POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65B00383R000200170002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 5, 1963
• Content Type: OPEN

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1963,
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
. The purpose of this expulsion of Dr.
Cassanovas Garrido, is to thwart any ef-
fort to return to constitutional rule,
which the State Department is properly
insisting upon.
It is my hope, and that, I am con-
vinced, of all freedom lovers and believ-
ers in the democratic process both at
home and in Latin America, that our
Government will adhere firmly to this
position and never grant either recogni-
tion or aid of any kind to the usurping
junta in the Dominican Republic.
The Dominican people are bitterly re-
sentful of the overthrow of their govern-
ment which brought to them ` the' first
breath of freedom after 31 years of tyr-
anny, a fact which is not obscured by the
now controlled press and slanted news
items being released under the police
state management of the usurping gen-
-erals and colonels and their false facade
of civilians.
Today, at the National Press Club, En-
riquillo del Rosario, the Ambassador of
the legal and constitutional Government
of the Dominican Republic, made an ad-
dress pointing out how tragic the situa-
tion is for the people of the Dominican
Republic, and urging that the United
States continue to insist on, the return of
law and order, constitutional govern-
ment, and the democratic regime which
was so ruthlessly overthrown.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the address by Ambassador En-
riquillo del Rosario to the National
-Press Club be printed at this point in
my remarks; together with two dis-
patches published in the New York Times
for Thursday, October 31, 1963, entitled
"Leaders Bar Policy Shift," and "Gains
Seen by United States," which show that
the usurping junta is not preparing to
make any concession whatsoever and
that the United States already sees some
benefits from the policy of "no recogni-
tion" and will adhere to it.
There being no objection, the address
and dispatches were ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF ENRIQUILLO DEL ROSARIO, AM-
BASSADOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERN-
MENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO THE
UNITED STATES, AT THE NATIONAL PRESS
CLUB, NOVEMBER 5, 1963
It Is now 6 weeks since the democratically
elected government of the Dominican Re-
public was overthrown by military force.
And it is important to establish very clearly
at this time how the Dominican people
themselves feel about the coup d'etat which
terminated constitutional government in my
country after only a few months' trial. It
has been said that they were indifferent to
this act, and that they are relatively content
under the present government.
This is utterly untrue.
Never before in history have the Dominican
people wanted democratic. government and
self-rule as deeply and as passionately as
now. Being deprived of self-government by
a military-dominated junta has made them
even more aware than before of how precious
democracy is to them. They are well aware
that the illegal junta which has seized
.power in the Dominican Republic represents
only a few wealthy men and ambitious ofil-
cers, and that these people do not want any
teal democracy. And they are equally aware
that any promises by the junta for a return
to democratic government are cynical and
insincere, entirely contrived to mislead peo-
ple in the United States.
The 'Dominican people definitely want a
return to constitutional government, and not
in 2 years or even 6 months. They want it
now. They are united in their contempt
and _ distrust for the illegal junta. And
despite the fears engendered by 32 years of
living under a brutal police state, they have
taken considerable risks to show their deep
desire for return to democratic self-
governfhent.
Very few newspapers in the United States
have given any idea of the scale and intensity
of these antijunta feelings. But they are
very revealing. Here is just a fraction of
the evidence of what the Dominican people
themselves are feeling and doing.
Over 90 percent of the professional leaders
of the country have denounced the coup and
are demanding a return to constitutional
government. The doctors' association,, the
lawyers' association, the engineers' associa-
tion, and the various teachers' associations
have gone forcefully on record to this effect.
These are obviously no radical hotheads;
they are the educated, middle class, respected
leaders of the country.
These professional groups have been
jointed by virtually all the labor unions and
civic organizations in a demand for the dis-
solution of the junta and a return to consti-
tutional government. Both university and
secondary school students, moreover, have
made repeated demonstrations in favor of
democratic self-government.
It is no exaggeration to say that 90 percent
of the people of the Dominican Republic are
not only indignant, but increasingly Indig-
nant, at being deprived of their democratic
rights. And they are fully determined, by
whatever means, to regain their liberties and
the right to have a government of their
choice.
In the face of the growing desire to throw
the junta out, the police and military have
used threats, tear gas, and even bullets
against demonstrators. They have started
to fill the prisons again with prodemocrats,
and have outlawed the basic rights of free
assembly guaranteed by the Constitution.
The usurpers still have the arms, but they
know that the people are united as never
before against them.
The recent imprisonment and forced exile
of Dr. Juan Cassasnovas Garrido shows the
junta's fear of any return to legality. Dr.
Cassasnovas was the President of the Senate
of the.legitimate Government. In the ab-
sence of the legal President and Vice Presi-
dent, both of whom were forcibly expelled
from the country, Dr. Cassasnovas was
clearly designated by the Constitution and
confirmed by the legislature as the legal suc-
cessor to the Presidency. But the junta,
fearful of any possible rallying point for
reestablishing legal government, tracked
down Dr. Cassasnovas last week, captured
him, beat him, imprisoned him, then forced
him into exile. The same junta which is
trying to dupe public opinion in the United
States by saying that it wants to prepare for
a return to constitutional government,
cynically throws out all persons who consti-
tutionally are designated as the country's
leaders.
