NOTE TO GENERAL WILSON FROM JACK H. TAYLOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001100110012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 22, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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22 August 1975
INTELLIGENCE ~CIMMUNITY STAF~"F
'T0: General Wilson.
We have received your copy of
.the OSR Memo en.titled''Flexibility
in Soviet Offensive Concepts: The
~Ro1es of Armer and other Ground
porces.~' But need guidance as to
exactly what you wish us~to do with
this.
a. How urgent-is the
matter?
b. To whom do you want
us to send this document?
It has been given considerable
distriliutian already, e. g., DIA has
received 151 copies both Codeword
and non-Codeword.
Please advise.
Ch~~, IC/PRD/Th
INF~F~MATION
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T~ ...
STAT
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18 August 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
SUBJECT Flexibility in Soviet Offensive
Concepts: The Roles of Armor
and Other Ground Forces
1. Attached please find six copies of the OSR
paper on armor concepts and the list of recipients.
We would appreciate your assistance in identifying
consumers who are not normally on our regular dis-
semination.
2. As you recognize, this paper represents
something of a departure from our regular publications
which tend to focus on broader policy support issues.
Your prodding plus the shortage of training materials
noted by our analysts while visiting several military
schools have persuaded us that there is a need for
monographs on battlefield concepts. The armor con-
cepts paper is a beginning.
3. We remain, at present, a bit uncertain as
to how this paper might be used and whether or not
it has the proper focus, We would appreciate your
comments in this regard. Further, if there are
particularly unexploited areas of intelligence where,
within the normal course of our research program, we
can be of assistance to your colleagues in the military
schools, we will be happy to try.
4. In the course of talking to you about operational
concepts and tactics, it has occurred to several of us
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that a seminar for instructors, sponsored by the
IC Staff or DIA might be a useful means of exchanging
ideas and current information. We would be happy
to participate in such an event and lend whatever
support we can.
~:hief
Theater Forces Division, OSR
Attachments:
As stated
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Secret
Flexibility in Soviet Offensive Conceits:
The Roles of Armor and Other Ground Forces
Secret
SR RP 75-4
July 1975
Copy '~ ~`.~ 4~
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
July 1975
Flexibility in Soviet Offensive Concepts:
The Roles of Armor and Other Ground Forces
The arms reduction negotiations between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact have focused renewed attention
on the balance of forces in Central Europe. In
this area, Western defense officials have been
concerned by the size of Pact armored forces and
the threat they pose to NATO. This concern has
grown as Pact armored forces--already the world's
largest--continue to increase in size and quality.
This paper surveys the evolution of the basic
types of units in the Soviet armored forces, how
they are structured, and how they are to be used
in the event of war.
The information on which this report is based
comes from a variety of sources, some sensitive
and not explicitly cited. Basic armor doctrine
and tactics are reflected, however, in unclassified
Soviet writings as well as in numerous defector
reports and exercises.
Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcome. They
may be directed to of the Theater Forces Division,
Office of Strategic Research, code 143, extension ~.
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Conten~.s
Page
Summary .
3
The Offensive Imperative and Implication for
Armored Forces
5
Early Organization and Tactics .
8
Armor in the Era of Massive Nuclear Response . .
9
Growing Concern for Flexibility amd Conventional
Capability .
12
Overcoming Enemy Antitank Systems:.
16
Soviet Combined-Arms Concept for the Offensive
Breakthrough
18
Tank Forces in a Modern Offensive..
21
Changing Soviet Ground Force Organizational
Patterns (Chart) .
10
Soviet Concept of Ground Offensive in Nuclear
War (Diagram)
12
New Soviet Self-Propelled Artillery
(Photographs)
14
Probable Soviet Concept of Movement by Tank and
Combined-Arms Armies of Wartime Front (Diagrams)
19
Soviet Infantry Attack Supported by BMP Infantry
Combat Vehicles (Photograph) .
20
Conceptual Meeting Engagement in a Breakthrough
(Diagram)
23
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Summary
Soviet military planning in the nuclear era used to
be based on the assumption that any war with NATO would
be nuclear from the outset. Since the late sixties,
however, Soviet operational concepts and weapon develop-
ments have reflected increasing stress on flexibility
for nuclear or conventional war. The flexibility policy
has occasioned some change in the expected combat role
of armored forces, but that role is essentially the same
in either type of conflict. And the Soviet tank force
remains the largest in the world--a status which appears
to be the result of several factors, including the offen-
sive focus of Soviet land warfare doctrine as well as
economic and institutional momentum.
Because their weapons and tactics had earlier been
intended mainly for nuclear war, the Soviets had to
deal with certain basic considerations in adapting to
a policy of flexibility for conventional war:
-- They could no longer rely exclusively on
nuclear weapons to achieve the breakthrough
in NATO defenses which must precede a massive
offensive into enemy territory, a basic tenet
of Soviet land warfare doctrine.
-- IQATO capabilities for stopping a conventional
attack increased significantly with the pro-
liferation of more effective antitank weapons.
