AFRICA REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 8, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

p,U?+ Secret
Por Release 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79T00912A002700QY1&Q4&3t*ocoNTRACT-
Assessment ORLON
Africa Review
Secret
RP AR 78-006
8 Septeml799
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AFRICA REVIEW
8 September 1978
CONTENTS
Senegal: Looking Beyond Senghor. . . . . . . . . . .
The succession of Prime Minister Diouf to
the Senegalese presidency, though blessed
by the ailing President Senghor and the con-
stitution, is not assured, and key civilian
and military power brokers are jockeying to
change the rules to allow popular election
of a new president.
Zaire: Continuing Economic Malaise . . . . . . . . .
9
President Mobutu continues to receive little
support from Zaire's troubled economy in his
effort to boost his sagging political fortunes
aggravated by the invasion of Shaba in May.
Namibia: Obstacles to a Settlement . . . . . . . . .
14
SWAPO may not agree to a negotiated settle-
ment in Namibia unless a separate cease-fire
agreement is signed and SWAPO guerrillas are
placed at five locations inside Namibia.
Namibia: Pressures in SWAPO To Continue the
Guerrilla Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
The leadership of the South-West Africa
People's Organization is divided over
whether to continue the guerrilla struggle
or support Western proposals for a peaceful
transition to independence in Namibia.
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Seychelles: A Possible Joint Fishing Venture
With Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
President Rene has reportedly agreed to the
establishment of a joint fishing company, but
seems now to be dragging his feet on implement-
ing this in an effort to extract similar offers
from Western countries.
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 21
ANNEX: Ethnic Factors Threatening Namibia's
Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Ethnic factors will play a key role both in
the process of drafting a constitution for
Namibia and in the stability of the govern-
ment that comes to power, whether it is domi-
nated by SWAPO or a political alliance sym-
pathetic with South Africa.
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Senegal: Looking Beyond Senghor
There are signs that President Leopold Senghor, who
apparently is in ill health, may be preparing to step
down in the not too distant future in favor of his con-
stitutional successor, Prime Minister Abdou Diouf. Diouf's
succession is opposed by important political interests,
and it is doubtful that the Army would permit him auto-
matically to assume office. Key power-brokers believe
a new president must be popularly elected to claim a man-
date and should not obtain office simply as Senghor's
chosen heir. If elections are held, we believe Senegal's
new president probably would be a senior member of Senghor's
party such as Foreign Minister Babacar Ba, who would con-
tinue Senghor's moderate, generally pro-Western policies.
Rumors of the President's illness and signs of tran-
sition planning have already set in motion jockeying for
power by political factions eager for change in a coun-
try dominated by Senghor since independence was gained
in 1960. With Senghor's passing, a heated--possibly
protracted--succession struggle could ensue, and long
pent-up political and social pressures would be released.
As the arbiter of the country's future, the Army could
intervene to impose a new president or seize power in
the event of civil unrest. Senegalese military leaders
are generally moderate and well disposed toward the US.
The armed forces Chief of Staff, General Idrissa Fall,
is the most likely candidate to head a military regime.
Senegal without Senghor will play a diminished role
on the African scene more commensurate with its modest
resources. Any new leader will be more occupied with
the country's severe economic and social problems, and a
civilian president will have to be more attuned to the
views of progressive, leftist-inclined elements. A more
nationalistic foreign policy seems likely, which would
increase Senegal's independence toward France and cause
it to move closer to the African and Third World main-
stream. Senegal will continue to value good relations
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with the US as an alternative to dependence on France,
but will be somewhat less inclined to support US posi-
tions on key African and international issues.
Diouf and Prospects for Constitutional Succession
Prime Minister Diouf is
the designated successor under
a constitutional amendment
Senghor pushed through the na-
tional assembly two years ago.
If the President resigns, is
incapacitated, or dies, Diouf
is supposed to serve the remain-
der of the five-year term to
which Senghor was elected last
February. Diouf may very well
not be allowed to succeed
Senghor despite his apparent
assets. He has served as Prime
Minister since 1970, with exten-
sive periods as acting head of
state, and is regarded as an
honest, intelligent, and able
administrator. Only 42, Diouf
gets on well with the young, well-educated technocrats
turned politicians who have dominated the cabinet in re-
cent years. As a Muslim, Diouf has served Senghor as
emissary to Senegal's politically influential Muslim
brotherhoods.
Diouf's automatic succession is contested by an im-
portant faction in Senghor's party, by the main opposition
party, and by the armed forces Chief of Staff, General
Fall. These elements all favor revising the constitution
through popular referendum to require a new presidential
election should Senghor leave the scene. Altering the
succession scenario reportedly will be given top consid-
eration by the usually docile National Assembly when it
reconvenes next month.
