SOVIET INTERNAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000500020008-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 22, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For ReleW 2001/05/17 : CIA-RDP79T00827A0O 00020008-3
;oviet Internal
remar:zea to us recently about the
percept e decline in political humor since the Qarushchev 25X1C
ouster. Gone is a character whose appearance, conduct and
policies seemed to beg the satirist's attention. In his
place is a team more inclined to operate with their collec-
tive feet on the ground and their shoes on their feet.
2. Despite the inherent problems of decision making
by consensus, the present leadership has not been ineffec-
Live in dealing with the vast problems of managing a com-
ple.: and highly structured society in a complex and i n-
ercasingl.y unstructured communist world. It has altered
"undamentally the i;hrushchevian approach in many police
arras and in some cases--partly because of good judg01nent
and partly because of good fortune--the results must surely
have been g;ratifying . With the 1966 harvest the best in
;ovict history, at leant as far major crops are concerned,
agricultural policy has been the most widely acclaimed
;31C'COS s .
3. In the broad areas of economic growth and inter-
national relations, the leadership can present only a
modest picture of achievement. Timorous steps have been
taken over the last year to introduce some aspects of a
market economy into a few carefully selected industries.
Although these industries have grown at a somewhat faster
rate than in previous years, only longer term and broader
application of these economic levers offers the prospect of
a higher sustained growth rate. The present leadership has
also shown itself more adroit in dealing with China and it
has markedly strengthened the Soviet s ion vis-a-vis
China in the world communist movement",,in without substan-
tial help from the Chinese themselves. It has not, however,
been able to reconstruct the kind of unity that once existed
among the other communist parties and states.
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CONFIDENTIAL
4. Granted these limited successes, the Soviet leader
ship has come nowhere near answering most of the great
questions facing it. It has not resolved the countless
and deerseated problems of resource allocation that would
he handled by the market ip a free economy. There are
indications that, although,keconomic plan for 1966-70 is
scheduled for formal approval by the Supreme Soviet at
its mid-December meeting;, there are still matters of re-
source allocation that are unresolved at the Politburo
level. The Soviet Communist party -- entrenched and jealous
of its very real perquisites -- suffers from declining;
relevance in a society whose prosperity incrcasinglyllinked
to the technical soundness, rather than the ideological
probity, of state policy. Finally, the USSR is all but
powerless to check the growing preoccupation of other
communist states with their own national well-being as
they themselves perceive it.
5. In striving to deal with these and other problems,
the present leadership has exerted considerable effort to
give the appearance of collective decision making. At
least as far as major policy initiatives are concerned,
the appearance is probably very close to the reality. In
fact, the present Politburo seems to have evolved a fairly
formal mechanism for decision making and a fairly rigid
code of individual behavior designed to insure collectivity.
G. The emphasis on collectivity cannot, of course,
erase the very real differences of personality, outlook
and interest that exist among those at the political
pinnacle. There is persuasive evidence not only that these
differences exist, but that they can be and are voiced.
Political wisdom may dictate circumspection in any individ-
,,nl'.cs advocacy of a policy, but it is from the inter-play
of different views that the consensus policy ultimately
emerges.
7. The apparent stability of the Soviet leadership
over the past two years rests on this general acceptance--
either by choice or by necessity--of certain broad rules
of the collective game. The subtle shifts of individual
standing go on, however, and the question of whether or not
.ome individual has transgressed the rules of the game
produces a constant; tension. Among the more notable shifts
CONFIDJ:Wf IAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
within the collective has been the slow but steady enlarge-
Of the position of Brezhnev who now readily assumes
the most prominent place in all public demonstrations of
nrecodence. He now seems to have the most important word--
probably the last word--in the key area of appointments.
? The fortunes of two other prominent Politburo mem-
bers, Nikolay Podgorny and Aleksandr Shelepin, have also
shifted Pod orny was kicked upstairs from his post ps
number two man in the party to the largely honorary position
of USSR President a year ago. Shelepin who enjoyed a wide
variety of important responsibilities in the immediate post-
hru shchev period has seen those responsibilities circum-
scribed. Both men retain their
however, and both are therefore still ivery omucheatotheburo,
center of Soviet power.
`?. The relationship between Brezhnev and Nosy-in
i;ypifies the strengths and weaknesses of the current
-^adershi~. The fact that the relationshi
'o~ ~~~ore ~ ~ i~ has stood up
than two years represents no small achievement
iit the extensive overlap o f party and government insti-
tutions and interests inevitably produces strain.
',loch, strain the How
t~re.~ent arrangement can take and still
ll
preserve its collective nature--or even a facade of
collectivity--probably can not be known until the system
is )ut to the test of a major internal or external setback.
CONFIDENT IAL
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