INDONESIA'S ''1945 CONSTITUTION''

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A000600010002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 14, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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14 April 1966
OCI No.. 1176/66
Copy No. 2 '3 6
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
DI .EC,TORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CO FIDENTIAL
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.B. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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OCI No. 1170/66
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
1.4 April 1966
Indonesia's "1945 Constitution"
1. When the present Indonesian constitution
was written in 1945, it was designed more as a sym-
bol of the struggle for national independence than
as a document defining a system of government for
a modern state. It was superseded in 1949, and a
relatively unsuccessful experiment in parliamentary
democracy ensued. In 1959, however, Sukarno resur-
rected the 1945 constitution to legitimatize his au-
thoritarian regime of "guided democracy." Under this
extremely vague document, great power is vested in
the executive, and there is almost no guarantee for
a popular voice in the government.
2. Military and civilian leaders of the new
government are now criticizing Sukarno's abuse of
presidential power and calling for a "retu.rn" to
constitutional principles. This agitat:i:n, however,
appears largely a tactic to further the -'enigration
of Sukarno. The army seems likely to use the 1945
constitution to justify a relatively authoritarian
regime much as Sukarno did.
3. Under the 1945 constitution, the president
is chosen by and is responsible only to the People's
Consultative Congress (MPR), a body composed of rep-
resentatives of political and functional groups and
charged with "deciding the outlines of national pol-
icy." The constitution merely states that the mem-
bership of the MPR, which must meet at least once
every five years, is to be chosen in a manner "pre-
scribed by law." No such law has materialized and
to date only an "interim" MPR appointed by Sukarno
has met.
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4. Legislative power is shared by the president
and the Council of Peoples Representatives (DPR) or
parliament, a body whose members hold concurrent mem-
bership in the MPR. No method is prescribed for se-
lecting these members, however, and they, too, have
been hand-picked by Sukarno. Both the president and
the DPR can initiate legislation but the DPR cannot
override a presidential veto, and "at critical times"
its legislation can be replaced by presidential de-
cree. This one-sided relationship has been rein-
forced by a uniquely Indonesian order of procedure
inaugurated by Sukarno and not stipulated by the con-
stitution. Under this procedure, unless the DPR can
achieve a unanimous vote, it must refer the matter
to the president for final decision.
5. The constitution provides for a vice-presi-
dent who "assists" the president and fills the presi-
dency upon the incumbent's death or disability.
Since the reinvocation of the constitution in 1959,
however, the vice-presidency has been vacant. In
1963 Sukarno's hand-picked MPR appointed him preEi-
dent for life. Sukarno accepted the appointment
with the understanding that it would be "reviewed"
by the first popularly elected MPR,
6. Military and civilian leaders now plan to
convene a session of the MPR in mid-May which they
will no doubt use to contrast the new government's re-
sponsibility to the people with that of Sukarno's
regime. Among other things this congress may fill
the vice-presidency and might even revoke Sukarno's
lifetime mandate, although this appears unlikely.
Any significant "democratization" of the 1945 Con-
stitution, however, seems unlikely. The army,
long disenchanted with Indonesian political parties,
has always approved Sukarno's concept of "guided
democracy" and strongly supported his junking of
the parliamentary system in 1959. As a result the
army is likely to work through Sukarno's interim
MFR rather than hold national elections in the near
future. With pro-Communist and Communist MPR mem-
bers arrested or "liquidated," the body can easily
be manipulated,
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7. In the political, vacuum left by the eclipse
of Sukarno, the army, in fact, has little choice in
the immediate future but to maintain its authoritarian
control. An almost inevitable point of difference
between the military and its civilian allies will be
the eventual extent of constitutional reform.
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