INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200040011-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 6, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

'F"-*Ar"' S.r'' Approved For Release 2002/01/ CIA RDP79ROO89OA001200040011-8
NSC BRIEFING 6 April 1960
INDONESIA
I. President Sukarno created a new parliament on 27 March, just four
days prior to his departure on another around-the-world trip; this
has been followed by numerous reports that various non-Communist
political and army elements, including Gen. Nasution, are plotting
to move against Sukarno during his absence.
A. The reaction to the new parliament has been strongly critical
in army and non-Communist political circles, particularly over
the fact that at least one fourth of the new deputies are
Communists.
B. This reaction will aggravate the already existing dissatisfaction
over Sukarno's long-standing apparent lack of concern over domes-
tic Communism, the economic deterioration in Indonesia, and the
unsettled conditions resulting from the continuing rebellion in
various parts of the country.
II. We are inclined to doubt that Nasution will bring himself to the
point of moving to oust Sukarno during his eight-week absence.
A. Nasution is known to be unhappy with some of Sukarno's policies,
and it is quite probable that he has ambitions to replace
Sukarno as the country's number-one man.
B. But Nasution fears--and with cause--that he would not be able to
hold together sufficient strength to maintain power.
III. There is still an outside possibility that Nasution or others may
decide to move at this time.
Approved For Release 2002/0t*S& 79R00890A001200040011-8
 Approved For Release 2002/01/30 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001200040011-8
A. The more likely possibility, however, seems to be further
incidents by right-wing dissidents assisted by military ele-
ments, similar to the small-scale attack on 19 March on an
army school in Bandung.
1. Such incidents would further complicate an already confused
situation, but in themselves would probably not precipitate
a military takeover of the government.
Approved For Release 2002/01/30: CIA-R 00890A001200040011-8