POINTS PAPER ON LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R001300050001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT; Points Paper on Laos
. Laos and its political problems.
Laos is a new nation born of the dissolution of French
colonial power; one of three countries which formerly made
up French Indo-China. Its population is small, less than
three million people, and its resources are limited. Its
boundaries to the north flank Communist China; to the east,
North Vietnam and part of South Vietnam; and to the south,
Cambodia and Thailand. Although its territorial integrity
was guaranteed by the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the North
Vietnamese have consistently violated Laotian borders and
attempted to subvert its government.
The leaders of today's Laos were once united In their
opposition to the French and the Japanese. As the Japanese
Empire disintegrated in August 1945, a "Free Lao" move-
ment began. The movement was nationalistic and idealistic
and drew young Lao activists to its standard. When the
French recognized a limited autonomy for Laos within the
French Union in 1949, this unity dissolved. A small com-
munist element of the "Free Lao" deserted the new govern-
ment and slipped into North Vietnam. This became the
nucleus of the Communist Party of Laos which is the Lao
People's Party. The military arm of the Lao People's
Party is called the Pathet Lao. This party was organized
and supported by the North Vietnamese from its inception.
The North Vietnamese hoped to destroy the Royal Laotian
Government using the Lao People's Party, a political front
organization, and the Pathet Lao. These organizations,
however, have never gained widespread popular support.
Between 1954 and 1961, the Royal Government tried
many times to reach an agreement with the communists
for their participation in the government and for the
incorporation of the Pathet Lao into the National Army.
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No agreement, however, was reached and by 1960 the
communist insurgency threatened the existence of the
fragile Laotian Government. A cease fire was arranged in
mid-1961. After strenuous diplomatic efforts by our govern-
ment and many others, new accords were signed at Geneva
in July 1962. These new agreements neutralized Laos. All
signatory countries, including the North Vietnamese, pledged
to withdraw their military forces and advisors from Laos.
We complied. The North Vietnamese did not. The Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC), an agency established in
1954 to supervise the execution of the first Geneva agree-
ments, was continued in its function and given new authorities.
The United States cooperated fully with the ICC which super-
vised our withdrawal. The communists refused to permit
ICC inspection of the areas under their control.
2. The relation between the war in Vietnam and the conflict in
Laos.
In 1960 the North Vietnamese Communist party decided to
use armed force to overthrow the Government of South Viet-
nam. They informed the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam (NLF) and began to infiltrate arms and war materiel
into South Vietnam under the guise of assistance to the NLF.
The South Vietnamese fought back and established a defense
line of strategic hamlets along the border of the Demilitarized
Zone which slowly choked off the communist supply route.
The North Vietnamese then turned to Laos to bypass the DMZ
and seized the major towns of the eastern Laotian panhandle.
Thereafter they built the complex of roads through Laos we
call the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Most of the personnel and
materiel for the subversion of South Vietnam have passed over
these roads. Without them, the North Vietnamese effort to
subvert South Vietnam would have ceased in the early 1960's.
North Vietnamese goals in Laos.
The North Vietnamese decision to use armed force to sub-
vert South Vietnam had profound effects on the new Laotian
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nation. After 1960 it became clear that the North Vietnamese
had two goals in Laos: to secure the Ho Chi Minh Trail as
the major supply route to their soldiers in South Vietnam and
to weaken and ultimately replace the Royal Laotian Govern-
ment. These remain the North Vietnamese goals.
4. North Vietnam's primary goal: to guard the supply route to
its troops in South Vietnam.
As the North Vietnamese attempt to take over South Viet-
nam met increasing resistence from the Government of
Vietnam and its ally, the United States, the North Vietnamese
were forced to allocate more of their soldiers and resources
to the subversion of South Vietnam. The increasingly effec-
tive allied interdiction of these men and supplies forced the
North Vietnamese to rely increasingly on the routes through
Laos. To protect our American soldiers in South Vietnam aircraft to
In 1964, it became necessary to use Chi Mi~nh~Tra,il south-
eastern and later bomb the Ho
eastern Laos. The Royal Laotian Government, moreover,
authorized this activity to support its efforts to restore
Laotian authority in the Trail area. The North Vietnamese
still give greatest priority to the goal of protecting the Ho
Chi Minh Trail. Each year, since 1969, the North Viet-
names have stepped up the infiltration of Vietnamese
troops into Laos. Today there are over 67, 000 North Viet-
namese soldiers in Laos. Of these, two-thirds occupy the
towns. of southeastern Laos guarding the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
5. North Vietnam' a second goal: the subversion of the Laotian
Government.
in north Laos the failure of the Lao Communists to gain
popular support or fight effectively also forced Hanoi to
use its own troops to achieve its aims. In the past the
North Vietnamese have been restrained in their actual
troop commitment in an effort to maintain the fiction that
the war in north Laos was being conducted by local Lao
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Communists. In addition, they feared that a blatant
commitment of enough forces to overrun north Laos would
invoke a major response by the United States or Thailand.
With limited forces available to both sides, other factors
played an important part in the defense of this area. The
climate of Laos is greatly affected by the yearly monsoon.
In early June the rains begin and do not stop until late
November. The rain is heavy. North Laos, moreover
extremely mountainous. The roads are primitive and
unpaved. During the rainy seasons the roads are impass-
able. Taking advantage of these natural factors, the Laotian
Government employed a classic guerrilla defense giving way
to North Vietnamese attacks in the dry season and retaking
the lost areas when the rains began again. At the request of
the Royal Government, the United States has provided air
support for some years for Laotian forces under attack.
ar the North Vietnamese forces in north Laos
.,....,_ , ..
moved beyond the areas they had previously occupied and
mounted an offensive which threatened the royal capital.
As the dry season ended the Laotian Government forces
counterattacked, intending to relieve this military pressure.
This maneuver, which succeeded beyond expectations, drove
the North Vietnamese off the strategic plain in north Laos
known as the Plain of Jars. This year, after rebuilding
their forces by introducing a new division from Hanoi,
re-equipping the one mauled in last year's fighting and
introducing tanks and long-range artillery, the North Viet-
namese Army has again taken the offensive. They now
threaten to overrun all Lao Government forces in north-
central Laos.
6. The American position.
The United States desires nothing more in Laos than to
see a return to the Geneva Accords and the complete with-
drawal of all foreign troops, leaving the Lao to settle their
own differences in a peaceful manner.
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It is the North Vietnamese who, in support of their two
political goals, have invaded Laos and who have escalated
the fighting,
The United States has no ground combat troops in Laos.
We have, therefore, suffered no losses of American military
personnel from ground combat. We are conducting air
operations in Laos for the protection of our forces in South
Vietnam and to assist the forces of the Goe ment of Laos
to combat a clear case of external aggression.
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