SE-51: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT (DRAFT FOR THE BOARD)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001100040019-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 1999
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: September 4, 1953
• Content Type: SE

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SECURITY INFORM1ATION SEP 4
1953
!t Saptember 3.953
SUBJECT: (SE-51:) THE SI(IFICANCE OF THE NEW INDCNESIAN GOVERNMENT
(Draft for the Board)
the Composition of the New Cabinet
1, After nearly eight weeks of political maneuvering, the
Indonesians finally succeeded on August Ist.in forming a new
cabinet. Like all cabinets since Indonesia achieved independence
in 1949, the present cabinet represents a coalition, but for the
first time does not include the Masjumi (Moslem Party), the party
with the most Parliamentary strength and the greatest public support,
2, The Nationalist Party (PNI) is dominant iu the cabinet.
It holds the post of Prize Minister, as well as the portfolios of
Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Finance. Except for Prime
Minister All, all these ministers are members of the Party ? s left
wing, Nahladatul Ulama (NU) and PSII, minor Moslem parties, hold
five cabinet positions: Agrarian Affairs,, Religious Affairs,
Communications, Public Welfare, and the second deputy prime minister-
ship, The Greater Indonesian Association. (PIR), a secondary nationalist
41 1L.-/-L-1 M I It ILL-
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party, holds the post of first deputy prime minister and the
portfolios of interior and Public Works. Minor nationalist parties
hold four seats. The four remaining seats, including the most ?
important Defense Ministry, are held by Marxist parties,
3 The outstanding characteristic of the All cabinet is the
strong leftist inclination of the ministers holding some of the
most important portfolios. None are avowed members of the Communist
However, four ministers,
Twa (Defense), Ong (Finance)s,
Abidin (Labor), and Sadjarwo (Agriculture), are probably willing
to cooperate with the Communists on most issues. An additional
four ministers, Sunario (Foreign Affairs),, Djody (Justice),
Abikusno (Communications), and Yamin (EEducation)s, can be expected
to cooperate with the Communists from time to time. Balanced against
these 8 cabinet members are the Prime Minister and the other 11
members of the cabinet, who do not however hold any influential
ministries except perhaps Economic Affairs,
Party,
Cabinet Support in Parliament
4o The parties represented in the cabinet have a total of 92
votes out of 210 active Parliament members.. Votes of the opposition
parties Masjumi9 Socialists, Christian, and Democratic .a= total
80o Eight out of 15 independent votes will probably 4#o to the
government,, giving the government parties 100 votes,, six votes short
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of a majorityc, This gap will probably be filled by the votes of
the Communist bloc. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and
the Communist-dominated labor union (SOBSI) have already indicated
that they will swing their 19 votes to support of the government.
In this situation the cabinet must rely on Communist support to win
Parliamentary approval of and controversial measured However,
party discipline is frequently broken in Indonesia and total Parlia-
mentary attendance rarely approaches the active membership of 210.
Therefore, it is quite possible that the opposition. might gain
sufficient votes unexpectedly on almost any issue and cause the
government to fall.
The Significance of the New Cabinet in Indonesian Political Development
5. The formation of a new cabinet was prolonged by a struggle
for power between the two major parties, the Nationalist Party and
the Masjumi. The Nationalist Party sought to achieve a dominant
role in the new government in order to enhance its political position
before national elections are held, To help counter the popular
strength of the Masjumi, the Nationalist Party turned to the Indo-
nesian Communist Party for support. On the other hand, the Masjumi
Party, alarmed by the growing cooperation between the Nationalist
Party and the Communist Party, sought to relegate the Nationalist
Party to a less dominant position in the new cabinet., The victory
of the Nationalist Party in forming a cabinet from which the Mas jum:3
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is excluded is significant in the political development of Indonesia
because it represents a complete split between the two major Indo-
nesian political parties which have heretofore cooperated in Indo-
nesian coalit.ion governments.
