UNDERSTANDING THE WAR IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000200100011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 7, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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7 November 1967
SUBJECT : Understanding the War in Vietnam
1. Attached is a copy of the report of the Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services
as a result of the former's visit to Southeast Asia in April, 1966.
You can get the flavor of it pretty well by reading the marked and
underlined portions.
2. I think that the understanding of the American people
and consequent support to the President might be enhanced if
the Stratton Committee made another visit now to Southeast Asia
to up-date their previous report in the same vein and with the
same sort of thrust. It seems to me that the progress has been
so great in the last year and a half that a new report of this sort
would have considerable impact.
3. It may well be that there are political factors with which
I am unfamiliar which might render such an effort counter-productive.
This is something that I think can better be judged by you and would
probably require the advice of the President's principal political
advisors in matters involving the Congress. However, I have the
strong feeling that a current report of this sort on the public record
that could be emphasized in press interviews and comment by
public officials might be of considerable help in countering the
peaceniks.
u us %rpfFfaylor
Vice Admirl, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director
STAT
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REPORT OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE
FOLLOWING VISIT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
APRIL 7-19, 1966
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
EIGHTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
[Pages of all documents printed in behalf of the activities of the House
Committee on Armed Services are numbered cumulatively to
permit a comprehensive index at the end of the Con-
gress. Page numbers lower than those in
this document refer to other
subjects.]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-066 WASHINGTON : 1966
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
EIGIITY-NINTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
L. MENDEL RIVERS, South Carolina, Chairman
PHILIP J. PIIILBIN, Massachusetts
F. EDWARD HEB?ERT, Louisiana
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
O. C. FISHER, Texas
PORTER HARDY, JR., Virginia
CHARLEIS E. BENNETT, Florida
JAME'S A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
RICHARD Jr. ICHORD, Missouri
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
G. ELLIOTT HAGAN, Georgia
CHARLES H. WILSON, California
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California
DONALD J. IRWIN, Connecticut
JED JOHNSON, JR., Oklahoma
FRANK E. EVANS, 'Colorado
RODNEY M. LOVE, Ohio
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington
HERVEY G. MACHEN, Maryland
SPEEDY O. LONG, Louisiana
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER, New Mexico
SANTIAGO POLANCO-ABREU, Puerto Rico
JOHN R. BLANDICORD,
WILLIAM H. BATES, Massachusetts
LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
BOB WILSON, California
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN, Michigan
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWARD G. HALL, Missouri
DONALD D. CLANCY, Ohio
ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania
MEMBERS OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, Now York, Chairman
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN, Michigan
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
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[No. 71]
REPORT OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE FOLLOWING VISIT TO
SOUTHEAST ASIA APRIL 7-19, 1966
Hon. L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Serv.ees.
Mr. Chairman, pursuant to your directions, the undersigned mem-
bers of the special 1966 subcommittee on the conflict in Vietnam trav-
eled to Vietnam and southeast Asia during the period April 7 to
April 19, 1966, and now have the honor to submit to you the following
report on our trip, including our findings and specific recommenda-
tions.
1. ASSIGNMMEN'r
In your letter dated March 15, 1966, establishing the subcommittee,
you directed us as follows:
It is highly desirable that the House Committee on Armed Services be kept
abreast of the activities within the jurisdiction of the Committee, particularly
so far as they affect our military commitments in Southeast Asia.
While you are in South Viet wain, I would appreciate it if you would pay
particular attention to the effectiveness of our river patrols, the scope of our
barrier patrols, the progress made with respect to the development of our port
facilities and our airfield construction, the morale of our troops, the adequacy
of their equipment, and put particular emphasis on research and development
projects that should be accelerated in view of the particular conditions that we
face in South Viet Nam.
When I mention equipment, I refer not only to ammunition and the like, but
also to clothing of every kind.
It is further requested that you submit a report of your findings and recom-
mendations in connection with this trip to the Committee within thirty days
following your return to. the United States.
This report is submitted in accordance with. those directions to sup-
port and amplify the verbal report presented to you within one week
of our return.
It. GENLRAT, ITINERARY
The subcommittee was accompanied on its trip by Brig. Gen. Wil-
liam G. Thrash, U.S. Marine Corps, as an observer, and Col. Frank R.
Burget, U.S. Army, as Department of the Army liaison officer. Dur-
ing the 10-day period we traveled a total of 24,052 miles, and touched
down in five different countries. Four full days were spent visiting
combat installations in South Vietu:un, 2 days visiting installations
and conferring with U.S. officials in T1lailand. 1 (lay conferring with
U.S. officials in Tokyo, Japan, and 1 day conferring with U.S. Pacific
Command officials in Honolulu. During our 4 days in South Vietnam
the subcommittee traveled mostly by armed helico1>ter, logging a total
of 2,857 miles in this war-torn country. ' ~
(9:;45)
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Because a series of violent Buddhist street demonstrations with
marked anti-American overtones had erupted in both Saigon and
Da Nang several days prior to the subcommittee's scheduled departure'
from Washington, some doubt had been raised, as you will. recall,
about the desirability of the subcommittee carrying out its scheduled
assignment at all. With strong support from yourself, however, and
with the concurrence of both the State and Defense Departments,
which you enlisted, it. was finally determined that the subcommittee
should proceed as originally planned, with the understanding that
specific details regarding our actual itinerary in South Vietnam would
be worked out with officials in Saigon in the light of current condi-
tions after the subcommittee had arrived at some preliminary touch-
down spot in the Far East, possibly Hong Kong.
On this basis the subcommittee departed Friendship Airport in
Baltimore on the afternoon of April 7 and arrived in Honolulu later
that same evening. Early the next morning the subcommittee met
with Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief,
Pacific, and was briefed for nearly 2 hours on the situation in south-
east Asia by him, by top members of his staff and by his subordinate
service commanders. By the time the subcommittee reached Hono-
lulu further messages had beam received from Saigon again suggest
ing the advisability of the subcommittee omitting South Vietnam
entirely from its itinerary, in view of the possible dangers created by
the continuing violence of the demonstrations. The subcommittee,
however, was still determined to carry out the original assign-
ment you had entrusted to us, and do it within the time frame
?indicated. Accordingly we undertook to discuss this matter at some
length with Admiral Sharp, pointing out that while we did not wish
to complicate Ambassador Lodge's problem during a difficult period,
we believed it would be possible for us to visit combat units in the
field in Vietnam without undue risk and without entering either Sai-
gon or Da Nang. Admiral Sharp concurred with this view and agreed
to suggest a suitable itinerary for our group to General Westmore-
land. The subcommittee desires to record its sincere appreciation for
,the help which Admiral Sharp gave us in this connection. Without
his assistance we might not have succeeded in visiting military instal-
lations within South Vietnam.
Before leaving Honolulu the subcommittee was advised that rioting
had erupted in Hong Kong, caused by an increase in ferry rates to
and from the mainland, which would make our projected overnight
stopover there dangerous. The committee decided to continue on
directly to Bangkok. The aircraft did touch down briefly at Hong
Kong to refuel, however, and during the brief interval on the ground
the committee met U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William
McC. Blair, Jr., who was returning to his post in Manila from a brief
holiday.
In Bangkok, where we arrived early on Easter morning, April 10,
details of our entry into Vietnam. were finally worked out. While
Ambassador Lodge did not interpose any objection to the itinerary
finally agreed upon, which omitted both Saigon and Da Nang, he did
continue to insist that he "could not guarantee the subcommittee's
safety," and made it clear that if we proceeded with our itinerary we
should do so with that fact clearly in mind. After conferring with
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Maj. Gen. Richard Stillwell, commander of the Military Assistance
Command in Thailand, who proved most helpful., the subcommittee
-determined that the degree of risk in the proposed itinerary was not
- iTnduly excessive. Thus, we departed Bangkok by air early on April
11 for our first touchdown in South Vietnam, at Pleiku, where we
were met, on behalf of Ambassador Lodge and General Westmoreland,
by Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, then commanding the 1st Air
avalry Division.
Our detailed itinerary within South Vietnam is included as an
appendix to this report. Speaking generally, however, the subcom-
mittee visited each of the four Vietnam Army corps areas, met with
two Vietnamese corps commanders and one Province chief, and with
their U.S. advisers; visited field positions of the 1st Marine Division,
the 1st Air Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry Division, and the 25th
Infantry Division; visited two special forces camps, one at Pleime and
the other at Tay Ninh in War Zone C; inspected the crack South
Korean Tiger Division; visited U.S. Air Force installations at Cam
Ranh Bay, Bien Itoa, and Tan Son Nhut, the last only a few hours
after the April 13 Vietcong mortar attack; visited the Army supply
base at, Cam Ranh Bay, and United States and Vietnamese naval in-
stallations for coastal and river warfare at Vimg Tan and Cat Lo;
spent one night on board the carrier Enterprise operating in the
Tonkin Gulf on "Yankee Station"; and called on patients in the 93d
Evacuation Hospital at Bien Iloa. In addition we conferred with
Rear Adm. T. J. Walker, U.S. Navy, commander, Carrier Division 3,
with Lt. Gen. Lewis W. Walt, U.S. Marine Corps, commander of the
Marine Amphibious Force in Vietnam, with Maj. Gen. Gilbert L.