-- The massed forces required to create a break-
through in NATO defenses during the conven-
tional phase of a war would present a tempting
target for the sudden introduction of nuclear
weapons by the NATO forces, particularly if the
breakthrough attempt were meeting with success.
The Soviets have taken steps over the past several
years to compensate for these problems:
-- The combined-arms tactics (and, to some ex-
tent, the more balanced force structure) which
emerged in Soviet ground forces during World
War II have been reemphasized with the return
to conventional war planning.
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-- The number of tanks in t1~e infantry arm of the
ground forces has been increased.
-- Artillery forces have begin enlarged and improved
as additional guns and new self-propelled artil-
lery have been introduced into the force.
-- The ground attack capabilities of the tactical
air forces have been upgraded as aircraft with
greater conventional payloads have entered
service.
-- In military exercises the Soviets contin-
ually rehearse tactics to maintain a dispersed
posture during the conve$~tional phase of a
war for as long as possible before concen-
trating for a breakthrough of enemy defenses.
In attempting to break through well-prepared enemy
defenses without the use of nucliear weapons, present
Soviet doctrine calls for the assaulting forces to con-
centrate much of their artillery-and combined-arms
forces--primarily motorized :r if lie divisions--opposite
a narrow sector of the defensive: front. After an ex-
tensive artillery barrage, the cr~mbined-arms elements
would be committed to secure a beach in the defenses
through which large tank units would advance.
Because of the Soviets? commitment to tank warfare--
underscored when they recently started large-scale pro-
duction of a new generation of tanks--it is likely that
Soviet offensive doctrine will continue to be based on
large tank forces. The main impact of changes in land
warfare policy has been, and probably will continue to
be, on the equipment and tactics: of the supporting arms.
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Early Organization and Tactics
The Soviets' preeminence in; number of tanks dates
from the start of World War II. For a decade before
then, however, they had experimented with various ar-
mored organizations and tactics. In the early thirties,
the Soviets--like the Germans--.agreed with the views
of theoretician: like Lidell Hart, the British mil~.tary
commentator, that the tank had an independent role to
play in battle. As a consequence, Soviet tank units
were organized into independent brigades and corps and
were to be used for critical breakthroughs of enemy
defenses.
This organization was abandoned in the late thirties
as its leading proponents fell victim to the Great Purge
and their successors attempted to apply the lessons of
a guerrilla war in Spain to large-scale European con-
flict. The result was that tanks were parceled outt
among infantry divisions as mobile firepower support.
The rapid destruction of the tank-supported infantry
of the French army in .May 1940 by a German blitzkrieg
prompted the Soviets to reexamine the structure of, their
armored forces. They reestabl~.shed armored brigades and
made them their basic armored rthaneuver unit in World
War II. During that conflict, they used tank brigades
independently and also combined them into tank armies to
provide shock for an offensive,: However, some tanks
were still attached to infantry and mechanized units to
provide firepower support.
In the final years of the war, the Soviets devel-
oped standard tactics against the Germans. Prior',to an
attack, massive preparatory bombardments by artillery
and air forces were concent:ratecl on a narrow sector of
the enemy front. Norms were developed for the numbers
of artillery pieces emplaced per kilometer of front,
and several days were required to stockpile ammunition
for each battle. Following the bombardment, infantry
units would advance to secure ~ breach in the line
through which armored and mechanized units would pass
to envelop or pursue enemy forges.
The basic tactics employed in these operations
brought the Soviets sustained successes and carried
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them in a series of leaps to Berlin. As a result,
the operational concepts developed during the war
became sanctioned as "historically correct" and have
formed the basis for Soviet land warfare doctrine
ever since.
In the years immediately following the war, a
number of organizational changes occurred that were
designed to incorporate some of the lessons of the
war. Infantry, tanks, and artillery were integrated
a~t the division level, resulting in a new ground
forces structure. Of the three basic types of ground
force divisions that evolved--rifle, tank, and
mechanized--all included organic tank units. (see
chart, next page.) Although the reorganization was
accompanied by a reduction in the overall size of
the forces, the number of divisions still totaled
about 175. Of these, 100 were rifle divisions and
the remainder mechanized or tank.
The Soviets did, however, continue to maintain
large artillery formations and tactical air forces.
During the latter stages of the war these forces had
provided the firepower which had enabled the Soviets
to break through heavily defended German lines time
and time again. Soviet planners held that these
tactics which had served them so well in World War II
would be applicable in the future wars as well. This
planning did not, however, reckon with the impact that
tactical nuclear weapons would have on the operational
doctrine of both sides.
Armor in the Era of Massive Nuclear Res onse
From the mid-fifties to about 1960, Soviet mili-
tary planners and theoreticians were occupied with
the problem of reconciling traditional ground offen-
sive tactical concepts with the new nuclear arms
environment. Initially, they decided that nuclear
strikes could substitute for concentrated artillery
and aerial bombardment, and artillery and tactical
air forces were greatly reduced. Divisions were
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ChangngScwiet Ground Force ~rAanizational Pattern
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?e? ? ?e?
