AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: November 17, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Nation LL Secret
p-,.Vv-or Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79T00912A002700QA949~-.3-ocoNTRACT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
P12
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 78-016
17 November 1978
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AFRICA REVIEW
17 November 1978
CONTENTS
A Perspective on the Angolan Leadership . . . . . . .
Angolan President Neto appears to be in con-
trol of his party and the government despite
signs of popular unrest and discontent among
blacks in the cabinet.
Namibia: Cuban Assistance to the South-West
Africa People's Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Havana has stepped up its training of SWAPO
guerrillas, but wants to avoid a direct
military clash with South Africa.
Benin: Internal Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Beninese Government is having increasing
difficulty coping with corruption, economic
problems, and its own failure to awaken pub-
lic enthusiasm for its domestic policies.
Note: A Supplement to today's edition of AFRICA REVIEW has been
published and disseminated in special intelligence channels.
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25X1A
A Perspective on the Angolan Leadership
Angolan President Agostinho Neto appears to be
firmly in control of his party and the government, de-
spite continuing but sporadic signs of popular unrest
and discontent among blacks in the cabinet. In recent
months, Neto has consolidated power in his own hands at
the expense of other government officials. It now ap-
pears that all important decisions are made by him or by
a small number of trusted advisers.
Although we continue to receive reports that Neto
is in poor health and may have a serious drinking prob-
lem, there have been no indications that his ability to
govern has been impaired. Neto has a of heart
by and circulatory problems that could be aggo Y the
pressures of office.
An indication of Neto's current strength is the ap-
parent lack of internal opposition to his recent diplo-
matic initiatives, including the campaign to improve re-
lations with the West. Those members of the party and
the government who in the past had strongly opposed the
return of Portuguese technicians and who generally ad-
vocated a more radical, "black-power," and pro-Soviet.
line have maintained a low profile in recent months.
Although some reportedly may be considering a move
against the government, Neto probably commands sufficient
support to keep them in check. Nevertheless, this group
probably enjoys considerable support at the grass-roots
level of the party and the government and probably would
quickly assert itself if Neto were to leave office.
The most immediate consequence of Neto's departure
would be a significant diminution of mulatto influence
in party and government, circles. The younger blacks,
particularly those in the military, strongly resent the
disproportionate influence wielded by the mulattoes
and probably would push for their removal if Neto were
no longer in a position to protect them. Prime Minister
Lopo do Nascimento, a mulatto, lacks a strong independent
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power base and recently has been rumored to be losing
influence. The other high-ranking mulattoes--party
theoretician Lucio Lara and Second Deputy Prime Minister
Carlos Rocha--probably are in a stronger position, but
still vulnerable because of their race. Defense Secre-
tary Iko Carreira, a mulatto who has come under increas-
ing scrutiny for his corrupt activities, reportedly ex-
pects he may have to flee the country. Many other
mulattoes would probably join him if it appeared a major
power struggle was about to break out in the post-Neto
period.
Although the mulattoes might press for a collegi-al
form of government to include them and other high-ranking
blacks, such a solution probably would only be temporary.
If a power struggle resulted, the type of regime most
likely to emerge would be strongly nationalistic, more
Marxist-Leninist, and directed if not controlled by the
military. While the emergence of such a regime would
bode ill for Portuguese interests in Angola, given
Angola's economic and security problems it probably would
not lead to a major reversal in current foreign policy
initiatives.
Prime candidates to lead such a government would be
Pascoal Luvualu, the black foreign affairs spokesman for
the party who has gained considerable influence and ex-
posure over the past year, and Rodrique Joao Lopes, known
as "Ludy," the black director of the internal security
service. Although Joao Luis Neto, "Xieto," a black and
the Deputy Defense Minister, has long been considered a
leading candidate for the presidency, his future may now
be clouded if reports are correct that he recently was
in Yugoslavia for psychiatric treatment. Others who
would likely be jockeying for top positions include the
extremely competent black provincial commissioner for
Huambo, Pedro Maria Tonha, "Pedale"; black Minister of
Education Ambrosio Lukoky; and Enriques de Carvalho
Santos, "Onambwe," a mulatto who has been closely associ-
ated with the Cubans but may now be somewhat in their
disfavor. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
Namibia: Cuban Assistance to the South-West Africa
People's Organization
As diplomatic efforts to reach a Namibian settle-
ment have stalled in recent months, Cuba has stepped,up.:
its training of South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) guerrillas. Cuba has also improved its air de-
fense system in southern Angola, presumably to deter
South African,raids like that against the SWAPO camp~at
Cassinga last May. Although Cuba wants to avoid a:direct
military confrontation with South Africa, it will not
shrink from defending major SWAPO installations in
Angola.
Following South Africa's announcement in September
that it would proceed unilaterally with elections in
Namibia, Cuba added 10 military advisers to the 16 al-
ready in Zambia to train new troops for SWAPO's guer-
rilla struggle. By late. October the new Cuban advisers
had reportedly been assigned to forward staging camps in
Zambia to prepare for SWAPO operations to disrupt the
elections to be held next month in Namibia.. Those slated
to take part in the attacks include 150 SWAPO guerrillas
fresh from a year's training in Cuba.. Since:1977 at
least.450 SWAPO personnel have,returned from Cuba:,a.fter
receiving tactical training and weapons instruction:-
Cuba has provided assistance to SWAPO since shortly
after the Angolan war.