Meyers, deputy commander of the new 7th Air Force, and with Gen.
William C. Westmoreland, who interrupted a busy schedule to fly to
Bien Hoa on April 14 to meet with members of the subcommittee for a
most informative, no-holds-barred interview lasting more than 2
hours.
Members of the subcommittee sat in with Enterprise pilots during
their pre-strike briefings, visited a number of Vietnamese hamlets in
company with General Walt, went out on a, river patrol operation with
the Navy and the Coast Guard in the Mekong Delta, visited forward
elements of the 1st Infantry Division during combat operations at
the Courtenay Plantation in a heavy jungle area, and spent one night.
in the field with forward battalions of the 25th Infantry Division.
The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Chamberlain, also made one
flight with a Blue Eagle aircraft during a regular TV broadcast to
U.S. troops and the Vietnamese people.
During the 2 days the subcommittee spent in Thailand we con-
ferred at length with General Stillwell and members of his staff, and
with U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Graham Martin. The subcom-
mittee also had the opportunity to visit Thai air installations at
Udorn and Tlbon.
Before returning to the United States the subcommittee conferred
with our Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer. Throughout
our trip the subcommittee spoke with a large number of American
servicemen of all ranks, as well as with a number of Vietnamese
civilians and military personnel. The findings and conclusions
which follow are based on our observations and on these conversations.
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1. Progress of the war : The subcommittee's first and major findin
is that American milit?ar operations in out Vietnam are pro-
ceeding most - avora v. he subcommittee believes that this favor-'
e trend has gone largely unno ice in the United a es ar
because of a tendency of newspaper reports to focus on details o
individual day-to-day battles, and nartly because of the, absence o
frontlines in the Vietnam war in the conventional sense. The com-
mittee is of the opinion that in the months that have elapsed since
U.S. forces first began to arrive in Vietnam in substantial numbers
last year we have taken a firm upper hand in the fighting against
the Vietcong. Our forces largely have the initiative today. They
have demonstrated over and over again their ability to move success-
fully into any area in Vietnam. They have increased the size of
the region which is largely free of Vietcong interference or domina-
tion. They have sharply cut, the percentage of the local rice crop
which the Vietcong have been able to seize and use. They have
largely destroyed the ability of the Vietcong to operate as a coherent
and organized -force. They have done this by maintaining constant
pressure on the Vietcong, by vigorous and continuing patrolling well
beyond the perimeters of our base or "enclave" areas', and by destroy-
ing the extensive underground network of tunnels which have for
years constituted Vietcong staging, rest, and rehabilitation areas;
supply dumps; ammunition and weapons areas; and hiding places.
While our finding does not imply that the Vietcong cannot launch
offensives against us in the future, the denial to them of much of
their elaborate jungle base area has gravely undermined their effec-
tiveness in projecting their military power to any significant extent
and for any sizable period beyond the immediate jungle and moun-
tain areas.
It appears that this trend has gained in strength within the past 3
or 4 months. A year ago, when the first ad hoc subcommittee of this
committee made its visit, the substantial buildup of American forces
was just getting underway. Even last fall, when a number of com-
mittee members had the opportunity to visit Vietnam, most Ameri-
can units were beginning to move out into combat operations and test
their abilities and techniques against the Vietcong in a new and
largely untried kind of jungle warfare. Today the results of that
test are pretty well in. Our forces have met the Vietcong and have
mastered them on the field. We have demonstrated, after some pain-
ful starts, a typically American ability once again to outguess and
outthink the enemy in his own unique brand of warfare: Instead of
being ambushed by the Vietcong, for example, we are today success-
fully ambushing him. We have adapted our heavy artillery fire to
the demands of jungle and tunnel warfare in brilliant fashion. Close
air support techniques for ground operations have now been success-
fully worked out. The subcommittee found no complaints on this
score at all, from any quarter. The helicopter has, of course, proved
to be a vital and tremendously effective part of this now ability to
outfight the enemy in his own terrain. It has, in fact, been the one
indispensable weapon system in this conflict. And our long-range
strategic B-52 bombers have proved a most helpful adjunct to the
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specialized demands of jungle warfare and their usefulness is now
fully recognized. Tanks, too, have been adapted for use in some
phases of jungle warfare, and are proving helpful in detonating land-
mines which cause such a large percentage of our infantry casualties.
American troops clearly have the momentum today, and we believe
full advantage should be taken of this momentum.
So successful has been our military progress that the subcommit-
tee believes we are moving steadily toward victory over the Vietcong,
provided we can keep infiltration from the north within something
like present limits, and provided, too, that we can have reasonable
political stability within South Vietnam.
The subcommittee recognizes the probability that concerted Viet-
cong attacks will occur during the monsoon season. But we were
impressed with the view expressed to us by several top U.S. field
commanders, that the monsoon season need not necessarily be advan-
tageous for Vietcong forces. While the rains do restrict our own
air and ground activity to some degree, they also restrict his ground
activity. And our helicopters can still operate during much of the
rainy season, even in the mud. We are therefore confident that any
monsoon offensive will be just as decisively beaten back this year as it
was a year ago.
Much of the published comment on our position in Vietnam,
especially from those who are not particularly conversant with mili-
tary matters, professes to see some kind of parallel between our posi-
tion in Vietnam today and that of the French more than a decade ago.
But no one who has had the occasion to visit Vietnam, and see at first
hand the size of our military forces, the impressive morale of our men,
the quality of our equipment, and the vast scope of our supply facili-
ties, could possibly think there is any really meaningful parallel
between French military experience in Vietnam and our own. More-
over, our forces have been doing an outstanding job in the civic action
field, helping the people of Vietnam in their own communities, and
we believe the people of Vietnam recognize this help and appreciate
it. The American people deserve to be told, again and again, of the
outstanding job, our troops are doing in Vietnam. They can well be
proud of that job.
2. Clearing and holding: To be sure the subcommittee recognizes
that
Vietcong as pan organized and effective fighting force--will not by itself
lead to the establishment of a stable, orderly and Prosperous over
ment in South Vietnam. But we do believe that once the major mili-
r threat. and -
it for more than 20 year~, h the admittedly long an
Tom ' - j~ ' of restoring law and order and developing the machinery,
of !a stable Lyovernmenta1 structure in Vietnam will become much more
manageable and then can largely- be worked out by the Vietnamese
themselves with such outside hel as they may need or request. We
feel strongly that military victory over the Vietcong can be achieved
without first solving all the complex political and economic problems
which currently face that unhappy country.
Today American forces can move into almost any part of Vietnam,
establish effective control, and drive out the Vietcong. This was never
the ease with Vietnamese forces by themselves. War zone C, for ex-
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ample, had never before been penetrated by friendly forces until the
1st Infantry Division went in there the other clay with remarkable
success.
Our biggest problem is that once our forces leave an area (as the
1st Infantry Division, for example, left the Courtenay Plantation at
Binh Ba to move into War Zone C) some Vietcong troops move back in.
Two things are necessary to deal with this situation. The first is
greater numbers. As U.S. forces in Vietnam increase, perhaps U.S.
units can conduct most of the initial "search and destroy" missions and
leave it to Vietnamese Army (ARVN) forces to follow through in
clearing and permanently holding these areas. We believe a system
can and must be worked out to put more ARVN forces into areas
already covered by U.S. search and destroy operations, so as to prevent
this reinfiltration by Communist troops. An increase in the size and
training of ARVN forces may be needed for this purpose. Desertion
continues to be a problem which limits the effectiveness of ARVN
forces, though this is not desertion to the VC.
The other thing that must be done is to carry out aggressive and
regular patrolling of all areas already covered by search and destroy
operations. Field commanders told us that an area once covered by
a vigorous search and destroy operation does not revert, when our own
military forces leave, to the same degree of Vietcong control as pre-
vailed before the search and destroy operation began. Local sup-
porting installations have been destroyed. Local populations are even
more hostile. By continuing to send regular patrols through these
areas, as the Marines are doing, at Chu Lai, we keep them reason-
ably free of Vietcong control, even though our military forces are no
longer physically stationed on the site.