In the last week, nonetheless, various
European governments have recognized the
junta. Let me say that this contrasts
sharply with the fact that the Dominican
people definitely do not recognize the junta,
and this is the capital point. Sovereignty
resides in the people. They alone have the
right to determine who shall govern them
and in` what framework. It is this basic
democratic right which is at stake, and for
which the Dominican people are fighting.
As the lawful representative of the con-
stitutional government of my country in the
United States, let me add that the people
of my country will. not recognize or honor
any commitments or agreements entered into
by the illegal government which is tempo-
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rarily in power. Any loans accorded to the
junta, for example, will in no way obligate
the people or their legitimate government,
and will be undertaken at the risk of the
lenders. The Dominican people have given
no authorization whatsoever to the junta to
undertake any fiscal or contractual obliga-
tions in their name.
The basic situation in the Dominican Re-
public is very clear. The people. elected the
first democratic government in 36 years by
an overwhelming majority in free elections.
In a few months after its installation, a mil-
itary coup backed by a tiny handful of
wealthy businessmen overthrew the legiti-
mate government on the spurious grounds
that it was encouraging communism and
had allowed the government to be infiltrated
by Communists.
Yet 6 weeks later, the junta has been un-
able to point out any Communists in the
government. This was probably no surprise
to them, but they were surprised to discover
how united the people are in indignation at
being deprived of their basic rights of self-
government. And the junta has also been
surprised that the U.S. Government has not
recognized and supported them. They had
deluded themselves into believing that the
United States has a certain fondness for mil-
itary dictatorships, a delusion shared by the
Communists as well.
The Communist line has been that the
United States withdrawal of. recognition and
economic aid is sheer hypocracy, and that
the United States secretly sympathizes with
the military junta and will shortly find a
formula for recognizing it. And they are
waiting hopefully for such recognition as the
basis to start a major propaganda campaign
throughout Latin America to the effect that
the United States really prefers military dic-
tatorship, which is indifferent to the misery
in Latin countries, over democratic govern-
ment. It is with this big lie that the Com-
munists hope to make Cubas of all Latin
America.
Ironically, the junta and the Communists
are now united toward the same objective.
Both want the military junta to be recog-
nized. The junta wants it in order to per-
petuate the privileges of the wealthy few.
The Communists want it as a weapon to de-
stroy not only the reactionary forces, but
also the democratic ones as well.
The next few weeks will probably be criti-
cal in my country. Pressure on the State
Department to find a modus vivendt with the
junta will probably increase. The junta will
make periodic threats of impending chaos
and. Communist takeover if they are not
backed. And they will continue to track
down, imprison and exile all democratic lead-
ers with a constitutional right to govern.
But the key fact is that the democratic
forces are in an overwhelming majority
among the people of my country, and it is
their wishes which must be respected, not
those of the present junta, who represent no
one but their own selfish interests. In this
calvary of democracy in one small Caribbean
country, there is still very much at stake for
the entire hemisphere. Democratic forces
look to the United States for moral support,
and are calling for that support. And it is
unthinkable that the United States should-
now or later-destroy the hopes of the demo-
cratic forces in the Dominican Republic and
in other Latin American countries by recog-
nizing the antidemocratic junta. This is
not an indifferent minority calling for back-
ing. It is the great majority, passionately
wanting a return to democracy, which appeals
to the American people not to let them down.
[From the New York Times, Oct. 31, 19631
LEADERS BAR POLICY SHIFT
SANTO DOMINGO, DONINICAN REPUBLIC, Oc-
tober 29.-The provisional Government of
the Dominican Republic, operating under
growing pressures of extreme rightwing ci-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
vilian and military factions. has decided not
to make political concessions as a price for
recognition by the United States.
The present disposition of the Dominican
ruling groups Is to stand firm on the refusal
to do anything to speed the return to the
democratic process beyond the original prom-
ise of general elections more than 2 years
from now.
Although the three-man civilian junta I
be inclined last week to allow presidential
and congressional elections perhaps before
the end of 1964, it has now become clear that
the powerful military-supported rightist
groups would not tolerate even such a con-
cession to win quicker recognition.
In fact, the Dominican rulers are taking
the.position that the country can go on in-
-definitely without Washington's recognition
and U.S. economic aid. Both were suspended
last September 24, when the military ousted
President Bosch from the presidency after
7 months In office.
The Kennedy administration indicated at
the time that diplomatic relations, aid under
the Alliance for Progress and military assist-
ance would remain suspended until at least
a semblance of the democratic process re-
turned to the Dominican Republic. Dr.
Bosch was the Dominican Republic's first
freely elected President in 38 years.
It is becoming increasingly clear that the
basic alternatives for the United States is to
refuse recognition indefinitely, in the hope
of stimulating internal change, or to restore
full relations on Dominican terms, which
would .imply a capitulation by the Kennedy
administration.
TIES wrrHOVT AID SUGGESTED
Borne observers here believe, however, that
the best solution would be a restoration of
formal diplomatic relations, without a re-
sumption of economic and military aid.
Such a policy, these observers say, would
maintain Washington's condemnation of
the anti-Bosch coup, but at the same time
would end what is becoming an untenable
international situation.
Although the Dominican leadership has
refused to make concessions as a price for
recognition, Its Inability thus far in finding
international acceptance is among the fac-
tors causing pressures from the rightist
civilian and military groups that placed it
in office.
