Discussion with (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01443R000100350009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 1, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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SECURITY INFORM IO
_. .6 L:>c,
CIA INTERNAL USE ON 1 October 1953
1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Discussion with
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1. illdevoted his extemporaneous remarks to developments in the
Soviet Union since Stalints death. He said that in order to comprehend the
meaning of the death, it was necessary to have comprehension of the system
which Stalin himself had created a system under Which the USSR had become
"Stalin's private property," subject to the will and the whim of an old man
who was vain, pathologically afraid of rivals, intolerant of any sort of
criticism, and subject to violent rages.
2. He said that with Stalin gone, it became necessary for his associates,
who had grown "tired of hie and apprehensive of the results of his policies,
to "reorganize the dictatorship." He believed that developments should be
viewed in this light more than as evidences of a struggle for power. He felt
that the West had concentrated too much on this latter theory, and doubted
that Malenkovts position had ever been threatened. He credited the present
regime with a genuine interest in avoiding the creation of a new Fushrer,
hence its efforts at a "Lenin!' type of dictatorship in which Power can be
delegated, and the emphasis on collective responsibility. He credited the
new regime with "a very clever job of shrinking Joe down to size --- his head
meant the disappearance of Stalin as a figure. It meant, said, 25X1A5a1
now being about the size of an orange," but underlined that this no means
that he was no longer portrayed as a great dispenser of doctrine, but would
have his place as the associate and successor of Lenin.
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3. the great difficulty facing the new regime in
its efforts to uproot the artificialities of the Stalin regime was whether or
not that rule "was a tumor or a cancer," in other words whether it could be
eliminated without seriously dislocating everything.
A.. In enumerating the steps taken by the new regime,
the following points:
made 25X1A5a1
A. It had de-Emphasized the Party committee secretaries, making it
clear that "they are the servants of the committees, not their
masters."
B. It had brought the MVD under control and reduced its influence
in many ways, including removal of concentration camps from its
jurisdiction to that of the Ministry of Justice. He pointed
out in this connection that at the moment there was perhaps
some doubt as to whether the MV)) still controlled its armed
units.
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C. It had endeavored in several fields, notably in the new emphasis
on consumer goods and in promised agricultural reforms, to give
the people a feeling of security. 25X1A5a1
5. "You may still see one man emerge as the dominant figure,"
said, "but at the moment the new men are trying to avoid the Stalin type o
rule which requires a general atmosphere of terror and involves keeping every?
one, including your closest associates, in a state of complete insecurity.
You might call this the government of Warren G. Malenkov (and the return to
normalcy)." He added that he felt Malenkov "wants to make the joint work
better as a team" but that this of course did not mean that the USSR was not
still a thoroughgoing police state, with all the basic controls which that
implies. People who bucked the system would be ruthlessly dealt with, but
those who "stayed off the grass" would be reasonably secure against capricious
arrest.
6, he felt that Malenkov had been very honest in his
public remarks on the state of the Soviet economy and very specific as opposed
to the vague generalization of Stalin's era, and that Krushchev had been
honest as well in his speech on agriculture. He pointed out that there was
a strong effort to end the years of peasant resistance in the introduction of
crop price supports and in the provision for smaller forced deliveries. He
said the new agricultural policy is designed to appeal to peasant self-
interest and may mark a distinct shift in policy akin to the promulgation of
NEP. He did pose the question of peasant reaction under the new policy of
greater individual security after years of sullen opposition to agricultural
policy, and said that the regime obviously had this question in mind and would
be careful not to let the peasants get out of control.
7. "It would seem," "that they have come to the conclusion
that they now have the required industrial base and can move ahead along two
lines: a slower development of heavy industry and an effort to close the
long existing gaps in the matter of consumer goods and agricultural policy
which have had such a weakening effect."
8. He saw "a little more common sense" in foreign policy, but no basic
change. He felt that the approaches to Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey had
been "a desertion of awkward, senseless positions into which Stalin had
gotten the USSR. He felt, however, that Moscow would support the East German
puppets at all cost, and that there was nothing in its recent notes on Germany
to offer any hope to the contrary. He noted that Ulbricht had received the
class A, red carpet treatment in Moscow, He saw a parallel policy in the case
of North Korea, which he was convinced Russia intended to hold, thus mini?
mizing the chances of a Korean conference.
9." they are caught in a contradiction; they want no
major trouble, which to them means no war, but they are unable or unwilling
to give up anything they have. It is a sort of policy of 'peace at no price'
--- more or less like our own." He characterized the Kremlin's approach to ,
foreign policy as "puzzled" and sometimes, as in the case of Vychinsky's
recent UN speech, as "sterile."
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10. He felt that the USSR had a more effective approach to foreign
economic policy, now based in general on "trade for trade's sake" without the
old emphasis on procuring strategic materials.
11. He said that fiscal policy was causing some speculation, since the
new budget cut down on the revenues which would in the past have come in from
the turnover tax, the forced state loan, and peasant taxes, without providing
any apparent sources to replace them. He said that possibly the "bonus" to
agriculture and the consumer had resulted from a radical revision of long-
range strategy as a result of nuclear advances which permitted savings in the
production of conventional weapons, but added that there was no real evidence
of military cutbacks.
12. Turning to the atmosphere in Moscow, he said that the people seem
"to have no desire to 'get at' the regime, that they seem to be ilnder less
strain; to have some feeling of hope ? they have a passionate desire, after all
these years, for normalcy and tranquility. And they have a deep-seated fear
of war." He added that, with their past memories of burned villages, deporta-
tions and reprisals, "they want no revolutions."