We have heard a good deal in recent months about the supposed
virtues of an "enclave" strategy for Vietnam. Actually we are al-
ready operating from "enclaves" in Vietnam. Every one of our bases
is defended around a 360? perimeter, whether at Ankhe with the
1st Cavalry, at Can The with the advisory group to the 4th ARVN
Corps, or at Cu Chi with the 25th Infantry Division. But in each
of these cases we operate from the "enclaves," we just don't sit passively
inside them. In extending our searches and carrying on our patrols,
we are employing a familiar "forward"strategy and thereby spread-
igathe "oil spot' areas of our effective control farther and farther
eyorid the immediate "enclave" area. Seventy percent of 1st Air
'Qavalry units, for example, are operating at any one time far beYond
their "enclave" area at Ankhe. Merely to remain passively within
these base locations, on the other hand, would be suicidal against as ag
gressive and determined an enemy as the Vietcong, and would sur-
render the balance of the countryside to them by default.
3. Maps as a measure of progress: The subcommittee also believe,
that the attempt to understand the progress of fighting in Vietnam by,
means of colored areas on a map can be seriously misleading. In Viet
nam mere acreage is not the most reliable index of control. Unless
one visits Vietnam it is difficult to appreciate just how much of this
country is covered by high mountains and almost impenetrable jun-
gles. The vast majority of the people live, and the vast majority
of business is carried out, in the relatively small areas which comprise
Saigon, the Mekong Delta to the southeast, the various coastal plain
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cities, such as Qui Nhon, Danang, Hue, and the network of roads or
rivers connecting them. If these populated areas and their connect-
ring lines of communication can he secured, as we are now doing, it is
?not really too _ important whether the Vietcong continue to roans
through the mountains and junglea, provided we have destroyed, as.
we are now destroying, their ability to establish within these inaccessi-
ble areas bases from which to mount well-equipped, well-supplied, and
well-organized attacks on the populated areas. Substantial areas of
the Mekong Delta, for example, have now been secured in this way.
Route 19 between Pleiku and the coast, which the Vietcong were in the
process of seizing in early 1965 to cut South Vietnam in two, has now
been opened to traffic, at least by day, and to some extent even by night.
The area around Qui Nhon, occupied by the Korean division, which
had been 75 percent dominated by the Vietcong when they first moved
in, is now regarded as almost entirely in our control. Indeed the ac-
complishments of the Korean division in Vietnam have been outstand-
ing, not only militarily but, in carrying out those civic actions which
build the support and confidence of the Vietnamese. In both the II
Corps area and the delta the rice crop now goes chiefly into govern-
ment, rather than into Vietcong channels, another reliable index of area
control. In the IV Corps area the population under ARVN control
went from 36 to 51 percent in 1965, embracing 2.7 million of the ,5 mil-
lion population, for a gain of 813,000 people; All these are concrete
evidences of the progress we have made. Jungles and mountains by
themselves simply cannot serve as a base for effective Vietcong control
over Vietnam. Our objective must continue to be. to insure that the use
of these inaccessible! areas by the Vietcong as military sanctuaries is
effectively denied. Insofar as we succeed in this we strengthen the
stability of the populated areas where the long-term future of Vietnam
must eventually be determined.
4. What does "winning" the Vietnam war mean? We have said
we believe we can win this war in Vietnam and that we are in fact mov-
ing in that direction. What precisely do we mean by "winning"? We
mean this : so disrupting and destroying the abilit of Vietcong Forces
at dgpite whatever additions and support ma be infiltrated fro
outside South Vietnam, the Vietcon are unable to mount sustained
organized attacks on South Vietnamese populated areas-, and
such sporadic acts of terrorism or attack as do occur can be contained
and dealt with by Vietnamese troops or police personnel. Victory
would certainly mean the gradual reduction of military incidenLs
in South Vietnam to a point that would permit an orderly of free, popular, elections an the establishment of a Permanent type
of South Vietnamese Government based on popular choir And it
would mean a situation in w is t e major share of responsibility for
maintaining local. order and control falls on the Vietnamese them-
selves.
Such a condition may not mean the immediate end of all American j,
presence in Vietnam. But it should certainly permit a gradual reduc-
-tiou_.in .the numbers of American combat troops required there, anal it
,should also mean that the extent and character of any continuing
.American presence would be determined by agreement between tho
United States and the duly elected Government of Vietnam. Tx
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pressed in these terms, we feel it is already possible to see the light of
"victory" at the end of the tunnel.
5. The nature of the Vietcong : No one can fully understand the
war in Vietnam without understanding the unusual nature o e
nem we face there, the ietcon . On the is of our observations
the subcommittee offers the following comments :
There has been an impression created in some quarters that the
Vietcong are just a ragtail military outfit, composed of dissident local
farmers and peasants, with a rifle slung over their shoulders and a
couple of days' supply of rice in their pockets, who can subsist for
endless periods in the jungle and create great havoc with a handful of
meager weapons. Such is decidedly not the case. The Vietcong are
a well-organized, well-equipped military outfit. 'They are able fighters
and are respected as such by our own troops. The major source of their
support is a fantastically extensive network of underground tunnels
dug deep into the hills and jungles of South Vietnam. Some of these
tunnel establishments go back to the days of the fighting against the
Japanese in World War II. Tunnel complexes which our forces have
uncovered and destroyed have contained such unlikely features as a
400-bed military hospital, with modern drugs and surgical tools ; caches
of rice and other supplies adequate to last for months; elaborate
dumps of weapons and ammunition, mostly of Communist Chinese and
partly of Soviet manufacture, including recoilless rifles, heavy mortars,
and machineguns; tractors and trailers; sizable barracks areas; rest
and recreation facilities ; uniforms as well as numerous civilian dis-
guises; even a printing plant for turning out propaganda. The recent
operations of the 1st Infantry Division in War Zone C have turned up
further examples of these incredible Vietcong tunnel base areas. It is
these tunnels, many of them ringing Saigon within a few miles, that
have sustained Vietcong operations in past years and have enabled
the Vietcong to hit and run safely. Without these complex tunnels
the nature of the Vietcong threat must undergo very drastic changes.
While we cannot estimate specific percentages, the subcommittee
as informed that substantial numbers of Vietcong forces are in fact
htli enous South Vietnamese, directly recruited into the Vietc onz
b'Fga""nization. This recruiting still goes on in South Vietnam' in
'mineral the Vietcong have two basic recruiting approaches. One is
the outright propaganda approach. Admittedly the lot of the Viet-
namese peasant has never been an easy one. Admittedly he is unhappy
with a war that, in one form or another, has been swinging back and
forth across his land for nearly 30 years. Admittedly he is fearful and
apprehensive, like most Asian peoples, of foreigners in his country'
'Mpi'ciaily-white ones. Vietcong recruiters have appealed to all these
emotions,`P`Iiis the panoply of glittering pie-in-the-sky promises which
are traditional with Communists, promises whose fallaciousness is not
revealed until it is too late to do much about them. The Vietcong
do have many of the propaganda factors in Vietnam going in their
direction.
source of Vietcong recruiting power is still naked
the largest numbers of new recruits. In areas contro e ti
cong there is little alternative to carrying out the military order of a
harsh and brutal occupying power.
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ut do the people really support the Vietcon ? Do the go along
3uth AR . force onl reluctantly? Is the ietcon move-
ent really grounded deeply in the wishes an as irations o the D&D
e
Memselves, so t, r part can wholly elim
note it? Th subcommittee strongly believes that the answer to these
-questions is "No."
We recogn ize that there is substantial sentiment among many
Viet
Pamese pea, for 'ust oin alon with w atever rou or power
a 12ens at the moment to be on top, regardless of ideology, in the hope
that thereb one can best be left a lone to cultivate his garden. U
those Peasants w o have had practical ex erience with ie con can-
col hav ouickly learned that Communist practice never measures u
to Communist promise. They have seen atrocities committed, as t hoe
we saw in n,etu resat Can Tho, for .xami le, They have witnessed
iolence and assassination. They have seen their sons and dau hters
pried off. their r;ce crops ex ronriate their local leaders mur ere
some 2.000 of them since 1954.
We are convinced by what we saw that the great bulk of the Viet-
namese people do not want to live under the terroristic regime of the
Vietcong, so long as we or the Vietnamese forces can guarantee them
some reasonable measure of security from the Vietcong. What is
hardest for them is to be caught in a seesaw movement in which control
of their village passes from Vietcong to ARVN or United States and
then back to Vietcong again. In such circumstances the local citizen
knows he will be punished, perhaps killed, for having "collaborated"
with U.S. or ARVN forces. A province chief was assassinated at
Phuoc Vinh, for instance, a base for part of the 1st Infantry Division,
for cooperating with our troops. We saw the memorial erected to his
memory. A priest at Cu Chi is accompanied today by an armed
American bodyguard wherever he goes. The Vietcong have put a
price on his head because his church had been a favorite Vietcong
meeting place before the U.S. 25th Division moved into the area. The
village chief near the Courtenay plantation at Binh Ba feared for his
life once the 1st Division moved out. Obviously the ability to provide.
reasonable local. security on a continuing basis is an indispensable
requirement for holding the support of the Vietnamese and building
a stable civilian government.