The groups are also publicly finding fault
with the leadership for its alleged failure to
"eliminate Communists" from the adminis-
tration and other sectors of national life.
The reason given for the coup was that it
would defend the country from communism.
Because the rightist groups' concept of
what cohatitutes a Communist Is extremely
elastic, the Dominican leadership is increas-
ingly faced with the choice of instituting a
major purge--one that could lead to a
breakdown of public administration-or
finding itself replaced by a new, more repson-
aive junta.
The leaders were criticized, in a letter
published In local newspapers last week. for
slowness in finding and ejecting Communists.
The letter was from Dominican Independent
Action, the civilian group principally respon-
sible for pusbing the military into the anti-
Bosch coup.
A month after the end of the Dominican
Republic's brief experiment in democracy,
the country finds itself in the midst of
growing confusion and dangers from both
the right and the left. With rapid polar-
ization, rightists as well as Communists and
their allies are seeking to build up their
forces for a showdown that many Domini-
cans fear may end in bloodshed.
GAINS SEEN BY UNITED STATES
WASSIINGTON, October 30.-The adminis-
tration believes that its refusal to recognize
the de facto regimes of the Dominican Re-
public and Honduras Is beginning to bear
fruit.
The objective of this policy is` to hasten
the return to constitutional order in both
countries.
U.S. officials reported today that the Domi-
nican junta has indicated its willingness to
negotiate the eaffiy restorati`o I t demo
POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, almost
overnight, the political situation in South
Vietnam has changed, and our policy
toward the new government of that coun-
try will change accordingly. The U.S.
Government-both the executive branch
and the Congress-has, since the se-
vere repression of the Vietnamese stu-
dents and Buddhists by the Diem gov-
ernment this summer, hoped for the cre-
ation of an atmosphere in South Viet-
nam which might regather popular sup-
port behind the war effort.
I think that the President has fol-
lowed the correct course in relation to
South Vietnam. Although we have fa-
vored reforms, we have left it gntirely to
the will of the Vietnamese to implement
that reform. If they themselves had not
so strongly desiredthe change, we would
have seen no coup in South Vietnam.
My one regret about the recent coup was
the violent death of Diem and Nhu, and
all others who fell in the fight.
Tt will be no easy task to reestablish a
stable and effective government In South
Vietnam, a government which can rally
the Vietnamese people to victory over
the Communist Vietcong guerrillas.
However, I hope we will share n helping
the leaders of the new Vietnamese Gov-
ernment to successfully prosecute the
war against the Communists, so that the
many Americans there can come home
again.
The effects of our policy in South Viet-
nam were well summarized in an article
by Warren Unna which appeared in the
November 5 issue of the Washington
Post. I ask unanimous consent to have
this excellent article printed at this point
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
BaIGIITi:n OvTi.oox: SAIGON Cogs BoosTS
U.S. POLICY
(By Warren Unna)
The Kennedy administration's policy to-
ward South Vietnam. despite all the cynical
predictions of it being either nonexistent or
negative, suddenly seems to emerge smelling
like a rose.
As things stand now. South Vietnam even
may lose its eligibility for becoming a whip-
ping boy in next year's election campaign.
Last week's coup in Saigon accomplished
two things:
1. South Vietnam gained a new govern-
ment which now at least has a running
chance of gaining the popular support needed
not only to win the war against the Viet-
cong Communist guerrillas, but to keep the
country stable enough to move forward once
that war is won.
2. The United States which contributes $1.5
million a day and some 18,500 military ad-
visers toward helping South Vietnam in Its
war effort, managed to stand by its principles
and encourage last week's coup without
"playing God" and being Its Instigator.
As some of the 'Washington pundits ob-
served, "CIA couldn't have been behind this;
It worked too well."
November 5
More concrete proof of the U.S. innocence
as instigator is the fact that one of the very
key State Department officials concerned with
South Vietnam was out of town at the time,
enrolling his children In school in the South,
The Kennedy administration's policy to-
ward South Vietnam was not always so
clean cut and decisive. Until last May, it
was governed by the fear that If this country
didn't coddle President Ngo Dinh Diem and
his all-powerful brother. Ngo Dinh Nhu,
these headstrong leaders might scuttle a war
which the United States, with its Interest In
defending the whole of southeast Asia, was
desirous of winning.
The Kennedy administration also did not
want to scare off the Diem-Nhu regime's
backing of a strategic hamlet program which
the United States was convinced would give
rural Vietnam the protection from the Viet-
cong and the sense of identification from a
caring central government necessary to win
the war.
But, according to one U.S. policymaker,
May 8 became the turning point. This
was the date of the first massacre of Bud-
dhists by government troops in Hue.
From May 8 on, the Kennedy administra-
tion became increasingly aware that its old
policy of placating Diem and Nhu would
get nowhere. These changes followed:
Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., who
was sent to South Vietnam with explicit
Instructions to appease Diem in the hopes
of restoring his confidence in the United
States, was called home for reassignment.
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a big-
name politician known for his bluntness,
was sent out with instructions to use his
head and stand up for things he believed in.
Lodge did just that. He suggested that
Nhu be relieved of his duties; he openly
countered Mrs. Nhu's criticism of U.S. sol-
diers; and he put an end to all of Nolting's
obsequious visits to the palace.
