NOTE TO ALLEN DULLES FROM CHESTER BOWLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01731R000400470020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 5, 1955
• Content Type: NOTES

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,~4EMOR; VDUM. FOR: GEI tigL CIL
t r
Attached is a copy of the saner nrepared by
Chester Bowles :which I and 2 mentioned to
you. I have sent copies of this to both DD/I and
DD/P and has sent an acknowledgment of
receipt of this -caner to .lir. Bowles.
0)
5 April 1955
(DATE)
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CHESTER BOWLES
ESSEX. CONNECTICUT
March 28, 1955
Dear Allen:
I am enclosing a memorandum based on a
recent three month trip which may interest
you.
With my best regards.
Sinc
Chester Bowles
Mr. Allen Dulles
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
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 Approved
On March lath I returned from a three h
and South Asia, which included a few final days i n*
prepared for annoyances and frustrations abroad*
seriously disturbed by the low state into which :.It,
by the steadily growing power and prestige of Chin, and the
which exists between the views commonly expressed An America and those
held by other non-Communist peoples not only in Africa and Asia, but
also in Europe.
I do not want to overstate my pessimism, much less to sound
irresponsibly alarmist. I write the following only after sober reflec?-
tion on the manifold, mixed impressions I have had in recent weeks, and
after considering carefully the qualifications which mustL-ajjW .be tf2
IS OIFMSE 4N *AM Of
placed against such general judgments. U &MASSW"
Reluctantly, I have concluded that our position in ]?+ 'u
r6 Azk
of
continue to deteriorate unless we modify sharply, mmay
that we now seem to hold most firmly. Otherwise the day not be
far distant when we shall find the balance of o in Asia, and
eventually the world shifting inexorably ag inst U1e. I do not think
it is too much to say that the danger to Amir sn obj tiv*$
interests is as great today in. Asia as, it was in z6mvo in !941#
Moreover, many.of the fundamental advantages xhiab w! held then in
Europe are not now available to us in Asia.
The following is an effort to put into abbreviated form the
essence of the present crisis as I as* it, and to suggest. certain
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corrective measures which appear
I will deal with the .,. '?
implications of our present approach* The iiatr3; r f Qum,
Matsu, Formosa situation simply reflect the broader problem which
must soon be faced,
next 50 years.
is unlikely by itself to contain Chinese ambit
Formosa, the Philippines and Thailand - of
which includes only such Asian nations
3. American atomic power alone Sul
Thailand, Indo--China, Malaya and Sumatra.,
expand into the rich and relatively empty
that within the next ten years China may be sorely tempted to
implications. China already raises twice as much rice per acre
as India and her climate limits her ability to raise two crops.
Her dwindling margin of potential food expansion makes it likely
tion and her limited land area would have important geopolitical
Union itself. Even if China were not Communist, her huge. popula-
great a potential threat to peace and stability. as the Soviet
bitter antagonism to the United States make her at least as
2. Communist China's dynamic rate of deve )p t . and her
power balance.
but also in the Middle East and Europe and to t entire world
opment of wide areas of growing strength and etibility in Asia
is crucial to our position, not only in that part of the world,
in our present situation. The halting of Gouutnial and the devel-
to Paris lies through Peking and Calcutta" has a dreadful validity
1. Lenin's observation that for world Communism the road
The Chinese appear to have no concept of the d.structiv r #s
atomic pd For
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principals rel.ianc~e.. ;~
and mass wades. Mao told Nehru, iI no of rerican+
atomic slaughter of Chinese: civilians would only solidify Asia
against us.
air power .. oven though it kills ten million Chinese," Mass
4. Under its Communist government China is achieving a
strong sense of political unity, ideological discipline and pat-
riotic moral:. Combined with her growing economic and military
strength, these factors are steadily increasing her prestige and.
influence throughout Asia, even among those who are ideologically
in cruelty and dishonesty, allied to the Soviet Union, and
We see doctrines and practices that we profoundly dislike, steeped
appears to us conclusive and not open to shading or amendment.
but stereotyped picture of the Chinese Communist government which
From bitter experience we Americans have developed a justified
to non-Communist Asians has led us to minimize this influence,
opposed to Communism.
5. Our failure to understand the nature of China's appeal
But their total image is obscured by other-aspects of modern China
the now China and in varying degrees are also repulsed by them.