No doubt the Vietnamese do not entirely love Americans. There
is in element of xenophobia in the Vietnamese, as there is in most
Asians. For that matter the American servicemen was not always
unanimously popular even in Australia or England during World
War II. But we are convinced that the Vietnamese are no more
interested in living the rest of their lives under a regime of terror
and violence than are other people and, therefore, welcome just as
anybody else would the opportunity to shape their own destiny in
some reasonable degree of security and peace. In areas where our
military victories have given them this opportunity, as in the, city
of Can Tho, population 70,000, which we visited, and in the hamlets
near Chu Lai, where General Walt took us, the people seemed gen-
uinely pleased to see Americans. The children were happy to be
able to go back to school, as we saw them going. And all the people
were grateful for the medical help which Navy hospital corpsmen
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serving with the Marines were furnishing at a daily village sick
call.
e are convinced the great maiorit of the Vietnamese d~
SO we
U 2t suDnort the Vietcong. They know the Communists as a harsh,
brutal, and violent organization, fighting not a struggle for reforng.
and reformation but a struggle for power and possession. Perhaps
the best proof of this point is the sharply rising percentage of "rat-
Tiers" we are picking up now in Vietnam; that is, South Vietnamese
~7ho `had joined up originally with the Vietcong and then deserted.
In the 4th Corps area, for example, ralliers have increased by 10.Q
yerceiit this year. In the 2d Corps area 2,000 ralliers have come ovei
so far this year. The growth of the rallier movement, plus a sulz,
stantial improvement in the quality of our intelligence from local
ietnamese, are the best proofs of the growing political support that
has accompanied our improving military position. Still anothc
revealing feature is the very substantial number of refugees who have
voluntarily moved out of areas controlled by the Vietcong and into
areas under our control. They have chosen to leave their traditional
homes rather than submit to Communist control.
Having reported at some length on our findings with regard to the
general military situation in Vietnam and its prospects for the future,
we turn our attention now to the specific questions raised by the chair-
man in his original directions. Of these perhaps the most important,
and certainly the most timely, is the matter of supply and possible
shortages of military equipment, ammunition, and clothing.
6 Supply and shortages : Speaking in general terms, for the areas
we visited, our findings support the statements made in recent weeks
by Department of Defense officials, viz, that no serious shortages
exist, none at least that have undermined our military position or
have resulted in the elimination of projected combat missions against
the enemy. Everywhere we inquired closely about the supply situation
with military personnel of all ranks. We were greatly impressed with
the supply buildup that has. been achieved in Vietnam in a relatively
short period, reminiscent of the logistic miracles that were so common-
place in World War II. Cain Ranh Bay, our largest supply base in
Vietnam, which. started almost from scratch a, year ago, is progressing
remarkably. A year ago a large number of ships were backed up there
for weeks. On the day we visited Cam Ranh one berth was actually
open at a pier. No fair appraisal of the overall supply situation in
Vietnam can be made without recognizing the magnitude of this
achievement. As one subcommittee member observed, "Now I see
how we plan to get rid of the Vietcong-we're going to crowd them
out with all this stuff we're bringing in."
In his discussion with the subcommittee General Westmoreland
gave us some further measure of the extent of the American supply
miracle when he acknowledged that he faced a very difficult decision
a year ago. Should lie request the urgent buildup of troops he be-
lieved necessary to prevent the Vietcong victory that was then immi-
nent, even though supply facilities to support such a force were then
nonexistent? Ile made the decision to go ahead with the troop build-
up, of course, and do the best he could to get them all the supplies
they needed. The gamble paid off. The needed troops arrived in
time to stave off a Vietcong victory, and no American combat mission
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was washed out because necessary material resources were not at hand.
Of course in the process there were some tight moments. Ships were
backed up for weeks at Cain Ranh Bay, waiting to unload, and in-
curring heavy demurrage charges in the process. But while these
ships swung at anchor they also provided a floating supply dump for
forces ashore. Needed items could always be lightered in as required.
So the troops got to Veitnam when they were needed, though we orig-
inally had no basic supply structure there to serve them, and somehow
the equipment has reached them there in time.
Although the subcommittee found no serious shortages, we did re-
ceive, however, beginning with discussions at Pacific Command head-
quarters in IIonolulu, evidence of a number of temporary shortages in
various items and of varying degrees of concern. These resulted, we
were told, not from basic inadequacies of stocks but from delays in
shipping, interruptions in unloading (as during the Buddhist riots
in Da Nang, for example), or temporary breakdowns in distribution
within Vietnam itself, conditions similar to those often encountered
in any active theater of war. Mentioned specifically in this connec-
tion were bomb fuses, flares, jungle boots, and tropical uniforms.
In general our contact with Army units revealed no shortages, even
of this variety. We did see at first hand during the night we spent
with the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi the fantastic use that is
being made of illuminating shells in night perimeter defense. But
even there we died not hear any complaints of shortages in this item.
The 1st Infantry Division did speak to us, however, of the need for
more heavy-lift Chinook helicopters to meet its full requirement for
mobile jungle operations. A recent engagement in which one co>>-
pany, surrounded by a Vietcong battalion, had been evacuated by lad-
ders into Chinook helicopters hovering over the 120-foot jungle trees,
more than proved the worth of these aircraft to the division. General
Westmoreland assured us that orders for extra Chinooks were already
in the mill and moving along properly. Nevertheless, the subcommit-
tee cannot urge too strongly that increased efforts be made to produce
and ship these Chinooks to Vietnam with all possible speed. The
Special Forces camp at Tay Ninh in War Zone CC is also in need of
integral helicopters of any sort. One of its outposts, for example, sits
atop Nuy Ba Den Mountain, the balance of which is in the hands of
the Vietcong, so that the only possible access is by helicopter.
It was in the air units, both Marine and Air Force, that we en-
countered the most frequent reports of shortages. The Marine air
wing at Chu Lai, for example, reported they were currently short of
napalm and 2.5 rockets, although this shortage was acknowledged to
be mainly the result of unloading tieups at Da Nang resulting'
esulting from
recent Buddhist riots.
The 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Cam Ranh Bay, whose F-4C
aircraft furnish close-air support for ground units in the II Corps
area, reported shortages of 20-millimeter ammunition and napalm, but
understood that some of these shortages were also the result of delays in
unloading. Air units at Bien Iloa complained of shortages of ammuni-
tion, especially 750-pound bombs. In such situations different weight
bombs, of 200, 500, or 1,000 pounds, have been substituted. The
subcommittee also found that air missions in Vietnam operate under
strict orders to return as soon as their assigned targets have been hit,,
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without attempting to unload any unexpended ordnance on other pos-
sible targets. Thus aircraft will frequently return with unexpended
ordnance.
Navy units we visited reported no shortages. The river warfare
forces at Cat Lo were looking forward to getting the new hovercraft
air cushion vehicles and also remarked very favorably on the fast pro-
duction schedule that had gotten the new plastic PBR boats out to them
so rapidly after those craft first went onto the drawing board.
7. Port development: The major new military port in Vietnam is
the one under development at Cam Ranh Bay. Our visit there was
most reassuring. Cain Ranh now has two piers in operation, one of
which is at DeLong. One LST unloading ramp is also in operation
and another under construction.
The Cain Ranti depot, which serves Army troops in central Vietnam,
reported no shortages. They maintain a regular system of roving field
expediters whose purpose is to troubleshoot supply problems. These
expediters, we were told, had encountered no shortage problems in
this area. A POL tank farm had been completed, but only one of the
tanks had been grounded. In the interim fuel is being stored on the
ground in huge rubber bladders. Many items at this depot, however,
are still. below their individual buildup objectives. Tropical Trousers,
jungle boots, and undershirts are in this category, and also some heavy
machinery spare parts. But all these items have been requisitioned,
we Were informed, and some are already on route. It was also em-
phasized that when an item is below supply objectives it. does not
mean that combat units are actually goin g without. anything they
rroed. As our brief experience demonstrated, however, the Vietnam
jungle i_s extremely hard on clothing. Our tropical fatigues stand up
only for 4 or 5 days in the jungle, so frequent replacements are neces-
sary and future demands on present supply could increase sharply.
