MEMO TO GAC FROM PAO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200160019-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: July 31, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TO: GAC
FROM: PAO
SUBJECT:
REMARKS:
DATE: 31 Jul 72
The following notations are the
result of a study of the George Ball
article in the July issue of Atlantic.
The remarks are keyed to the 17)i7iTEiTion
of the attached xeroxed article. Where
Ball quotes the draft SNIE 10-3-64, we
are obliged to rely on his accuracy as
no copy of the draft seems to be extant.
Attachment
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THE UNDER SECRETARY. OF STATE
WASHINGTON
October 5, 1964
Dear Dean, Bob, and Mac:
I am enclosing my sceptical thoughts on the
assumptions of our Viet-Nam-policy. This amplifies our
conversation a week ago as I promised to do.
The paper has the obvious limitations of a personal
effort drafted mostly late at night and without benefit
of staffing. I offer it as a focus for discussion and
as an incitement to a broad study of the problem.
Only five copies of this document have been prepared.
I am sending one each to the three of you and am retaining
two in my safe. I think you will agree that it should
not be discussed outside the four of us until we have
had a chance to talk about it.
Yours ever,
George W. Ball
The Honorable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
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How valid are the assumptions underlying our Viet-Nam policies?
by George W. Ball
October 5, 1964
FOREWORD
I.
Purpose of Memorandum
Within' the next few weeks we must face a major
decision of national policy. The political situation in
Saigon is progressively deteriorating. Even if that de-
terioration is checked, there seems little likelihood of
establishing a government that can (a) provide a
solid center around which the broad support of the
Vietnamese people can coalesce or (b) conduct mili-
tary operations with sufficient effectiveness to clean
up the insurgency.
Under these circumstances the United States has
four broad options:
1. Our first option is to continue the present
course of action in an effort to strengthen the South
Vietnamese effort, recognizing that at some point we
shall probably either: ?
a. Be forced to leave as a result of a neutralist
coup or decision in Saigon; or
b. Be forced to adopt one of the other options
by the manifest hopelessness of the present course
of action.
2. Our second option is to take over the war in
South Viet-Nam* by the injection of substantial U.S.
ground forces operating directly under a U.S. chain
of military command.
3. Our third option is to mount an air offensive
against the North in the hope of bringing pressure on
Hanoi that would either:
a. Persuade the Hanoi Government that the
game is not worth the candle and that it should
cease direction and support of the insurgency in
the South; or
b. Improve our bargaining position in relation
to Hanoi and Peiping so as to make possible an
acceptable political solution through negotiation.
4. Our fourth option is to adopt a course of action
that would permit a political settlement without di-
rect U.S. military involvement under conditions that
would be designed hopefully to:
*For glossary and explanation of usage, see p. 49.
a. Check or at least delay the extension of
Communist power into South Viet-Nam;
b. Provide the maximum protection for Thai-
land, Malaysia, and South Asia;
c. Minimize the political damage resulting to
U.S. prestige in other Asian capitals, throughout the
nonaligned world, and with our Western Allies.
The first option?to continue the present course of
action?is not likely to lead to a clean-cut decision.
To say this is not necessarily-to condemn it. Yet if we
are to seek a political solution without committing
United States forces to direct military conflict by an
air or ground offensive, it may be advantageous to
set this process in train by an incisive decision under
optimum circumstances rather than to let circum-
stances take their course. This question is discussed
in Part Two of this memorandum.
The second option?to take over the war by the in-
jection of substantial U.S. ground forces?offers the
worst of both worlds. Our situation would, in the
world's eyes, approach that of France in the 1950s.
We would incur the opposition of elements in Viet-
Nam otherwise friendly to us. Finally, we would find
ourselves in la guerre sale with consequent heavy loss
of American lives in the rice paddies and jungles.
The third option?to mount military pressure
against the North primarily by an air offensive?is
clearly preferable to the second. North Viet-Nam
rni.(Jit well retaliate by ground action that would re-
quire the deployment of U.S. land forces. But there
are obvious advantages in our initially 'choosing the
offensive capability with which we have the unques-
tioned advantage. This memorandum raises a series
of questions about the third and fourth options. It
suggests lines of approach?tentative answers?to
these questions. But it has not benefited by staff work
which the complexity of the issues requires.
In raising these questions and offering some tenta-
tive answers, this memorandum creates a prima facie
case for a possible alternative to intensifying our role
in the Vietnamese war. Having met this burden of
going forward, I suggest that the burden of proof is
upon those who advocate the third option. It is they
who seek increased U.S. involvement.
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How to Approach the Problem
I. Primacy of the Political Purpose
The maintenance of a non-Communist South Viet-
Nam is of considerable strategic value to the United
States. Secretary McNamara has said of Southeast
Asia:
its location across east-west air and sea lanes flanks
the Indian sub-continent on one side and Australia,
New Zealand and the Philippines on the other, and
dominates the gateway between the Pacific and In-
di,la Oceans. In Communist hands, this area would
pose a most serious threat to the security of the U.S.
and to :he family of Free World nations to which we
belong. To defend Southeast Asia, we must meet the
challenge in South Viet-Nam.
But, in spite of the strategic importance of the real
estate involved, our primary motive in supporting
:he Government of South Viet-Nam is unquestion-
ably political. It is to make clear to the whole Free
World that we will assist any nation that asks us for
our ]lelp in defending itself against Communist ag-
1,,reSsion.
For tile purposes of this memorandum I have as-
relined that the political objective should be the prin-
cipal frame of reference in assessing the cost of
chaiijng our present relations with South Viet-Nam
either by directly involving the United States in an
attack on the North or by the deliberate search for a
political solution. That cost must be primarily mea-
sured by the political impact ..;ri other nations?the
consequences for U.S. prestige and the credibility of
our commitments elsewhere, the erosive effect on our
ahianees, and the impact on the will of other nations
to cominue to resist Communist aggression.
2. South Viet-Nam is Not Korea
In approaching this problem, I want to emphasize
one hey point at the outset: The problem of South
is isz.(i generis. South Viet-Nam is not Ko-
rea, and in making fundamental decisions it would
be a 'alistakC cor us?to rely too heavily on the Korean
analogy. There are at least five principal differences
between the present position of the United States in
South Viet-Nam and our situation in South Korea in
a. We were in South Korea under a clear UN
Inter:dale.
Oar presence in South VietNain depends upon
the con-tinuing request of .the GVN plus the SEATO
pi-otocol.
d their peak,?UN forces in South Korea (other
ot,rs a;;c: those of the ROK) included 53,000 in-
tern:ye:len and 1000 other troops provided by fifty-
three ra-dions.
in Viet-Nam we are going it alone with no sub-
stantkil help from any other country.
c. In 1950 the Korean Government under Syngman
Rhee was stable. It had the general support of the
principal elements in the country. There was little
factional fighting and jockeying for power.
In South Viet-Nam we face governmental chaos.
d. The Korean War started only two years after
Korean independence. The Korean people were still
excited by their newfound freedom; they were fresh
for the war.
In contrast, the people of Indochina have been
fighting for almost twenty years?first against the
French, then for the last ten years against the NVN.
All evidence points to the fact that they are tired of
conflict.
e. Finally, the Korean War started with a massive
land invasion by 100,000 troops. This was a classical
type of invasion across an established border. It was
So reported within twelve hours by the UN Commis-
sion on the spot. It gave us an unassailable political
and legal base for counteraction. .
in South Viet-Nam there has been no invasion--
only a slow infiltration. Insurgency is by its nature
ambiguous. The Viet Cong insurgency does have
substantial indigenous support. Americans know that
the insurgency is actively directed and supported by
Hanoi, but the rest of the world is not so sure. The
testimony of the ICC has been fuzzy on this point--
and we have been unable to disclose our most solid
evidence for fear of compromising intelligence
sources.
As a result, many nations remain unpersuaded
that Hanoi is the principal source of the revolt. And,
as the weakness of the Saigon Government becomes
more and more evident, an increasing number of
governments will be inclined to believe that the Viet
Cong insurgency is, in fact, an internal rebellion.
