US-IRANIAN RELATIONS

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 10, 2003
Sequence Number: 
57
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 6, 1966
Content Type: 
IM
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7.pdf208.98 KB
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Approved 25X1 No, 0813/66 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence * OSD & DOS REVIEWS COMPLETED * 6 May 1966 1. US-Iranian relations may reach a critical point this month over the issues of Iranian mili- tary purchases and the Iranian drive to increase oil revenues. An, annual joint survey of the Iranian economy is under way now, and the report of the US Military Survey Team to Iran (Peterson. Report) has been completed and was submitted to the Shah on 4 May. Analysis of these two reports in Washington will determine the extent to which large Iranian military expenditures in the US are economically feasible. In addition, the Oil Consortium will determine this month how much to increase its oil offtake (exports) from Iran. The Shah considers a large increase essential to finance his military and economic programs. 2. The Shah is determined 'to make major mili- tary purchases in the near future to bolster de- fenses in. oil-rich southern Iran and in the Persian Gulf, which he believes are endangered by the am- bitions of Egyptian President Nasir. The Iranian parliament in November approved additional military expenditures of up to $200 million. The Shah would prefer to make these purchases in the US, but has made it clear that he will turn elsewhere if this proves too difficult. 3. The US takes the position that these pur- chases can, be approved only in the context of an annual joint review of the Iranian economy. The annual review grows out of a US-Iranian Memo of *Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence Approve Approve Understanding in. 1964. In essence, the review pro- vides economic information. which Washington will analyze to determine whether Iran. can afford in- creased military expenditures and still maintain rapid economic development. The Shah finds such limitations irritating and insulting, particularly in the light of his new "independent" foreign. policy. 4. The arms issue is complicated by the comple- tion. of the Peterson Report. This report appears to be more in line with the Shah's thinking--it acknowl- edges the Arab threat to Iranian. security and recom- mends.. stronger defenses in the southern, provinces and the Persian. Gulf. The additional recommended armaments would require a credit of $328 million over the $200 million credit extended under the 1964 agree- ment. 5. However, the State Department has tentatively determined (pending completion. of 'the annual review) that the new credit must not exceed $184 million., thus requiring that the Shah postpone a substantial portion of the arms purchases until after 1971. In addition, the US Embassy in Teheran has expressed its concern over the magnitude of the prices listed in the Peterson Report, and fears that the Shah will be disturbed also. Thus, although all the Shah's wished-for purchases except a prestigious destroyer apparently will be approved in principle, the Shah may well find the delay on some items, and the prices, unacceptable. Completion. Of the annual re- view probably will not substantially alter the 'US position. It is quite conceivable that the Shah will use the Peterson Report to counter State De- partment arguments against immediate heavy expendi- tures. 6. The oil issue is locked in closely with the foregoing. Members of the Oil Consortium may reach a decision, this month on the rate at which they will increase oil offtake. As of late April, the member companies were thinking in terms of a 10.5-percent, or at most 12-percent, increase over 1965 production. The Shah insists, however, that the rate must be at least 17 percent if Iran is to carry out its economic and military programs without "reorienting" its trade pattern. Both the US and British companies in the Approv 25X1 25X1 Approve consortium argue that they are producing as fast as possible, and each group accuses the other of hold- ing back production. A final meeting was scheduled for 10 May, but apparently has been temporarily post- poned because the Shah has invited some company heads to Teheran for discussions later in May. The US fears the consequences of a major confrontation be- tween Iran. and the consortium, and has been, encourag- ing US companies to raise their production as much as possible. 7. The Shah, bolstered by his rapprochement . with the Soviets and by political stability and eco- nomic growth at home, has exhibited an increasingly independent spirit in the past year. He is de- termined to obtain new military equipment soon., and there is little doubt that he will turn elsewhere if the US does not sell quickly and on favorable terms. He has felt for some time that the US takes Iranian friendship for granted, and he regards the arms question, as a crucial test of US support and sin- cerity. He is equally determined to increase oil revenues,, and may well be serious in his threat to shift at least part of Iran's trade to the East, where export prices are lower and terms are easier. This could, in turn, put a brake on 'the growing US private investment in Iran, as well as affect our general politico-military relationship with the country. 25X1 25X1 Approv d ForIPWease "^^"^ ""' . ^' A P911P r7 TOO82G A OOOGAAAA AA57 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057=7(/t ' - 7 May 1966 In view of the current high interest regarding US Iranian relations, I hope that you will find the attached memorandum on this subject timely and useful. It summarizes in brief compass the issues which are uppermost in the US-Iranian relationship at the present time. R. J. SMITH Deputy Director for Intelligence 6, "US-Iranian Relations" Also sent to: The Honorable Bill Moyers :special Assistant to the President The Honorable Walt Rostow Special Assistant to the President Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7 Available Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7 ILLEGIB Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/24: CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010057-7