The committee was informed that the Cam Ranh Bay base is intend-
ed to serve forces in the central area of South Vietnam, roughly the
II Corps area. The port of Saigon would then serve as a supply area
for forces in the III and IV Corps areas, and Da Nang would be de-
veloped to supply forces in the I Corps area. Qui Nhon is suited only
for unloading LST's over the beach. In the case of Saigon, the com-
mittee did observe a fairly large number of merchant ships anchored
at Cape St. Jacques off Vung Tau in the Mekong Delta at the mouth
of the Wonsak (Saigon) River, waiting their turn to go up to Saigon
to unload. So un.loadin delays anc demurrage charges are ap-
parently still a factor in Saigon even if they are no longer a problem
at Cam Ranh, and further action may have to be taken to deal with
this problem.
8. Naval operations, barrier and river patrols : Naval carrier
operations against targets in North Vietnam appear to us to be proceed-
ing well. We also witnessed the U.S. cruiser Canberra conducting
shore bombardment operations against Communist positions. We
found opinion as to the desirability of commissioning an additional
reserve fleet cruiser or battleship for naval gunfire support purposes.
Admiral Sharp told us lie had recommended recommissioning another
such cruiser. General Walt favored either a battleship or a cruiser,
especially, he said, during the monsoon season when close air support
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is less available. On the other hand, General Hollingsworth, assistant
commander of the 1st Division, told us the flat naval gunfire trajectory
would make these ships unsuitable for support missions well inland
where most ground troops would be likely to be operating. Instead
he recommended the assignment of an additional tactical air squad-
ron as more flexible for support to his division.
General Walt also recommended that reserve fleet merchant ships
be anchored offshore to provide needed electrical generating capacity
for installations ashore.
We found our naval barrier patrols, operating along the Vietnam
coast in Operation Market Time, proceeding well. These are designed
to interdict Vietcong resupply operations from the sea to the shore.
The Navy informed the subcommittee that they were regularly stop-
ping and searching some 2,000 junks a day. 01 these only a very few,
however, had been found to be carrying military contraband. Never-
theless, the Navy conceded there were practical limitations to the
maintenance of an absolutely airtight barrier to Vietcong resupply
from the sea, especially at night. For example, the need for Vietna-
mese civilians in the area around Qui Nhon to engage in their normal
fishing occupation by night as well as day makes any nighttime coastal
curfew in this area impossible. American Army advisory personnel
told its they believed that Vietcong units operating in the Mekong
Delta are still being supplied by sea. A recent Marine operation
along the Saigon River, Operation Jack Stay, turned up a 200-bed
Vietcong hospital built on stilts in the long grasses of the delta. Mar-
ket Time officials said they would regard their barriers as successful if
they reduced the chances of Vietcong infiltration to 25 percent.
Members of the subcommittee went out on Coast Guard WPB's,
and the Navy's new "Swifties" and PBR boats to observe these river
patrol operations, and were impressed with the courage of the crews
as well as the firepower available to them.
Considerably less reassuring to us, however, was the patrol situation
on the Mekong River itself, an operation with the code name Game
Warden. At the time of our visit no patrols had even been put into
operation, although we were told they would begin on May 1. Because
of the number of ships and junks which proceed regularly up the
Mekong River, the committee is deeply concerned that substantial
amounts of war material may be reaching the Vietcong by way of
the Mekong. We were told that because the Mekong is an "inter-
national waterway," there are limits to what can be done to control
this traffic. The subcommittee is not entirely convinced, however, that
everything possible is presently being done to deal with the serious
threat to our own troops posed by the possibility of Vietcong resupply
through the Mekong River.
9. Airfield construction: The subcommit,tee's itinerary included
three major military airfields : Tan Son Nhut just outside Saigon, both
a military and commercial field, in fact the largest and busiest in the.
world; Bien Hon, primarily military, some 30 miles northeast of
Saigon; and the Air Force strip at Cam Ranh Bay. We also visited
the Marine field at Chu Lai; the Army field at Pleiku ; and smaller
fields at Qui Nhon, Cat Lo, Tay Ninh, and Cam Ranh village. All of
these except Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa are metal matting strips.
The Air Force strip at Cam Ranh, covered by aluminum matting, is
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scheduled to be replaced by a concrete runway, but the civilian con-
tractor's timetable has slipped badly. Only very preliminary grading
has been started. Meanwhile the temporary aluminum matting has
become slippery and dangerous, especially when wet.
The Marine field at Chu Lai, about 4,000 feet in length, is also
slated for extension and replacement with a concrete strip, but work
there too has moved slowly. Meanwhile it appears to be functioning
adequately as a SATS short-landing and takeoff field. Takeoffs are
assisted with JATO bottles, and arresting gear has been installed for
landings when needed. A steam catapult was in the process of being
installed when we were there.
The April 13 mortar attack on Tan Son Nhut raised in our minds
serious questions about the quality of protection which this major field
receives. With 6,000 flights per month, 450 aircraft based on the field,
and some 10,000 personnel on the base, Tan Son Nhut is busier than
O'Mara in Chicago. Metal revetments already in place saved many
planes during the mortar attack, but more revetments are needed.
Our reaction to the April 13 attack does not seem to have been as swift
or vigorous as one might have expected. Perhaps the defense of this
key field should be transferred from Vietnamese to United States per-
sonnel. Until the necessary additional revetments are built, perhaps
we ought also to consider greater dispersal of the combat aircraft at
Tan Son Nhut, possibly with the help of an additional aircraft carrier.
10. Morale : One of the most remarkable things about our military
operations in Vietnam is the unusually high morale of our troops. It
impresses us as being as high or higher than in any other recent mili-
tary operation we have been engaged in. This is even more remark-
able in view of the highly vocal opposition to our involvement in
Vietnam that has been expressed in some quarters here at home.
The high American morale apparently stems from two or three
causes. First and foremost is our policy of rotating combat troops
out of Vietnam after 1 year. In this way every soldier or marine
knows in advance the time of his departure, and how much longer his
combat commitment will be. Air personnel are usually rotated after
100 combat missions.
Of course, such a rotation policy is not without its problems. A
very substantial proportion of the ground troops now in Vietnam
arrived there last summer and early fall. Thus, we face a rotation
"hump" problem in the near future. Administrative steps are being
taken to ease the impact of this hump, though we will still need to
bring large numbers of new troops into Vietnam within the next few
months to replace those scheduled for rotation.
A second reason for high morale lies, we believe, in the excellent
job being done by our top military command to inform our soldiers
of the reasons for their service in Vietnam. Orientation talks in each
division, and direct. contacts between troops and the Vietnamese peo-
ple, have convinced our servicemen they are in Vietnam not just to
fight but also to help a people get. on its feet as a new and free nation.
In the 25,t1-i Division, for example, we heard the comment : "Morale
is better here than it was when we were in Hawaii. Out here the
boys know they have a job to do, and they're anxious to get it done."
Nearly every combat unit, we visited, including the Korean Tiger
Division, took special pride in describing for us the various "civic
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action" projects in which they were engaged to help local Vietnamese
citizens in their area.
The subcommittee was particularly impressed with the program
being carriedout at the direction of General. Westmoreland to en-
courace more harmonious relationships between Americans and Viet-
namese Each new American soldier is issued the following car
when he arrives :
NINE RULES FOR PERSONNEL OF U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
The Vietnamese have paid a heavy price in suffering for their long fight
against the communists. We military men are in Vietnam now because their
government has asked us to help its soldiers and people in winning their struggle.
The Vietcong will attempt to .turn the Vietnamese people against you. You can
defeat them at every turn by the strength, understanding, and generosity you
display with the people. Here are nine simple rules :
1. Remember we are guests here: We make no demands and seek no special
treatment.
2. Join with the people! Understand their life, use phrases from their lan-
guage and honor their customs and laws.
3. Treat women with politeness and respect.
4. Make personal friends among the soldiers and common people.
5. Always give the Vietnamese the right of way.
6. Be alert .to security and ready to react with your military skill.
7. 1)on':t attract attention by loud, rude or unusual behavior.
8. Avoid separating yourself from the people by a display of wealth or
privilege.
9. Above all else you are members of the U.S. Military Forces on a difficult
mission, responsible for all your official and personal actions. Reflect honor
upon yourself and the United States of America.
Still another reason for high morale is the splendid quality of
medical care available. Because of the helicopter we can move battle-
field casualties quickly and directly to a major rear-area. hospital, and
as a result only 1 percent of those wounded in battle in Vietnam have,
died of wounds, compared to 5 percent in World War II. Neuro-
psychiatric casualties are almost nonexistent, in contrast, to Korea and
World War H. Our subcommittee's visit to the. 93d Evacuation
Hospital demonstrated that even wounded personnel display unusually
good morale and have a high regard for the quality of the medical
treatment they are receiving.