13. "You get no impression of a people waiting to rise up," he said,
adding that, with the sixth sense they have developed for the true state of
affairs, the people would not take kindly to another aggressive war (Finland,
a thoroughly unpopular venture, being a case in point) and that such a
venture might bring trouble.
14. "Things are beginning to work in the Soviet Union," he said. "The
deep freeze of Stalinism is over, and blood is returning to the body. What
direction events will take, perhaps not even the men at the top are sure of."
15. He said that in the event the regime was forced to turn back toward
the repressions of Stalinism, "pressure would really build up," and that that
would be the time for application of the psychological warfare techniques.
25X1A5a1 16. Points made by in reply to questions or during the
course of a conversation in the office of the DCI prior to the discussion,
included:
Al. He does not overrate the blackmail possibility of the atomic
and thermo-nuclear threat, except to the extent that it may be
"self-induced" in the United States and especially Western
Europe. The Communists are quite casual about human life, but
have "very little sense of humor about buildings." The Soviet
leadership has despoiled and exploited everything in sight ---
they admit that they have wrecked their agricultural production
and tacitly confess to the damage to the arts and sciences ---
and have even traduced the political philosophies and doctrines
by which they profess to live. The one thing which they have
to show for all this is the industrial plant which they have
erected, and they have a keen enough appreciation of the
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possibilities of atomic retaliation and what this would mean in
terms of destruction of their own industry. Yet their ability to
shrug off "greater sanctions" would certainly be inhanced by
their new atomic capabilities. In other words since "two can
play at mass destruction" they can insist that local flare?ups
be allowed to progress to their logical end with conventional
weapons.
. Granted the continued partition of Germany and the full support
of the Kremlin for the East German government, Berlin is bound
again to become a "hot spot," although does not anti? 25X1A5a1
cipate anything as drastic as reimposition of the blockade. He
pointed to a passage in a speech by Malenkov crediting the self?
discipline of the Red Army with preventing the June 17th riots
in Berlin becoming a conflagration, as a possible warning to the
East German government that so much tolerance might not be shown
if things got out of hand again. He said he felt Russian policy
toward Germany was based on the assumption that EDC would go
through. He felt the Russians were caught in a terrible dilemma'
as to whether to seal off Berlin and thereby ruin the policy of
detente, or to leave it open as a running mound in the German
puppet state.
With reference to the Satellites, he urged thorough analysis
of "what is making these things happen there --- are they develop-
ments which could be ironed out if the Soviet Union were given
tranquility (in which case we should not permit it to them) or
are they something indigenous which would produce more trouble
on their awn than could ever be caused under outside influence?"
He said he considered the latter more likely.
D. He said he felt that the abandonment of forced industrialization
in the Satellites had been caused by the realization --- with
Russia's own experience in mind --- that such a program in an
essentially peasant country, relying only on the resources of
that country, would of necessity mean the imposition of police
terror, with potentially serious results. He added that improved
standards of living in the Satellites might also make the popu?
lations hard to controls, with possibilities of future trouble.
He thought that psychological warfare tactics should be studied
very carefully, and doubted whether external pressure would do
any good at this moment. He said that the recent discussions
between American ambassadors abroad had revealed a feeling on
the part of those stationed in Western Europe that cleavages
among the Western powers might outweigh any advantages gained
by too aggressive tactics. The ambassadors to the Satellites
had pointed to the danger of fomenting something like the dis?
astrous Warsaw uprising of 1944, and had pointed out that crude
pressure tactics usually provided Communist propagandists with
a golden opportunity.
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E. He said that he felt the Kremlin was still undecided whether to
try Beria publicly, and that he was inclined to think the present
tendency was against doing so. In this connection he said there
? had been no real purge, in the old sense of the word, following
Beriats disgrace, and that the personnel shifts in the MIlD had
probably been more administrative ones connected with assuring
party control. He classed Beria as a genuine Stalinist who be-
lieved that the Soviet Union could only go on in an atmosphere
of terror and police repression. (He was asked whether he
thought Beria had escaped said replied that he doubted it strongly,
but that it was interesting to note that nowhere had the claim
been made that he had been arrested. He thought it would be use-
ful to know whether the word "arrested" had been used in connec-
tion with those purged in the 301s. A recent study by OCI shows
that it was.)
25X1A5a1 F.
characterized Malenkov as "smarter than Stalin, par-
ticularlyin the latterls closing years, and a more dangerous
opponent." He pointed out how completely he dominated all
others at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet. He said Molotov,
a man with no great pretensions to power, probably had grown
so used to the state of things under Stalin that he was now
unhappy --- at any rate "he now has the appearance of a very
unhappy man."
, As to the army he doubts that it is an independent competition
for power. It seems to be pleased with developments, particu-
larly the new agricultural policy which is given much space in
the military press. Historically Tukaschevsky at al got into
trouble because they railed at the way the state was antagonizing
the peasants and thereby making the arpy take thoroughly disaf-
fected conscripts.
H. He suggested that the American approach to the Soviet problem
was too often characterized by "the substitution of cliche for
analysis," adding, "it should always be borne in mind that
evolution goes on under a dictatorship just as it does every-
where else, even though it may be a concealed one. That
evolution is taking place in the USSR today."
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HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence
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