THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010037-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: April 27, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI No. 0371/66
Copy No.
11U
WEEKLY REPORT
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
27 April 1966
INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE 25X1
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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SECRE I
GROUP 1
Excluded from autornatic
downgrading and declassification
onio
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECT IONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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79
OCI No. 0371/66
Published by the Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(21 April - 27 April 1966)
CONTENTS
Page
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE iv
Map, South Vietnam, facing page 1
I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1
A. POLITICAL SITUATION 1
Interest shifts to preparations for
constituent assembly elections (p. 1);
Ky government convenes advisory meeting
on election procedures (p. 1); Buddhist
hierarchy continues to declare itself
satisfied with government's election
gestures (p. 1); Concern over possible
Buddhist domination becoming increas-
ingly evident in non-Buddhist circles
(p. 1); Ky now considering ways to pre-
serve military influence (p. 2); Ky's
views may foreshadow eventual conflict
with Buddhists (p. 2); National Police
Director Lieu replaced by Colonel Loan
(p. 2); Economic Situation: Saigon re-
tail price index falls T5-: 3); Exchange
rates generally unchanged (p. 3).
B. MILITARY SITUATION 4
Communist activity increases but re-
mains below 1966 weekly average (p. 4);
Weekly statistics are given (p. 4);
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Friendly operations increase, but
enemy contacts are generally light
(p. 4); Multibattalion operation
ends in I Corps (p. 4); FILLMORE con-
tinues in II Corps (p. 5); Friendly
operations successful in III and IV
corps (p. 5); B-52s fly 14 missions
(p. 5); Pilots report results of
tactical air sorties (p. 5); Commu-
nist incidents increase in I Corps
(p. 6); Three airfields attacked in
II Corps (p. 6); Terrorism continues
high in III and IV corps (p. 6);
Status of transportation routes shows
little change (p. 7).
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Page
Map, Transportation Routes, facing page 7
C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT 8
Over two thirds of provinces behind
projected schedule (p. 8); US Mission
report evaluates factors influencing
apparent lack of progress (p. 8); Dis-
ruptive factors beyond provincial con-
trol are noted (p. 8); Success of gov-
ernment's civilian action programs
prompting Communists to mount counter-
pacification program (p. 9); Captured
documents reveal Viet Cong plans (p. 9);
Chieu Hoi returnees show lowest weekly
total since January (p. 9).
Map, North Vietnam, facing page 11
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC 11
Four MIGs lost in seven aerial engage-
ments over North Vietnam (p. 11); DRV
National Assembly is addressed by Ho
Chi Minh and other leaders (p. 11);
Hanoi responds negatively to Mansfield
proposal (p. 11).
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Page
III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS 13
Current crisis causing GVN leaders
to cancel planned trips abroad
(P. 13); Government representatives
attend preparatory session for Far
East foreign ministers' conference
(p. 13); ICC commissioners planning
more frequent meetings in Hanoi
(p. 13); Australian Prime Minister
Holt visits South Vietnam (p. 14).
ANNEX: South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Personnel Losses (Weekly)
South Vietnam Battle Statistics--
Incidents and Attacks (Weekly)
(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South
Vietnam is based on contributions from CIA,
DIA, and INR; it is edited and published by
CIA without final coordination.)
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THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
Political attentions shifted during the week to prepara-
tions for constituent assembly elections. However, there
was evidence of a mounting reaction in the country to recent
Buddhist political tactics.
On the military front, both Communist activity and
friendly operations increased during the week, but result-
ing contacts remained slight.
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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
A. POLITICAL SITUATION
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1. Political attentions shifted during the week
to preparations for constituent assembly elections,
although there was also evidence of a mounting reac-
tion in the country to recent Buddhist political
tactics.
2. As a small step toward implementing its elec-
tion decree, the Ky government last weekend convened
a meeting of 47 notables and elected officials to
advise on election procedures. The meeting, which
included several participants sympathetic to the
"struggle movement" in I Corps, voted to set up a
100-man council to draft an election law and to
oversee the elections, including candidate screening.
The new council, expected to be formed in the next
few weeks, is to consist of an equal number of repre-
sentatives from provincial and municipal councils,
and of representatives from political and religious
groups, plus legal experts. The means of selecting
the membership were not specified, presumably leav-
ing the government free to determine at least half
of the council's composition.