President Kennedy In an extraordinary
Labor Day TV interview, called for "changes
In policy and perhaps with personnel"-an
explicit encouragement to the Vietnamese
military leaders who at that time had come
to the United States asking for support if
they attempted a coup.
The military leaders called off that earlier
coup attempt. But the Kennedy administra-
tion, on its own, proceeded to suspend two
vital economic aid programs to South Viet-
nam and cut off the $3 million a year the
CIA had been paying special forces troops
whose anti-Communist efforts Nhu had re-
directed against his own Buddhists.
The apparent assassination of both Diem
and Nhu reportedly was not in the cards.
The administration believes the coup leaders'
assertion that they risked three costly hours
at the height of the rebellion in holding
their fire on the palace in the hope that
Diem and Nhu would accept their guarantee
of safe conduct out of the country.
But after the white flag was flown and the
trucks wheeled into the palace to pick up
Diem and Nhu the coup leaders found they
had been duped and that the brothers had
escaped.
Yesterday the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was
instructed to convey Washington's disap-
proval of the brothers' deaths.
The Kennedy administration is well aware
that there is no such thing as an ideal gov-
ernment in South Vietnam. But now at
least the United States can hope for working
out mutual problems with a sovereign gov-
ernment more representative of its people.
FUND TO HELP FINANCE EXPERT
ASSISTANCE FOR INDIANS IN
CASES BEFORE INDIAN CLAIMS
COMMISSION
Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, yes-
terday President Kennedy signed into
law H.R. 3306, which establishes a fund
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
but that does not belong in the basic research
category.
The second advantage of a clearer sepa-
ration of basic research from applied research,
development, and testing would be In the
clarification of our worries about duplica-
tion. Congress has very rightly been worried
about the duplication of effort in the research
and development sphere. Scientists equally
correctly deny that there is any intentional
duplication in basic research. Congress
wishes to save money, and can very properly
raise questions about duplication of develop-
mental efforts In the programs of agencies
that have overlapping responsibilities. But
duplication of effort in basic research is a
quite different matter. The scientists own
motivation, his reputation for originality,
and the elaborate procedures that have been
established for exchanging information about
the research that is being undertaken in
different laboratories, should constitute
much better guarantees against unnecessary
duplication than could be provided by any
set of governmental regulations or congres-
sional hearings.
Third, questions of overhead, of the kinds
of reporting required, of the relative merits
of grants versus contracts, and other prob-
lems of management would, I believe, be
easier to agree upon if we took them up sepa-
rately for basic research and for applied re-
search and development than they have been
when these have all been lumped together
into an undifferentiated category.
Fourth, the Government supports science
education in a variety of ways in order to
have a continuing supply of people qualified
in pure science and its applied fields, but
there is a considerable amount of confusion
in the process. For example, much of the
money that is allotted for research purposes
is, in fact, used for the advanced training of
graduate students. I said earlier that edu-
cation at this level consists largely of a
research apprenticeship. A great number of
the grants for basic research and many of
those for applied research that are carried
out In university laboratories include funds
for graduate assistants. The money is use-
fully spent, and the training received by
graduate students contributes to our future
supply of scientists and engineers. But some
of the icaues are clouded, because money that
appears in the budget for one purpose is
expended for a related but nevertheless dif-
ferent purpose.
There are some major differences between
the proper methods of support for science
education at the graduate level and for sci-
ence education for younger students. The
budgets upon which Congress has to act in-
clude funds for both of these levels. But at
no point in their consideration is there a
clean separation between the two, and con-
sequently there Is never an opportunity for
a clear decision as to how much money can
Appropriately go to each and the differences
in arrangements that will most effectively
foster each set of objectives.
Fifth, a clearer separation of the four
areas of support that I have been discussing
would make it easier to define the kinds of
responsibility that can most appropriately
be carried out by Congress, by the executive
agencies, and by the scientists who are ulti-
mately responsible for the research and edu-
cational activities that are being supported.
The lines are not completely sharp, but I
would suggest that Congress and the Office
of the President have primary responsibility
for deciding what the total budget shall be
and how It should be divided among these
four broad areas, Within the area of de-
velopment, testing, and associated applied
research, Congress and the Office of the Presi-
dent also have primary responsibility for sub-
dividing funds, for here are involved spe-
cific national goals-for defense, for public
health, for our activities in space, for in-
dustry, agriculture, arid for national pres-
tige. On the other hand, the cognizant
agencies, such as the National Science Foun-
dation or the National Institutes of Health,
and their grantees have a better basis for de-
ciding how money for basic research should
be spent and how money for the advanced
and graduate education of prospective scien-
tists should be spent. Confusion, mistrust,
and a considerable amount of wasted ef-
fort result when either group tries to make
decisions that might better be made by the
other. In his testimony a few days ago,
Dr. Wiesner spoke of the great speed with
which a new finding in science may alter a
variety of research activities. When this
happens, a great deal of time can be wasted
by going through a lot of bureaucratic red-
tape to secure permission to alter the direc-
tion of a study or to secure a piece of equip-
ment the need for which was not forseen
when the proposal was originally, submitted.
