HARDY HEARING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 10, 1967
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79T00827AO01000060002-9
10 October 1967
Subject: Hardy Hearing
1. A memo on"who started the Korean War" (copy
attached) and a complete, corrected copy of the pre-
pared briefing text have been turned over to Office
of Legislative Counsel OER memo on mili-
tary shipments to Cambodia is to be ready for delivery
overnight.
2. In the transcript, substantive questions in
the ad lib sections have been reviewed by DDI and by
me, and checked out where necessary with analysts.
a) Comparative Japanese trade with Commu-
nist China and U.S., Page 735 line 24 to Page 736,
line 4: we are supplying as an insert to the record
a statement on Japanese trade with these countries
specifically, rather than "Communist countries" and
"North America."
b) Burma Road and Vinegar Joe, p.760,.4-12:
similar insert for the record.
c) I suggested and DDI agreed you might wish to
moderate statement on importance of Malaysian troops,
p. 761 lines 4 to 6, as they have just about the
smallest (28,400) army in the area, and Australia and
New Zealand are quite concerned about vacuum when
British are pulled out. Suggested insert for record.
3. Statements which you indicated you wanted to
review yourself are paperclipped: Page 678, lines 1-14;
Page 680, lines 11-251 Page 687, line 0 -to 688, line 20;
Page '1', line 21 to Page 73Tine 3; Page 737, lines 4-91
and Page 764, lines 6-17.
4. With regard to Page 680, DDI China hands believe
use of ChiNat troops in Vietnam would create major prob-
lems, including provocation to Chicoms. DDI agrees you
might make this portion a flat statement along lines:
"I am not the person to answer that question for you...
State has a very strong feeling that commitment of Na-
tionalist Chinese forces in South Vietnam would be a
poor thing to do politically. The ChiNats do have ex-
cellent armed forces."
STATINTL
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Insert in Mr. Helms' testimony following Rep. Stratton's
questions on the Burma Road and General Stillwell.
Mr. Helms: Originally the Burma Road began at Lashio,
where it was fed by railroad from Rangoon, and ran
from Lashio across the Chinese border at Want' ing,
through Paoshan and Tali to Kunming. The Japanese
pushed General Stillwell and his Chinese troops
across Burma back into India. When the road was
reopened, the Japanese still had it cut off from
southern Burma and Rangoon, so we had to build a
new feeder, which came to be known as the Ledo
Trace or Stillwell Road. It ran from Ledo in
Assam down to Myitkyina and then south along the
Buse border to hit the original Burma Road near
tng.
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Insert in Mr. Helms' testimony with.reference to
Malaysian troops.
Mr. Helms: Until now, Malaysia since its independence
has been able to count on Commonwealth forces--
Australian and New Zealand, but principally Britis,
in times of need, sucl,. as the confrontation with
the Indonesians. The Malaysians themselves have
about the smallest armed forces in the area-
about 28,400 in the army, for instance--and the
Australians and Now Zealanders are quite concerned
about the need for strengthening Malaysia as the
British forces are withdrawn.
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Insert in, Mr, Helm* testimony regarding Japanese trade
with Communist China and the United States.
Mr. Helms In the last complete trade year--1966--
only three percent of Japan's total trade was
with the Chinese Communists, as compared to 29
percent with the United States. From China
point of view, however, trade with Japan is
much more significant, amounting to 15 percent
of Communist China's total foreign trade. Japan,
in fact, replaced the Soviet Union as China's
principal trading partner in 1966.
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NOTE DDI:
1. Herewith copy of Hardy transcript. DCI
specifically asked that you and I go over it per-
sonally to make sure that he was answering correctly
in his ad lib sections--as far as substantive content
is concerned-after which he will also review to de-
termine how he wants to be recorded on policy questions.
STATINTL
STATINTL
STATINTL
forces which _ will have re-inserted.
3. I have been over transcript and checked
against briefing text, leaving following ad 16b
sections: (paperclipped at start) AA. 673 line
a)
notes that Subcommittee staff
would not care to have it known around
Community that we got our hands on text to
review it, prefer that transcript not be shown
to anybody but DCI---hence limit those we have
to consult or call in.
b) - for his part goes to major lengths to
conceal from committee that we have a made a
copy.
2. Reporter left out 15 pages of text on Chicom armed
*A* p.696 line 25 to 698/24
*B. p.702 linw 20 to 706/6
it out
and Q&A
1 to 695/23
*C.
p.711
line
16
to
712f8
*D.
p.719
line
1
to
720/4
*E.
p.724
line
19
to
731/7
F.
p.734
line
3
to
744/22
G.
p.748
line
12
to
757/3
H.
p.759
line
4
to
end of
transcript.
4. in those marked above with an asterisk, I suggest
there is nothing we need to check out. On remainder, my
suggestions are attached.
STATINTL
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AA. Page 673,line 1 to Page 695, line 23.
DCI will probably want to consider wording of p. 678,
lines 1-14. P. 680, starting at line 11, DCI might wish
to reduce this to flat statement along lines: I am not
the person to answer that question for you....State De-
partment has a very strong feeling that commitment of
Nationalist Chinese forces in South Vietnamw would be
a poor thing to do politically. The Chinese Nationklists
do have excellent armed forces." P. 688, lines 4-13,
another section for DCI's review.
F. Page 734,line 3 to page 744, line 22.
DCI will want to review refs to U.S. diplomatic
policy, 734,linez 21, to 735 line 3,and p.737, lines 4-9.