3. The Present Situation
The feeble condition of the Saigon Government is
well understood. Perhaps the clearest appraisal of
present conditions is in SNIE 53-2-64, unanimously
approved by the United States Intelligence Board
last Thursday:
Since our estimate of 8 September 1964 the situ-
ation in South Viet-Nam has continued to deteriorate.
A coup by disgruntled South Viet-Nam military fig-
ures could occur at any time. In any case, we believe
that the conditions favor a further decay of GVN will
and effectiveness. The likely pattern of this decay will
be increasing defeatism, paralysis of leadership, fric-
tion with Americans, exploration of possible lines of
political accommodation with :he other side, and a
general petering out of the war effortIt is possible
that the civilian government promised for the end of
October could improve GVN esprit and effectiveness,
but on the basis of present indications, this is unlikely.
4. How to Formulate the Problem
Confronted by this deterioration we find ourselves
in a difficult dilemma:
Should we move toward escalation because of the
weakness of the governmental base in Saigon in the
hope that escalation will tend to restore strength to
that base; or can we risk escalation without a secure
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base and run the risk that our position may at any
time be undermined?
So far we have focused our attention almost en-
tirely on how we can (a) clean up the insurgency by
actions in South Vien-Nam and (b) bring pressure on
lianoi to stop or materially reduce the insurgency.
Wc have proceeded on the assumption that once
having undertaken a program of military action in
South Viet-Nam, we must pursue it until we achieve
military success. We have assumed that without mu-
airy success a negotiated solution could be achieved
only at an unacceptable cost to the United States.
What we must now do, in view of the present pre-
carious situation, is to undertake a rigorous balanc-
ing of accounts. We must examine the range of pos-
sible costs that might result from the widening of the
war and the enlargement of the United States mili-
tary commitment and balance those costs against the
costs of a carefully devised course of action designed
to lead to a Political solution under the best condi-
tions obtainable.
The purpose of this memorandum is to examine
the assumptions that support each course of action. It
is divided into two major parts:
Part One is an examination of the basic premises
that underlie the case for achieving a solution
.through the application of additional military force.
Part Two is an examination of possible alternative
courses of action for developing a political solution
without the investment of further military force and
at minimum cost to U.S. interests.
2AR T ONE
cVIINKfION OF THE PlIEMISE.`','.
3: A 20LICY OF MILITARY ACTION
A GA:NST NORTH VIET-NAM
A.
Coni:iiions Necessary for Sustained Air Action
Against the North
I. Is our base in South Viet-Nam sufficiently secure to
the undertaking of sustained air action against
the North?
The dangers of undertaking such air action with-
out a sectire base are at least two in number:
a. General Taylor has stated on more than one oc-
casion that we should not become involved militarily
with North Viet-Nam, and possibly with China, if
on: base in South Viet-Nam is insecure. (See Sai-
gon's [cables numbered] 465 and 972.) If the political
satin don in Saigon should continue to crumble, air
action against North Viet-Nam could at best bring a
?yin-nice' victory. Even with diminished North Viet-
namese support for the Viet Cong, a disorganized
South Vietnamese Government would be unable to
eliminate the insurgency.
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b. The launching of an air offensive would involve
a substantial additional United States commitment
in South Viet-Nam. There is serious question
whether such a commitment should be made so long
as we are vulnerable to the risk that we may be asked
to leave the country if a neutralist government
emerges in Saigon.
2. Would action against North Viet-Num increase po-
litical cohesiveness and improve morale in South Viet-
Nam so as to strengthen the governmental base?
This Contention deserves the verdict, known in the
Scottish law, of "not proven."
Our objectives are not fully congruent with the as-
pirations of the South Vietnamese people. We are
considering air action against the North as the means
to a limited objective?the improvement of our bar-
gaining position with the North Vietnamese. At the
same time we are sending signals to the North Viet-
namese that our limited purpose is to persuade them
to stop harassing their neighbors, that we do not seek
to bring down the Hanoi regime or to interfere with
the independence of Hanoi.
When General Khanh temporarily raised tlic level
of morale in July, he did so by promising the South
Vietnamese people to lead them north in order to ef-
fect the reunification of Viet-Nam. "Certainly," he
said on July 19, "our National Liberation Revolution
will achieve success, and thus our beloved Vietnam-
ese fatherland will become free, independent; and
reunified." Only such statements, he felt, could help
the "national war weariness." (See Saigon's 212 and
232.)
Reunification, however, is not a U.S. objective, nor
can it be if we are to maintain a juridical posture ac-
ceptable to the rest of the world. Yet there is little
evidence to suggest that the South Vietnamese would
have tneir nearts lifted merely by watching the North
Vietnamese suffer a sustained aerial bombardment.
Most have families or at least friends in the North.
The following CIA report of the reaction in Saigon
to our August bombings casts doubt on the easy as-
sumption that air action against the North would
necessarily, improve South Vietnamese morale (Field
Report, August 8):
I. On 6 August an _American who speaks Vietnam-
ese got the reactions of 20 or 25 Vietnamese of various
walks of life in Saigon or. the matter of the 5 August
bombing of North Vietnamese installations by United
States aircraft. It should be noted here that some of
the Vietnamese were etaged in conversation among
themselves and did not realize that the American
nearby understood Vietnamese. Of these 20 to 25 in-
dividuals only one registered unequivocal support for
the U.S. action. All other Vietnamese registered mild
dissatisfaction to strong disapproval.
2. The one Vietnamese to declare support for the
-U.S. action was a sergeant in the airborne brigade
who said he had been in the United States twice and
considered himself more American than Vietnamese.
On the other hand, none of the other Vietnamese of
this small sample even indicated any particular dis-
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1'1'00i-tee), the President Rejected
tc)proval of the North Vietnamese attacks on Ameri-
can ships. About four of the individuals mentioned
that they had been listening to Radio Hanoi and that
version was different from the American. As
a resuit they were not sure of the facts of the matter.
3. In almost all the cases the principal reason given
i-or disapproval of the bombing action was that the
Americans were now unilaterally killing Vietnamese
whiie in the past the Americans were merely helping
Vietnamese to kill Vietnamese. Another main reason
t'or their disapproval was fear that the conflict would
spread and more directly affect them.
The available evidence leads to the tentative
cautionary conclusion that if air bombardment is not
folow,ed by the fact?or even the promise?of a.mili-
Lary invasion of North Viet-Nam, there is no assur-
ance that it would improve South Vietnamese morale
over any significant period. We did bomb North
Victaamese targets on August 5. But since then there
has been an abortive coup, a Montagnard revolt, fur-
ther factional fighting, a weakening of Khanh's posi-
t:on, and general deterioration.
It may be argued, of course, that the observable ef-
fects of an isolated attack such as that of August 5
are not a fair indication of what might be the con-
sectiences of a sustained program of military pres-
sure a2ainst the North. That is true. But to the extent
that military action would invite significantly in-
creased reprisals or would raise the specter of Chi-
fl arIV momentary euphoria might
well be replaced by demoralization. An air attack on
Saigon,
or example, would probably have anything
but a cohesive effect on the population. On the con-
trary, it mii2nt incite further factionalism, contribute
to war e-ahaustion, and lead to the destruction of the
:):,:aertt weak governmental structure.
In sum, I bad no assurance that morale can be im-
aroved by a U.S. air offensive against North Viet-
La. lvloralc depends instead on effective political
cnaewnip and an improvement of the conditions of
The ine;ease in casualties that would result from
eseaa,tion would be unlikely to appeal to a war-
weary people.
B.
iIie Most Favorahle Result We Could
ithi,e to Achieve 'ay Military Action Against
North Viet-Nam?
L Can we, by military pressure against North Viet-
;IM, persuade the Hanoi Government to stop Viet
Co,g actior: in the South or at least reduce that action
to !lie point where the Viet Cong insurgency becomes
'..nc fianoi Government has been deeply com-
ited to its present course of policy for many years.
(See the documented analysis in "A Threat to the
Peace," Department of State Publication 7308.) It is
not likely to give up its objectives easily.