Part of Diouf's problem is that he is not regarded
as a man of presidential timber who can hold Senegal to-
gether. He is seen as a self-effacing creature of Senghor
who lacks his own power base and political charisma.
General Fall shares these sentiments and also distrusts
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Diouf's intentions toward the military. Additionally, a
growing number of influential Senegalese insist that a
new president must have his own popular mandate and no
longer tolerate the idea that Senghor can dictate his
own successor. Considerable personal opportunism marks
this attitude.
The Army as Arbiter
Unlike most African countries, Senegal has an apoliti-
cal military establishment that does not seem eager to
intervene in the political process or to covet power for
itself. The 8,500-man Army will act as the final arbiter
in case of a prolonged squabble over the presidential
succession or an outbreak of civil unrest. Unless the
constitution is amended to block Prime Minister Diouf
from automatic succession, it seems likely that General
Fall will insist on holding new presidential elections
even if Senghor looms in the background to provide a form
of legitimacy to his dauphin. Diouf could count on some
support among the national police and paramilitary gendar-
merie, but these services are likely to line up with the
Army in a political showdown.
If the armed forces are
drawn into running the govern-
ment, General Fall would be the
foremost candidate to assume
leadership. A 46-year-old,
French-trained professional, sol-
dier, he is respected by the of-
ficer corps and is genuinely pop-
ular with his men. Furthermore,
he belongs to the most politi-
cally important Muslim brother-
hood--the Mourides. Fall has a
reputation as an able adminis-
trator, a moderate, and a strong
nationalist. He is friendly to-
ward the US and would like to re-
duce Senegal's heavy dependence
on France.
The Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Coumba Diouf Niang--
also a Mouride--might well see himself as a kingmaker if an
impasse arose in the choice of Senghor's successor. In
contrast to General Fall, Niang is widely disliked in
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the military, where he is regarded as an unscrupulous op-
portunist who would stop at nothing to advance himself.
The Succession and Other Political Interest Groups
The Religious Brotherhoods
Outside the military, Senegal's Muslim brotherhoods
will have an important voice in the presidential succes-
sion. The brotherhoods command the religious loyalty of
the country's predominantly Muslim population and either
own or control virtually all land used to grow peanuts,
the only cash crop. Weakened by their rivalries and lack
of sophistication in the modern political arena, the
brotherhoods are not in a position to dictate national
leaders or policies. They are interested, however, in
receiving assurances that their economic and social in-
terests will not be threatened. In turn, they can influ-
ence the peasant vote and will use their riches to make
as many candidates for high office as possible beholden
to them. The most influential brotherhoods are the Tid-
janyya and the smaller, but economically stronger Mourides.
The French
The French have a vested interest in Senegal, which
under Senghor has been a leader among West Africa's mod-
erate French-speaking states and a firm supporter of Paris'
policies in Francophone Africa. As the first French colony
in Africa, Senegal's associations with France are very
deep, and Paris can be expected to aid discreetly its
favored presidential successor, who apparently is Prime
Minister Diouf at this time. Day-to-day French influence
stems from its dominance of the modern economic sector,
indispensable financial aid ($113,500,000 in direct aid
in 1977), and the defense relationship with Senegal, which
includes a major French military base at Dakar.* Senegal's
close relationship with France under Senghor and the per-
vasiveness of the French presence have long fueled leftist,
anti-French, nationalist sentiment which an antagonistic
*The French presently have more than 1,300 naval, air, and ground
personnel and a Jaguar aircraft squadron in the area of Dakar.
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political figure could try to parlay into popular support.
These trends are behind Senegal's efforts in recent years
to shift the focus in its foreign relations away from
France and to be more open toward the US.
Students, Workers, and Intellectuals
Students, workers, and intellectuals are the most
socially conscious, leftist inclined, and anti-French
elements in Senegal. They are inclined to support can-
didates on the leftmost end of the political spectrum.
These groups united in a general strike in 1968 that
nearly brought down the government. Today, especially
among students and intellectuals, many Senegalese evince
a deep yearning for change, for broader and more direct
participation in the government, and for fresh political
faces and new directions.
In recent years, students and workers have been
coopted or otherwise kept under control and off the po-
litical stage by firm government action. With Senghor's
passing and Senegal's continuing poor economic situation,
restlessness among students and workers could again be-
come difficult to control and fan wider popular discon-
tent or even rioting. Domestic concerns are thus likely
to predominate regardless of what leader comes to power.
These will include high unemployment and shortages of
jobs for ever increasing numbers of frustrated university
graduates, a drop in government export earnings because
of the latest drought, rural hunger, and corruption in
the government.
