bauer; Kautsky; Social Democrats
see: Schwarz
SCHWARZ, Solomon ..................... 47
(Schwartz); article in "Socialistichesky Viest-
nik" 77; see also: Liga; Social Democrats
SIMARD, Dr. Albert C. J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
letter in "New Leader" 83; see also: Ameri-
can Committee for Free Russia
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 106
SMNR ............................ 66,68
Union of the Youth of the Peoples of Russia;
(Soiuz Molodezhi Narodov Rossii); see also:
SBONR; "Borba"
SKARZHINSKY, P . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 64,67
see also: VMS
SMYENA VEKH ........................ 43
Change of Sign Posts; (Smyenovekhovtsi); see
also: Ustryalov
SMYENOVEKHOVTSI
see: Smyena Vekh
"SMOLENSK PROGRAM" December 1942 ....... 54
see also: Russian National Committee
SOCIALISTS
see: Social Democrats; Populist-Socialists;
Social Revolutionaries
SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ........ 39,40,42,44,46,47,55
(SD); (Mensheviks); see also: Abramovich;
Aronson; Dallin; Dan; Dvinov; Martov; Nicol-
aevsky; Schwarz; Second International; "So-
cialistichesky Viestnik"; Socialists
SOCIAL REVOLUTIONARIES ....... 39,40,42,44,47
(SR); (Eser); see also: Argunov; Chernov;
Kerensky; Maslov; Socialists; Zenzinov
"SOCIALISTICHESKY VIESTNIK" (magazine) .. 40,70
("Socialist Courier"); ("Sotsyalisticheskiy
Vestnik"); see: Abramovich (article); Nicol-
aevsky (article); Schwarz (article); see also:
Social Democrats
SOCIETY OF FELLOWS, Harvard University . ... 53
SOIUZ ANDREEVSKOGO FLAGA
see: SAF
SOIUZ BORBY ZA OSVOBOZHDENIE NARODOV ROSSII
see: SBONR
SOIUZ BORBY ZA SVOBODNUIU ROSSIIU
see: SBSR
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SOIUZ MOLODEZHI NARODOV ROSSII
see: SMNR
see: SVOD
SOIUZ VOINOV OSVOBODITELNOGO DVIZHENIIA
SOKOLOV-KRETCHETOV ............ .... . .41
see also: Confraternity of Russian Truth
SOLIDARISTS
see: NTS
SOLONEVICH, I.
article in "Nasha Strand" 73; see also: "Nasha
Strana"
"SOTSYALISTICHESKIY VESTNIK"
see: Socialistichesky Viestnik
"SOVETSKOE POKOLENIE"
see: Anisimov
"SOVIET DEFECTION IN WORLD WAR II"
see: Fischer
SOVIET PATRIOTS ..................... 46
"SOVIET GENERATION"
see: Anisimov
see: Social Revolutionaries
"STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES"
see: Friends of Fighters for Russian Freedom
STRUGGLE FOR RUSSIA
see: Borba za Rossiyu
SULZBERGER, C. L.
"New York Times" (article) n54
SUPREME MONARCHIST COUNCIL
see: VMS
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SVOD ... 62,67-69,71,75
Union of Soldiers of the Liberation Movement;
Soiuz Voinov Osvoboditelnogo Dvizheniia; see
also: SBONR; Vlasov Movement (post-war)
"THE THIRD FORCE..."
see: Kazantsev
"THE TRUTH ABOUT THE VLASOVITES"
see: Aronson
"THIRTEEN WHO FLED"
see: Yakovlev (co-editor)
THOREAU ............. 32
TOLSTOY, COUNT ALEXY ................ 43
TOLSTOY, Mrs. Ivan ..................... 81
see also: Friends of Fighters for Russian
Freedom
"TOWARD A RUSSIAN POLICY"
see: Wasson
"TRETIIA SILA..."