Capanese trade figures, bottom of p. 735 and top of
736, were pulled from Basic Fact Book; OER might wish
to make answer more precise and more responsive (e.g.,
Japanese trade with U.S. and with Communist China, rather
than with "North America" and "Communist Countries." I
thought myself Japn share of Chicom trade was considerably
more significant, approaching it from ChiCom rather than
from Japn percentage, but didn't have it readily avbl.)
I don't believe our Japanese analysts would differ
with DCI's answers on Japanese attitudes 741/14 to 744/22.
s
G. Page 748 line 12 to page 757 line 3.
I can't vouch for answer p. 749 line 25 that all
military aid to North Korea comes from Soviets.
Page 759, line 4 to end.
Page 760, lines 4 to 12: which way did the Burmssa Road
go, and which way did Vinegar Joe go?
Page 761, lines 4 to 6: It might be advisable to moderate
ref to importance of Malaysian troops inasmuch as OBI Factbook
credits them with army of only 28,400, one of smallest in area,
and they are quite dependent on Commonwealth (Aust.&NZ) backing.
Page 764, lines 6-17, DCI again referring to Agency's
non-role in policy.
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The USSR, _Communist China, and the Origins of the Korean 4ar
All available evidence points to the conclusion that the Soviet Union
_lanned and directed the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950.
The North. Korean regime was a pi_rely Soviet creation and a full-fledged Soviet
satellite. Its armed forces ere organized, trained, and equipped entirely by
the US.,R. Soviet control was assured by the presence of Soviet advisers at all
levels of the North Korean army and government. Many key North Korean party
and government officials, moreover, had been Soviet citizens or served in the
Soviet army during Iorld,,gar II. Purges and demotions between 1945 and 1950
had eliminated those Koreans who had returned from China or were oriented toward
the Chinese Communist Party.
Stalin's decision to launch the Korean venture appears to have been prompted,
on the one hand, by his paranoiac susp,cion that the US intended to restore
Japan as a strong military power in northeast Asia and, on the other, by his
confidence that the North Koreans could score a quick victory without provoking
American intervention.
D,y late 11,419, the US had made 4* clear its readiness to by-pass Soviet
obstructionist tactics and conclude a separate peace treaty with Japan. Stalin,
there ore, was determined to slam the door against what he viewed as an emersing
US-Japanese anti-Soviet alliance by seizing the entire Korean Peninsulas--the
historic Japanese/ ateway to the Asian main4.and.. In early 1950, Soviet propaganda
was filled pith allegations -that the US planned to 'revive Japanese militarism and
Imperialism."
talin unquestionably anticipated a quick and easy conquest of South Korea.
kOK forces were markedly inferior to those of the North in manpower, equipment,
and training. North Korean espionage, military probes, and subversion had further
reduced South Korean effectiveness. American forces had been w-thdrawn from
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south Korea in mid-1949 and the soviet strategigts undoubtedly discounted the
r)ossibi.lit,yof a US military response. ; talin's confidence in an easy victory
. ~. , ;' l QhP afl xrly
renf:;thened by pua.LZC sZ1avdtuGA;O ~.y ~?;?~~~~--_?. -- I
pu T "+ perimeter" in the Pacific.
1950 w outh Korea e JS defense r
. _ tih
Thee Chinese Communists almost certainly had advance knowledge of the iuorth
Korean attack. Both the details of this planparid the broader question of the
threat of a resurgent Japan ! robably were jiseussed by Hao and Stalin during
the Chinese leader's ten-week visit to Moscow in early 1950. The Chinese evi6ently
shared soviet concern or the prospect of a close alliance between the U6 and
a r'armed Japan. Poking echoed Moscow's attacks a,ainst the US "plot" to revive
Japanese militarism.
The ,vino-oviet Treaty Of 911i_arlce't signed in
'ebruary 1950~O''as sped iically directed against 'the revival of Japanese imperialism
nom the resumption of aggression on the part of Japan or any other state that
may collaborate in any way with Japan in acts of aggression."
In addition to similar propaganda limes, evidence of Chinese knowledge and
approval of the soviet plan for a swift North Korean strike against the youth
included the return to Worth Korea in February 19!;0 of Koreans who had served
in the Chinese Communist army--at a time when the North Korean forces were
!;eginning the transition to a war footing. It is highly unlikely, however, that
the Chinese leaders foresaw serious risks of becoming involved in the war. They
apparently shared Stalin's judgment that the U$ would have no choice but to
acquiesce in a quick and decisive North Korean victory.
The Chinese were anxious to deny Korea to xmerican and Japanese power. fOX
they re,;arded the peninsula as a forward shield protecting their vital industrial
centers in Manchuria and the political center of North China. In the sprin.-I of
1050, however, the Chinese Communist loaders ~nr>re preoccupied primarily with
plans for the conquest of Taiwan and Tibet and the consolidation of their power
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in southern and central China--areas in wizich anti-3ommunist guerrillas were
.still active. The Chinese, thr>reiore, hoped that a swift North Korean victory
.and amonstration of American inaction would hasten the collapse of Chinese
aaationalist morale and resistance, thus opening the way for the early "liberation"
of Taiwan.
risen the unexpected American military intervention shattered the Conmiunistst
calculations and confronted them with the imminent destruction of the North Korean
regime, a :soviet diktat was not needed to brinf the Chinese into the war.
Peking's decision to intervene was based on the Chinese le=aders' own view of the
threat to their security nosed by the presence of a powerful enemy on Chinas
doorstep. The Chinese, of course, exploited the emergency to extract lai e-
scale military assistance from the Soviet Union, but the decision to
a:pears to have been basically a Chinese decision.
liter/e'i
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