Congress and the Office of the President have
great and overriding responsibilities for the
health of the Nation's research and develop-
ment effort. They need not and should not
dilute that responsibility by attempting to
exercise a kind of control in one area that
is only appropriate in some other area, or by
attempting to make detailed research de-
cisions which they are not truly qualified to
make. Who is responsible for what would
be easier to decide if we were thinking sep-
arately about these four parts of the total
research and development effort than if we
try to establish rules and procedures for all
of our research and development activities.
Consequently, it seems to me altogether
desirable that the subcommittee take up
seriously and in depth the general question
of the relationships between government and
science. I believe that you can take up
these questions most constructively if the
four areas that I have discussed are looked
at one at a time to see what their problems
are and how those problems can best be
solved.
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH FUNDS
The second general problem that I would
like to discuss is closely related to the first.
The problem is that of the geographic dis-
tribution of Federal research funds.
The facts are perfectly clear and are a
matter of record for each agency. A few
States get a great deal more money than
do all the rest. In general, the States that
get the most money for research are such
populous States as California, Massachusetts,
and New York, but even on a per capita basis
the disparities among the States are tre-
mendous. Whether the distribution is what
it ought to be has been and and no doubt
will continue to be subject to a good deal
of argument. A considerable part of the
argument has been confused and confusing
because we have been trying to use the same
money for objectives that in the short run
are mutually contradictory. In the abstract,
most people would, I believe, agree that it
is desirable that research be done on a va-
riety of problems and that the research be
of as high quality as we can procure. In the
abstract, I believe also that most people
would agree that it would be desirable to
have a larger number of research and educa-
tional institutions of high quality, and that
such institutions should be located In vari-
ous parts of the country instead of being
concentrated in a few locations.
In practice, there has been conflict between
these two objectives. The need for defense,
the fear of possible attack, the desire to
ameliorate or even eradicate crippling and
disabling diseases, and the desire to achieve
other national goals as rapidly as possible
have all argued in the direction of placing
research grants and contracts with those
institutions that are best qualified to con-
duct the desired research. There are not
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many such institutions. Consequently there
has been a pile-up of Federal research funds
In a relatively small number of our best
qualified universities.. In order to fulfill
their obligations, these universities have
recruited competent scientists from other
universities and colleges, and so there has
been further concentration of research talent
in the best institutions. From time to time,
this system has been criticized and the claim
advanced that research funds should be more
broadly allocated among the 50 States. The
concentrated distribution has often seemed
necessary in the past. The urgency of
attaining some of the goals we have had in
mind would have made anything like an
equal distribution among the 50 States a
serious mistake.
But this situation has posed a dilemma for.
Congress, one that was illustrated-to take a
single example-by the hearings of a subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Appropriations
of the House of Representatives earlier this
year. In reviewing the 1964 budget of the
National Science Foundation, officers of the
National Science Foundation were criticized
several times for what members of the sub-
committee considered undue concentration
of NSF funds in a few States. The same
hearings, however, resulted in striking out
of the NSF budget the funds that had been
requested for developmental grants that
would have enabled NSF to assist a number
of universities to attain greater research com-
petence, and thus on merit to secure a larger
proportion of funds handled through the
regular grant procedures of the National
'Science Foundation and other agencies.
We cannot let down our guard, but I sug-
gest that we have reached a stage where we
can do some longer range planning, and that
it would now be appropriate to allot some
funds specifically for research support with
selection to be made strictly on grounds of
quality, as has been the policy of the agencies
in the past, and to allot some funds specifi-
cally for the purpose of building up a broader
base of high-quality institutions scattered
throughout the land.
Here clearly is a matter of high policy for
the Congress and the President's Office. The
change of policy would recognize that there
is now an overemphasis on research at the
expense of teaching and an overemphasis
upon short-time research goals at the ex-
pense of a broadened research competence.
When the establishment of the National
Science Foundation was first being debated
in Congress, consideration was given to the
possibility of alloting some portion of its
funds-perhaps 25 percent-among the sev-
eral States on a formula basis and of allot-
ting 75 percent strictly on the basis of merit.
This proposal was killed, partly because the
pork-barrel label got attached to it, but the
objective Is still desirable. I propose, there-
fore, that the Government's total objective
in supporting science would be better served
if immediate research competence were not
the only criterion for the distribution of
funds and if some grants for research and for
the improvement of science education were
to be made either on a formula basis or by
selection of especially promising institutions
with the intent to develop first-class institu-
tions in parts of the country in which they
do not. now exist.
To the extent that Federal funds can be
used to accomplish this purpose, it will be
necessary to use, a larger fraction of that
money than we have been using in past years
in the form of institutional grants rather
than individual project grants, and it will be
necessary frankly to recognize the desirabil-
ity of placing a larger amount of the total
budget into universities that have the poten-
tial of reaching top rank but that have not
yet done so, for it is in our longrun interest
to have top-quality universities and research
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C0Q9RESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
events. It is tragic that a leader who
began by accomplishing so much that
was constructive with so little, that a
Government which began with so much
promise, in the end crumbled in mili-
tary coup and violent death, a situation
which I deeply and personally regret.
When news of these events first reached
this city, it seemed to me that their pri-
mary significance to the United States
was clear. They were a clarion call for
a reassessment of U.S. Policies with re-
spect to Vietnam and southeast Asia.
For the government which fell, up until
a few months ago, had been generally
regarded for years, I so felt, as indis-
pensable in the structure of American
policy in southeast Asia. We will fail
to heed this call only at the risk of great
danger to the future of our relations with
all of Asia.