At the moment Hanoi believes that it is close to a
victory in South Viet-Nam. So long as the situation
in South Viet-Nam does not materially improve?so
long as the Saigon Government continues in a state
of ineffectiveness or disintegration?Hanoi will cling
to the hope of ultimate victory.
So long as it believes victory is near, it will prob-
ably be willing to accept very substantial costs from
United States air action. Its public posture, at home
and abroad, and its private behavior, both diplo-
matic and military, support this hypothesis.
- Not only will North Viet-Nam continue to have
the will to support the insurgency but it will continue
to have the ability.
Sigma II, conducted by the Joint War Games
./&a,-,,ency, Cold War Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
from September 8 to 11, 1964, revealed that exhaust-
ing the 1964 target list presently proposed for air
strikes would not cripple Hanoi's capability for in-
creasing its support of the Viet Cong, much less force
suspension of present support levels on purely logisti-
cal grounds.
2. Assuming that we might, through military pressure,
persuade the Hanoi Government that it was paying
more .for the Viet Cong insurgency than it was gaining,
would that Government in fact have the capability to
stop or materially reduce the Viet Cong action to the
point where it became manageable?
In principle, the answer should probably be in the
affirmative. But what is far inure likely is that the
Government in Hanoi would publicly disclaim fur-
ther connection with the Viet Cong insurgency while
in fact continuing to supply covert help. As stated in
"Alternatives for Imposition of Measured Pressures
against North Viet-Nam" (Policy Planning paper,
March 1, 1964, Tab 2, page 4):
. . . Prob.ahly the most that could be expected in
the best of circumstances, would be that the DRV
would ultimately slacken and ostensibly cease its sup-
port of the VC, while pressing for a cease-fire in the
South, ordering the VC to regroup and lie low, and
covertly preparing to resume the insurrection as soon
as the DR.V thought it could get away with it. We can,
of course, have no assurance that such "best of cir-
cumstances" would obtain, even if considerable dam-
age had been done the DRV.. . .
3. If a complete military victory is not possible, can
we, by military pressure against North Viet-Nam, at
least improve our bargaining position to the point
where an acceptable negotiated solution might be
achieved?
This ciuestion cannot be answered categorically. So
far, the only kind of barain Hanoi has been inter-
ested in is one that would contemplate the with-
drawal of the United States forces. The mere fact
that we have levied destruction on North Viet-Nam
would not lay the basis for a viable negotiated settle-
ment unless at the same time three conditions had
been met:
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a. An effective government had been established
in Sai.cr,on.
b. The Viet Cong insurgency had been reduced to
a level where it could not eliminate a South Vietnam-
ese Government deprived of U.S. support.
c. Effective international arrangements had been
established to prevent further infiltration of supplies
and material by the North Vietnamese Government.
4. If in fact, the United States, by direct employment
of inilitag power, did succeed in softening up the Ha-
noi Government, would this improve the climate for a
iw otiation that would be likely to include other Asian
end neutral powers?
The fundamental premise that it would be easier
to deal with North Viet-Nam after an air offensive is,
in my view, based on a wrong assessment of the po-
litical impact of such a course worldwide and its ef-
fect on our bargaining strength. These issues will be
exam:Lied more fully in a later section.
C.
Posslhle Censetlitenees of U.S.-Initiated Escalation
l.tVoidd the Hanoi Government yield to the pressure
generated by our air offensive without first undertaking
a major invasion .of South Viet-Nam .by North Viet-
Lamese forces?
in reacting to our air offensive, the North Viet-
nemese Government would be likely to follow the
?nrinciple that each party would choose to tight the
kind of war best adapted .to its resources. If we were
to escalate by employing air power?a type of offen-
sive capability in which we have the unquestioned
advantage?the North Vietnamese would be clearly
tempted to retaliate by using ground forces, which
they possess in overwhelming numbers. As sia.',cd ri
Ac October 3 draft SNIE (which the Intelligence
'Board is considering today), ". . there would be a
substantial danger that they would increase the pres-
sure of the insurgency in South Viet-Nam, in-
:rot:tie:ag additional forces to speed the collapse of
the GVN and thus cut the base from under the US
position before North Viet-Nam had suffered unac-
ceptable damage."
At the least we could expect Hanoi to make a
larger infiltration effort. It is estimated that within
two months an additional two divisions could be coy-
eri'le introduced through Laos and across the DMZ.
eIanoi mieht also increase terror and sabotage in
tile South. including terror attacks on American per-
solaitel in Saigon and even the bombing of Saigon
end oi'fir urban centers to induce demoralization.
Nor can we rule out the possibility that iianoi
would undertake an overt ? invasion. By directly
bombing North Viet-Nam, we would have removed
the political inhibition against overt use of force. It is
estimated that in two months' time, it could put six
divisions (roughly 60,000 men) across the zone and
through the Panhandle. This could not, of course, be
done without expense. It would expose the North
Vietnamese forces to counterblows from the air,
especially against lines of communication and
supply.
2. Would the Peiping Government permit the North
Vietnamese Government to stop the Viet Cong- insur-
gency without its intervening directly on a limited or
total basis?
China has substantial interests that would be jeop-
ardized by United States air strikes against North
Viet-Nam.
a. Its first interest is to avoid the loss of lace that it
would suffer if it did not come to the assistance of a
Communist neighbor against a United States attack.
Peiping has, since our strike of August 5, repeatedly
proclaimed at the most authoritative levels that "ag-
gression against the DRV is aggression against
China." it has also conducted continuous propa-
ganda campaigns to prepare its military and civilian
populace for helping North Viet-Nam. On the other
side of the coin, Hanoi's posture in the Sino-Soviet
dispute has persistently supported Peiping's positions
and attacked those adopted by Moscow, at least since
June, 1963, and fear of subservience to Peiping does
not seem to have materially affected Hanors course
of action in confronting either Moscow or Washing-
ton.
b. A second Chinese interest is to safeguard its
own security, which would be menaced by United
States action directed at the establishment of South-
east Asia as a permanent base of threatening United
States power. This seems clearly to have been the
Chinese motivation in attacking when we ap-
proached the Yalu River.
c. A third interest is Chinese concern for the main
rail line linking coastal Kwangtung with inner Yun-
nan i'ro-tance. This line transits North Viet-Nam and
is vital to the security of South China.
Already Communist China has involved itself in
the air defense of North Viet-Nam by deploying Chi-
nese pilots and aircraft to Niue Yen and in the instal-
lation ofjoint Sino-Vietnamese air warning systems.
Of course, the question of possible Chinese in-
volvement cannot be answered categorically one way
or another. The October 3 draft SNIE concludes that
in :he face of sustained U.S. air attacks on North
Viet-Nam, "a large-scale Chinese Communist
ground or air intervention would be unlikely." But
we would be imprudent to undertake escalation with-
out assuming that there was a fair chance that China
would intervene. We made a contrary assumption in
Korea in October of 1950 with highly unfortunate
consequences. Let us recall the circumstances.
"In your opinion," President Truman asked Gen-
eral MacArthur, ''is there any chance that the Chinese
might enter the war on the side of North Korea?"
MacArthur shook his head. "I'd say there's very
little chance of that happening. They have several
hundred thousand men north of the Yalu, but they
haven't any air force. If they tried to cross the river
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,.AAL
aif force woald slaughter them. At the most per-
haps 60,033 troops would make it. Our infantry could
eisily contain them. I expect the actual fighting in
North Korea to end by Thanksgiving. We should
have our men home, or at least in Japan, by Christ-
mas."
A. the very moment that President Truman and
General MacArthur were talking, there were already
,-.-13;e than 100,000 Chinese Communist troops in
North Korea, and another 200,000 were ready to cross
the Yalu. By mid-November at least 300,000 Chinese
wohld be poised to strike?and the ROK, American
and other UN forces would not even be aware of their
presence. Before the war was over, the Chinese Com-
maids: armies in Korea would reach a peak strength
of more than a million men.
(Don Lawson: The United States in the KoreanM7ar,
p. 79)
:5. WO:lfd it be possible for the United States to control
:he process of escalation so as to achieve the requisite
inyrovement in its bargaining position without danger
of trii;go.ing the kind of North Vietnamese or Chinese
action envisaged by paragraphs. 2?