Most non-Communist Asians are also aware of these facets of
bitterly opposed to our interests,
which have a
profoundly deep appeal in Asia, China-is seen as a
nation which has participated in the cow rug;gle against
western domination, and which shares with her Asian nations such
t e pre'!sl are a.nr,?t--w .ite racial consciouanea +I
basic problems asav arty, illiteracy and tk of industrial,
development. There is widespread admiratip for the vigor with
which China is attacking these problems. F' rther to complicate
 Approved
"Asia for the Asians".
it s a ma j oR~rity. of CGm tuniat Asians
h
ave now arrived at a picture of Ching which', although still
blurred , is dangerously dik f'reht f our Oft*
b* Yet for the long haul the only eft ty. co tter balance
to China in Asia is India and Japan with A -l t Mi i y ~-
in the background. Unless these two kay-nations z? in dependent
Anrl f'y.3 ~~ _
ability to meet the economic demands of their movle thrmib
My own observations derive largely from my detailed acquain-
tance with Indian problems, but it is my belief that developments
in Japan support many of the same conclusions,
a. Japan and India between them have 455 million
people, 20% of the world's population. From the point of
view of man- npoWer this is the only Asian counterbalance to
China's 580 million.
b. With 75% of Asia's industrial output, millions of
skilled and potentially skilled workers, and, in the case
of India, ample natural resources, these two nations are
the only effective Asian industrial counter-balance to China*
c. With her long religious and cultural heritage,
dynamically brought to life in recent rears by Gandhj, India
is by far the most significant Asian atii t.ual and dg ] _.
i a2 counter-balance to China.
7. India is now making rapid economic
progress -probably equal
to that of China. Her lesder?e are becoming confident of their
s attered,
hands and in any event the present world ba1an a of power will be
h
V)W ( us, Asia may eventual &Ur fall into C4 n n at
?w~uW~ri-Ct4~.c means.
rove
 Approved Fift [eas 20 ,; ; C1 3P80` OQ 4Q.04 0020
.an Cpl India
discussions with Indian political., business, AM religious leaders
have convinced me that in a psychological and philosophical sense
the gap between our two countries is already dangerously great.
Reports from Japan indicate the same unhappy development'
there. The Hatoyama government seems to have been elected on an
almost impossible platform which promised the best from both
worlds. If this government eventually fails, the drift of
Japanese foreign policy is not likely to be more favorable to us.
8. The Soviet Union is handling itself in Asia with increased
drifting steadily apart. Three weeks of i p mt vs
are most disturbing. At"
overpowering. Unless we develop a bold and comprehensive economic
rid program the economic link between India sr d the Soviet Union
> _ _ikely to grow. Japan also seems to be moving towards closer
e ;:'iornic relations with Russia and Chia*
skill and is slowly but steadily improving its position. Compe-
tent Soviet technicians are beginning to move into India, in
some cases, I was told, following the refusal of the United King-
dom and the United States to meet Indian requests. After un-,
successfully seeking capital in the United States for a steel
mill, India turned to Russia and plans are now well advanced.
Within three or four months some 300 Indians will be on their way
to Moscow for training in management and technical planning.
Since we have failed to offer the kind of massive assistance
which India requires to meet the bold industrial goals of the
second Five Year Plan, India seems likely to turn increasingly
to Moscow. This is so, not because India prefers Communism, but
because the political pressures for economic progress are almost
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 9. This omina e
major nations of non-Communist Asia 1 ch + A6e
an adequate counter-balance to China, is due to a compleX
combination of circumstances. But it is fair to aay t: t .,cur
present dilemma stems as much from the things as, frog the
things we d_0.
Among the factors which are working against us in free Asia
are the following:
a, Many non-Communist Asians have come to consider us
a militaristic people because most o f the tling$ they hear
about us are of a military a t]_19 A recent survey of the
newspapers in the Indian State of Hyderabad revealed that
82%% of all mentions of America in a single month involved
military subjects, consisting largely of reported speeches
and statements by American military, governmental and con-
gressional leaders.
b. The Indians in particular believe that their
judgment on Asian affairs has been proved by experience
to be at least as good as our own.
1. They warned us that China would enter the
war if we crossed the 38th parallel.
2. They insisted that Chiang Kai-shek could
not invade China without involving us in a major conflict.
3. They prophesied that French military power
could not hold Indo-China even with unlimited American
equipment.