Civilian Contenders for Power
The Ruling Party
In the likely event that Senghor's successor is de-
termined by new presidential elections, the primary focus
of the succession struggle will be within Senghor's long
dominant, slightly left of center, Socialist Party.
There is little doubt that Prime Minister Diouf would be
challenged by other senior party members for the nomina-
tion. Foreign Minister Babacar Ba, as Diouf's strongest
rival in the government, has long been regarded as his
most likely challenger.
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The 47-year-old Ba has
high caste origins in Senegal's
most populous region, long ex-
perience in the government, and
a sizable national political
base. He is intelligent, a
skilled negotiator, and pre-
viously played an important role
as Finance Minister. In the
past, Ba has served as acting
head of state during simultane-
ous absences of both Senghor
and Diouf. Though close to the
French, he favors diversifying
Senegal's relations to dilute
French influence and to expand
the US role in Senegal.
One reason Ba is not Senghor's
designated successor may be because he was cabinet chief
under former leftist Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, whose
attempted coup in 1962 was squelched by the military.
Ba's attractiveness--particularly to the military--may
be dimmed by his aloof and irascible character and by
his public image as being susceptible to corruption.
Though a Muslim, he may have eroded some of his standing
with the Mouride Islamic brotherhood.
In the event of a serious party impasse over the
selection of a presidential candidate, the military and
other elements may seek to draft a respected civilian
figure. This might offer the military a more palatable
way of resolving a political crisis than a direct take-
over. One attractive candidate may be the 57-year-old
Senegalese Director-General of UNESCO, Amadou Mahtar
M'Bow. His international standing combined with past
cabinet experience at home, good Muslim credentials, and
a record of political activity outside and within the
Socialist Party could make him an acceptable compromise
candidate. In addition, he once served in the French
Army, as have many top Senegalese Army officers. Some
influential Senegalese, however, believe M'Bow's lower
caste origins limit his chances for the presidency.
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A dark horse candidate might be Minister of Higher
Education Ousmane Camara. A former militant student
leader and a technocrat with political strength in the
Socialist Party, he has served successfully in several
other politically sensitive posts such as security chief,
Minister of Interior, and Minister of Labor. His hard-
line approach to public order might be seen as positive
credentials by the military for handling future political
crises.
The Other Parties
Opposition to Senghor and his Socialist Party tradi-
tionally has come from the Senegalese left. Leftist
leaders at this time appear to have limited mass appeal,
despite their ambitions. Any determined bid for power
by extreme leftists would cause Senegal's fundamentally
conservative military leaders to intervene to protect
the country. In the last four years, Senghor has nurtured
two legal opposition parties and tolerated a third under-
ground group in order to strengthen his own party for his
passing by subjecting it to greater competition and public
debate.
All 18 opposition seats in the 100-man National As-
sembly are held by the Senegalese Democratic Party led
by attorney Abdoulaye Wade. A moderate, who espouses na-
tionalistic and egalitarian policies, Wade has sought to
stake out political ground to the left of Senghor's
party and has opportunistically opposed Senghor on most
key issues. Wade has sought with little success to orga-
nize under his leadership a national front of all leftist
political groups. He probably has made the most headway
among opposition groups in building a grass-roots political
organization and has cultivated some support among the
Mourides. Wade has yet to demonstrate, however, the base
of strength and popular appeal that would be likely to
win him the military's support.
Majhmout Diop, leader of the legal wing of the
Marxist-Leninist African Party of Independence, has done
little to reestablish himself as a credible political
figure since his party was officially sanctioned in 1976.
The diehard remnants of this old party probably do not
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number more than a few hundred persons, and Diop's pledge
to play politics under the rules laid down by the govern-
ment has cost him support from more radical leftist ele-
ments.
The most prominent challenge to the legal three-
party system comes from Senegal's nonofficial leftist
opposition, the National Democractic Regroupment led by
professor Cheikh Anta Diop. He is an admirer of Guinea
President Sekou Toure and a proponent of radical African
causes. Cheikh Diop's group includes the best known
figures in Senegalese opposition politics, including
former Prime Minister Mamadou Dia and his Interior Min-
ister Valdiodio Ndiaye. This group has captured the
imagination of Senegal's leftist intellectuals and aca-
demics in Dakar with its strong nationalist tenets and
professed concern for the peasant masses. Cheikh Diop
possesses family ties with the Mourides and for a time
received active support to legalize his party from an
influential Mouride political adviser. (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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Zaire: Continuing Economic Malaise
President Mobutu continues to receive little support
from Zaire's troubled economy in his efforts to boost his
his sagging political fortunes aggravated by the invasion
of the Shaba Region in May by Angola-based rebels.