6, The split between the two major parties is probably a
normal phase in the political development of Indonesia now that the
unifying force of the struggle for independence has been largely
dissipated and Indonesian leaders are faced with the difficulties
of organizing and developing a country. To the extent that the
Masjumi-Nationalist split leads to the formation of two distinguish-
able political groups representing separate interests in Indonesia.,
this event will strengthen Indonesian political development. In this
connection, it is important that the split has occurred at least
in part over the question of cooperating with the Communists. This
may lead to a sharp division between anti-Communist and pro-Communist
groups in Indonesia. It already appears that the Nasjumi is taking
the lead in unifying an anti-Communist opposition of all parties
not represented in the cabinet. It is possible that Vice-President
Hatta, long known as a pro-American and anti-Communist, will be the
leader of the anti-Communist forces.
7. The formation of the new cabinet has had an impact on the
political position of President Sukarno, and this in turn may sig-
nificantly affect the political development of Indonesia. For
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motives that are not yet clear,, Sukarno accepted this cabinet after
refusing one of similar composition and after refusing to seek
expedient solutions which he called unconstitutional0 This action
has brought Sukarnoes reputation for being above party considerations
into question for the first time. He will probably be regarded
henceforth as more sympathetic to the Nationalist Party than any
other. This will inevitably reduce his prestige and his effective=
nss as the strongest unifying force in Indonesian political life.
The New Cabinet Is Program
8 The program announced by the new cabinet is similar to the
programs of its predecessors, differing only in emphasis. The
program stresses domestic security, the importance of holding general
elections'. an economic policy based on the welfare of "the common
people, an independent foreign policy,, and a revision of the relation-
ship between Indonesia and the Netherlands.
90 The problem of domestic security was given first place in
the government program, with emphasis given particularly to a pledge
to destroy Darul Islam, the Moslem dissident group. President
Sukarno has indicated that a campaign will be launched against all
armed dissident groups,, including specifically certain C a munist-
controlled groups. However,, because an all-out campaign would
require a basic reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces'.
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it is likely that only limited action will be undertaken against
Daxul Islam. Concurrent with such action, the Nationalist Party
and the Communists will seek to weaken popular support for the
Masjumi, charging that collaboration exists between Darul Islam
and the Masjumi.
loo The new program calls for the immediate holding of general
elections for Parliament and a constituent assembly as required by
the election law passed by the last session of Parliament, However,
considering the other problems confronting the new government and
the many obstacles to be removed before elections can be held,* it
is not likely that the elections will take place before 19550
11, The cabinet?s announced economic program provides little
definite indication of the governments intentions. Little change
# NIE=779 "Probable Developments in Indonesian, published 11 June 1953,,
page 9, para. 51.
Sip. We believe that the national elect.onsf, although complicated
and delayed by numerous technical problems, probably will be held
sometime during 1954, The governmentes ability to maintain at least
the present degree of internal security Is a critical factor in carry-
ing out the election plans. Also,, even though the election law has
been passed, regulations to implement the basic law must be formulated
and acted on, and the generally illiterate population must be educated
and otherwise prepared to carry out its franchise. Various groups
which sought to delay adoption of the basic elections law probably will
raise other difficulties to present.. or at least delay,, the promised
elections. In this situation, much will depend on the actions of a
few political leaders, whose personal goals and motives are not readily
discernible.
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is expected in agrarian policies. No definite statement was made
regarding foreign investment ox nationalization of estate or other
foreign holdings., but the new government will probably follow a
policy less favorable to foreign investors, particularly with respect
to labor legislation. The government will probably also take some
steps toward regulating the use of foreign exchange in a manner "more
advantageous to the masses.," a policy which might increase the balance
of payments deficit and inflationary pressure-so
12. The new government has indicated that it will in general
follow the existing foreign policy but will give even Greater emphasis
to Indonesiaess "independent" positions Stress has already been laid
on the importance of establishing closer relations with the Soviet
Bloc in order to counterbalance those now existing with the West.