The subcommittee believes that the high quality of officer and NCO
leadership being provided to the troops in Vietnam is another im-
portant reason for the high morale we observed.
The subcommittee did note several points which could help in
maintaining high morale. For example, some improvement in rest
and rehabilitation opportunities is needed. In general a combat soldier
in Vietnam can count on only one 5- or 6-day R. & R. period during
a normal 12-month tour. With the current emphasis on keeping
American personnel out of major South Vietnam population centers
as much as possible, we believe that a more liberal R. & R. program
should be quickly developed.
We understand that some troops have complained about the absence
of fresh milk and vegetables, although combat mess fare in most
parts of Vietnam struck us as being a notch or two above what it was
in World War II. Efforts to provide such additional items, at least
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in essentially garrison conditions, might well pay dividends, we
believe.
Mail seems to be reaching Vietnam rapidly. Congress was well kd-
vised in taking action to expedite air mail delivery to and from Viet.,
nam. Any expansion of this service would of course contribute to col .
tinued high morale.
` 11. Possible research and development projects:Pursuant to th.e
chairman's request the subcommittee made extensive' inquiries about
possible research and development projects that might prove helpful
to our operations in Vietnam. The following were suggested to us.
(a) People sensors.-The biggest P. & D. need in Vietnam, with its
thick jungles and mountains and extensive network of underground
tunnels, continues to be the development of some device to detect the
presence of people who cannot be seen.
(b) Protection against dust.-Dust, hard, red dust, is typical in
Vietnam and takes a heavy toll in corrosion and erosion of our heli-
copters, trucks, and other machinery. Dust is an especially acute prob-
lem with helicopters. Engines that normally run 1 000 to 1,600 hours
without overhaul must be overhauled in Vietnam after only 300 hours
because of the dust. Some protection against its effects is desperately
.needed.
(c) Longer delay fuzes.-Because so much of the fighting in Viet-
nam must be conducted in jungle areas, there is need for longer delay
fuzes on our bombs and artillery, to permit ordnance to penetrate
jungle growth and reach the ground before exploding.
(d) Stvxrdier'jungle uniforms.-Action in the jungle has also proved
especially hard on U.S. tropical fatigue uniforms. These last at most
"from 4 to 5 days in jungle operations. Without adding to their weight
or degrading their comfort., material should be developed to stand up
longer in rugged jungle operations.
(e) Fresh milk and fresh vegetables.-As indicated above, it would
also be worthwhile to explore ways and means of supplying fresh milk
and vegetables to combat troops in Vietnam, or at least the best pos-
sible substitutes. In the case of milk, for example, research might im-
prove the taste of "sterile" milk, that is, milk prepared for shipment
without refrigeration. Or the Army might explore the feasibility of
utilizing "blender" devices already on the market, which reconstitute
powdered milk with butter so as to taste almost like fresh milk.
(f) A COIN aircraf t.-Marine aviators and others continue to urge
development of the new counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft that has
been promised for so long. Such an aircraft could help in closer troop
support operations, in its ability to loiter on station, and as a forward
air controller.
(g) Antitruclc bombs.-With increased emphasis being placed on in-
terdicting the movement of troops and supplies from North Vietnam,
much of it now done by truck, there is an urgent need for developing
ordnance that can close down these roads for longer periods than those
relatively brief moments when attack aircraft are actually overhead.
Enemy trucks can now move at night except when under actual attack
or where roads have been entirely blocked. The subcommittee under-
stands that during the Korean war a kind of "butterfly" bomb was
employed against North Korean roads, small bombs with delayed
action fuzes that were scattered across an enemy road and would not
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explode until hit or until after a period of delay. These proved
effective in stopping all enemy truck traffic .at night following a single
air attack. No such bomb is presently in use against Vietcong supply
roads today. We believe its development and use along infiltration
routes and at supply "choke points" would prove extremely helpful,
and should be expedited.
12. Political comments : The subcommittee recognizes that it can-
not speak with authority or expertise on the complex political situa-
tion in Vietnam. Our assignment was not in this field, our stay in
Vietnam was all too brief, and because of the restrictions imposed
by the disorders at the time we were unable to hold any discussions
with American or Vietnamese civilian or diplomatic officials. Never-
theless, the military and political situations are closely intertwined in
Vietnam, and recent events do raise the possibility that the military
victory we now seem to be in the process .of winning could be thrown
away by political disturbances in one or two major cities. Asa result
of our tour we formed several impressions on these matters which
Members may find of interest.
Everyone recognizes that successful realization of our objectives in
South Vietnam involves the establishment of a government there
which has substantial popular support and which can maintain law
and order. Our military and diplomatic officials are working hard
toward this result. It should not, however, be forgotten that Viet-
nam has no tradition of representative or democratic government.,
and has in fact existed as a separate independent nation only since 1954.
It is still a poor, backward, underdeveloped Asian country with a
very low literacy rate. For years it was occupied and dominated first
by the French and then by the Japanese, both of whom kept the
country so fragmented and divided that no group could successfully
challenge the occupying authority. Over the years the natural leaders
of the country were either wiped out or sent away. And since 1956
the Vietcong terror campaign has further eroded this potential Viet-
namese leadership, with more than 2,000 village leaders either captured
or assassinated since that time.
These facts complicate the establishment of effective election pro-
cedures in Vietnam. Yet we must begin to move in that direction,
and the subcommittee regards the elections for a constituent assembly,
now scheduled for September 11, as a necessary and desirable step
toward the drafting of a constitution and the creation of a govern-
ment which will be more representative of important religious and
political groups in South Vietnam.
We are inclined to agree with the view that the recent political
demonstrations in Vietnam do represent a reconition on the part of
many South Vietnamese people that the military' war against the Viet-
cong is going favorably.
Looking ahead to the composition of a postwar government while
still at war is not unusual. In a society with more of a democratic
tradition than Vietnam the political "outs" might have set up their
soap boxes in the park, or written letters to the editor, or sounded off
to their Congressman. But none of these avenues is open in Vietnam.
81r_jj_eTdenionstrations with violent overtones seem the only real__way
t ey know of attracting the attention of public opinion.
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In view of the anti-American overtones of recent demonstrations,
the question naturally does arise whether the Vietnamese people want
the Americans to leave? Are they really unappreciative of the help
we have given them in resisting a Communist invasion from the north?
Our observations convince us that the answer to both questions is an
emphatic "No." The Vietnamese people are in favor of what we are
doing to help them, we believe, and do want us to stay. Despite a
genuine Vietnamese suspicion of foreigners, we saw no evidence of
anti-American sentiment in the areas we visited. Such sentiment
as has boon expressed we believe to be limited in location and scope
and not representative of the sentiment of the people as a whole. We
do not believe that the Vietnamese would ever freely vote to let the
Vietcong take over their country, and this judgment appears to be
supported by the fact that even during the latest demonstrations
against the Ky government, not a single opposition leader has sug-
gested siding with the Vietcong.
In connection with these demonstrations it is well to remember that
Vietnam is a highly fragmented society. Except for the military
there is hardly any group that exercises influence on a countrywide
basis. A large segment of the population are regarded as Buddhists in
Vietnam. Yet the fact is that the Buddhist movement is far from
monolithic. One group is centered in the north, another in the delta.
Others are located elsewhere. There is no one Buddhist leader, not
even Tri Quang, who can claim to speak for all Buddhists. Several
t;op Vietnamese generals with whom the subcommittee conferred were
Buddhists, yet they disagreed vehemently with the course which Tri
Quang and his followers had been advocating.
There are a number of other groups that have also demonstrated
a measure of political dower and interest, for example, the Catholics
and the Cao Dai religious group, whose central temple we flew over
in Tay Ninh. The best chance for setting up a stable and effective
government would seem to us to lie in the creation of some kind of
coalition arrangement between the military junta and several of these
more significant civilian or religious groups. This, we believe, is
the most urgent political need at the moment, and the current move-
ment toward new elections is directed toward meeting this need.
No government can survive in Vietnam without the support of the
military, since, as we have already observed, it is the one group whose
influence extends throughout the whole country. On the other hand,
as we are now witnessing, it will be increasingly difficult for a purely
military government, without civilian representation, to govern
effectively.
Yet this task is not a simple one and certainly cannot be accomplished
overnight. Americans will need patience, perspective and perse-
verance to see Vietnam through what is bound to be a difficult
transition period.
13. What more can we do? The subcommittee now turns to a mat-
ter which occupied much attention throughout our visit : what more, if
anything, should be done to speed victory in Vietnam?