Foreign exchange remains tight, foodstuffs and other
essential imports are scarce, and inflation goes unchecked.
The President is also unlikely to generate much popular
sympathy by having accepted an austerity program after
considerable pressure to do so from Zaire's leading West-
ern creditors. An unexpected surprise has been the near-
normal operation of the Kolwezi mining complex despite
the exodus of 800-1,000 foreign technicians during the
Shaba incursion. The mines are unlikely to maintain a
high output level for long, however, without some return
of the expatriate presence.
Good News from Shaba
The mining sector has rebounded more quickly than
expected from the Shaba fighting. According to Zairian
data. which has been generally confirmed by
copper
output during July totaled tons, almost 90 per-
cent of last year's monthly rate. Cobalt production for
the month reached 1,200 tons, substantially above the 1977
monthly rate. Mining officials have improved the cobalt
recovery rate from processed copper to take advantage of
currently favorable market conditions. Cobalt prices
have jumped from $6.85 a pound to $12.50 a pound since
the Shaba invasion.
The Zairians now estimate maximum output for the
year at 380,000 tons of copper and 12,000 tons of cobalt
compared with last year's totals of 435,000 tons and
10,000 tons, respectively. In addition to the production
forecasts, Mobutu must also take satisfaction in the
fact that Zairian cadre are operating the Kolwezi
facilities with no major difficulties. A few senior
expatriates fly in from Lubumbashi for daily inspection
visits. Some French and Belgian personnel previously in
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ANGOLA
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Kolwezi reportedly have already been rehired. At
present, there are a minimum of 35 white technicians in
Kolwezi--23 French, 11 Belgians, and one British. Mobutu
wants to reduce the number of foreign personnel in Shaba
by at least half and has notified many that their services
are not needed.
Problems Continue Elsewhere
The upbeat reports from the mines are not repeated
elsewhere in the economy. The Shaba disruptions have
had negligible impact on the world price of copper--
Zaire's major export--and Kinshasa's foreign exchange
position remains precarious. We estimate Zaire needs
$500 million this year to keep the economy afloat and
cover $300 million in debt amortization payments. West-
ern donors pledged a substantial amount in emergency aid
in June, and Kinshasa is trying to resume negotiations
broken off during the Shaba fighting on a $215 million
loan with a consortium of 60 Western banks.
The payments squeeze has prompted new government
import restrictions that would cut back sharply on pur-
chases of a wide range of consumer goods. The move comes
at a time when stocks of many staples are already low,
and prices in Kinshasa have risen more than 80 percent
above those of a year ago. In addition, the country's
main flour mill will shut down soon unless the government
settles some overdue accounts for shipments of imported
wheat.
Construction timetables for major development pro-
jects may also be affected. One US firm in charge of
the 2,000-kilometer transmission line connecting the
Kolwezi mining facilities with the Inga hydroelectric
plant has warned the government that further work will.
stop if adequate funds are not forthcoming. The trans-
mission line is essential if government plans to expand
copper and other industrial production are to be realized.
The government has also been unable to check its
proclivity for excessive spending. Expenditures for the
first half of this year outpaced revenues by almost $200
million, and no letup is in sight. Even this deficit
is understated because of financial juggling. As ex-
pected, most of the overspending went for salaries--all
civil servants were recently given a 25 percent wage
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increase--and the President's private slush fund. Mobutu
uses the latter to pay off political and military sup-
porters as well as to advance his personal wealth through
real estate and other dealings.
The continuing economic decline and pressure from
Western creditors have pushed Mobutu to accept a severe
austerity program, the third since 1967. The latest
reforms, drawn up by the International Monetary Fund just
before the Shaba incursion, are to be implemented fol-
lowing ratification of the package by the Fund next month.
The stabilization measures include substantial IMF in-
volvement in day-to-day operations of the central bank
and Finance Ministry. A group of Fund experts assigned
to the central bank has already arrived in Kinshasa, and
the budget team is slated to come this month. The pro-
gram also requires a shift in investment spending to
agriculture and basic infrastructure, both ignored in
Mobutu's rush to industrialize.
outlook: Rough Road Ahead
Zaire's economic outlook during the next year or so
will depend in large part on the situation at the Shaba
mines. Senior expatriates in Lubumbashi believe the
July production rates for copper and cobalt are not sus-
tainable and that production during the next several
months will suffer because of inadequate preventive main-
tenance and the inexperienced Zairian staff operating
Kolwezi's sophisticated facilities. Kinshasa's inability
to guarantee the timely delivery of spare parts will be-
come increasingly important as existing stocks are ex-
hausted.