3. The Buddhist hierarchy continues to declare
itself satisfied with the government's election
gestures to date. It has toned down the militancy
of the "struggle movement," and has reacted mildly
to an outbreak of violence late last week between
demonstrators and government troops in Da Lat, de-
spite the death there of seven persons and the ar-
rest of nearly 100 students. The combined efforts
of Buddhist leaders and I Corps commander General
Dinh have restored a measure of calm to the troubled
cities of Hue and Da Nang, although antigovernment
elements still retain a substantial degree of local
authority.
4. Concern that the Buddhists may dominate an
elected assembly or serve as a vehicle for Commu-
nist infiltration via the ballot is becoming in-
creasingly, loud, among other groups including the
Catholics, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, Nationalist
(VNQDD) and Dai Viet political party factions,
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organized labor, and Saigon University circles.
Demonstrations and oblique calls for government ac-
tion against the leaders of recent disorders may be
intended to provoke a reaction fron the Buddhists,
who already suspect these groups of operating in
concert with the government to delay elections.
5. Premier Ky, apparently gaining confidence
from the cessation of Buddhist attacks, is now con-
sidering ways to preserve a dominant military influ-
ence over the processes leading to constitutional
government. He told Ambassador Lodge that a meeting
of seven of the ten Directorate generals on 25 April
had generally agreed to run hand-picked military
candidates for seats in the constituent assembly.
The Directorate reportedly feels that if the mili-
tary can win a fourth of the assembly seats, this
will constitute a powerful bloc around which other
genuine nationalists can rally.
6. According to Ky, if "good men" are elected to
the constituent assembly, the Directorate would be
willing to see that body transform itself into a
legislature. In Ky's view, however, it would still
remain subordinate to the Directorate, which would
be retained and possibly expanded to include some
civilian leaders. Ky's remarks are the first indi-
cation of government planning with regard to the
post-election period, and may foreshadow eventual
conflicts with the Buddhists who envisage a govern-
ment fully responsible to an elected parliament.
7. Ky also moved last week to replace Colonel
Lieu, considered sympathetic to ousted I Corps com-
mander Thi and other government critics, as direc-
tor of the National Police. Lieu's removal has so
far caused no ripple of protest despite earlier
threats by several cabinet ministers to resign if
he were replaced. Lieu's successor is Military
Security Service chief Colonel Loan, who has been
identified with a so-called "Baby Turk" element of
field-grade and junior officers who have been ex-
erting pressure on the government for internal re-
forms and stronger action in I Corps. A general
officer close to the "Baby Turks" characterized
them as a loose assiociation of officers sharing
common backgrounds and ideas, but also noted that
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they could bring effective strength to bear for a
coup attempt should they decide OD concerted action.
Economic Situation
8. The index of retail prices in Saigon fell
substantially with the easing of political tensions
and the removal of the early curfew. Arrivals of
imported wheat flour and increased distribution to
retailers of imported condensed milk caused the
prices of these items to fall. Prices of iron and
steel products, fertilizers, and newsprint, however,
continued to rise as a result of heavy demand and a
reduction in government surveillance of importers'
operations. Rice prices also rose in spite of the
sale to Saigon retailers of government rice at be-
low market prices. The GVN minister of economy had
announced on 12 April that commencing 18 April the
ministry would sell government rice at official
prices, which are far below the market price, to
Saigon retailers for resale. These government sales
will entail a loss to the ministry of about 40
piasters per 100 kilograms because the government
has been buying rice at a higher price.
9. In the Saigon free market, the prices of
$10 bills and gold were unchanged at 172 and 246
piasters per dollar, respectively. The price of
$10 MPC (scrip) fell by one piaster per dollar to
118. In Hong Kong, the piaster-dollar cross rate
fell from 156 to 153.
10. After consultations with officials of the
GVN Ministry of Economy and with industrial groups,
the US Mission in Saigon has estimated a need for
$20 million in security stocks of essential com-
modities. The 29 warehouses required to stock
these items will be ready by October.
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B. MILITARY SITUATION
1. Communist-initiated activity increased during
the week ending 23 April, but still remained below the
1966 weekly average of 804 incidents.