'We will not serve the interests of the
Nation if:
First. We regard the overthrow of the
Diem government as a victory or defeat
for this country. It is neither. It is
more an inexorable development in the
tragic postwar, history of the Vietnamese
people.
Second. If we reassume that the sue-
ceSsor military-dominated regime is an
automatic guarantee of a permanment
improvement in the situation in Vietnam.
This successor authority in Vietnam is,
at this point, at best a promise of some-
thing better. But if the Korean experi-
ence is at all relevant, it is apparent that
such promises can be undone in short
order.
If these tragic events of the past few
days are to . have constructive signifi-
cance for this Nation as well as for the
Vietnamese people, we would be well
at}vised to recognize that the effective-
ness of our Asian policies cannot be
measured by an overthrow of a govern-
ment, by whether one government is
"easier to work with" than another; by
whether one government smiles at us
and another frowns. In the last analy-
sis, the effectiveness of our policies and
their administration with respect to the
Vietnamese situation and, indeed, all of
southeast Asia can only be weighed in
the light of these basic questions:
First, Do these policies make possible
a progressive reduction in the expendi-
tures of American lives and aid in Viet-
nam?
Second. Do these policies hold a valid
promise of encouraging in Vietnam the
growth of popularly responsible and re-
sponsive government?
Third. Do these policies contribute
not only to the development of internal
st~.bility in South Vietnam but to the
growth of an environment of a decent
peace and a popularly based stability
throughout Asia-the kind of environ-
ment which will permit the replacement
of the present heavy dependence upon
U.S. arms and resources with an equi-
table and mutual relationship between
the Asian peoples and our own?
This is, indeed, an appropriate time,
Mr. President, for the executive branch
to reassess policies for Vietnam and
southeast Asia in these terms. It may
well be that few changes, if any, are re-
quired at this time. But if that is the
case-if indeed the problem in Vietnam
Approved For
has been primarily one of an inadequate
government-then, Mr. President, we
should begin to see results in the period
ahead. We should see:
First. A reduction in the commitment
of U.S. forces and aid in Vietnam and
southeast Asia;
Second. The emergence in Vietnam of
a responsible and responsive civilian gov-
ernment attuned to the needs and rea-
sonable aspirations of its people;
Third. An improvement in the rela-
tions of Vietnam with Cambodia and
Laos;.
Fourth. A growth in mutual commer-
cial, cultural, and other friendly inter-
course between the people of this Na-
tion and the various Asian people.
These are basic tests, Mr. President,
and it remains to be seen how they shall
be met not only in our relations with
the successor authority in Saigon but
with all the nations of southeast Asia.
From the point of view of this Nation,
it would appear appropriate to reiterate
at this time what the Senator from
Rhode Island [Mr. PELL] and the Sen-
ator from Delaware [Mr. Boccs] will re-
call that we stated on our return from a
visit to Vietnam and southeast Asia less
than a year ago:
It must be clear to ourselves as well as
to the Vietnamese where the primary re-
sponsibility lies in this situation. It must
rest, as it has rested, with the Vietnamese
Government and people. What further ef-
fort may be needed for the survival of the
Republic of Vietnam in present circum-
stances must come from that source, If it
is not forthcoming, the United States can
reduce its commitment or abandon it en-
tirely but there is no interest of the United
States in Vietnam which would justify, in
present circumstances, the conversion of the
war in that country primarily into an Amer-
ican war, to be fought primarily with Ameri-
can lives. It is the frequent contention of
Communist propaganda that such is already
the case. It should remain the fact that
the war in Vietnam is not an American war
in present circumstances.
That conclusion, Mr. President, in lay
judgment, would apply to the successor
government in Saigon no less than to its
predecessor.
EXHIBIT 1
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD
The news of the uprising in Vietnam came
as a complete surprise to me, and I am quite
certain a surprise to the administration.
There have been rumors, of course, for weeks
that a coup d'etat was in the making, but
there was nothing tangible to reinforce such
an assumption up to this time.
This appears to me to be a purely Viet-
namese affair which the Vietnamese should
settle among themselves. As far as this Gov-
ernment is concerned, it is my opinion that
the events of the past several hours call more
than ever for a reassessment and reappraisal
of our policy in South Vietnam and, for that
matter, in all of southeast Asia.
One would hope that the pepple of South
Vietnam will obtain the kind of government,
out of these tragic developments, which will
be responsive to their needs and responsible
to them. It remains to be seen whether
such a government shall emerge, and in any
reappraisal of our policies this would be a
factor of the utmost importance.
I have always had the highest respect for
the integrity, the patriotism, and dedication
of President Ngo Dinh Diem and regret
deeply and personally, very much that the
situation has had to come to such a pass.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I rise to
strongly endorse the statement of the
very wise Senator from Montana [Mr.
MANSFIELD]. There is no Member of
this body and few in the United States
who know and understand that area and
its people as well as he. I had the privi-
lege of being with him on his .last trip to
Vietnam, and would like to underline his
thought that these are days of decision
for the people of Vietnam. They can
make up their minds to go along the
democratic path we have hoped they will
follow, or they can follow the paths of
other countries in the Far East, of which
Korea would be an example. The Viet-
namese have seen what happens when a
country does not enjoy the regard or re-
spect of her people-the people will even-
tually toss out the government. On the
other hand, if the government enjoys the
respect and regard of the people, the peo-
ple embrace it and it remains in power.