A rash of equipment failures will almost certainly
put pressure on Mobutu to bring in additional European
technicians. A senior Zairian mining official was in
Paris recently to negotiate the hiring of 25 French tech-
nicians, but we do not know the outcome of these discus-
sions. Most of the 800-1,000 foreign workers who fled
Kolwezi are ready to resume their former positions. Few
of these people have been able to locate other jobs be-
cause of the current economic slump in Belgium and other
industrialized countries and the substantial excess ca-
pacity in the world copper market.
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The expatriates by and large are unimpressed with
existing security as provided by the Pan-African group,
although they believe the Pan-African group is superior
to anything the Zairians have to offer. Indeed, Brussels
has reportedly insisted on adequate security in Kolwezi
before permitting Belgian citizens to return. The'French
are training a brigade of Zairian paratroopers to replace
the multinational African force, but training will not be
completed until the middle of next year. The continuing
Zaire-Angola rapprochement could ease expatriate uncer-
tainties about renewed rebel attacks, but many problems
must be resolved before a complete reconciliation is
achieved.
Mobutu will also have to adhere to the austerity
program if he is to have continued access to Western
capital markets. Negotiations on the'$215-million bank
loan and an IMF standby loan hinge on Kinshasa's per-
formance. The foreign exchange guidelines promise long-
term benefits by shifting funds to agricultural and trans-
port projects, but their immediate impact will be more
cuts in consumer imports. Popular dissatisfaction with
the government is almost certain to rise as goods become
increasingly scarce and prices soar. At the same time,
IMF supervision of the federal budget will probably limit
Mobutu's ability to draw on public funds for his personal
use, including buying off potential political opponents.
The President has backed off from similar reform programs
in the past when the political situation became tense,
and he may well be tempted to do so again. Such a move,
however, would mean losing overseas credits, jeopardizing
the future of Zaire's modern economy, and greatly enhanc-
ing the possibility of Mobutu's removal. (SECRET NOFORN)
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Namibia: Obstacles to a Settlement
The leader of the South-West Africa People's Organi-
zation, Sam Nujoma, told US officials early this week
that SWAPO may not agree to a negotiated settlement in
Namibia unless a separate cease-fire agreement is signed
and SWAPO guerrillas are placed at five locations inside
Namibia under UN supervision. This issue has not sur-
faced, however, in subsequent discussions in New York
involving the Western five, the African group, and UN
officials. SWAPO has only about 200 trained guerrillas
operating inside Namibia, and it may be planning to in-
filtrate large numbers of guerrillas into the territory
as South Africa withdraws its forces. Pretoria would
object strongly if this issue is introduced into the
negotiations; it has already raised several other major
objections to UN Secretary Waldheim's report on Namibia.
Nujoma is seeking a written cease-fire agreement
signed separately by SWAPO and South Africa. Although
South Africa apparently supports the idea of a written
cease-fire agreement, it strongly suspects that SWAPO
would not abide by it. Nujoma argues that SWAPO needs
such a document in order to convince its military com-
manders to adhere to a cease-fire. The idea of having
SWAPO guerrillas located at bases inside Namibia may
have come from a hardline faction within the leadership
that includes the military commanders. They strongly
suspect South Africa's motives in agreeing to a negoti-
ated settlement and may have insisted that SWAPO also
maintain armed forces during the transition. By locat-
ing them in Namibia and not across the border in Angola
or Zambia, SWAPO would be able to "show the flag"; its
guerrillas would also be able to vote.
SWAPO views such an agreement as the prelude to the
assignment of both South African and SWAPO forces to bases
inside Namibia during the transition period. Pretoria
has agreed to permit 1,500 of its soldiers to be re-
stricted to one or two bases in northern Namibia; SWAPO is
8 September 1978
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proposing that its forces be confined to five locations--
Katima Mulilo, Tsumeb, Runtu, Ondangua, and Windhoek.
Pretoria doubtless would view such a demand by SWAPO as
an effort to wreck a negotiated settlement.
SWAPO would have difficulty justifying the need
for five bases, particularly one as far south as Wind-
hoek. South African officials estimate that in mid-
August SWAPO had no more than 200 guerrillas operating
along Namibia's northern border with Angola and Zambia.
They believe that less than 30 trained guerrillas have
infiltrated into central and southern Namibia to conduct
terrorist activities.
SWAPO no doubt hopes to fill the five camps with
guerrillas infiltrated into Namibia after South Africa
withdraws its forces. SWAPO's secretary of defense is
said to have told his military commanders last July to
move their guerrillas into areas vacated by South African
forces as soon as they are withdrawn. SWAPO may also
ask its adherents in the territory to proclaim themselves
as guerrilla fighters.
