(Sanitized) MOVES IN MIDDLE EAST
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80R01443R000400230003-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
November 17, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 4, 2000
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 21, 1955
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80R01443R000400230003-1.pdf | 226.81 KB |
Body:
25X6
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
ij 41a
Approved5F orie~lease 2000/08 - DR~1IM000488230003-1
INDONESIA
I. President Sukarno is apparently attempting
to bring down the Ma.sjumi-led coalition of
Prime Minister Ha.ra.ha.p.
A. Sukarno opposes disciplinary action--
proposed by Hara.hap and vice-President
Watta.--against Air Force officers re-
sponsible for (14 Dec) public defiance
of government's authority.
B. 14 Dec incident took place at swearing-
in ceremony for new cabinet-appointed
deputy a.ir chief.
1. Sukarno had approved appointment,
but apparently not agreed to early
insta,lla.tion of new deputy.
2. Air Force personnel made show of
arms and broke up ceremony.
3. Air Force (17,000) has not previous-
been of political importance but
lines now drawn are same as in
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
Approved For Release 24 101i44F~~0400230003-1
'a.tta. on one side; National Party,
Communists and Sukarno on the
other).
C. Another example Sukarno siding with
PKI is 14 Dec speech, when he said
WOULID B;
A exclude Communists from next Indonesian
government, since supporters their
ideology had polled 6 million votes.
II. In address to an Air Force formation on
19 Dec, asking for "calmness and unity,"
Sukarno had at his side Air Force chief
Suryadarma., who engineered incident;
earlier, he had refused Suya.darma's
resignation.
A. Cabinet weakening on earlier decision
to take "strong measures"; no arrests
yet made.
III. Sukarno has strong motive for bringing
down government in near future.
-2-
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
Approved For tele e20AO/pp r - pp q~~JIAENR0#80230003-1
new parliament (to represent national
minority groups); these 20 may hold
balance of power.
1. Provisional constitution states
these shall be appointed by "the
government": both Ha.raha.p and
Sukarno claiming privilege.
2. If Sukarno got a rubber stamp
cabinet, dispute would become
academic.
IV. Haraia.p will resist pressure to resign,
is backed by Hatta, and the Army.
A. But as head of a, many-party coalition
government (due to resign when new
parliament meets in Apr 156) his
political position is weak.
B. He cannot count on full support of
small-party coalition members when
present parliament reconvenes
(10 Jan) .
-3-
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
Approved ForrRele eggg9/08ZIgiF - Pn~OgPA44JROJW00230003-1
voting for Constituent Assembly
further tending to weaken his position.
1. These show National Party,
Communists and Moslem NU all doing
better than at comparable point in
counting of September vote.
2. Ha.rahap's Ma.sjumi Party doing
worse.
-4-
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
Approved Forielease 2000/08/30: CIA- RDP8oR8 M8040 30003-1
INDONESIA BACKGROUND
LATEST ELECTION FIGURES
1. Latest available figures on Indonesia's
29 Sep elections for Parliament (unofficial,
published 1 Dec) show the following:
NATIONAL PARTY (PNI). . . . 8,078,000
MAASJUMI . . . . . . . . . . 7,853,000
COMMUNISTS (PKI). . . . . . 6,451,000
NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU). . . . 6,006,000
A. Although these figures are unofficial,
they were published after completion
of the official count (29 Nov).
II. Early returns from Indonesia.'s 15 Dec elec-
tions for a constituent assembly (to frame
constitution) show a drop in Ma.sjumi strength
when compared with similar returns from the
Sep voting, as follows:
DEC VOTING
SEP VOTING
(as of
20 Dec)
as o
3 Oct)
PNI . . .
.3,563,000
(34%)--5,788,000
(32%)
NU.
.2,870,000
(27%)--4,399,000
(24%)
PKI . . .
..2,567,000
(24%)--4,089,000
(23%)
MASJUMI .
..1$63,000 (15%)--3,648,000
(20%)
Approved EqrjftIea/Sg 20?0LSQL.6JAfRB-BB-QR0 F6Q0400230003-1
Approvdd~Forie1ease 2000/08/30: CIA-RDPid RBJJJ 000400230003-1
1. Campaign for 2 Jan '56 elections being
marked by increased registrations, quicken-
ing tempo.
A. Over 1,200,000 new voters registered.
B. Candidates are drawing record crowds
at record number rallies.
C. Poll indicates more Frenchmen than ever
before intend to vote (88% of electorate,
compared with 80% in '51).
II. Basically, a, three-cornered race, which re-
duces possibility of elections producing
stable majority: the three majors are--
A. Communists, who are playing up worker
solidarity, pressing for left government:
1. Confident this time that "alliance"
mechanism--which worked against them
in 1951--will be unable to deprive
them of seats in proportion to their
popular strength.
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
Approved For Rqeas 2S%Wo m4PCF will gain 35-40 seats, for
41, ~
total about 135 of 596(30 Algerian
seats will not be filled now) at
stake.
B. Mendes-France Republican Front (coali-
tion of Socialists, most Radicals and
minority of ex-Gaullists), is attacking
Right-Center "stagnation," advocating
parliamentary, electoral reform to
strengthen French executive.
1. Republican Front hopes to win pro-
test vote (usually given to Commu-
nists), and youth vote.
2. Front expected to win about 150
seats.
C. Third major group is.Fa.ure-Piney coali-
tion (includes Popular Republicans,
a bloc made up of Independents, Pea.sa.nts
and most ex-Gaullists, and also those
right-wing Radicals who have split from
Approved For ReIomj OOI08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1
-9-
1 0 IPM IN
Approved For RelpaseT;gl0sOI2poup: i 7-Pfj8.Ofg14~~PgPJ00230003-1
prosperity, promise of higher
living standards; also aiming at
youth by advocating cut in military
service.
2. Faure-Pinay group may win close to
300 seats of 596 total. Neverthe-
less, little likelihood of stable
coalition.
III.Among smaller splinters are anti-ta.x
rightists (Pouja.dists) who are running nega-
tive campaign against both Mendes and Faure
cand ida.tes .
A. Their activity responsible for some
violence so far.
TV. Contest between Mendes and Fa.ure-Pinay blocs
confused by fact that both blocs include
wide spectrum of views, yet share basic
ideology (differing mostly on method).
A. Formal platforms similar: only clear-
cut issue separating them is state aid
Approved For Relgg ens g8Q%ogiAA-F RPM&%OR X1400230003-1
Approved For Relgase g8kg8/;Va:n ~?P"1g44 g%%400230003-1
foreign affairs issue by attack on
Pinay for accepting 19 Dec NATO
Council statement on Soviet Middle
East tactics.
V. Both Pinay and Mendes pessimistic:
A. Pinay fears loss of votes to anti-ta.x
rightists, thus forcing use of propor-
tiona.l representation in many a.rea.s
(which will help Communists).
B. Mendes-Fra.nce's private opinion of
Republican Front chances is only about
150 seats -
-4-
Approved For Release 2000/08/30 : CIA-RDP80RO1443R000400230003-1