We hope this lesson will not be lost on
the new Government of Vietnam. We
also hope that Government will not lean
too heavily on the United States, as our
eventual goal remains not only the resto-
ration of Vietnamese freedom from
authoritarianism, no matter whether
Communist or otherwise, but the reduc-
tion of our manpower and financial com-
mitment in South Vietnam.
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, I was in
the Chamber when the distinguished ma-
jority leader, the Senator from Montana
[Mr. MANSFIELD] made what I consider to
be a very comprehensive and important
statement concerning the situation in
Vietnam.
I recognize in the very able majority
leader a man of great wisdom and a stu-
dent of foreign affairs and of the south-
east Asia area. I thought his statement
was considerate not only of past develop-
ments in South Vietnam and the south-
east Asia area, but also one looking hope-
fully toward the future with the best in-
terests of freedom loving people and the
people of South Vietnam and the south-
east Asia area in mind.
His statement deserves the attention
of all of us, and especially of our execu-
tive department, and those concerned
with the problems in that part of the
world.
I take this opportunity to express my
support of the views and thoughts so
well presented by the very able and dis-
tinguished majority leader. C'1
GEORGE F. KENNAN'S VIEWS ON
FOREIGN POLICY
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President
some comments were made on the floor
of this body relating to an article about
Mr. George Kennan. Several articles
were written. I ask unanimous consent
that at the end of my remarks, an article
from Look magazine of November 19, by
J. Robert Moskin, be included in the
RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I do
not agree with some of the comments
made by Mr. Kennan. I have regarded
him, and still do, as one of the outstand-
ing public servants of this country. I
think he was, and is, uniquely 'qualified
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20000 CONGRESSIONAL RLCORID - SENATE November 5
20000 speak- Washington, especially when it cost money."
to, comment on various aspects of our Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Now free to
out boldly, he warns that "overmilitarize- The bureaucracy cannot react to changes
fan policy, Particularly on that part tion" of our cold war thinking and fear of fast enougd by countries 'they to our relations with the Soviet the "powerful influence of the right wing" are daresp," he says. y "The ponderousness of our
Union and Eastern Europe- He was in are destroying our strength abroad. Government institutions works against our
the Foreign Service for 25 or 30 years. (By J. Robert Moskin) best interest."
He was acknowledged as one of the lead- ?Congress and the American people are so The third force Kennan sees crippling our
ing experts on Russia. He spoke the divided that American leadership Is inde- foreign policy is the self-interest of our
language well. He was sent there as a cisive. It is high time we clarified our Ideas, allies. "This coalition is Incapable of agree-
very young man specifically to learn as a nation and a government, as to what we Ing on any negotiated solutions except un-
Russian. He was our Ambassador to want in our contest with the Soviet Union conditional capitulation and the satisfaction
Russia. He had the distinction, if one and the rest of the Communist world: of the maximum demands of each of our al-
wishes to call it that, of having his recall Whether we want these countries to change, lies. It is easier for a coalition to agree
requested by the Soviet Government for to capitulate to our desires' or whether we to ask for everything but the kitchen sink,
want war. People who hold all these three rather than take a real negotiating position.
remarks he made that were considered points of view have influence in Washing- "This worries me because there is not
by the Kremlin as being critical of the ton ,, going to be any capitulation. Our adver-
Situation in Berlin, I believe. This was This warning comes from George F. Ken- saries are not that weak. If we cannot find
about 10 years ago. ran, long time expert on communism, former any negotiating position, the cold war will
I believe everyone acknowledges that U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet union and to continue, and the dangers will not decrease."
our pro-
he has conditions experience and knowledge of shall lan ? and is a rararchitect t hen the Mar- IMP - The posals "but Russians munlessay you not dangle accept something
oondiirns in that part of the world and rank diplomat like Keenan, who has served before them, you put no pressure on their
of our relations there. 29 years in the Foreign Service, breaks loose decisionmaking."
I regret that anyone should criticize from the establishment and speaks out on Kennan sees no New Frontier in foreign
his efforts to enlighten the American America's foreign policy failings. affairs. "The Kennedy administration is not
people and Members of this body about Keenan, 59, has fought for his convictions by any means a free agent In foreign policy.
our relations with Yugoslavia specifi- against Democrats and Republicans alike. I can see important changes in military
-Cai1y, or Eastern Europe generally, or He opposed Democratic Secretary of State policy. But in foreign policy, the admin-
ith the Acheson's German policy and was once istration has had little latitude of action.