(a) -'Mould we, for example, be bombing more in North Vietnam-
Th subcommittee supports bombing o erations now carried out
in the north as necessary for limiting North Vietnamese resupply an
reinforcement operations to the south. While aerial bombing has not_
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shut ofl' this resupply entirely and r bl never will. it does limit
t e extent of these reinforcements and thus reduces the size of the
military threat,
(h). Cambodia.--The subcommittee is deeply concerned about the
possibility that Cambodia's neutrality is being violated by the Viet-
cong and the North Vietnamese. The subcommittee received several
unconfirmed reports that Cambodia is being used as a sanctuary and
supply base for the Vietcong. War Zone C in the area north and west
of Tay Ninh is apparently a major Vietcong headquarters. Recent
operations through that area by the 1st Infantry Division tend to sup-
port this thesis. Vast caches of Vietcong supplies were uncovered,
although our troops failed to engage sizable numbers of enemy troops.
American personnel reported to us that Vietcong troops, when hard
pressed in War Zone C, regularly retreat to safety across the river into
Cambodia. We. were informed that three small airfields in Cambodia,
located north and west, of War Zone C, are, in the opinion of some ob-
servers, used regularly to resupply Vietcong troops in that vicinity,
with each field averaging three C-47-type planeloads of supplies per
day. We were also advised that Red Chinese personnel are operating
boats and junks on the Oriental River in this area, ferrying supplies
and personnel into and out of Vietnam.
(e) Ending infiltration from the north.-A major limiting factor
on our ability to win the military war in South Vietnam is the-ex-
tent of Comrnnnist infiltration from the north- This infiltration comes
down the Ho Chi Minh trail, running from the southern part of North
Vietnam over into eastern Laos through some choke points like the
Mugia Pass, and then down truck roads through the Laotian jungle,
finally cutting off at various points south of the 17th para lei,
where supplies and personnel move back into South Vietnam in
the I and II Corps areas. Originally this trail was little more than
a precarious kind of coolie footpath. But today it is a full truck
route over large sections, although the terrain through which it passes,
and the spots where supplies and personnel move back into South
Vietnam, are still jungle and difficult mountain areas. The problems
in locath.-igr and interdicting this truck traffic by air alone are stagger-
ing. In fact ive, cannot interdict it c letel in this way, ? we c
rev limit it. Military operations in Laos itself are forbidden by the
Laotian peace settlement of 1962. Yet rarely has a major military cam-
paign been conducted with such a readily breachable flank as the
one our forces possess in South Vietnam.
(d) Public relations an.d television.-.Since the su}pport of the people
is absolutely essential for the success of military operations against
must be made to develop adequate communication facilities between
-the Vietnamese. own people, The high rate of
illiteracy in Vietnam means that this need can be filled only to a very
limited degree by newspapers and other printed media. A good deal
of interest has been generated within the past year in the establishment
of a TV system. Broadcast, facilities were installed some months ago
in three superannuated C-12l (Constellation) Navy aircraft, known
as the Blade Eagles. One of these three planes was badly damaged
during the April 13 mortar attack on Tan Son Nhut. A second re.
ceived minor damage but still flew the same night, with Mr. Chamber-
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lain aboard. In fact the gentleman from Michigan has been one of the
most ent'hus'iastic and effective supporters of this whole project. The
`subcommittee shares his enthusiasm and joins in his appeal for rapid
improvement in its effectiveness.
The present obsolete aircraft are limited in both range and cruising
capacity. If P-3 (Electra) aircraft were substituted the TV mission
could operate from areas of more assured security and would not be
subject to the threat of constant attack at Tan Son Nhut. Their area
of coverage and their transmission time on station would also be
greatly increased. Present TV broadcast hours in Vietnam are all
too brief and the programs, especially those beamed to the Vietnamese,
are inaedquate. At the present time we broadcast over two separate
channels, one for American troops and the other for the Vietnamese.
But coverage is limited to the immediate Saigon area. We need to ex-
tend the sweep of television to a much larger segment of the country.
Naturally the number of television sets available in Vietnam is
small. The subcommittee found, however, that there is very great
interest in television on the part. of the Vietnamese, and any kind of
set is in great demand. It would be possible to set up a public set
in a central spot in each community, as is now done in San Juan, P.R.,
for example,, for the use of a whole village.
If the Vietnamese people are to support our efforts in their country
they need to know what' is going on. Certainly they ought to be able
to see and hear their own premier. And if they are to vote infelIi-
gently in the September'eIections, they should be acquainted with the
issues and candidates. The potentiality of television in bringing the
people of Vietnam into a closer participation in their own govern-
ment is almost unlimited. The committee believes, however, that it
has not so far been adequately taken advantage of. A few. dollars
here--less perhaps than might be spent in a single B-52 raid--could
pay enormous political dividends. We believe an all-out effort in this
direction is desirable, and recommend the enlistment of the full and
prompt support of the American television industry toward this
objective.
14. Thailand: To get a full. understanding of what is going on in
'Vietnam one also needs to visit Thailand. The subcommittee was
most impressed with what we saw there and with the outstanding job
being done by General Stillwell, who served as General Westmore-
lands deputy before coming to his present command. General Still-
well's understanding of the threat we face in South Vietnam serves
him well in Thailand.
' 'Like most southeast Asian countries, Thailand faces a povert=y prob_
1'em and is in need of modernization and improvement. But one can?
already see the beneficial results of American aid there and the oppor-
tnnities which further h~~e~ll _c~an provide. Unlike Vietnam, Thail'zn&
has a long history ofiildependence, and a heritage of nationalism which
makes the country a cohesive unit. Friendly relations between the
Thais and ourselves have existed for many years.
Thailand has supported our policy, recognizing that if Communist
invasion and subversion of the "war-of-liberation" variety succeeded
in Vietnam, she would unquestionably be the next target. Indeed
within the past couple of years a familiar pattern of Communist ter-
rorism has already developed in the northeastern part of Thailand,
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closest to Laos and Communist China. Villages have been attacked
and community leaders and teachers assassinated or kidnaped, just
as the Vietcong have been doing in South Vietnam. Because of ter-
rain, distance from Bangkok, and relative inaccessibility these areas
have been the most economically depressed in Thailand and hence more
susceptible to Communist agitation and recruitment. To some extent
a similar threat has also been felt: in the southern panhandle near
Malaya, where bands of Communist guerrillas driven out of Malaya
during the fighting there are still hiding out.
In Thailand the main thrust of American aid has been toward
opening up lines of communication between Bangkok and the north-
east, so that this area can be better protected and more rapidly
developed. A modern, 2-lane superhighway, the Freedom Highway,
extending part of the way out of Bangkok in this direction, has been
built with American funds. Other improvements and extensions are
projected. The subcommittee believes that funds spent on such proj-
ects as this will be of great benefit to us and should be supported gen-
erously. Thailand is one place where the American foreign aid dollar
is paying off well in behalf of American interests.
Because of the threat in the northeast and the proximity of Thailand
to Vietnam, one of that country's most urgent needs is for improved
conventional military forces, including helicopters for rapid jungle
movement, like those. of the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry. Help is urgently
needed too in building an effective river patrol system along the cx-
-tensive Mekong River border with Laos.
The subcommittee recommends support for these projects. In fact,
'considering the similarity of the threat now emerging in northeast
Thailand, the subcommittee believes that military assistance funds for
Thailand could be handled more expeditiously if they were incor-
porated, as is now done with those for Vietnam, directly into the de-
fense authorization and appropriation legislation.
15. Japan : Japan is a long way from Vietnam and has taken little
or no interest in our current involvement there. Yet the subcommittee,
on the basis of discussions with Ambassador Reischauer, believes that
Japan can play an important role in the future of Vietnam as well as
Asia generally.
Japan is by far the most modern, efficient, and productive nation in
Asia. In fact Japan has now become one of the most productive in-
dustrial nations in the world. With an area only the size of California,
she has a gross national product equal to that of all of Africa or all of
Latin America, greater than that of Communist China, twice that of
India, and equal in fact to that of all the. rest of Asia combined, exclud-
ing China and India. So when it comes to helping nations like Viet-
nam get on their feet economically, Japanese assistance could prove to
be extremely valuable. Once the military situation has been brought
under control, she can and should play a major role in helping South
Vietnam rebuild herself.
With an allied-imposed constitution that outlawed war and banned
all military forces, Japan has thus far been able to avoid facing up
to the military realities of the Far East. Yet the rapid expansion of
Communist China's nuclear capability is expected to lead to some sub-
stantial changes in her attitude and a greater concern with her own
defense problems. While she has tended in the past to look on China
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with favor, as the source of her own heritage, the Greece to her Rome
so to speak, and has deplored what she regarded as an uncompromising
American attitude toward the Red Chinese, there are indications
now that the Communists' bitter reactions to America's 1965 Christmas
peace offensive in Vietnam have forced a reappraisal in Japan's think-
ing. If Japan does take a more realistic view of her defense problems
and begins, as now seems probable, to assert a position of political
leadership in Asia more in keeping with her economic superiority,
perhaps we can hope for increased support from other Asian powers
for our efforts to contain the spread of communism.