ThIs cLueszion goes to the heart of the premise
upon which the proposals of military pressure
? t North Vie-Nam are based?that we can take
o,.-Tc!osive action while controlling the risks and that
vie can hait the process of escalation whenever we
;eel we have accomplished our objective or the
enemy is about to respond with unacceptable force.
fotn this t)c,-err.ise of doubtful validity. As we
ntount the scale of nrop.ressively more intensive air
attac!.Is on North Viet--Narn, either Hanoi will re-
or i: won't. Either Peiping will respond or it
. (And assume that what is wanted is not a
.,.)revenjvC: war with China.)
1.esponds, we shall be led to continue our
...chs until inere is SOrne indication by Hanoi that it
:eady to negotiate. But once Hanoi or Peiping does
ccs and, our own counteraction will have to be mea-
'C-1 ny the character of that response.
is in. the nature of escalation that each move
rases the option to the other side, while at the same
:iarty whicn seems to be losing wilt be
t:;r.-i-)te.el to keep raising the ante. To the extent that
the response to a move can be controlled, that move
is r,rcinably ineffective. If the move is effective, it may
no. be p,oss:ble to control?or accurately anticipate?
, S:-,onse.
on the tiger's back we cannot be sure of pick-
toe place to dismount.
V
D.
Need for U.S. Ground Forces
it be possible to repel a heightened ground
:forth Vietna:nese forces against South Viet-
:Van; without .5ibstaiiiial U.S. land forces?
The answer to this question is clearly "no."
in the case of an invasion it is obvious.
But even substantially increased infiltration from
North Viet-Nam would require substantial American
ground units to defend our bases from attacks by the
North.
We cannot counter ground forces by air power
alone, as we quickly learned in Korea.
And we should remember that in South Viet-Nam
the nature of the terrain reduces the premium on
modern firepower and logistic equipment even more
than it did in Korea.
2. Could substantial U.S. combat forces be committed
to South Viet-Nam without substantially altering the
relationship of the United States to the war?
Up to now we have maintained in tile eyes of the
world that our forces were in South Vict-Nam solely
to advise and train South Vietnamese forces and as-
sist them with logistics. The injection of substantial
United States combat forces would necessarily
change our relationship to the management of the
war. Such forces would be assuming conspicuous
combat roles under a direct United States chain of
command.
At the same time the presence of United States
combat troops would necessarily mean a progressive
taking-over of many of the functions now exercised
by the South Vietnamese.
The French would take the lead its pointing out
that we had now clearly put ourselves in the position
of France in the early 1950s?with all the disastrous
political connotations of such a posture. Asians
would not miss the point.
The repercussions of this action -would also be sub-
stantial on the home front. Americans would feel, for
the first time, that they had again been committed by
their leaderS to an Asian war. The frustrations and
anxieties that marked the latter phases of the Korean
struggle would be recalled and revived?and multi-
plied in intensity.
3. Could additional forces needed for security against
the consequences of escalation in Southeast Asia be
provided without large-scale U.S. mobilization? How
fast could the United States move to carry out such
mobilization? ?
(The answer to this question has not yet been de-
veloped.)
E.
l?t?e,5sure for Use of Atomic Weapons
1. If the conflict stalemated on land?and particularly
V the Chinese intervened?would the United States be
likely to resort to the use of at least tactical nuclear
iveapo,ls?
If ground fighting should drag on for a sustained
period, the U.S. forces would begin to take sub-
stantial casualties.
At this point, we should certainly expect mounting
pressure for the use of at least tactical nuclear weap-
ons. The American people would not again accept
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the frustrations and anxieties that resulted from our
abstention from nuclear combat in Korea.
The rationaiization of a departure from the self-
denyine,. ordinance of Korea would be that we did
not have battlefield nuclear weapons in 1950?yet we
do have them today.
At the same time we must recognize that in the
eyes of the world, and of Americans, the distinction
betwesm tactical and strategic nuclear weapons car-
;:es little conviction.
2. Could nuclear ,eapons be used without substantial
political costs to our world position?
Our employment of the first tactical nuclear
weapon would inevitably be met by a Communist ac-
cusation that we use nuclear weapons only against
yellow men (or colored men). It is Communist
dogma that this is the reason that we used atomic
bombs against Japan but not against Germany in
World War II. There would be a profound shock
around the world not merely in :Japan but also
among the nonwhite nations on every continent.
In this connection we should recall the reactions in
Deceinber, 1950, when President Truman even sug-
gested the possibility of using atomic bombs in the
Kot-ean War?at a time when we still had the nuclear
monopoly.
As stated by T. R. Fehrenbach, in This Kind of
Within three hours, there was resulting explosion.
The TiilICS of I December remarked: The Presi-
dent's mention of an atom bomb caused con-
sternation and alarm in Britain and brought from
France ofilcial disapproval. Most U.N. delegates were
Lul.feeci that it would be politically disastrous to use
the bomb in Asia.
Nothing so awakened the French Assembly as
mention of the bomb. To the fear of the bomb lately
has been added a fear of General MacArthur, who is
regarded as impulsive and reckless in his reported de-
sire to bomb Manchuria and risk extending die war.
A headline read: Britons dismayed by Truman's
talk?Attiee will fly to Washington to discuss crisis
wlibt President.
The London Times editorialized: [Truman] touched
upon the most sensitive fears and doubts of this
ace.. . .
Winston Churchill, in Commons, warned 'the West
..gains; involvement in Asia at the expense of Europe.
The :-:ouse cheered Prime Minister Attlee's an-
nounced edg,ht to Washington.
La Melbourne, Australia, where there were few
friends of Red China, newspapers expressed the hope
ttiat diplomatic s dli would avert a conflict with Com-
munist China. The Melbourne Herald wrote: The Chi-
neSe. era no longer be despised militarily. Their revo-
lutionary leaders obviously command unity and
loyalty v.'hich Chiang never attained.
Italian Communists and anti-Communists alike ex-
pressed deep fears of general. war.
And papers all over the world stated that Mac-
Arthur should have halted the U.N. armies no farther
north than the middle of North Korea, leaving a
;Julie; between them and Manchuria.
The Communists would certainly point out that we
were the only nation that had ever employed nuclear
weapons in anger. And the Soviet Union would em-
phasize its position of relative virtue in having a nu-
clear arsenal which it had never used.
At the same time, our action would liberate the So-
viet Union from inhibitions that world sentiment has
imposed on it. It would upset the fragile balance of
terror on which much of the world has come to de-
pend or the maintenance of peace. Whether or not
tile Soviet Union actually used nuclear weapons
against other nations, the very fact that we had pro-
vided a justification for their use would create a new
wave of fear.
The consequences of all this cannot be overstated.
For the past four years we have been making slow
but perceptible progress toward a new era of rela-
tions between the two centers of power M this mid-
twentieth-century world. But the first use of the
bomb by the United States would destroy all this. It
would set us back to the tense and suspicions days
before tile Cuban missile crisis. Prospects for dis-
armament and other measures for lot?vering the gen-
eral level of world anxiety would be destroyed.
Moreover, we would feel the eacts deeply at
home. The first firing of a nuclear weapon (whether
tactical or strategic, it makes no difference) would re-
vive a real but latent guilt sense in many Americans.
It would create discouragement and a profound
sense of disquiet. it would generate resentment
against a Government that had gotten America in a
position where we had again been forced to use nu-
clear power to our own world discredit.
17.
1,)ossibility of Soviet Intervention
1.lf2lhat are the chances that the Soviet Union might
imervene before or after the intervention of China and
what fOrtn would Soviet intervention be likely to take?
There is no reason to expect Soviet military inter-
vention at an early stage of a U.S. air offensive
against North Viet-Nam. But the Soviet Union
would certainly be expected to lead a propaganda at-
tack against U.S. imperialism and to support the po-
litical demands of Hanoi. This is an imperative of So-
viet policy that derives from its competition with Red
China for domination of the Communist parties
around the world.