4. Their proposal for an Indo-China case fire
was rejected by us on the grounds that it tnvored the
Communists. Twra cnon ;er e
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Rion PIM am, t*'.
In North Viotnam
co As a result Indiana are p'dly irritated
by what they believe to be our tail consult
them or even to treat their vewe with respect.
Asians are deeply convinced that we are violating those
principles in the conduct of our foreign affairs. They
are particularly critical of what they believe to be
our continued compromise on the issue of colonialism.
They are also annoyed by our assurance that the
major objective of our Asian policy is toesave Asians
from Communism" They consider this approach to -be
patronizing and tactless, and to ignore the success of
their own vigorous efforts.to curb internal Communism
by creating a positive, dynamic free society.
d. Most Asians feel that Americats greatest
strength lies in the principles on which our nation is
based, principles which the Asians borrowed freely in
establishing their own constitutions. Today most
Most Asians believe that Chiang. Kai-shek and
Syngman Rhee are as ready to resort to violence and the
suppression of civil liberties as Mao Tee Tung himself.
Moreover Chiang, Rhee and Bao Dai are also associated
in their minds with feudal practices of an economic,
social and political variety that are part of the
discredited past. Their Hindu and Buddhist religious
beliefs lead them to believe that evil cannot be con-
quered by evil, and that we have lost sight of t hi s
fact.
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between America and the bulk Of
by the fast that most Asians, particularl.Y the South
Asians, are incredibly ignorant of the events which
lead up to the cold war impasse in which we now find
ourselves. While we were being conditioned by the
harsh realities of the Stalin-Hitler pact, by the
repudiation of the Yalta agreements, by the rejection
of the Baruch Atomic Plan, by the ooup de'tat in
Czechoslavakia, and by the Soviet armament in the face
of our disarmament, most of the Asian people were in
the turmoil of their own independence struggle and
largely oblivious to world events.
In other words a crucial chapter of recent
hsitory remains largely unread in Aaia7-: a.chapter
which we quite properly consider essential to an
objective understanding of the present world situation
and of our reaction to it*
f. The South Asians, having largely won their
independence through non-violent methods and success-
fully suppressed their own Communist rebellions without
outside assistance, put their principal faith in the
strength of people and ideas, and charge us with placing
too much faith in weapons. They contrast the success
of the militarily weak government of free Burma in
suppressing a formidable Communist rebellion with the
failure of massive French military power in colonial
Indo-China backed by $3 billion of American military
support.
A pr9ypd,
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Aa3.~r~.s f eel t-L~
k
largely bytheir ab
and social stability through economic reform and
development. Most of them admit that ComS.tnism is
a military danger, but they believe that a more immed-
iate danger lies in Communist a v } feeding on
lack of economic progress,
g. Asians resent our efforts to force them to
"Choose sides" in the cold war struggle, and point out
that for 150 years we hold ourselv6a aloof from the
struggles of Europe and entered the Second World War
only when we were attacked. They argue that the most
constructive contribution that they can make to Asiait
stability and security is to make their own soonomia
and political system. function effectively*
h. Many Asians feel that our interest in their
welfqre is almost exclusively based on our fear that
they will go Communist. "If we had no Communists" they
say "you would ignore us." This causes them further
to lose faith in our moral leadership.
10. To sum up the differences which are steadily
or other in the next few years, and in whiob mi itary strength
and freedom as a crisis which t .ll .bee, ieettled one way
Asia: We tend to look at the cold war sts"'ie between Communism
cutting us off from the main stream of now-ftamunist opinion in
is the central crucial factor.
Because of our experience with Rutai
China as primarily* a question of Co Mist ;U0010
China in terms of their c- 'mm CCOPIO* A
 Approved Foe,
-aspects of which seem to u- 94h incidental.
They assume that war is not imminent, that the struggle
is of much longer range, and that the final decision will be
based primarily on economic, political and social factors rather
than on military power. The fact that South Asian nations won
their freedom from militarily powerful Britain by non-violent
methods helps convince them that ideas and peoples are a stronger
long range power factor than machine guns and boats.
Our energies and fears are concentrated on o as the
primary menace. Because of their own emotional experience (often
involving long jail sentences) they are still more deeply
concerned with colonialism, while rather naively they consider
it to be as much of a danger as Communism itself. Understand-
ably, but illogically, their fears are almost excluettely of
white western colonialism, which further complicates our efforts
to create understanding.