On the basis of the finding and comments set forth above, the sub-
committee submits the following specific recommendations :
1. We are convinced that a military defeat of the Vietcong, while
no doubt requiring a reasonable degree of political stability within
South Vietnam, does not require a full and complete solution to all of
Vietnam's many complex economic, social, and political problems.
These can largely be solved only by the Vietnamese people themselves.
Yet we detect some feeling here in this country that a major military
commitment will be required in Vietnam until all these problems have
been solved, thus creating the discouraging prospect of an interminable
and open end situation. We therefore recommend that in order to
facilitate greater public understanding of the war official statements
distinguish more carefull between containing the immediate an
overriding military threat which now faces South Vietnam, and the
longer, slower, harder, and essentially local job of building a stable
n Drosperous society in South Vietnam.
2. Holing Vietnamese territory already cleared of Vietcong forces
and securing it against further Vietcong attack is also a job which
must increasingly be transferred from American to ARVN forces and
Vietnamese national police units. For this purpose an increase in
ARVN forces and in their training is recommended.
3. We recommend a substantial and rapid increase in TV broad-
casting facilities in Vietnam directed toward informing the Vietnamese
people and strengthening their readiness for carrying out democratic
procedures.
4. We strongly recommend that serious attention be given to the
growing problem of Vietcong use of Cambodian sanctuary, including
the possibility of limiting the use of the Mekong River. We also
recommend that the committee undertake its own inquiry into whether
Cambodia is aiding the Vietcong as has been alleged in some press
reports.
5. We support an increase in military assistance funds for Thailand
and recommend that these funds be included as part of the Defense
Department authorization and appropriation, as is do-no with Vietnam
military assistance funds.
6. We recommend retention of the 1-year rotation policy for
combat troops in Vietnam.
7. We recommend that prompt action be taken to extend and liberal-
ize R. & R. arrangements for combat troops.
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8. While the matter is outside the jurisdiction of this committee, we
would recommend that Congress exempt from income tax all mili-
tary pay earned in Vietnam.
9. We recommend the recommissioning of a reserve fleet cruiser or
battleship to provide additional naval gunfire support for ground
forces ashore.
10. We recommend installation of air-conditioning equipment in the
patient wards of the evacuation hospitals in Vietnam, where feasible.
11. We urge all possible speed in producing and supplying addi-
tional helicopters, especially the heavy-duty Chinook, to meet the
urgent needs of infantry forces and special forces troops in Vietnam.
12. We strongly approve of the increase in South Korean forces
stationed in South Vietnam that is now underway. Their record-irk
combat and in carrying out civic actions in cooperation with the Viet-
namese people has shown that they can make a unique and most valu-
able contribution to our common effort.
13. In carrying out the longer more difficult job of building a
stable, prosperous, and representative society in South Vietnam, wee
recommend that American civilians, including Peace Corps personnel
be recruited to assist with'this effort, subject to the wishes of the Viet-
itamese Government, and as the military situation -permits. We also
recommend that similar units from South Korea, Thailand, Japan, and_
the United Nations be invited to join in this effort, again subject to the
\vishes of the Vietnamese Government.
14. While recognizing the problems involved in developing effectiv,
66ction procedures in a nation like Vietnam while war is still in
'progress, y2iievertheless recommend that everything ossible continue
fti be done to encourage the 'Vietnamese Government to move rapidly
-toward the establishment of a more representative government in , o utb
Vietnam, bT,8 on the expression, through free elections, of the wishes
of the Vietnamese -people.
V. CONCLUSION
In sun y, the subcommittee believes the fight in Vietnam is a
commitment for our country militarily, oliticaIl and
morally. We believe it is in line with our historic policy to resist
aggression both Communist and Fascist. We believe our Armed
Force's are beginning to win a militai y victory over the Vietcong an
doing a vas lv better and more effective job than some reports have
indicated and that chances for such a military outcome will be im-
proved if the complex political situation can he stabilized,
We recognize the immense help which countries like Thailand,
South Korea, Australia and New Zealand have given in this conflict
and believe that efforts should continue to be made to enlist further
Asian support for our operations in Vietnam.
Once the major military threat has been contained, we believe the
United States must also help the people of South Vietnam, in accord-
ance with the wishes of their elected government, in building a stable,
prosperous, and representative society of their own.
We congratulate and commend our top military commander in Viet-
nam, Gen. William C. Westmoreland. General Westmoreland not
only has directed a brilliant military campaign against the Vietcong,
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he has also displayed a remarkably effective grasp of the complex
social, political, and economic problems in Vietnam.
The subcommittee also wishes to record its high regard for the other
top officers involved in our Vietnamese commitment, in particular
Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp, U.S. Navy, Pacific commander; Lt. Gen.
Lewis W. Walt, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Amphibious Force com-
mander; and Maj. Gen. Richard Stillwell, commander, MACTHAI.
All these officers display the same broad appreciation of the political
and economic realities in southeast Asia that we found in General
Westmoreland, and the American people can have the highest confi-
dence in their abilities.
The Vietnam war has been a complex and controversial issue f
Congress and the American people. Some of this controversy stems,
we believe, from the fact that press accounts, perhaps inevitably,
The most important message of this?subcommrttee to t -o W Congress
and to .the American people, therefore, is one of encouragement and
-hope.... Undoubtedly there will be difficulties and disappointments.
.ahead in Vietnam. There will be downs as well as ups before the
matter is. finally resolved. But we strongly believe that this Nation
hi v our objectives in Vietnam, and that our commitment there
should be regarded not so much as a problem but as a challenge an
an opportunity. Here again we have the chance to help another de-
velopilg country get. on its own feet and begin buildlnc a new so-
eiety, in peace, in accordance with its own wishes, and unharassed
and unmolested by its neighbors. Surely it is no less important that
this opportunity be available today to a small and faraway country in
Asia called Vietnam, than it should have been available in 1938 to a-
small and faraway country in Europe called Czechoslovakia.
Certainly if the American GI, in a few short months, can, as we,
have seen him do, master the complex techniques of fighting guerrilla
forces in the harsh and unfamiliar jungles and mountains of Vietnam,
then other agencies of our Government should be no less successful in
mastering the economic and political boobytraps that lie ahead on the
road toward establishing a free and peaceful South Vietnam in a
.free and prosperous and peaceful Asia.
* Respectfully submitted,
JUNE 15, 1966.
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, Chairman.
ROBERT L. LEGGETT.
FLOYD V. HICKS.
CHARLES E. CIIAIMIBERLAIN.
ROBERT T. STAFFORD.
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APPENDIX A-ITINERARY
April 7: 1500 Departed Friendship Airport, Baltimore.
April 7: 2330 Arrived in Honolulu.
April 8: Honolulu, CItiCPAC briefing. Departed Bangkok,
(International Date Line)
April 10: 0130 Arrived Bangkok, Thailand: Conference with General Stillwell;
MACTHAI briefing.
April 11: 0900 Arrived Pleiku, visited II Corps Advisory group and Special
Forces Camp at I'leime ; flew to An Khe for briefing and visit with 1st Cavalry
Division (Ali-mobile) ; flew to, Republic of Korea Tiger Division; flew from
Qul Nhon to carrier, U.S.S. Enterprise.
April 12: Tour of carrier, U.S.S. Enterprise; flew to Chu Lai, visited 1st Marine
Division for briefing ; flew to Cam Ranh Bay visited logistical area ; flew
to Can The for visit with IV Corps Advisory Team.
April 13: Can Tho, briefing with IV Corps Advisory Group; flew to Vung Tau,
visit with Senior Advisor 3d Coastal District at Cat Lo ; briefing on Game
Warden and Market Time; flew to Binh Ba for visit with 1st Infantry Di-
vision ; flew to Cu Chi.
April 14: Ou Chi, visit with 25th Infantry Division ; flew to Tay Ninh, visit
with Special Forces Team ; flew to Bien Iloa, visit with General West-
moreland, and visit to 93rd Evacuation Hospital, and visit with 3d Tactical
Fighter Wing; flew to Bangkok.
April 15: Bangkok, visit with Ambassador Martin ; flew to Udorn, Thailand,
briefing and tour ; flew to Uboit, briefing and tour ; return to Bangkok.
April 16: Departed Bangkok.
April 10: 2200 Arrived Tokyo, Japan.
April 17-18: Tokyo. Briefings at U.S. Embassy.
April 18: 1530 Departed Tokyo.
(International Date Line)
April 19: 0130 Arrived Dulles International Airport.
(9569)
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