2. During the period there were 765 Communist-
initiated incidents compared to the previous week's
607. There were 20 attacks and 570 acts of terrorism
compared to last week's 17 and 463, respectively.
The kill ratio favored free world forces 4.56 to 1
compared to the preceding week's 2.75 to 1. Viet Cong
losses for the period were 694 killed and 89 captured.
Vietnamese casualties for the period were 93 killed,
243 wounded, and 33 missing or captured--a total of
369 compared to last week's 555. United States losses
for the week were 35 killed and 547 wounded--a total of
582 compared to the last period's 726. Free world losses
totaled five killed and 31 wounded. The South Vietnam-
ese lost 100 weapons (one crew served), and the Viet
Cong lost 186 weapons (14 crew served).
MIA/ TOTAL
KIA WIA CAPTURED CASUALTIES
US 35 547 0 582
ARVN 93 243 33 369
THIRD COUNTRY 5 31 0 36
VIET CONG 694 89 783
GVN/Allied Activities Forces
3. Friendly large- and small-unit operations as
well as corresponding enemy contacts increased during
the week. The contacts, except for two operations,
were generally light.
4. In I Corps, the multibattalion US Marine/ARVN
search-and-destroy Operation HOT SPRINGS/LIEN KET 36
was terminated on 23 April in Quang Ngai Province.
Friendly losses were 12 killed (five USMC) and 71
wounded (33 USW). The Viet Cong lost 252 killed, 18
captured, four suspects detained, and 113 weapons
(14 crew served).
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5, Operation FILLMORE continued in II Corps with
only minor contact reported. Cumulative results of
continuing Operation SU BOK, being conducted by ele-
ments of the ROK Capital Division in Binh Dinh Prov-
ince, are 89 Viet Cong killed and 121 captured. Ten
ROK troops have been killed and 45 wounded.
6. Two battalions of the US 25th Infantry Division
conducted Operation KAHALA in Hau Nghai Province, III
Corps, during the period 16-21 April. Final results
indicated Viet Cong losses of 55 killed, two captured,
and 18 weapons. There were three US killed and 45
wounded.
7. In IV Corps, a task force from the 21st ARVN
Division terminated Operation DAN CHI 219 on 24 April.
Friendly forces sustained casualties of 28 killed
and 124 wounded (six US), while inflicting losses of
42 killed, six captured, and 14 weapons (two crew
served) on the Viet Cong.
8. Free world forces conducted 110 battalion-size
or larger operations during the week, 60 of them
achieving contact: 36 GVN, 17 US, one ROK, and six
combined. There were 27,911 small-unit operations,
including 3,595 conducted by US forces. Of the 162
that achieved contact with the enemy, 109 were con-
ducted by US units.
9. Fourteen B-52 Stratofortress missions
utilizing 123 aircraft were flown during the week
ending 24 April. The target areas were in the South
Vietnam provinces of Tay Ninh, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam,
and Quang Tri, as well as along the Laotian - South
Vietnamese border.
10. On 20 and 22 April, a total of 15 aircraft
supported RAT MAT IV, V, and VI to prevent a possible
attack on the Khe Banh Special Forces Camp in Quang
Tri Province. On 23 and 24 April, LOW STOOP I and II
flew 15 aircraft in support of ground search-and-destroy
Operation BIRMINGHAM, which began on 23 April.
11. During the period 15-21 April, approximately
2,074 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance
sorties were flown by US Navy, Air Force, and Marine
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aircraft. VNAF aircraft flew additional armed re-
connaissance missions. The cumulative results of
these strikes as reported by the pilots included de-
struction of 1,541 structures, 68 sampans, 15 bunkers,
82 huts, 20 riverboats, 2 supply areas, 2 trucks and
2 AW sites. Damage was reported to 1,279 structures,
33 sampans, 13 bunkers, 132 supply areas, 14 river-
boats, 2 tractors, and 1 truck.
12. Forces conducting Operation MARKET TIME
searched 4,686 junks and 18,446 people during the
week; 18 junks and 110 people were detained.