11. In spite of the tense attitudes, sharp criticism,
and frank disillusionment that most South Asians express towards
our country, I am convinced that a deep underlying bond of
respect and potential friendship continues to exist, and that
with skill and sensitivity there is still time in which to
build on that foundation.
This was demonstrated on my recent trip by the profound
concern with which Indian and Burmese officials discussed American-
Asian relations with me, by the admiration which they continue
to express for our democratic heritage, and by the friendly
response I received to a blunt speech before the Council of World
 Policy." Although most or t
my thesis, they applauded my willingness to "oak-out # nkly.
12. Although many Europeans are also in disagreement with
our policies in Asia, I found in Europe a similar, under-the-
surface desire to believe in us. This reservoir of good will,
however, is not bottomless. We will run grave risks unless we
can soon bring our views into closer harmony, not only with
those of most Asians, but with those of our western allies. If
free Asia 'slips away, the support of the majority of Europeans
will be difficult if not impossible to hold. The rush for the
Communist band wagon will be heavy.
13. In devising policies adequate to this situation we
shDuld start with the fact that our ability to control future
events in Asia is strictly limited. India, Japan and all of Asia
may eventually end up in the Communist camp, even though we do
all the right things. They may remain free, even though we do
all the wrong things. Our role is at best marginal.
That margin, however, may be decisive and we cannot afford
to throw it away. What we are now losing is our ability to
affect the final result, plus an opportunity to create a warm
and lasting partnership with India, Japan and the South Asian
nations, which might conceivably determine the balance of power
for several generations.
1. Our Asian policy should be based on the action that
the a tan ,1.. P'a ;t remains the foundation stem of our national
s t., r?, .: r . ~i P.. ,3 zt: ;aa~ s r~;~` 4 {ire must gIve c.aree `L . eanaidwation to
 in dealing with C . Ch
own in dealing with colonial problems.
2. Our present policy is right in its insistence that a
line be drawn against Communist aggresgSion in Asia as in Europe
and that this be defended at whatever cost. However, it is
essential that the line, where drawn, be morally as well as
physically defensible, and that it hpvp the clear support of
our F;uropean allies and at lea: approval of the
great majority of non-Communist Asians.
3. We must start now to find a common ground between
ourselvcs and strategically placed India and Japan. While
living up fully to our other commitments, we must develop a
special priority approach to these two key nations without
which a free, stable Asia is impossible.
4. If, as I believe, our present difficulties are as much
the result of our words as our actions we must find some effective
means of reducing our public emphasis on the military aspects of
foreign policy. For practical purposes this means a moratorium
on speeches and statements by the Pentagon which affect our
relations with foreign powers.
Our military power must at any cost be kept at peak
efflci,:~ncy. But if we are to appear as seekers after pea our
foreign policy statements must appear less militaristic, less
thundering, less all enveloping.
5. We could do worse than emulate the British whose navy
for 100 years silently stood b otween us and potential European
aggressors such as Spain, France, Prussia and Russia. If it had
r:ct been for British sea power during this crucial period of our
 If the British
us of our dependence on then, of t'he ,ro
own reaction would have been Emph>attc . We
wall of naval and air power for the free
maturity and tact which the British demonstrated- t h"'
6. Our diplomacy should have two objectives first to
This double objective'is by no means impossible. It will,
and it would be folly to assume that they will not continue*
whatever cold war differences and tensions continue to exist -
powerw will allow us; and second to place on them the onus for
achieve whatever degree of stability and coexistence the Communist
however, require a quite different approach in our speeches,
public statements, and diplomatic discussions.
In dealing with Asia and indeed with our allies in Europe
we mu.t start, not with cur interpretation of the world situation,
but with the interpretation of those neutralist and semi-
neutralist nations which may eventually determine the balance of
power. Our policy proposals should be projected from this common
ground. Any manufacturer who failed to adopt this basic tactic
in selling his products would not long remain solvent#
lations fail, as most of them surely will, the neutralist
nations, if we have handled ourselves skillf lly, will find
It is important for us to identify our interests with those
of all free nations -- and not simply the small group of nations
which accepts our lead Willy nilly. Through diplomatic channels
we should frequently discuss the tactics of peaceful solutions
with such leaders as U Nu, Nehru and Hatoyatma , as well as
Churchill, Eden and Adenauer. When these efforts to ease re-
tbem; e v pr ~~ t e
 Approved F lease 2004/04/01 : CIA-RDP80R01< 4 0470020-9
Minister of But a) the question of -"at.su, ~ ey. ct+ ter zir~ -
and I am confident that the following statement would be en-
thusiastically welcomed by them.
