THE CHINESE REPRESENTATION ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000500020005-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 25, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 November 1966
The Chinese Representation Issue
The debate on Chinese representation opened in the
UN General Assembly on the 16th of November and will
continue until 29 November when the voting is ex-
pected.
A. The whole situation has become extremely fluid,
largely because of Canadian threats earlier this
month to propose a new resolution for Assembly
consideration.
I. The proposal would call on the Assembly
president to negotiate with the Communist
and Nationalist Chinese on a plan to admit
Peking to the Assembly and give the Commu-
nists Taiwan's seat in the Security Council,
2. The Nationalists would retain their Assembly
seat however.
Ottawa has favored this new approach to the rep-
resentation issue primarily because Foreign Minis
ter Martin and other top policy makers from all
appearances firmly believe that Communist China's
representation in the UN is a necessary first
step to bringing Peking into the mainstream of
international life
1. Only then can meaningful solutions to other
international problems--i.e., disarmament,
nonproliferation, etc.--be reached.
2. Canada's commercial relations with China
are also expanding.
. Ottawa likes to show that it is not influ-
enced by the US in the formulation of its
foreign policy.
There has accordingly been considerable,
but not intense, pressure from the press and
public on the government to take some ini-
tiative that will bring Peking into the UN.
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C. It remains unclear whether or not Ottawa will
actually follow through its stated intentions.
1 In his 23 November statment to the Assembly,
External Affairs Minister Martin did not
introduce a resolution but reserved the
right to do so.
2. In any case Canadian maneuvers have already
had the effect of creating major new pro-
cedural and voting uncertainties.
, The "important question" resolution requir-
ing a two-thirds vote to seat China WAS
tabled prior to the opening of the debate,
and it presumably will be voted upon.
4. The outcome is uncertain, but it is probable
that the resolution will pass by a slim ma-
jority.
Peking'sD. sponsors have also introduced the usual
Albanian-type resolution, calling for the admis-
sion of Peking and the ouster of Taiwan.
1, It had earlier been expected that the results
would be close, and there is no way of know-
ing what shifts in previous voting patterns
the new situation has brought about.
The main effect of the Canadian moves, however, has
been the introduction of a new resolution by Italy.
A. Supported by five other countries--Chile, Brasil
Bolivia, Belgium, and Trinidad and Tobago--the
resolution calls for the formation of a study
committee to make recommendations to the 22nd As-
sembly for a solution to the question of Chinese
representation in the UN.
1. Many countries believe that the committee
will come out with a two-Chinas recommenda-
tion.
2. Although the US has endorsed it, none of the
other major powers is very enthusiastic about
the Italian idea.
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. The Soviets see it as a delaying maneuver
while the French hold there is nothing to
study.
4. Peking has dmounced the Italian proposal
as "an absurd idea which in essence advo-
cates two Chinas."
S. The Chinese Nationalists are working vigor-
ously to defeat the Italian resolution.
President Chiang has threatened to withdraw
from the UN if it is approved, but it is
doubtful if he has yet made any firm deci-
sion.
Whatever the outcome, it seems likely that those
who favor Communist China will be able to claim a
psychological victory even though from all indi-
cations it has no interest in joining the UN as
it is presently constituted, and certainly not if
Taiwan retains a seat.
1. It will be widely presumed that the US was
compelled to shift its ground because it could
no longer be assured of commanding majorities
for the important question ruling and against
the Albanian resolution.
2. Moreover a study committee may well lend
itself in practice to a further erosion of
Taiwan's claims.
3. Canada's own proposal, for example, is de-
signed to attract Peking by awarding it a
permanent Security Council seat.
4. The temptation may be great to make other
inducements.
However, even those countries which strongly
oppose Peking's admission see certain advantages
in the study committee as a fallback position.
1. It will at least delay the issue another year.
2. If Peking should continue to insist on total
exclusion of Taiwan and fundamental changes
in the UN itself, the blame for its exclusion
would tend to shift onto China itself.
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