see: Kazantsev
"TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS" 54,n55,n56
see also: Nuremberg Trials
TRUBETZKOY, Prince ................... 43
see also: Eurasian Movement
TRUDOVAIA KRESTIANSKAIA PARTIIA-KRESTIAN-
SKAIA ROSSUA
see: Krestianskaia Rossiia
"TRUST" 44
Monarchist Alliance of Central Russia; Mon-
arkhicheskoe Obiedinenie Centralnoi Rossii;
MOCR; (MOSR); (MOR); see also: Monarch-
ists
TURKUL, General Andrei ............ 66,67,74,76
see also: KOV, KONR Army
TURKUL'S VLASOVITE GROUP
see: KOV
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 UNION OF RUSSIAN FASCISTS
see: All-Russian Fascist Organization
UNION OF SOLDIERS OF THE LIBERATION MOVE-
MENT
see: SVOD
UNION TO FIGHT FOR THE LIBERATION OF RUSSIA
see: SBSR
UNION OF THE FLAG OF ST. ANDREW
see: SAF
UNION OF THE ST. ANDREW FLAG
see: SAF
UNION OF STRUGGLE FOR A FREE RUSSIA
see: SBSR
UNION OF STRUGGLE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE
PEOPLES OF RUSSIA
see: SBONR
UNION OF STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM OF RUSSIA
see: SBSR
UNION OF THE YOUTH OF THE PEOPLES OF RUSSIA
see: SMNR
UNION OF YOUNG RUSSIANS
see: Mladorossy
UNION TO FIGHT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE
PEOPLES OF RUSSIA
see: SBONR
UNITED VLASOVITES
see: KOV
UNITED VLASOVITE MOVEMENT
see: KOV
"DER UNTERMENSCH" (pamphlet) ........... n53
USTRYALOV, Prof . ..................... 43
see also: Smyena Vekh
VLADIMIR Cyrilovitch, Grand Duke ....... 39,64,65
see also: Monarchists
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VLASOV LIBERATION MOVEMENT
see: Vlasov Movement (war-time)
VLASOV, Lt. Gen. Andrei
45,46,53-57,n55,n56,66,67,68,71
see: Vlasov Movement (war-time); Vlasov
Movement (post-war); Kromiadi
"A. A. VLASOV: a Brief Biography"
see: Osokin
"ANDREI ANDREEVICH VLASOV: Kratkaia Biografia"
see: Osokin
VLASOV MOVEMENT (WAR-TIME)
53,54,55,62,65,66,68,70,71
(Vlasov Liberation Movement); see also: KONR;
KONR Army; ROA; Russian National Commit-
tee; Vlasov
VLASOV MOVEMENT (POST-WAR) ........... 67
see also: ACODNR: KOV; SBONR; SVOD;
Vlasov
VLASOV ARMY
see: ROA (1943-1944); KONR Army (1944-
1945)
VLASOV MOVEMENT'S MANIFESTO
see: Prague Manifesto
"VLASOV MOVEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF
DOCUMENTS"
see: Dvinov
"GENERAL VLASOV'S OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY"
see: Fischer
"VLASOV AND HITLER"
see: Fischer
VLASOVITES
see: Vlasov Movement (war-time); Vlasov
Movement (post-war)
"VLASOVSKOE DVIZHENIE V SVETE DOKUMENTOV"
see: Dvinov
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 n56,66,67,68,71
); Vlasov
~aia Biografia"
,65,66,68,70,71
: KONR;
Commit-
. . . . .. . . 67
SVOD;
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VMS .... ... ................ 40,64-68,74,76
Supreme Monarchist Council; Vysshyi Mon-
arkhicheskii Sovet; (Highest Monarchist Coun-
cil); (Monarchist Council); see also: Monarch-
ists; Skarzhinsky
VOICE OF AMERICA ............... ...... 31
"VOLTA NARODA" (Berlin - KONR) (newspaper) .. . n54
"The Will of the People"; ("People's Will");
see also: KONR; Kazantsev
"VOLTA NARODA" (Munich - KOV) (magazine) .... 75
"The Will of the People"; ("People's Will")
see also: KOV
"VOLUNTEER"
see: "Dobrovolets"
VOORUZHENNYE SILY KOMITETA OSVOBOZHDENIIA
NARODOV ROSSIA
see: KONR Army
VON SCHENK, Ernst
see: "Memoirs of Alfred Rosenberg"
VON MOLTKE, Count H. J.
see: Moltke
VONSIATSKY, A ........................ 41
see also: All-Russian Fascist Organization
VSEROSSIISKAIA FASHISTKAIA ORGANIZATSIIA
see: All-Russian Fascist Organization
VYSSHYI MONARKHICHESKII SOVET
see: VMS
WASSON, R. Gordon ..................... 83
"Toward a Russian Policy" 3; see also: wee
Russia Fund
"WHAT KIND OF A WAR?"
see: Baldwin
WHITE, William L . ..................... 82
see also: American Committee for Freedom
of the Peoples of the USSR
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 "WHITE" LEADERS
see: Denikin; Judenitch; Koltchak; Wrangel
"WILL OF THE PEOPLE"
see: "Volia Naroda" (Berlin); "Volia Naroda"
(Munich)
WLADIMIROW, W.
"Dokumente and Material des Komitees zur
Befreiung der Voelker Russlands"; ("Docu-
ments and Material of the Committee of Lib-
erationof the Peoples of Russia") n54,n55; see
also: KONR (re Wladimirow book)
WOOD, John E. F . ...................... 83
see also: Free Russia Fund
WRAGA, Ryszard
biography: ... 33; "The Russian Emigration
after Thirty Years' Exile" 33-50
WRANGEL ................... 37,41,43,63,68
see also: ROVS; "White" Leaders
YAKOVLEV, Boris A ..................... n81
co-editor: "Thirteen Who Fled" n81; see also:
Institute for Research on the History and In-
stitutions of the USSR (Munich)
"ZNAMYA ROSSII" (newspaper) ........... 65,75
("Banner of Russia"); see also: Monarchists;
Chukhnov
YOUNG RUSSIANS
see: Mladorossy
ZEITZLER, General ................ ..... 56
ZENZINOV, W. .. .................... 47
see also: Social Revolutionaries; Liga
ZHILENKO
see: Zhilenkov
ZHILENKOV, G. (Zhilenk4pProved For Release.2002I9j1/30 : CIA-RD
see also: SBONR; KONR
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