WESTERN EUROPE CANADA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000700050002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Confidential
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Western Europe
Canada
International Organizations
Confidential
No. 0165-75
April 1, 1975
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005627
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 1 1652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligi nr:e, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed tr
the authors of the individual articles.
Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement . . . . . 1
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Berlin and the Quadripartite Agreement
More than three years ago, the US and USSR
negotiated the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin
in hopes of removing a bone of contention be-
tween the Allies and the Soviet Union. After
the pact was signed in June, 1972, access to and
from the city became freer than at any time since
the Berlin Wall was erected and the atmosphere
of siege began to fade as Moscow and Pankow muted
their threats.
There was a certain optimism among West
Berliners, springing largely from plans to make
the city a meeting place between East and West
and a center for international exhibitions,
congresses and scientific exchanges. The eupho-
ria has now vanished. Periodic disputes with
the Soviets and East Germans about West Berlin's
relationship to the Federal Republic illustrate
that the Quadripartite Agreement has changed
little.
The agreement actually has become a new
reference point for debate between the Allies
and the Soviets. The agreement establishes
limits to what each side may do to advance its
interests in the divided city, but built-in
ambiguities permit continued jockeying for
advantage. For example, the agreement states
that West Berlin is not a constituent part of
the Federal Republic but at the same time it
pledges that the city's ties to West Germany
will be strengthened.
In acknowledging the conflicting objectives
of the Western allies and the Soviets, the accord
ensures that debate among the four wartime allies
continues to be one of "challenge and response"
as each side attempts to assert its interpretation
of the document.
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The Priority of Detente
While neither side finds itself completely
satisfied with the Quadripartite Agreement, the
delicately-balanced accord thus far has proved
flexible enough to withstand disputes. It under-
scores the responsibility the four powers share
for actions taken by the two Germanies affecting
the status of Berlin.
The Soviets continue pursuing a policy aimed
eventually at isolating West Berlin from its
Western protectors as much as possible, but
recent controversy over Berlin has stemmed from
the interplay between Bonn and Pankow as they
promote their vested interests in the divided
city.
Bonn's willingness to strengthen ties to
West Berlin by establishing a Federal environ-
mental office there last summer and Pankow's
earlier success in reducing inter-German travel
by doubling the minimum currency exchange require-
ment were the most dramatic challenges to the
atmosphere created by the Quadripartite regime.
The Allies and the Soviets have each sup-
ported the actions taken by their respective
German allies, but the four powers collectively
have not permitted these developments to become
unmanageable.
The Soviet do not want disputes over Berlin
to upset the political calm in Central Europe
or to damage the prospects for a successful con-
clusion to the European security conference.
The Western allies, for their part, do not
want to make improvements in Berlin's status the
sole test of detente. They are, for example,
unenthusiastic about supporting ambitious pro-
posals to tie the city more closely to West
Germany for fear of antagonizing the Soviets.
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Disappointed West Berliners
The broae perspective is not fully shared
by the West Berliners;' they are more skep-
tical about the alleged uenefits of the Quadri-
partite Agreement.
West Berliners welcome the reduction of
tension, but fear that the price may be a loss
of the city's sense of mission and dynamism.
They suspect that the Western allies are becoming
complacent about Berlin despite signs of contin-
uing, though more subtle, pressure from the
Soviets.
They complain that Chancellor Schmidt lacks
Willy Brandt's commitment to uphold Berlin's
interests. Schmidt indeed has placed a higher
priority on other matters and Brandt's creams
of expanding the city's international role are
not likely to be realized.
The pessimism among the West Berliners has
roots deeper than dissatisfaction with the Quadri-
partite Agreement. They are increasingly dis-
turbed about the city's future, fearing that it
may become not only a political backwater in an
era of detente but that it may also decline
economically.
West Berlin's economy continues to grow,
slowly; unemployment, though increasing, remains
rather low--only 2.7 percent at the end of 1974.
This outward appearance of economic stability
is deceptive. The city depends on large sub-
sidies from the. government in Bonn. West Germany's
three major parties have agreed to continue sub-
sidies until 1990 no matter who heads the national
government.
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West Berlin's dependence on Bonn's largesse
stems not only from the lack of an economic
hinterland, but also from the former capital's
weak demographic base. The high death rate--
largely the result of an inordinately high per-
centage of elderly--and the emigration of young
people seeking more promising careers in the
Federal Republic have caused a slow but steady
decline in population.
Draft exemptions and tax incentives have
failed to reverse the trend. The result is that
the demand for labor can only be met by foreign
workers, primarily from Turkey, who already
constitute nearly ten percent of the total labor
force. Social and ethnic frictions are likely
to grow.