Communist Activity
13. Incidents in I Corps increased during the
week. On 18 April an unknown number of Viet Cong
attacked a GVN Popular Force (PF) platoon in the
Demilitarized Zone; losses were not reported. Other
incidents included attacks against three PF posi-
tions in Quang Ngai Province; an attack against US
Marines near Chu Lai in the Quang Ngai - Quang Tin
province border area by an enemy force supported by
mortars; and a mortar attack against US Marine posi-
tions southwest of Da Nang, Quang Nam Province.
14. In Pleiku Province, II Corps, the Viet Cong
overran a village at the end of the Duc Co airstrip.
Special forces personnel at Duc Co believed that the
action is the first in a series of attempts to clear
friendly inhabitants from the area prior to an at-
tack on the camp in the coming rainy season. An Khe
airfield in Binh Dinh Province received mortar fire
as a cover for sabotage of two C-130 Hercules air-
craft parked on the strip. The new Pleiku airfield
sustained considerable damage from a Viet Cong mortar
attack. The enemy weapons were placed near a friendly
ammunition dump so that counter-fire could not be
safely directed against them.
15. In III and IV corps significant activity--
other than the continued high incidence of terrorism--
was limited to probing attacks against two watch-
towers and harassment of Xuan Loc airfield, Long Khanh
Province, with mortar and small-arms fire.
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CURRENT OPERATIONAL STATUS OF MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND COASTAL RAILROAD
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16. Lines of communication status changes include
the closing of National Route 1 south of Mo Duc in
Quang Ngai Province, and also in Binh Thuan Province.
Route 14 is open in Binh Long Province. The national
railroad is again closed between Nha Trang and Ninh
Hoa in Khanh Hoa Province, but remains open from
Ca Na to Thap Cham in Ninh Thuan Province.
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C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
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1. The first summary of the US Mission's new
monthly joint report on revolutionary development
indicates that 33 of the 45 provinces and cities
reporting for the month of March are behind sched-
ule. The standards used to evaluate progress for
the first quarter of 1966 were set forth in the
provincial pacification plans completed prior to
1 January 1966. Most of these plans were poorly
conceived or set unrealistic goals. The mission
feels that the planners could not, at the time,
foresee the increases in local Viet Cong strength,
the allocation of allied military forces, provincial
administrative changes, the withdrawal of ARVN re-
sources, or political disruption. Thus, the lack
of achievement noted in the report may actually be
somewhat overstated, and reflective in part of the
planning difficulties.
2. Where there is a legitimate lack of pacifi-
cation progress, officials place the blame largely
on shortages of resources, inadequate administrative
support, and certain factors outside the control of
provincial officials. There seems to be a direct
correlation between competent provincial adminis-
trative officials and progressive pacification ac-
tivity. Changes of district and provincial tech-
nical service chiefs, inadequate training, low
motivation, and low pay of cadre are particularly
disruptive. Unrealistic pacification plans are due
mainly to untrained provincial officials who utilize
faulty administrative procedures.
3. Among the disruptive factors that are beyond
provincial control are direct Viet Cong pressure on
the revolutionary development programs, such as the
harassment of cadre teams and the destruction of
hamlets, the build-up of Viet Cong forces, setbacks
due to the political crisis, and a general apathy of
the population, especially in III and IV Corps. The
lack of local forces or their inability to provide
security is a constant difficulty to the field
workers. It is the mission's opinion that problems
associated with politics, inflation, personnel
changes, and the lack of local manpower will con-
tinue, while improvements should take place in com-
modity distribution, financial procedures, and in-
sufficient advisory personnel.
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4. There is continuing evidence that the civilian
action programs directed agains the Vietnamese Com-
munists are producing defections from enemy forces,
especially when coordinated with significant military
operations. The number of refugees and returnees
who cite a decline in the morale of the Viet Cong
continues to increase. As a result, the Viet Cong
are mounting counter-pacification programs.
5. Specific Viet Cong plans for countering the
GVN pacification effort in one of the districts of
the III Corps National Priority Area around Saigon
are outlined in a document captured in early 1966.