Other Concerns
Nujoma cited as SWAPO's other major objection to
Waldheim's recommendations the lack of any mention of
the current drive in Namibia to register voters. Nujoma
attacked the registration campaign as blatantly biased
against SWAPO, objecting specifically to plans to stop
the process later this month. Although the African group
has supported SWAPO on this issue, Waldheim has been re-
luctant to include specific language in his report that
would nullify the South African registration effort.
SWAPO has also complained that the role of the UN
Special Representative for Namibia has not been clearly
spelled out. Last month, Nujoma indicated that he might
seek Security Council approval of a.resolution establish-
ing the Special Representative in a predominant relation-
ship over the South African-appointed Administrator
General as part of a general effort to seek "clarifica-
tions" of Waldheim's recommendations.
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Although SWAPO appears satisfied with the proposed
UN force level of 7,500 soldiers, South Africa has raised
major objections. Foreign Minister Botha maintains that
UN forces would not be required to police the northern
border, assuming SWAPO adhered to a cease-fire. If SWAPO
violated the cease-fire, Botha said South Africa would
have to resume responsibility for maintaining order in
the territory. Pretoria, however, may be willing to lift
its objection if the specific figure of 7,500 soldiers
is not mentioned in the final report, or Waldheim gives
assurances that the UN would consider sending fewer sol-
diers if conditions warranted.
Prior to his departure for consultations in Pretoria,
Botha gave Waldheim a long memorandum detailing South
Africa's current position and noting SWAPO's recent ter-
rorist actions in Namibia. The document, drafted the day
after the South African cabinet met to discuss the
Namibian situation, reiterated South Africa's objections
to the size of the UN peacekeeping force and the inclu-
sion of a police contingent and stressed the importance
of holding elections in the territory before 31 December.
It also maintains that the delay in implementing the
Western proposals "was not due to any fault on the part
of South Africa"--reflecting South Africa's growing
eagerness to proceed with the implementation of the tran-
sition proposals. (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
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25X1A
Namibia: Pressures in SWAPO To Continue the Guerrilla
Struggle*
The leadership of the South-West Africa People's
Organization is divided over whether SWAPO should con-
tinue the guerrilla struggle or support Western proposals
for a peaceful transition to independence in Namibia.
Many key political and military leaders strongly dis-
trust South Africa's motives in accepting the Western
plan and urge that SWAPO continue fighting until South
Africa withdraws from the territory. Many also fear
they would stand little chance of being elected to an
important post if they returned to Namibia.
Consequently, SWAPO terrorist activity will probably
continue and possibly intensify in northern Namibia at
least until a formal cease-fire goes into effect. If
South Africa retaliates by launching a major strike
against SWAPO bases deep inside Angola or Zambia, this
could give some SWAPO leaders the excuse they have been
seeking to renege on their acceptance of the Western
plan. Even if SWAPO agrees to a cease-fire, some of its
military commanders may attempt to continue guerrilla
activities.
SWAPO is under strong pressure, however, from the
frontline African states to accept the Western plan, in-
cluding its cease-fire provisions. The frontline states
probably would oppose any effort--either military or
political--by SWAPO's militant leaders to wreck a peace-
ful settlement. If SWAPO were denied the support and
sanctuary of the frontline states, it would not be able
to sustain a prolonged guerrilla war. (SECRET NOFORN-
NOCONTRACT-ORCON)
*The above key points are from a memorandum entitled Namibia:
Pressures To Continue the Guerrilla Struggle (RPM 78-10341), pub-
lished on 5 September 1978. Copies of the memorandum may be ob-
tained from the author.
8 September 1978
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25X1A
Seychelles: A Possible Joint Fishing Venture With Moscow
President France Albert Rene reportedly agreed in
principle last June to the establishment of a joint
fishing company with Moscow, but now seems to be
dragging his feet. Rene's reluctance to conclude the
deal may be an attempt to extract similar offers of sup-
port from Western countries. Despite the relatively
leftist orientation of his regime and his large cadre of
radical supporters, Rene seems eager to maintain his
country's nonaligned stance.
Under the agreement, the Soviets would be allowed
to use one of the country's islands as a repair base
for their trawlers, as well as installing a floating
drydock for the service and maintenance of their fishing
fleet. Rene also granted landing privileges to Aeroflot,
enabling the Soviets to rotate their fishing and repair
crews between the two countries.
Moscow had attempted to reach a similar agreement
with Mauritius, but its efforts failed last June when
relations deteriorated and it is eager to implement the
fishing accord with the Seychelles as soon as possible.
Rene, however, has called for further negotiations--
expected to take between six and 18 months--to clarify
the extent of the Soviet Union's role in the arrangement
and its presence in the Seychelles and the islands'
territorial waters. In the meantime Moscow is striving
to avoid irritating Rene or giving him an excuse to back
out of the agreement. The Soviets, for example, have
decided not to use the facilities of an island chan-
dlering service operated by the brother of James
Mancham, whom Rene deposed in 1977..