If Red China should decide at some stage in the
struggle to intervene directly by the interjection of its
own land forces, this would, of course, present a new
situation. Peiping could then put great pressure on
the Soviet Union to provide assistance?at least in
materiel. This would probably have the effect of nar-
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The Prophecy the President Rejected
ng the schism between Moscow and Peiping, for
s.vc should have provided both sides with a common
eaciny.
Finally, oar expenditure of even a single nuclear
weapon would impose the ultimate test for the integ-
rity of international Communism. While no one can
be certain, the best judgment is that the Soviet Union
could not sit by and let nuclear weapons be used
arrainst China.
G.
The lebtdver;ollileitl Costs of Escalation
1/onld the clear evidence of our intention to carry
out our commitments increase United Slates prestige
around the world?
The assumption which has governed our planning
with respect to South Viet-Nam has been that the
United ';trites must successfully stop the extension of
Communist power into South Viet-Nam if its prom-
ises are to have credence. It is argued that failing
such an effort our Allies around the world would be
inclined to doubt our promises and to feel that they
could no longe: safely rely upon American power
ainst Communist aggressive ambitions.
lnive ay our own public statements contributed
to such a reaction. (See, for example, Attorney Gen-
eral l:ennedy's comment in Germany that if Ameri-
cans did not stop Communism. in South Viet-Nam,
eotal poopie believe that they would stop it in
Ar si l'inse concerns one must balance the view
m.triy of oar Allies that we are engaged in a fruit-
less straggle in South Viet-Nam?a struggle we are
bat d to lose.
They fear that as we become too deeply involved
?w.r on the land mass of Asia, we will tend to lose
atic.-est. problems. They believe that we
v-ould I-boils:1 to risk bo,,c,eeing ourselves down in
tan Indochina jungle. They fear a general loss of eon-
tamec .Atenerican judgment that could result if we
.sticd a course which many regarded as neither
mien-, nor necessary.
Whet we might gain by establishing the steadfast-
ness 02 our commit merits we could lose by an erosion
dent:e in our Warilent.
"c"
L-,1:7 balance of these two considerations
vary vi'idely from country to country depend-
Ire national interest and national ex-
each nation involved.
1?'ance would also be affected by the depth of
an Airict-ican involvement on the one hand and the
an in which we might propose to achieve a pa-
solution without direct military involvement
ca a ma em.
Cr.c point, licywever, is clear. We cannot assume
ih:n an escalation of the war in South Viet-Nam in-
volving a more profound American engagement
would 'be 'universally applauded by our friends and
Allies or that it would necessarily operate to increase
our prestige or the confidence placed in us.
2. How would countries in Southeast Asia react to
these courses of action?
The Philippines and Thailand would have an ini-
tial preference for escalation over any immediate
move for a political solution. They might be pre-
pared at the outset of escalation to offer material
help in the form of bases and perhaps technical per-
sonnel. But this initial reaction would last only so
long as our actions showed unequivocal signs of suc-
cess in halting North Vietnamese aggression in South
Viet-Nam and produced no serious threat of Red
China's involvement. Should Red China come to
North Viet-Nam's defense, Thailand, at least, would
be alarmed at the dangers of an overland thrust from
the North.
It is possible that the move for a political solution
might create a crisis of confidence on the part of
Thailand. Yet with their usual pragmatism and real-
ism, the Thais would be unlikely to blame the United
States were Saigon simply to give up the fight. So
much would depend upon the sequence of devel-
opments, the final settlement, and what we were pre-
pared to offer as a guarantee of our willingness to as-
sist Thailand. against aggression, that I cannot now
make a ;IlOre FCCiSC prediction.
Suspicious or hostile neutrals-43unna, Cambodia,
and Indonesia?would have mixed feelings about ei-
ther Course. But they would no doubt be happier
with a political solution out of' a simple desire to see
the "mess" in South Vict-Nam disappear. A U.S. air
offensive against North Viet-Nam would be publicly
condemned in both Cambodia and Indonesia, but
only Cambodia might be likely to give marginal help
to the Communists.
3. How would this affect our position in Japan and
elsewhere iii Asia?
japanose views have not yet crystallized on the im-
portance to Japan's security of Southeast Asia, much
less South Viet-Nam. Tokyo seems to have little
faith, at present, that South Viet-Nam can long resist
the Viet Cong. Under these circumstances, a care-
fully worked out political solution would presumably
be preferred to escalation, especially were escalation
to bring in Red China. This latter contingency would
prove embarrassing for the government if any use
were made of our bases or our forces in Japan.
01- all the Asian countries the Republic of China
and the Republic of Korea would probably have the
strongest' preference for escalation and most deter-
mined opposition to a political solution. For Taiwan,
the stales would be nothing less than recovery of the
mainland as opposcd to an expansion of Red Chi-
nese power. Seoul would interpret our willingness to
remain commined in Asia in one direction or the
other, depending upon how we handled these courses
of action.
4. would be the effect on the United States's po-
sition in the other less-developed countries?
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The general attitude of the less-developed
countries is not hard to predict. In my view a care-
fully worked out political arrangement would cost
the United States little with most of the less-devel-
oped countries, particularly if it appeared that in
- joining in developing such an arrangement we were
. responding to the wish of the South Vietnamese
people to bring a halt to the war. The loss of face to
the United States under these circumstances should
not be at all substantial.
On the other hand, the opinion of the less-devel-
oped countries would strongly oppose an air offen-
sive against North Viet-Nam. The element of race
\vould have a strong influence, as well as the dis-
parity in strength and size between ourselves and the
Vietnamese. We could not avoid a reaction in many
of the less-developed countries that we had sub-
stituted ourselves for the French in the continuation
of a colonial war.
Our loss of prestige in the nonaligned countries, or
even in most of those less-developed countries allied
with us in defense arrangements, would, of course, be
enormously magnified if we were led to use even one
nuclear weapon.
5. ;ruit,n would be the effect on the United States's po-
sition it: Europe?
Most of our European allies would, I think, tip-
timid a move on our part to cut our losses and bring
about a political solution. Opinion in France is, of
course, clear on this question. But opinion in other
European countries would also be against any escala-
tion of the war that might conceivably lead to the in-
volvement of European combat forces on the Asian
N?ini nland.
As has repeatedly been pointed out in this memo-
randum, tile issues in Indochina are not clearly de-
CU100. as they were in Korea. Even during the Ko-
rean War our Allies grew unhappy with the extent of
our involvement as the war dragged on?even those
who had applauded our demonstration of steadfast-
ness at the beginning.
I discussed this general problem of European reac-
tions to Viet-Nam with [NATO] Secretary-General
3rosio the other night. In Italy, he salc.1, public opin-
ion was not sympathetic with the American efforts in
South Viet-Nam?even though our position was un-
derstood by some of the leaders at the top level of the
Ciovernment. In Germany he had observed a willing-
ness to accept America's present Southeast Asia po-
lieies -as a matter of correctness," but Germans
would certainly feel deep concern if they ever
thought \ye were becoming involved on the Asian
iand mass to the point where we might begin to re-
face our defense efforts in Europe.
The British are, of course, a special case because of
their own interests in Malaysia. I cannot, however,
believe that any British Government?particularly a
Labor Government?would be happy if our air offen-
sive should continue for any length of time against a
small Asian country.
in final essence, our influence in Europe depends
not merely on the defense efforts we are making, but
on European confidence in our judgment and re-
straint. If we were to take any action that might be
regarded as demonstrating either a lack of judgment
or a lack of restraint, we would greatly undermine
our European position.
The French are already busily promoting rumors
that the United States is so involved in Southeast
Asia that it can no longer be depended upon to con-
cern itself with Europe. Once WC mounted an air of-
fensive that might lead to substantial escalation, this
rumor would begin to find a willing audience in sev-
eral European countries.
IT)AnT TWO
?:-.1073L-Ems POSSMLITIES
OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION
A.
The Thnust of the Analysis
The analysis contained in Part One suggests the
faowing:
1. Unless the political base in Saigon can he made
secure, the mounting of military pressure against the
North would involve unacceptable risks.