Recent terrorist attacks on two of the
city's leading political figures and the subse-
quent tightening of security has only heightened
the general sense of insecurity. The West
Berliners, however, are not easily intimidated.
The vast majority, moreover, are repelled by
such violence and extremist political groups of
right and left have attracted little support.
In the local election in March, the West
Berliners, as usual, gave their overwhelming
support to West Germany's three established
parties.
Whatever West Berlin's internal situation,
its future as always will be shaped by others.
In this regard, the two Germanies are playing
an increasingly important role.
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The Four Powers are responsibile for all
major matters affecting the city's status.
While both Bonn and Pankow had clear political
interests in Berlin prior to the Quadripartite
Agreement, defense of their respective positions
against the opposing big powers had to be based
solely on the justification provided by their
respective big power allies. Now, the Quadri-
partite Agreement and the related inter-German
transit accords have formalized procedures for
inter-German discussions on matters affecting
Berlin and provided a basis for pursuing their
interests there.
The compromise struck last November by
Chancellor Schmidt and East German Communist
party chief Honecker illustrates the extra
dimension Berlin plays in inter-German relations.
Bonn, in effect, offered to extend the interest-
free saving credit provision that helps finance
bilateral trade in return for a reduction in the
minimum currency exchange requirement for visits
to East Berlin and East Germany. Some West
Berlin officials were critical of Schmidt's
willingness to bargain for this concession but
are now pleased that travel to East Germany is
approaching the record level reached in 1973.
Talks began last week on ways to improve
road, rail, and canal traffic in and around
Berlin. Economic cooperation between the two
states may also be discussed, particularly
an East German offer to deliver electricity to
West Berlin.
Even though the Schmidt government has been
at the forefront of these developments, it has
closely coordinated its moves with the US,
Britain and France.
The Quadripartite Agreement also gives
Bonn the responsibility for representing West
Berlin abroad but the Soviets are attempting to
April 1, 1975
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interpret this provision in the narrowest
terms possible. The West Germans have
struggled alone and unsuccessfully to defend
this right in such matters as legal assistance
for West Berliners, as well as in negotiations
on scientific and cultural cooperation with
the Soviets and East Europeans.
Soviet Objectives
This resistance from the East points to the
crucial role the Soviets are playing in Berlin
affairs. Moscow has a vested interest in main-
taining the broad concept of four-power rights
in Berlin and in Germany as a whole because this
is the sole legal basis for the Soviet presence
and authority in the area.
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its unwillingness to allow the East Germans to
incorporate East Berlin fully into the German
Democratic Republic.
The Soviets, on the contrary, continue to
push for a very restricted interpretation of the
Quadripartite Rights Agreement--claiming that
it pertains only to West Berlin. This tactic
is essentially a daily operational objective de-
signed to isolate the city politically. To
strengthen their legal position, the Soviets
have expanded their official presence in West
Berlin through the consulate general granted
them by the Quadripartite Agreement.
Geography and the prevailing political
climate, allow the Soviets to play a more direct
and continuous role in Berlin than permitted
by any of the three Western allies. Bonn
feels that the allies, for example, have done
little to help expand international air traffic
to West Berlin. The East Germans allow over-
flight rights only to carriers destined for their
April 1, 1975
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airport in East Berlin. Tegel, the large new
airport in West Berlin, seems destined to serve
only allied carriers. The Schmidt government,
which would like to overcome this problem, has
so far been dissuaded from embarking on talks
with the Soviets about the general civil air
status of Berlin.
Energy supply for West Berlin is another
problem. The city is the only major urban
center in Europe not connected to an electric
power grid. It depends entirely on imported
coal and oil, and an energy shortage could
develop in the early 1980s.
The Schmidt government has responded to a
Soviet proposal to supply West Berlin and the
Federal Republic from a nuclear generating plant
in the western USSR if German firms are allowed
to build the facility. The idea of building a
nuclear plant in West Berlin itself raises a
host of problems and was, in fact, considered
and rejected by the Western Allies more than a
decade ago. The negotiations are temporarily
stalled. Moscow is dragging its feet, demanding
better financial terms and is reopening questions
about routing the transmission lines across East
German and Polish territory. Moscow is using
these arguments probably as a bargaining tactic,
but the East Germans hope the negotiations will
collapse. This would give them the opportunity
to push their separate commercial offers to
deliver energy to West Berlin.
Bonn prefers to deal directly with Moscow,
and the West German industrialists involved
in the project remain optimistic. Should the
negotiations be concluded successfully, the
Schmidt government will seek the approval of
the Western allies to export nuclear technology
to the USSR. The West Germans might interpret
the lack of such approval as a sign of allied
w-illingness to place their own interests ahead
of ensuring a more secure future for West Berlin.
(Confidential)
April 1, 1975
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Confidential
Confidential
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