Arrangements will probably be made soon to open an embassy in Moscow,
an action already approved by the Parliament. Attempts will probably
be made to increase trade with the Soviet Bloc,, but significant results
are not likely. Concerning US aid, the foreign minister has announced
that the agreement to receive TCA aid will be continued but will be
reviewed in order to determine how advantageous it is to Indonesia.
Other foreign policy objectives are likely to be: (a) the negotiation
of a bilateral treaty with Japan to suprlant the San Francisco treaty
which the Indonesians signed but did not ratify; (b) a revision of
the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia, replacing
the existing Round Table Agreements of 1949 with normal international
treaties; and (c) a renewal of demands that Western New Guinea
become part of Indonesia.
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Probable Developments
I3o We believe that the cabinet will move slowly in carrying
out .ts program. Its Parliamentary support is too meager 'to risk
quick or decisive action an long-standing controversial issues.
The government will find it particularly difficult. to initiate an
all-out campaign to eliminate the Darul Islam or to effect a radical
reorganization of the armed forces commando
ao An all-out attack on the Darul Islam., would probably
have the support of the general publics some of the
armed forces, and those political groups represented
by the Nationalists and the Communists. However, it
would probably be resisted by the army commander in
the Celebes. It is also likely that the Moslem repre-
sentatives in the cabinet and Parliament would withdraw
their support of the goverment, thus precipitating its
overthrow.
b0 The present government will almost certainly not take
decisive steps to reorganize and modernize the armed
forces. It may attempt to strengthen the determination
of the armed forces to wipe out the Darul Islam by
installing Communists or Communist sympathizers in command
positions? Any sweeping mares in this direction., however,
would probably be strongly opposed -. possibly to the
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extent of precipitating an attempt to overthrow the.
government
by an estimated seventy.-nine of the
eighty-five combat battalions in North Sumatra, West
Java, and Central Java fifty percent of the National
Police Brigade; the bulk of the air force; and possibly
the navy.
]i If the cabinet proceeds toward its goals slowly and
cautiously, it is not likely to fall during the next six months
or more. The opposition in Parliament does not have sufficient
strength to defeat the cabinet, particularly so long as the Commis-,
nists continue to support the cabinet. The opposition is in a
particularly difficult position because it has supported a similar
program and where it does disagree with the cabirxet, it is advocating
policies which, with the possible exception of action against the
Darul Islam,. have little popular support, ioe.,:measures to attract
foreign investment and increase economic auster;ityo
15, However, beyond this period, the tenure of the cabinet
will become considerably more uncertain because:
a. The goverment will be under steady pressure from the
Communists to place pro-Communist individuals in key
positions in the bureaucracy, the amd forces., and the
policed As this occurs, the anti.-.Coma nist opposition
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may be able to convince the conservative members of
the groups now represented in the government of the
Communist danger, Internal dissension in the cabinet
or an adverse vote in the Parliament might then cause
the government to fall.
b. The present cabinet must cope with the same controversial
issues which caused the overthrow of the previous govern-
ment. In view of its slim majority in Parliament.,
the government will run the risk of incurring an adverse
vote which would cause its fall anytime it seeks to
deal with these issues. Moreover., prolonged inaction
in handling these issues would probably also lead to
the fall of the cabineto
c. Indonesia's economy is in precarious condition at present,
Either.through inexperience or leftist pressure., the present
government might not deal effectively with a developing
economic crisis,, Such failure would lead to its overthrow.
16., As long as the present cabinet remains in power., the.Commu-
nists will be in a position gradually to increase their influenced
They will make progress toward (1) infiltrating the Nationalist and
other parties in the government; (2) placing Communists and Commu-
nist sympathizers in important positions in the various ministries
and in the armed forces;and (3) improving their chances for popular
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popular support in the forthcoming elections. The Communists will
also be able to exert considerable influence over the cabinet
because of the latter's dependence on Communist support in Parliament.
However, we do not believe that through such measures the Communists
will for some time be able to gain control over the government. We
further believe that they do not now, nor will for some time, have
the capability to overthrow the government by force. We believe
it unlikely that they can gain the necessary control over the armed
forces except through a program of infiltration which would require
a considerable period of time.
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