"We have no desire to retain Matsu and Quemoy once we are
convinced that Chinese will not attack Formosa. If the
Chinese will n' kc. clear statement saying that they will not
attempt to take Formosa by force we will use our good offices to
secure a Nationalist, withdrawal from the coastal islands.
"This need not imply that the Chinese have in any way
modified their claim to Formosa. But let us first stop the fight-
ing. Then we can plan a conference at which the broader problems
may be ''iscussed and settled."
I believe that the Indian and Burmese governments would
both support this proposal wholeheartedly in Peking. Cert inly
it would win the enthusiastic approval of the British. If the
Chinese accept it present tensions w'iil be 'greatly reliavedp.
If the Chines,, refuse (as I believe they may) they will be
plac~:d in an indefensible position not only in Europe but in
non--Communist Asia on the eve of the Bandung conference.
7. We should develop a tenable colonial policy which
faces the renlities of the present world situation, and yet which
remains responsible and practical. Africa requires a hard, fresh
and imaginative new look. We must approach Africa as A . and
no4; simply a: a projection of Britain, France, Belgium and
Portugal,, 01--- consideration of Indo-China as a projection of
F~ a c e , tithe:" than as an Asian problem in its own right , cost
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.. n . . .. i . . n,? V. . 6 i.v ansS.~ i s..64!'_ lT . v
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Greater emphasis should be placed on a positive a#` ration of
democratic . aith and less emphasis on negative, fear ridden
8. We should impro'
thoughtlc ss;.y or in the name of ?cono ` ek to -bloc this effort
the equivalent effort devoted to military defense. Those who
grant-technical assistance program is at least as important as
'lust as in 1948 it was too late to save China.
In the present deteriorating situation an adequate loan-
economic development. What is urgently needed is a comprehensive
plan for the industrially underdeveloped nations plus Japan.
Who can estimate what it would be worth to us to keep India and
Japan from slipping behind the Bamboo curtainx By the time the
price becomes clear to all our key officials it may be too late--
a greater sense of urgency and mission. For nine months there
has been no American ambassador in critical Burma.
10. We should develop the means of working with Asian
nations on a substantial scale as partners in their own
anti-Communism. The information program should respect the first
rule of experienced advertisers and start not egotistically with
what we want to sell,, but tactfully with what others want to huy.
The USIA, however, will face a hopeless publicity task as
long as the Picture of America which emerges abroad continues to
be based on the constant barrage of war-like statements by our
generals and our admirals.
9. We should strengthen the morale of our able Foreign
Service and seek in every way to improve the standard of American
representation abroad. Government officials should also be given
nay carry a heavy responsibility, when the hi*tory of the pro*WZ
period is wr_tten.
 It wiAl~prPVec Vhlr 'U4~0'~i:cCI AfRIIP8 0 64 OTT--11 s
e! has ne s#n a's nduetrtal, g r us: t Clamoring needs
* t gz , .. d,eri' India,. " li be a seriou mistake
Union to build the new steel mill in Madhya
'red sh ,if this can still be avoided. The Russians will throw
ing into this project, and it will be surprising iP it is
aluminum, electric equipment, etc.
t the first of many similar industrial projects in fertilizer,
If we allow the Russians to beat us at our own game
history. In Asia this means Japan and India.
industrial development overseas -- it will be the ultimate folly.
I believe that this may be the last year in which we may hope to
have the field of industrial development relatively to ourselves.
We cannot, however, save any nation which is incapable of
saving itself. Although economic holding actions may be necessary
in some areas, a major share of our effort should go to those
nations which have demonstrated growing strength in their own
r6ight, and which for the long haul may determine the course of
I am aware that the proposals which I have made amount to
a heavy shift in the present emphasis in our Asian policies. I
am also aware of the contrary pressures which insistently clamor
for the attention of our policy makers.
For that reason, if for no other, it is obvious that the
shift which I propose cannot be achieved without the most powerful
and determined leadership from the White House and from those
Congressional leaders of both parties who understand the full.
dimensions of the danger which we face My purpose in writing
ikL
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this memorandum is to urgo such leader