ARMED INCIDENTS ALONG THE KOREAN DMZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010033-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 8, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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 Approved For R~se 2002,~~~~~9T T00826~400010033-4
NO F IGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE'dNLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelii,gence
8 November 1966
Armed Incidents Along the Korean DMZ
1. The attack by uniformed North Korean troops
on 2 November 1966 against a US patrol unit south of
the Demilitarized Zone (I)~IZ) was apparently in re-
taliation for a South Kaz?ean (ROK) raid a week earlier,
Although there has been a marked increase in North
Korean harassing attacks along the DMZ since mid-
October, these actions probably do not reflect a de-
cision to engage in wholesale violations of the
.armistice agreement. The targeting of the 2 November
raid against American troops suggests that Pyongyang
was seeking to force the US to prevent any repetition
of the raid on 26 October by some 30 ROK troops into
the DMZ.
2. There is :no evidence that the North Koreans
intend to open a ";second front" in the Vietnam War.
However, it is possible that the North Koreans be-
lieve that heightened tensions along the DMZ would
serve as a warning to the ROK and the US against
further deployments of ROK troops to Vietnam and
demonstrate North ];~orean support of Hanoi to other
Communist states.
3. There is no indication.that this upsurge of
violence was related to President Johnson's visit to
South Korea. Recent interrogation of apprehended
agents indicates these attacks had been planned long
before the President's Asian trip was announced.
is memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current In-
telligence and coordinated with the Office
of National Estimates.
NO FOREIGN I)ISSEM/BACKGROUND USE .ONLY
Approved For Release 200?~~/ ~'~-~'19T00826A001400010033-4
 Approved For R~se 2002-7'9T00826A`400010033-4
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
4. Neither statements by North Korean leaders
nor Pyongyang's propaganda suggest an intention to
divert US attention from Vietnam. Kim I1-song's ma-
jor policy statement on 5 October, although it made
the customary offer to send "volunteers" to Vietnam,
contained no threat to open a "second front" in Korea
and the US commitment to Seoul probably ?remains an
effective deterrent to such action.
5. South Korean military officials probably
hoped that the ROK. raid, which is claimed to have
cost the enemy some 30 casualties and may have pene-
trated through the DMZ into~North Korea, would boost
morale lowered by North Korean incursions. Although
the UN commander and the US ambassador have warned
the South Koreans against repetition of such inci-
dents, there is a danger that they will undertake
carefully concealed reprisals if they suffer further
personnel losses.
6. The North Korean presentation at the Mili-
tary Armistice Committee meeting held on 4 November
at Panmunjom followed the traditional propaganda
pattern. The senior North Korean representative
made no direct mention of the ROK raid, probably
out of reluctance to call attention to North Korean
vulnerabilities or to raise the question of North
Korean casualties. He did accuse the UN side in
general terms of numerous border violations.
?. The recent upsurge of violence by North
Korean infiltrators suggests at least a temporary
shift of mission from intelligence collection and
subversion to harassment. In the past, infiltrat-
ing agents--usually in civilian clothes--rarely en-
gaged in fire-fights except when challenged by the
ROK military or security services. Since mid-
October, however, infiltration teams have deliberately
sought out and attacked ROK forces. These probing
operations may have been designed to test the ef-
fectiveness and reaction of South Korean forces de-
ployed along the DMZ as well as to undermine troop
morale.
8. North Korean agent operations along the
DMZ have been conducted with varying intensity since
d F R~ pI
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 Approved For R~se 200?~~'~~"~~~9T00826~400010033-4
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
the armistice agreement in 1953. In the past year,
larger teams and more heavily armed operatives have
been used. Agent teams began concentrated operations
in the ROK last May. After an abnormal period of in-
activity in September and early October probably
caused by heavy rains and agent losses, North Korean
infiltrators carried out seven surprise attacks
against ROK troops in a five-day period beginning
on 13 October. By 2 November, ROK and US forces had
suffered some 36 fatalities (six US) in 40 incidents
this year as compared with 20 Korean soldiers killed
in 55 incidents in 1965 and four in 32 incidents dur-
ing 1964.
9. The harassment along the DMZ is expected to
taper off during t:he next few weeks as the foliage
disappears and snow begins to fall. Tdormally, agent
operations during 'the November-February period are
infrequent because of bad weather.
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 Approved For Rlse 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79T00826A,400010033-4
KOREA: Armed Incidents 13 Oct - 2 Nov 1966
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SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010033-4
 Approved Release 200~~RI~79T0~6A001400010033-4
Approved For Release 2002/9'I~`~G'Ya14D~79T00826A001400010033-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010033-4
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010033-4
 Approver Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79T~6A001400010033-4
Talking paper for "Armed Incidents Along the Korean DMZ"
The paper reviews the upsurge of North Korean
harassing actions along ithe DMZ since mid-October and
assesses the reasons for it.
--It rules out i~hat the increase is related to
the President ''s trip because the attacks were
planned beforE~ the trip was announced. It
also finds no reason to believe there is an
intention to divert US attention from Viet-
nam, although one purpose might be to demon-
strate Pyongyang's support of Hanoi.
--The reason fox' the upsurge probably is to
test the effectiveness and reaction of ROK
forces along t;he DMZ and to undermine their
morale .
--Harassing actions are likely to taper off soon
as the weather worsens.
The paper, initiatedl by OCI because of the 2 November
ambush of a US patrol, ha.s been coordinated with ONE.
Recommend routine internal and external dissemination.
Approved For Release 2002/01/30: CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010033-4
 25X1A gpproved For Release 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010033-4
Approved For Release 2002/01/30 :CIA-RDP79T00826A001400010033-4