Following typical Communist strategy their propa-
gandists are instructed to stress the miserable
living conditions of the people and blame this on
the Americans and the government. Concrete steps to
counter the GVN program include developing the
People's Revolutionary Party, building the township
guerrilla forces from local inhabitants, developing
10 to 15 Liberation Front associations in each ham-
let, and selecting hamlet Front members for political
struggle groups. These struggle groups will then
organize demonstrations, which will be the primary
disruptive tool. According to the document, they
should protest the rising cost of living, the draft,
"chemical poisons," and artillery shellings, and
call for the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam.
6. Dramatic evidence of the high priority the
Viet Cong accord to countering revolutionary develop-
ment was provided yesterday in Phuoc Tuy Province.
A civic action team about six miles from the province
capital was virtually annihilated by a Viet Cong at-
tacking force of unknown size; 32 members of the
team were killed.
Returnees (Chieu Hoi)
7. Only 314 returnees came in during the week
ending 15 April, the lowest weekly total since mid-
January. A captured document, dated January 1966,
contains directions to Viet Cong unit commanders on
how to counteract the Chieu Hoi program. They are
told among other things to increase political indoc-
trination, watch personnel returning from leave,
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maintain tighter control over soldiers' friends and
relatives, enforce discipline more strictly, pro-
hibit troops from picking up air-dropped leaflets,
and forbid personnel from listening to GVN radio
broadcasts.
8. Three North Vietnamese civilians who rallied
in I Corps claim to be from a group of 150 teachers,
nurses, and students who left Hanoi on 13 January
1966 for central Vietnam. They reportedly saw safe-
conduct passes and bomb-warning leaflets along the
Ho Chi Minh trail in February, but had seen no such
leaflets in North Vietnam as the police there collected
and burned them. They also claimed that the group
had secretly listened to Voice of America and other
broadcasts from Hue and Saigon as early as 1960.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC
1. Seven aerial engagements between US aircraft
and North Vietnamese MIGs have taken place over the
Hanoi-Haiphong area since 23 April. In these en-
gagements, two MIG-21s and two MIG-17s were downed
by air-to-air missiles. The purpose of this vigorous
fighter reaction by the North Vietnamese appears to
be an effort to restrict US air incursions in the
Hanoi-Haiphong area.
2. Despite US successes in the air-to-air en-
gagements, 15 US aircraft have been lost over North
Vietnam since 20. April. Four of these were lost in
operations against the Bac Giang bridge.
Political Developments
3. The North Vietnamese regime on 25 April an-
nounced that a week-long National Assembly meeting
had been convened in Hanoi on 16 April. The meeting
was addressed by the most popular members of the
leadership--Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Pham
Van Dong. They presented the assembly with an opti-
mistic view of the war situation and stressed the
singleness of purpose of the Vietnamese people on
both sides of the 17th parallel in their struggle
against US "imperialism."
4. The National Assembly serves as a major trans-
mission line for getting party directives down to
the people, and it usually meets twice a year. Last
fall's session was canceled, however, apparently be-
cause the party leadership was engaged full time in
formulating policies to cope with the new war situa-
tion. This latest meeting appears as part of the
regime's effort to bolster popular morale and to
prod the population into greater efforts in meeting
the demands of the war situation.
Hanoi on Mansfield Proposal
5. In propaganda and public statements through-
out the week, Hanoi repeatedly attacked Senator Mans-
field's proposal for peace talks on Vietnam as a
"new peace hoax" designed to cover up further US
Appro
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escalation of the war. The statements repeated
Hanoi's demands for a settlement of the war, but
appeared directed more at discrediting the sin-
cerity of the Mansfield proposal than at playing
up the Communist position on negotiations.
Approv
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ri
III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS
A. OFFICIAL VISITS
1. Because of the current government crisis,
many trips abroad are being canceled. Chief of
State Nguyen Van Thieu notified the Chinese Embassy
in Saigon that projected state visits to the Repub-
lic of China and South Korea must be postponed in-
definitely. A Chinese Embassy officer quoted Thieu
as saying that it was unlikely that any member of the
Directorate will leave South Vietnam for ceremonial
or other visits before the elections scheduled for
mid-August.
2. Secretary general of the Directorate Chieu
has canceled his visit to the United States and
Canada.
3. Tran Van Tuyen, ambassador-designate to
London and former deputy premier in the Quat gov-
ernment, told a US Embassy official that he had
decided not to go to London to assume his duties
because he feels he can play a more important role
at home.