2. To persuade the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment to leave South Viet-Nam alone, military pres-
sure against Hanoi would have to be substantial and
sustained.
3. Even with substantial and sustained military
pressure it is improbable that Hanoi would per-
manently abandon its aggressive tendencies against
South Viet-Nam so long as the governmental struc-
ture in South Viet-Nam remained weak and in-
capable of rallying the full support of the South Viet-
namese people.
4. The United States cannot substitute its own
presence for an effective South 'Vietnamese Govern-
ment and maintain a free South Viet-Nam over a
sustained period of time. ?
5. We must be clear as to the profound con-
sequences of a United States move to apply sus-
tained and substantial military pressure against
North Viet-Nam. The response to that move?or even
the deployments required by prudence in anticipa-
tion of a response?would radically change the char-
acter of the war and the United States's relation to
the war. The war would become a direct conflict be-
tween the United States and the Asian Communists
(North Viet-Nara cum Red China).
6. Once the United States had actively committed
itself to direct conflict with the North Vietnamese
and Hanoi had responded, we could not be certain of
controlling the scope and extent of escalation. We
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Rejected
ctirniot more the danger?slight though some be-
lieve it 'to be?that we :night set in train a series of
events leading, at the end of the road, to the direct
intervention of China and nuclear war.
7. Finally, it remains to be proved that in terms of
U.S. prestige and our world position, we would risk
less or gain more through enlarging the war than
-thi:ough searching for an immediate political solution
that would avoid deeper U.S. involvement.
Wnat: Political Solution?
e analysis in Part One logically raises the ques-
don as to what is meant by political solution. How
could this be achieved at minimum cost and maxi-
mum security?
: can set down no more than a sketchy outline of
the possibilities. For quite obvious reasons, we have
so far not undertaken any intensive expert study of
this qtiestion.
We hava spent months of concentrated effort try-
inc to devise ways and means to advance the present
-policy of winning the war in the South.
We have spent weeks trying to devise an effective
strategy for applying increasing military pressure
-r sst sbe North.
but we have given almost no attention to the pos-
sible :,olitieni means of fading a way out without
annner enitirnenuent of the war.
1. we are to make informed decisions on the range
of crhicai issues that now confront us?decisions that
would reflect the evidence and arguments on more
than one side of the case?we should undertake a
see-trolling study of this question without further de-
As a preliminary contribution to such a study I
consideration of the following issues?among
otter.;.
C.
ClearireJ the Air ;or a Negotiated Solution
Is :valistic to think we can improve our nogotiat-
71on by an air offensive?
of dose who argue for applying sustained
pressure against the North disclaim the ob-
ective of totn1 military victory. They contend instead
s;:.7h military pressure is necessary in order to
-,rove ;he bargaining position of the United
i.aes?or, in other words, in order to enable us to.
from strength.
This contention presupposes that it will be possible
aeeve a political solution that will satisfy the ma-
jor retirements of American policy?but only after
the war has '0.-?en transformed from its present chic-
acter of a conflict between North Viet-Nan-1 (earn
Red China) and South Viet-Nam (Qum the United
States) into a clear demonstration of the superiority
of U.S. to Asian power and determination.
I reject this thes-is. In my view the transformation
of the war in this manner would create enormous
risks for the United States and impose costs in-
commensurate with the possible benefits. But at the
same time I would challenge also the thesis that a ne-
gotiation arrived at after sustained military pressure
would necessarily result in a more favorable political
solution than a negotiation that was not preceded by
such pressure?even assuming .that we were able to
avoid a major war in the process.
The position I am urging becomes clear, I think,
when we examine the elements that would constitute
a solution adequate to our political requirements.
D.
What Provisions Should We Seek to Have Included
in a Negotiated Settlement?
Ideally a negotiated settlement of the problem of
South Viet-Narn should include the following provi-
sions:
(a) The effective commitment of North Viet-Nam
to stop the insurgencY in the South;
(b) The establishment of an independent govern-
ment in Saigon capable of cleaning up the remaining
elements of insurgency, once Hanoi has ceased its di-
rect Support;
(c) Recognition that the Saigon Government re-
mains free to call on the United States or any other
friendly power for help if it should again need assis-
tance; and
(d) Enforcible guarantees of the continued inde-
pendence of the Saigon Government by other signa-
tory powers.
E.
Want Kind of Political Settlement Might We
Reasonably Hope to Achieve by Negotiation
Following Sustained Military Pressure on the North?
I. How would we move from sustained air attack to
the conference table?
The draft SNIF, 10-3-64 entitled "Probable Com-
munist Reactions to Certain Possible U.S./GVN
Courses of Action" indicates that the range of Com-
munist reactions to a U.S. air offensive might in-
clude:
a. Retaliatory military moves on the ground;
b. A temporary suspension of Viet Cong action;
c. A drive to increase the insurgency in South
Viet-Nam by the introduction of additional
forces "to speed the collapse ofhe MTN and
thus cut the base from under the U.S. posi-
tion before North Viet-Nam had suffered un-
acceptable damage";
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d. An l'ort to mobilize international pressure
the ITn;7enl States and a sugg's'hn of
some williress to accommodate U.S./GVN
views in order to bring about a new confer-
ence.
The SNIE suggests that it is unlikely that Hanoi
and Peiping would undertake large-scale Chinese
Communist ground or air intervention in view of
Communist China's desire to avoid a full-scale war
with die United States. However, they do not?and in
One nattire of things cannot?rule out this possibility
tniiegorically. Nor can we prudently do so in design-
a South Vietnamese policy in view of the magi-li-
lt:tie of the costs if we are wrong.
As of the time this is written, there does not appear
to be full unanimity in the intelligence Community
as to the emphasis to be placed on the alternative possi-
bilities that Hanoi might react to sustained U.S. air
attack by (a) temporarily slowing down or sus-
pending Viet Cong action or (b) reinforcing and ac-
celerating the South Vietnamese insurgency. If Ha-
noi were, in fact, to introduce additional forces into
South Viet-Narn and achieve conspicuous Viet Cong
successes, we should be faced with substantial pres-
sure for the United States to move from air attacks
against North Viet-Nam to a direct involvement of
American forces against the insurgency.
Certainly the conclusions of the SNIE?tentative as
they ttre?underline the fragility of dtc governmental
stroeture in the South and suggest clearly the hazards
of a quantum jump in United States military involve-
ment through an air offensive, at a time when the le-
gitimacy Jour presence could be destroyed over-
night by the emergence of a neutralist government in
Saigon.
Certainly, if, following the institution of an air of-
fensive, IIanoi were to begin serious agitation to
summon an international conference to halt "U.S.
aggression," we should have to respond quickly be-
lore the Saigon Government crumbled beneath us
r.r.tt world opinion coalesced against us.
2. i:ou strong a position would America have in a
CCi;IC.'iVnCe that followed a sustained air offensive?
Any negotiation that followed an air offensive
would probably take place in the framework of a
cc international conference. Hanoi and the Com-
munist Bloc nations could be expected to sec.'.k such
a conference, and we should be under great pressure
front neutral countries to acquiesce.
We should not assume that our posture in such a
conference would be very good. We would already
have taken the fateful step of recasting our Southeast
Asian role. No longer could we succeed in 'presenting,
oorseives as a great power engaged in helping a
beleaguered small power at the small power's
t-equest. in the eyes of a great part of the world we
would appear as the leading Free World power uti-.
iizing modern weapons of destruction to destroy tile
economic life of a defenseless small nation. Certainly
this would be the thrust of Communist propaganda.
it would be reinforced by gloomy headshaking iii
Paris. We would be cast in an aggressive role as
never before in the postwar world.
Let me reiterate once more that Indochina is not
Korea. In bombing North Viet-Nam we would not be
seeking to stop massive and overt aggression south of
the Yalu River on behalf of the UN. We would ap-
pear instead to be a great power raining destruction
on a small power because we accused that small
power of instigating what much of the world would
quite wrongly regard as an indigenous rebellion.