Cuba sees the South African.p.resence.in Namibia as
an important obstacle not only to the country's "libera-
tion" but--more importantly to Havana's immediate con-
cerns--to the consolidation of the Neto regime in Angola.
In an effort to reduce if not completely remove the South
African presence, Cuba has cooperated with Western diplo-
matic initiatives while remaining suspicious of South
African and Western intentions.
Reflecting Havana's desire to reduce the risk of
confrontation with South Africa, Vice President for
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Foreign Affairs Carlos Rafael Rodriguez reportedly in-
dicated to the Argentine Ambassador in mid-October that
Cuba favors the creation of a buffer zone along the
Angolan-Namibian border. Yet, Cuba is committed to de-
fending SWAPO installations in southern Angola, and for
this purpose Cuban units reportedly were sent to rein-
force some SWAPO bases in southern Angola earlier this
fall.
Earlier Assistance to SWAPO
Cuba has provided military assistance to SWAPO
since shortly after the Angolan war. In October 1976,
SWAPO President Sam Nujoma visited Cuba to ask for
military aid. The following month, Cuban and Angolan
forces helped SWAPO stake out an area in southern Angola,
where the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) had been operating for military training
and for staging raids into Namibia. This area is
contiguous to Ovamboland--the native region of most of
the guerrillas--and is therefore ideally suited for
infiltration. Over the past two years, Cuban advisers
have trained SWAPO personnel at various installations in
southern Angola; from time to time, SWAPO troops have
participated in Cuban and Angolan operations against
UNITA.
In the fall of 1977, Cuban military advisers began
to train SWAPO personnel in Zambia as well. In November
of that year, 10 Cuban advisers were permanently assigned
to the main SWAPO training base at Senanga, where they
provided instruction in security, military intelligence,
and small-unit tactics. As of last summer, the number
of Cubans permanently assigned had increased only slightly
to 16, although as many as 70 Cuban military personnel
reportedly were temporarily detailed to SWAPO camps last
June. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
Benin: Internal Problems
The left-leaning regime of Mathiew Kerekou, which
marks its sixth year in power this month, is having in-
creasing difficulty coping with corruption, serious eco-
nomic problems, and its own failure to awaken much public
enthusiam for its domestic policies. Although the regime
is not seriously threatened, it has responded to its
dilemma by raising the specter of a mercenary attack--
reminiscent of an unsuccessful invasion in 1977 by anti-
Kerekou exiles--and by tightening security. Many Beni-
nese do not believe the government's claims that another
invasion is in the offing, which has contributed to a
growing public sense of malaise and cynicism about the
regime and its internal policies.
Domestic Malaise
Kerekou and his revolutionary government continue
to have difficulties in improving Benin's underdeveloped
and slow-growing economy. Inadequate rainfall, manage-
rial errors, and an inability to procure investment capi-
tal have caused the government to fall behind in its
planned expansion of Benin's agricultural, industrial,
and educational sectors.
Despite the government's efforts to evoke the mer-
cenary menace, most Beninese are more concerned with the
recent revelations of corruption and lethargy in their
government. A major focus of local attention has been
the recent financial scandal at the Commercial Bank of
Benin, involving large discrepancies in the bank's ac-
counts and the murder of a bank employee. Kerekou
ordered a full-scale investigation into the bank's activ-
ities and announced that "counterrevolutionaries" will
be executed. The bank scandal and Kerekou's harsh re-
action has led to additional rumors and speculation that
higher governmental officials may be engaging in other
corrupt activities.
Kerekou's new electoral plan for the proposed National
Assembly has also triggered considerable public uneasiness
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BOUNDARY REYRFREMTATION ~S
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHOR; TAIlYE
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International
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National capital
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and apprehension. The President has decided that the
National Assembly should be dominated by workers, the
party, and teachers; middle-class merchants and religious
leaders would receive only token representation. To
achieve this combination, assembly delegates will be
elected by class and trade, rather than by geographic
regions.
Kerekou's electoral plan has generated little en-
thusiasm among rural voters who are being called on to
devote several days of valuable planting time to govern-
ment-sponsored sessions on revolutionary ideology and
pay a stiff fee for a voter card. Urban response to the
voter registration campaign has also been unenthusiastic,
prompting Kerekou to announce that students without voter
cards will be ineligible for foreign study grants.
Kerekou's preoccupation with foreign mercenaries
led him recently to reinstitute night police checks in
Cotonou and on the main roads to Nigeria and Togo. For
most Beninese these measures are an inconvenience and
serve more to emphasize the Army's arbitrariness than to
meet security concerns. The public perception that the
regime has difficulty coming to grips with its problems
has been reinforced by the diversion of badly needed
building materials to the construction of an extravagant
monument, which so far has served only to snarl capital
traffic.
Outlook
Despite Kerekou's apparent concerns, there seems to
be little substance to his fears about another mercenary
invasion. Both Cotonou and the interior remain calm,
and we have no evidence of serious plotting against the
regime. Kerekou does recognize, however, that the cred-
ibility of his regime is wearing thin and that there is
growing public dissatisfaction with the government's
internal shortcomings. In the absence of other alterna-
tives, Kerekou may well respond by imposing even tighter
security--or some other arbitrary measures--a move that
would probably result in even greater public alienation.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
17 November 1978
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