B. FAR EAST FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE
Charge Ty and Cao Xuan Tu from the Foreign Office
represented the GVN at the 18-20 April Bangkok am-
bassadorial-level preparatory conference for the
Far East foreign ministers' conference to be held in
Seoul on 14 June. The final communique announced
that the Seoul conference will consider mutual co-
operation among the Asian and Pacific countries in
various general and specific fields. Representatives
of Australia, the Republic of China, Japan, the Re-
public of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic
of the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of
Vietnam participated in the Bangkok meeting. A
Laotian representative attended the meeting as an
observer.
C. ICC
Canadian ICC Commissioner Moore told a US Embassy
official in Saigon that the ICC is now planning more
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frequent meetings in Hanoi than in the past. Ac-
cording to Moore, the ICC commissioners would prob-
ably meet in Hanoi toward the end of May and would
hold meetings there on an average of once every
three months. Although the Canadians stated that
the North Vietnamese wanted the ICC to meet more
frequently in Hanoi, the DRV denied this, claiming
that it had only been inquiring as to why the com-
mission did not meet more often in Hanoi. In either
case, the ICC has decided to act on the North Viet-
namese hint.
D. AUSTRALIA
Prime Minister Harold Holt visited South Vietnam
from 22-25 April, touring Australian Army and Air
Force units and civilian aid activities. Meanwhile,
an advance party of about 100 men from the fifth and
sixth battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment
arrived in Saigon preparatory to the mid-May arrival
of the 4,500-man task force.
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SOUTIPVItIftIMR
0g3t Mitsf1ttF'79T00826A0000010037-9
WEEKLY REPORT 16 APRIL-23 APRIL 1966
Total Personnel Losses
SECRET
(Killed in Action,- Captured or Missing in Action, excluding VVounded in Action)
3,500 iI r-T-T l ii -ri rt?t
GVN /US/other Free World
? Viet Cong/PAVN
--- US only
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
78
16
4,000
3,500 II-
3,Goo
2,000 -
1,500 -
50)
APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT
OM] NOV
DEC
JAN I FEB
5
MAR l APR
IT
,-.-
..
_-4
- -
-, I
_
414
-,-

US Combat Casualties
(including North
Cumulative, 1961-1964
Cumulative, 1965
Cumulative, 1966 to date
TOTAL
in
Vietnam)
Fatalities
Vietnam
Non-fatal Wounds
Captured
Missing
255
1365
1462
3082
1524
6110
8776
16410
10
15
8
33
12
136
46
194
..,
.
k
4
r
r?
g.7...
4.!
00
,
'
-
-..
-
:
,
,
_
,
w
I APR I MAY IJUNE I JULY I AUG I SEPT I OCT I NOV I DEC IJAN EB
62022
M Killed in action
Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses
(US/GIN/Other Free World)
Missing or Captured in action .Wounded in action
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987
821
33
133
SO UT H AVIETWM 43'Age0amtgeMP79T00826A0000010037-9
WEEKLY REPORTis APRIL-23 APRIL1966
62021
1,
1,
Viet Cong Incidents
SECRET
? Attacks iii Terrorism 0 Sabotage '

250
' Propaganda 1 Antiaircraft Fire '
000
-=--..-
a?
_
_
65
750
_
=
?
-
-
=
._:.
-
?
500?.
----_,_
slaws-
?
:
_
til-'
--.--.7------_-.?_--,,-__
=
N
:
73 ?
250

? :
17
0
1
=

E:ii.iii.
1
ir3.3
011
1
APR MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEPT
OCT NOV DEC
JAN FEB
MAR APR
20
15
10
Company and battalion sized attacks
? Battalion sized (and larger) attacks only
n
????
I
\ /
r %
i
/
to?
A
1
i
t
.+.
? ????
i
,0-1
% i I
1
%
I
/
i.
??

?
?
?%.
I S
I APR
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
MAY JUNE I JULY
AUG I SEPT OCT I NOV
Weapons Losses
DEC
JAN I FEB
AR I APR
Government
Viet Cong
o
I?APR
86
MAY [JUNE JULY AUG SEPT OCT I NOV { DEC JAN FEB MAR I APR
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106
17
52
70
20
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SECRET
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