Rene agreed to meet the Soviet fishing delegation
last June to discuss Soviet poaching in Seychelles waters
and establish a licensing fee for Soviet fishing in his
country's maritime zone. The Soviets ignored these
issues, however, and proposed the joint fishing venture.
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Rene at first flatly rejected the offer and reiterated
his policy of not entering into arrangements that would
undermine the creation of a government-owned fishing
industry.*
Rene's subsequent decision to entertain Moscow's
proposal was probably made at least in part to encourage
other major powers to increase their economic assistance
to the Seychelles. Rene has already approached London
and Paris for funds for modernizing the Seychelles'
fisheries. He probably reasons that his chances of
receiving Western aid will improve once these countries
learn that the Seychelles may enter into a joint fishing
agreement with Moscow.
Although a staunch advocate of nonalignment and
opposed to foreign military bases in the Seychelles, Rene
recognizes the benefits of Western economic involvement
in the development of his country. In a recent trip to
Tanzania, Rene stated--partly for the benefit of his
hosts--that he would
If Western economic aid for the fishing industry
fails to materialize, Rene recognizes he still has an
interested partner in Moscow, which is eager to broaden
its influence in the Indian Ocean at Western expense.
At a minimum, Rene will insist that his country have the
major voice in the joint fishing company, and he will be
careful to guard the Seychelles' sovereignty. (SECRET
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT)
The Seychelles fishing industry relies on traditional methods and
equipment. Rene has indicated that it is necessary to improve this
sector for the economic well-being of the islands. Fish is a staple
food for the islanders, and at present the entire catch is used
for domestic consumption. Rene probably envisions exporting fish
once the fishing industry is modernized.
8 September 1978
25X1 C
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FOR THE RECORD
ANGOLA-PORTUGAL: About 500 Angolan refugees have
left Portugal for Angola over the past month. According
to UN officials, another 500 are preparing to return
shortly, and the list of those seeking repatriation is
growing rapidly. They estimate that several thousand
refugees will return to Angola if sufficient funding can
be found. Although the Angolans are giving priority to
the repatriation of skilled refugees, they have indi-
cated that all will be permitted to return except those
who are known to have opposed the government. The first
group of returnees included teachers, mechanics, carpen-
ters, restaurant workers, and clerks. About two-thirds
of the repatriates are black, one-fifth white, and about
a tenth mulatto. There are about 10,000 Angolans--mostly
refugees--in Portugal. The repatriation of a substantial
number of them would help alleviate Portugal's unemploy-
ment, housing, and other social problems. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
ANGOLA - SOUTH AFRICA: Angola released eight South
African prisoners of war on Saturday in exchange for
three Cuban soldiers captured during fighting in Angola
three years ago. All the prisoners received good treat-
ment while in captivity and were in good health. One
other South African soldier, captured by guerrillas of
the South-West Africa People's Organization earlier this
year, is still being held in Angola. According to offi-
cials of the International Red Cross, who arranged the
transfer at N'Giva in southern Angola, South African and
Angolan officials present at the exchange took the occa-
sion to discuss other matters of mutual interest--most
likely the return of refugees who fled to Namibia to
escape the fighting in Angola and possibly the status of
the incomplete Cunene hydroelectric project, which is
to provide power and irrigation to Angola and Namibia.
Angolan and South African officials have met secretly on
several occasions in the past to discuss these issues as
well as the creation of a security zone along the
Angolan-Namibian border. The last round of talks were
broken off by the Angolans last fall for unspecified
reasons. (CONFIDENTIAL)
25X1A
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25X1A
ANNEX
Ethnic Factors Threatening Namibia's Future
If South Africa and the South-West Africa People's
Organization endorse UN Secretary General Waldheim's
recommendations on a Namibian independence program, a
UN peacekeeping force will be dispatched to the territory
to supervise the election of a constituent assembly to
draft a constitution for an independent government.
Ethnic factors will play a key role both in the
success of the election and in the stability of an inde-
pendent government. Clashes between rival tribal groups,
disguised by political party affiliations, are likely
to mar the election campaign.* Once an independent
government has been established, tribal tensions accom-
panied by the departure of whites will threaten its
stability.
The Ethnic Mix
Namibia's population of about 1 million is excep-
tionally diverse. It includes eight major black groups,
two mulatto groups, and three white groups. They live in
a predominantly desert or semidesert land of about 824,000
square kilometers, twice the size of California. Its
population density, a little more than one person per
square kilometer, is the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa.