v,*His Kremlin. fired by Republican Secretary of State John "Supposing these strictures did not exist
.His views are deserving of
W- His Foster Dulles for disagreeing with his talk of and the Congress were more receptive? I
weight. I would certainly not say they the "liberation" of Eastern Europe. Now, believe we could usefully rethink our posi-
weTe infallible, but there Is no more gennan has resigned as President Kennedy's tion on the problems of Germany and Central
thoughtful man or student of our rela- Ambassador to Communist Yugoslavia be- Europe. The same applies to the complex
tions with Eastern Europe and Russia in cause, he feels, the Congress and Washing- of problems surrounding Communist China,
or out of government. ton bureaucracy had him hogtied and have Taiwan, and the Japanese peace treaty. We
He has resigned. He has a private crippled American foreign policy. ought to review carefully our attitude toward
'Capacity now. He is entitled to speak as After a lifetime in diplomacy (he was sent Gen. Charles de Gaulle and see whether,
any other citizen Is. The only difference to the Soviet Union as soon as we recog- under his concepts, France could not assume
nized Its existence In 1933). this tail, lean, more of the burden of leadership in Western
is that he speaks about his special field Imposing man sits now In his still book-bare Europe and protection of Western Europe
-of study from knowledge and experience office at the Institute for 9dvanced Study against Communist pressures. There ought
that are virtually unique among all the in Princeton. N.J., clasps and unclasps his to be searching reexamination and clarifica-
citizens of this country. hands, jumps up and paces the small room, tion of our policy toward Eastern Europe.
I believe the statements he made in peers out the window-as he struggles to say The samelapplies to hesadiousoneutralist
this article are on the whole correct. I know albo ththe state of theca_ ir Na people abroad. "Finally, there must be a real debate and
clarification of our views on the problems of
the that stionsy that prove that many In essence, he holds: We are fumbling be-
predict
of the suggestions that have been made cause we have not made up our minds what nuclear weapons. It seems dangerous to me
regarding our policy with respect to the kind of world we want, or what our role in that we should have to continue to stagger
Soviet Union will prove to have been wise the world should be. The administration is along with unresolved differences such as we
ones. ^erotd in on political victory at home, en- have just witnessed in the debate on the test
. 'Me PRESIDING OFFICER. The time meshed in bureaucratic redtape and buf- ban treaty."
of the Senator has expired. feted by political cyclones that roar in from To Illustrate how such forces paralyze our
Mr. FOLBRIGHT? I ask unanimous many directions. It sacrafees thought-out foreign policy, Keenan explains why he re-
consent that I may have 1 more minute. policies to pressures often Inspired by "the signed from the State Department: "I had
The PRESIDING' OFFICER. Without powerful Influence of the American right- no difficulty with the administration, but
wing." gennan fears that unless we nail the actions which the Congress designed to
-objection, it is so ordered. down what we want our foreign policy to be, the administration's hands in our eeo-
Mr. FQLBRIGHT. Several years ago we will plummet to the ground in wing- tie tie tc relations with Yugoslavia-and in a
Mr. Kennan became well known for an clipped futility, or plunge Into the flames way hr would deny the Yugoslavs normal
article in Foreign Affairs, written by of war. commercial treatment-largely paralyzed my
m, r; $-I believe that was the pseudo- ?I. we can't devise solutions better than effectiveness there. If I had greater support
Mm. It was considered as the origin thle we should ask ourselves whether we on the congressional side, and felt there were
the policy of containment. Subsc- belong to the big leagues," Keenan warns. important possibilities for scoomplishment,
Indecisiveness at the top leads to a sterility my decision might have been different."
quent to that, a new policy of liberation of Ideas and a failure to act. As a result,
theoretically was developed, which has he argues, our foreign policy is paralyzed. A Although Yatehad millions
Kenn
In
congre slssionaa approval
not proved as effective. I think the ac- politician, whether in the White House or of dollars moo in ns the bank getting
teal state of affairs is much Closer, and the Congress. who voices new ideas or acts spent ve m on the Embassy fence. "The
has been, that of containment rather protect hie poi foreign 11lif saffairs. tmextremists jealous and narrow ways In which these mat-
He liberation. who talk loudly, but carry a very small stick tens are handled have to be changed."
He also has given noted lectures on of responsibility. Last July 26, an earthquake destroyed the
Western Europe regarding our policies gennan sees three forces paralyzing our Yugoslav city of Skoplje, killing and Injuring
-in that area, which, while they have not foreign policy. The first is the Congress, in thousands. He has bitter memories: "The
which a few powerful men-such as some congressional strictures were so severe that how
been followed. and were roundly con-
We Coul demned by y former Secretary Acheson, leaders of the House Ways and Means te;e Come kingdl L~uid do was givedblood. Noe cony
may prove in the future to have had con- mittee-tie up foreign policy.
strong notions about what the Government gressional committee could stop me frof
giderable wisdom.
In any case, I for One wish to COm- should be doing; others fear attacks from the doing that.
extremists; some speak for special interests Last year, the Congress directed the Presi-
111end Mr. Kennan for taking the trouble or jealously hug their prerogatives as hold- dent to stop, as soon as practicable, normal
to give the public his views. I regard ers of the Nation's purse strings. There Is most-favored-nation trade with any coun-
him as one of the outstanding public no reason to believe Kennan says, that their try dominated or controlled by communism.
servants of our time. views represent American opinion more ac- "The Yugoslavs aren't even a king aid,
nnstt' I curately than the President's. Kennan says. (They stopped
lz "
OUR FoREiGN POLICY Is PARALYZED The second force is the deadening hand assistance from the
normal 957.)
~(Noz'E. Respected diplomat. Russian ex- of Government bureaucracy. As an Ambas- "They just ass won't them
t and Pulitzer Prize historian. George F. sador, gennan found "the great difficulty ment, and the Congo give
Eennan, h quit as President Kennedy's was to get opinion and authority out of That's very bad.
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