Under these circumstances our position at the con-
ference table would be awkward?hi spite of our best
efforts to portray America's role in its truelight. Cur-
tninly we would expect both the Communists and
nonaligned powers to insist?as an indispensable pre-
requisite in any settlement?that the United States
withdraw its military presence front Southeast Asia.
We would expect also a cease-fire, which the United
States would necessarily obey but which in the na-
ture of the insurgency would be very hard to police.
it is hard to foretell how the conference would deal
with the insurgency itself. Most OF the member na-
tions would instinctively seek some kind of recon-
ciliation of the Vietnamese and Viet Cong elements
through an enlargement of the go \,?erninenitti base.
But, as will be pointed out, we should be nble to
achieve that result quite as easily and in a better hi-
termatioumi we wcht it.) m Culli.CVLI-Lc...: that
had not been preceded by an air offensive.
it may be contended that the scenario I have out-
lined is not one that the United States need follow.
Instead of agreeing to a big conference, could we not
undertake to pursue a negotiniing track through di-
rect or indirect approaches to Hanoi and try to bring
about a political settlement that would not bog us
clown as happened in Geneva in 1962?
I seriously question the possibility that we could
avoid a big conference. Once we had launched an air
offensive we would find ourselves under great world
pressure to stop the shooting, and move to a confer-
ence table in the presence ot. other nations. The war,
in elect, would have become everybody's business.
We should have lost the option of quiet negotiation?
and indeed a good deal of our ability to influence the
choice of forum.
3. What can we reasonably hope to achieve by a nego-
tiation not preceded by direct militag action against
ihe North?
a. First of all we could expect the condition prece-
dent to the beginning of negotiations to be an agree-
ment a cease-fire.
b. As part of the settlement regular U.S. forces
would almost certainly have to be withdrawn. This
withdrawal, however, might be phased. It would
commence only when the cease-fire was fully effec-
tive and provision might be made for the return of
U.S. Forces (at the request of the Saigon Govern-
ment) if the cease-fire were violated.
c. The base of the Saigon Government would
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The Prophecy the President Rejected
have to be broadened to include Viet Cong elements.
o. Depending upon the format of the negotiation
die independence of South Viet-Nam might be guar-
anteed by other signatory powers with possible pro-
vision for a control commission or some other kind of
international pressure to police the security provi-
sions of the agreement.
F.
The Possllfility of a Diplomatic Settlement Not
Pr:icedo.il by On Air Offensive
I.1 SuE preliminary steps should we take to minimize
the cost to .American prestige of a negotiated solution
no! preceded by ndlitary action?
We are presently in South Viet-Nam because the
South Vietnamese people, speaking through their
Government, have asked us to help them resist Com-
munist aggression. We have repeatedly stated that
we will continue in South Viet-Nam "so long as the
i'Livamese people wish us to help." We have tried to
matte clear to the world that we are prepared to assist
any nation tl:ist asks our aid in defending its freedom
iiigeinst Communist attack.
The ciaiii.fying words "so long as the Vietnamese
people wish us to help" assume two things:
-a. Ti there is in fact a widespread desire on
he part of the Vietnamese people to avoid a Com-
munist J.:Ilse-over and that they are prepared to
continue to risk their lives in a sustained struggle
achieve this end; and
b. That South Viet-Nam has an effective Gov-
ernment -that can speak for the South Vietnamese
neople and can conduct the struggle on their
be-
Athe moment, both of these points are in doubt.
.ct ?igence information discloses substantial war-
yeearittess aihonn the South Vietnamese people. This
Peel:0dt by a rising curve of desertions and the
Government's increasing difficulty in filling the rolls
tar eet:Isnlent.
The fact that there is no effective South Vietnam-
ese Government that can adequately direct the af-
feirs of the country in the present war crisis hardly
needs o:nem. Almost every substantive cable
underlines this point.
As a first step in preparing the ground for a politi-
cal solution at minimum cost, we should make clear
to Inc worth how the juridical and political basis for
cr tinted American effort relates to the existing
slate of ftic:s in South Viet-Nam.
n speciflc terms, this would involve the following
steps:
a. \17c should clearly and emphatically reiterate
the 'oasis for our involvement in South Viet-Nern,
emphasing the qualifying phrase "so long as the
Son ItVietnamese wish us to help." We should put
other governments on notice that we do not intend
to remai-et in South Viet-Nam, once it develops
that the Vietnamese people, speaking through
their Government, no longer desire our help. NVe
should, so far as possible, seek to make a virtue out
of this position, emphasizing that, unlike the Com-
munists, we never seek to impose our will on an-
other country.
b. We might, at the same time, serve notice on
the South Vietnamese Council that we are deter-
mined to continue the struggle and have the capa-
bility to do so but that this is possible only if they
achieve a unity of purpose in Saigon, clearly ex-
press that unity, and create a Government free
from factionalism and capable of carrying on the
affairs of the country.
c. If properly managed, this notice should signal
to whatever responsible elements remain in Saigon
that they must declare themselves. It might be ex-
pected to have one of three effects:
(I) Hopefully?but not probably?it might re-
sult in pulling together the responsible elements
in the country and lead to the creation of a uni-
fied government.
(2) It might free the capitulationists and neu-
tralist elements to organize a government on
neutralist principles.
(3) In spite of the fact that we had empha-
sized "United States determination equally v,itit
the condition precedent, there would probably
be a strong tendency in Saigon to regard this as
a warning of ultimate United States dis-
engagement. The most likely overt reaction
would be ambiguous. I3ut we would almost cer-
tainly accelerate existing covert probing of the
possibilities of a deal with Vict Cong elements.
(See SNIE 53-2-64, par. 10.)
2. Should we seek immediate negotiations or a period
of maneuver?
it would probably be better for us to encourage a
period of ambiguity than to seek immediate negotia-
tions. el-ne main argument on the other side is that
the .Viet Cong now have no prominent leader to rep-
resent them, in time they might gain one. But this
factor seems more than offset by the arguments for a
period of maneuver. A U.S. effort to force an abrupt
showdown would increase the chances that the South
Vietnamese would blame us for whatever ensued. A
period of delay would permit the various sectors of
Vietnamese opinion to adjust to the possibility of a
political solution. Such a period would also permit
the personalities who miglif otherwise be the victims
of retaliation to make their own personal arrange-
ments. And, by allowing a period of wheeling and
dealing, the United States itself might play a more
effective role in influencing the selection of a transi-
tional government and affect the shape of the nego-
tiations.
3. fkiiat other Governments might be helpfully enlisted
in setting the stage fbr a negotiated solution?
The Governments that should be considered in-
clude:
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a. The United Kingdom
b. Canada
c. The Philippines
d. Poland arid India (through the ICC)
I do not suggest that we approach the French Gov-
ernment. Certainly De Gaulle's policy will be to try
'oring, out United States disengagement at maxi-
mum, rather than minimum,. cost to United States
prestitie.
It is important that we design our plan of
action in such a manner as to avoid having it appear
as h 'French diplomatic victory.
i noL prepared at this point to suggest thc man-
'- in which the good offices of other governments
hi be used, since this will require a study ot the
problem and the definition of a more precise course
of policy.
G.
Framework for a Settlement
1. 7far kinds of framework might be utilized for
achieving a negotiated settlement?
a. The first is a localized negotiation between a
neutralist South Viet-Nam Government and the Na-
tional Liberation Front. This would probably not
lead to the reunification of Viet-Nam?at least not
immediately?but merely to the creation of a govern-
ment of national union. In reality, of course, the Na-
tiotaf Front would be speaking under the
tutelage of the Hanoi Government, but the negotia-
tions wotad have the appearance of a local reshuf-
ding of the various elements involved in the inter-
mttional South Vietnamese struggle.
Localized in this way, the settlement would not
contemplate any third-power guarantees?at least
b. file second possibility is a negotiation between
Cite Saigon Government and the Government in lia-
non A settlement reached in this manner would be
:o lead to the reunification of Viet-Nam under
government largely dominated by Communists.
c. The t,f2ird possibility is a large-scale approach to
the "neutralization" of South Viet-Nam with third-
powe: :,:tiarantees.