The north is relatively populous, and mounting popu-
lation pressures have forced thousands of Ovambos into
the contract labor force. This force, which is employed
*All of Namibia's political parties (there are more than 30) are
tribally based. Even SWAPO, which has succeeded in gaining appre-
ciable support from more than one tribe, is still predominantly
an Ovambo organization.
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in the fishing, mining, and ranching industries in all
parts of Namibia, has been instrumental in spreading
SWAPO propaganda outside its Ovambo stronghold, and
Ovambo workers have fought with other tribes over polit-
ical issues.
The South African Government, which has administered
Namibia since 1920, stresses the differences among the
nonwhite groups. Its policies of separate development,
which have included the creation of homelands for each
black group and segregation by tribal group in the urban
townships, have perpetuated those differences. Critics
of apartheid charge that South Africa exaggerates the
differences. The truth lies somewhere in between. While
Pretoria's policies have discouraged improvements in
intertribal relations, ill will between some of the groups
would persist no matter what policies the ruling adminis-
tration followed.
Pretoria and most of the 100,000 Namibian whites
argue that an independent government will fail unless
ethnic factors are considered in its formulation. They
point out that the Ovambos, who number about 450,000,
comprise half of the nonwhite population and would suppress
the smaller groups in a government not structured along
ethnic lines. Partly for this reason, Pretoria has backed
the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance that has been pressing
for an ethnic-based constitution in an effort to ally
white and black political parties that support the prin-
ciple of ethnicity. The Alliance, however, is losing its
image as a nonracial political front. Even the moderate
black parties in it are charging that a government elected
on an ethnic basis is a ruse to perpetuate white rule;
they are now declaring their support for a government
elected by universal suffrage.
Political rivalries combined with intertribal ani-
mosities and overcrowded conditions to incite rioting in
the black townships earlier this year. More than 40
blacks were killed. Chief Clemens Kapuuo, who commanded
the support of most of the Hereros and was the leading
moderate black politician in the territory, was assassi-
nated, presumably by Ovambo supporters of SWAPO.
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The major clashes were between Herero supporters of
the Alliance and Ovambo migrant workers who supported
SWAPO.* These two groups are most likely to vie for
political supremacy after independence.
The Ethnic Factor and the Future
Intertribal relations will affect the stability of
an independent government, whether it is dominated by
SWAPO or by a political alliance sympathetic with South
Africa. The impact of strained relations will be most
severe if an election is held without SWAPO participation
or if SWAPO loses the election.
If the UN-arranged agreement falls through and an
election unsanctioned by the UN is held without SWAPO
participation, SWAPO would probably try to promote a
general boycott of the process. Ovambo contract workers
would play a key role, and communal fighting would almost
certainly result. Continued fighting, combined with a
resurgence of warfare in the north, would be a serious
threat to a government so elected.
If SWAPO loses or fails to attain a clear-cut victory
in a UN-sponsored election, the new government would prob-
ably have to contend with continued guerrilla insurgency
in the north and growing terrorism throughout the country.
Relations between the Ovambos and the other tribes would
further deteriorate. Most whites would stay on, at least
for a time, to assess the prospects for an administration
that would favor their interests. Continued hostilities,
however, would discourage many whites, and an exodus would
begin.
*The Hereros, who number only about 60,000, are more cohesive and
politically knowledgeable than other black groups. If their num-
bers had not been reduced by warfare with other tribes in the 19th
century and with German colonialists early in this century, the
Hereros would probably play a more important political role today
than the Ovambos. They lobbied for Namibian independence as early
as 1949. They worked closely with Namibian whites to draft the
Turnhalle constitution because they favored a government structure
that would prevent the Ovambos from gaining political supremacy.
Although their fear of Ovambo domination has not lessened, they
have pulled away from an unequivocal endorsement of an ethnic-
based government.
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if SWAPO wins the election, the Ovambos are certain
to be the predominant tribe in the new administration
even though SWAPO would strive to play down its Ovambo
image. The shock of an Ovambo-dominated government could
provoke serious tribal disputes. Because of the small
size and isolation of the other tribes, however, the
Ovambos would not be politically challenged for some time.
Many whites would leave, especially if the new government
launched nationalizations of ranches and other white
businesses. (SWAPO has thus far been surprisingly mod-
erate in shaping its economic plans, apparently in hopes
of retaining some white businesses and administrative
talent.) The 70,000 Afrikaners, who have strong ties to
South Africa, would be the first to leave. The Germans
(about 30,000) and English-speakers (10,000) would take
a longer look at political events before departing. The
Germans, who have the strongest roots in Namibia among
the whites, would stay unless expropriation of their
property or antiwhite fervor forced them out. (CONFI-
DENTIAL)
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