TheL;11,:et of such a settlement would be to extend
the Laos formula to South Viet-Nam. In view of
present power relationships, the settlement would a!-
ii certainly mean the withdrawal of American
;o:ces.
d. The fourtli possibility is a large-scale approach
to the neutralization of all of Indochina (and even of
Soudfeast Asia) under third-power guarantees.
Tins is essentially what General de Gaulle is pro-
posing. Fle advocates a conference in which "ninny
n(:wers would participate." This means at least the
fourteen powers that participated in developing the
Geneva Accords. The outcome would presumably be
a revision of the Geneva Accords so as to apply
somethin..; akin to the Laos formula to the whole of
Indochina.
2. 1I/hat t;pe of framework would result in the best
outcome jOr American interests?
A strong argument can be made in favor of the
first option?a local settlement. Such a settlement,
worked out within South Viet-Nam, would mean the
incorporation of National Liberation Front elements
in the governmental base. But that government
would also include elements drawn from the reli-
gious sects, the Army, and other factors of Vietnam-
ese life. The result might well be an uneasy coalition
in which the Communists would presumably be the
most aggressive and dominant component. But the
full effect of a Communist take-over would be dif-
fused and postponed for a substantial period of time.
By making it possible for the South Vietnamese to
work out a settlement among themselves?without
the direct and overt interference of Ilanoi?we would
obscure and confuse the Communist victory by in-
jecting elements that suggested the resolution of an
internal revolt.
Such an approach would have die additional ad-
vantage that it would not directly involve Peiping. As
a consequence the settlement would not appear as
the overt extension of Chinese power further into
Southeast Asia. If?as is often argued?the Viet Minh
do not wish to have Red China -playing too lame a
role in their affairs, this form of settlement inight
help them to resist Chinese domination. To that ex-
tent it could serve the purposes or the West. .
We nifty be driven to this result and?if so?we
Should be prepared to minimize the breakage. But it
is not a solution which we should seek as an object of
policy.
Nor is a negotiation within the second framework.
While the matter certainly deserves more intensive
study than I have been able to give it, I can see defi-
nite til.fad?iatagcT a direct negotiation between
Saigon and Hanoi in which no other powers would
be present. There is a danger that such a negotiation
would involve a satellite status for South Viet-Nam if
it did not result in an actual reunification.
Certainiy, a large-scale conference on the 1962 Ge-
neva pattern would seem preferable to a direct Sai-
gon-Hanoi negotiation. By providing for a cocain-
rung third-party involvement?plus some kind of
national control mechanism?the great powers would
continue to exercise some restraint against overt
Coinihunist moves in the country.
As General de Gaulle has suggested, a 11-0e con-
fereficc would tend to dilute the nature of the direct
coarrontation between the Bloc and the Free World.
It should result in a settlement that would provide at
least some protection for non-Communist elements
in the population.
General do Gaulle pro-poses that such a conference
shouhl not be limited to the problem of South Viet-
Nam but should extend at least lb all the territory of
the old French Indochina. He has even indicated the
possibility of extending it to all of Southeast Asia.
To accept the principle of a large conference does
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not neeessarily mean acceptance of all Dc Gaulle's
assumptions. The virtues General de Gaulle sees in a
lariJe conference are that it would last a long time?a
year or even two years?and that during this period
the Viet Cong would maintain a cease-fire. The
maintenance of a cease-fire, however?particularly in
the case of an insurgency such as that. in South Viet-
Nam where there are no well-defined battle lines?
does not so.em'a very realistic possibility at view of
our other experiences with the Communists. in the
19t).4 Geneva Conference the Viet Minh used miii-
iary throughout the conference to influence
.Cc political result?including the siege of Dien Bien
t"hu.
General Cr Gaulle also puts great emphasis CM an-
other assumption, that Flo Chi Minh and the North
Vietnamese Government have inherited the ancient
Indochinese determination to resist Chinese domina-
tion. This tendency, however, might be better served
by a localized conference than by a conference in
which China played a dominant role. Certainly it is
hard to accept General de Gaulle's thesis that the
Red Chinese Government is not expansionist, that it
is preoccupied with domestic problems, and that for
at lenst the next 10-15 years Peiping will be content
to leave Southeast Asia alone?so long as it is not
menaced by an American presence in that peninsula.
3. Does IL, LW o.&i- 0 possible alternative _framework
po!'"ical
The in?Th 0 frh.nWv whh a conference solution is
inn -,crience shows that ad hoc machinery, usually
constituted on a Troika basis, is ineffective in polic-
jn settlement and in enforcing the safeguards es-
,
An a:tern:It:ye would appear to be UN involve_
moni. V,:hin all its defects, UN intervention in the
1\11.idie thst, the Congo, and even in Cyprus has
us advantages that would not have been
present in a situation of direct national involvement.
cotirse, there are a number of obvious objec-
tious. Li Thant, for example, has said that the situ-
.
ation in Viet-Nam would be beyond the capacity of'
the o:ganizetion. Moreover, the interests of Red
China aitel Nm .Viet-Nam, two nonmembers, are
very directly involved.
cc balance that should be struck ari7OilL', these
tori otuerf'X;r.S a frecinf, the use of the LIN cannot
or o.-irltienti..; determined without further intensive
snit., Nevertheless, in the past months we have al-
tahan tentative steps looking toward UN
iiivoieement in Indochina. I am convinced that this
' should not be abandoned without further in-
teris:vt: exploration and that this exploration should
niiaertiiiten at once.
I would certainly see grave disadvantages in ex-
tending the scope of the conference beyond In-
dochina. The question whether it should include all
of Indochina?North Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia, in addition to South Viet-Nam?is a tactical
one to which we should give careful study. Certainly
we have already dealt with Laos in the context of
such a conference, and we have expended a good
deal of capital in trying to prevent a conference in
the case of Cambodia. But we should, I think, take a
further look at this whole question within the context
of our Southeast Asia policy.
CONCLUSION
I offer this memorandum not as a definitive docu-
ment but as a challenge to the assumptions of our
current Viet-Nam policy. I have tried to suggest
areas of exploration that could lead to other options.
It may be observed that I have dwelt at length on
the probable reaction of other countries to alterna-
tive lines of action. This is not because I believe, that
in formulating our foreign policy we should be un-
duly preoccupied with what others want us to do or
that we should be continually looking over our shoul-
der. But our present line of policy has been justified
primarily on political grounds. It has been defended
on the proposition that America cannot afford to
promote a settlement in South Viet-Nam wIthout
first demonstrating the superiority of its own military
power?or, in other words, giving the North Vietnam-
ese a bloody nose. To do otherwise would enor-
mously diminish ,6imerican prestige around the
world afid cause others to lose faith in the tenacity of
our purpose and Inc integrity of our promises.
I have, therefore, sought to meet this thesis head-
on by discussing the effect on governments and pub-
lic opiaion in other nations.
There are conspicuous lacunae in this very prelimi-
nary paper. i have not attempted, for example, to
discuss the defense arrangements that we would have
to make with Thailand or the possible need to rein-
force British assurances with regard to Malaysia. I
think it likely that the development of a political so-
lution (whether or not preceded by an air offensive)
might atiminister extreme unction to SEATO. But
that is all a matter for further study.
What I am urging is that our Southeast Asian pol-
icy be ioolted at in all of its aspects and in the light of
our total world situation. It is essential that this be
done before we commit military l'orees to a line of ac-
tion that could put events in the saddle and destroy
our freedom to choose the policies that are at once
the meat effective and the most p1 udent.
r:proJuceri here, as in thc orib,inal iic'ino-
iyCtC at the tinte it was writtcn. Thus
Pciplug (Peking), and Red China
,:(7);(1.)1.'e if China).
I,feanings of abbreviations are as follows: GVAI?Govern-
merit of (5011;1; ) Vietnam; R 0 A' ?lic7mblic of (South) Ko-
re:" 1\-lLY---IVorth Viethahz; ICC- International Control
Cohani.,,sion for fih:lnaun; National intelli-
gence Eslimate; I/C- --Viet Umg; DR V--Democratic' Repub-
lic of (North) Vietnam.
49
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