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reduced in number and the ground forces were stream-
lined for nuclear combat. The large mechanized divi-
sion, for example, was dropped, as were many of the
divisional and nondivisional artillery units. Rifle
divisions were given additional tanks so that they
came to resemble the present-day Soviet motorized
rifle division. Despite the reductions, the Soviets
retained a sizable ground force comprising some 80
motorized rifle and 50 tank divisions.
As the USSR began to acquire strategic nuclear
forces in the early sixties, Khrushchev, with an eye
toward military economies and with the sympathies
of proponents of strategic nuclear power within the
military, exerted pressure for further reductions in
the ground forces. War with the West, he argued,
would be a decisive global conflict, its outcome
determined largely by massive nuclear exchanges at
the outset. Strategic exchanges also would decide
any theater conflict.
Despite an emphasis on the decisiveness of strate-
gic nuclear strikes and the lower priority assigned
conventional forces in the early sixties, ground
forces advocates managed to stave off further major
reductions by arguing the imperatives of a large
European ground campaign as part of a nuclear con-
flict with the West. As a result of their efforts,
the role of ground forces in a nuclear conflict and
the conduct of ground operations on a nuclear battle-
field came to underlie--through the mid-sixties--the
basic doctrinal rationale governing weapons procure-
ment and tactical planning.
During this period the Soviet concept of ground
operations in a nuclear environment viewed tank
forces as having an even greater role than in World
War II and the immediate postwar period. Soviet
planners believed conditions on a nuclear battlefield
would make unprecedented demands, as well as oppor-
tunities, for maneuver. Tank forces would be commit-
ted directly through gaps created by nuclear strikes
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Soviet Concept of Ground Offensive in Nuclear War
to pursue surviving NATO ttroops, engage NATO reserves,
and seize important areas in trhe NATO rear. (see
diagram above.) Motorized infantry units would
protect the flanks of advancing armored columns and
deal with pockets of bypassed NATO forces.
Growing Concern for Flexibili~y and Conventional
Capability
In the mid-sixties, Soviet military planners
began once again to modify thezir views of the likely
nature of a European conflict, Reacting to NATO's
flexible-respanse strategy and benefiting from a more
generous procurement climate for conventional forces
following the ouster of Khrus~nchev, they began to plan
for a war that, at least in its initial stages, would
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involve large-scale conventional operations. At the
same time, however, they continued to recognize that
nuclear weapons could be introduced suddenly and at
any time.
The concern for a period of conventional fighting
presented the Soviet planners with certain basic
problems. During a conventional period of conflict,
the Soviets would have to rely on nonnuclear weapons
to create gaps in NATO defenses. Yet, much of the
conventional firepower of both ground and tactical
air forces had fallen casualty to the "nuclear stream-
lining" of the late fifties and early sixties. Be-
lieving that NATO would resort to nuclear strikes if
faced with rapid, extensive enemy penetration, Soviet
planners had to deal with the conflicting demands of
massing for conventional breakthrough and avoiding
destruction by the enemy's sudden introduction of nu-
clear weapons. Complicating this problem was the
fact that armored forces, the most flexible and sur-
vivable in the face of such a dilemma, had increas-
ingly to confront improved antitank weapons in the
hands. of defenders. These concerns called for a
fundamental rethinking to develop new weapons and
tactics.
Growth of Conventional Artillery. In about 1966
the Soviets began to reintroduce some of the artillery
that had been withdrawn from the ground forces under
Khrushchev. The artillery in motorized rifle and
tank divisions, for example, was increased by one-half
to two-thirds: from 48 guns to 72 in the motorized
rifle division and from 36 guns to 60 in the tank
division. Except for tank divisions, which now have
12 guns less, the artillery strength of Soviet divi-
sions has returned to the levels of the fifties.
Recent evidence indicates that the Soviets intend
to increase divisional artillery even further. During
the past few years, the number of guns in some Soviet
divisions opposite China and in the western USSR have
been increased to the point where these divisions now
have more than half again as many guns as divisions
in the forward area. This may be partly a reflection
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New Soviet Self-Propelled Artillery
Characteristics
~;_~~ mm
Gun
~,~ Tans
Weight
~~
Crew
~+~7~
Entered Service
~:. 'i1Cn
_~ ~,~~
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grams will enhance Soviet ground attack capabilities
in general, there has been no: significant effort to
improve the capability to provide close air support
for mobile ground force units. The Soviets apparent-
ly intend to support these units primarily with artil-
lery at least for the near term.
Overcoming Enemy Antitank Systems
Although it has been said many times that the
best antitank weapon is another tank, recent Soviet
writings appear to reflect a greater concern for NATO's
antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) than for its tanks.
Tank technology has changed little over the past decade
while the effectiveness o.f antitank systems has in-
creased significantly.
Even during the early sixties, when they were pre-
occupied mainly with nuclear Manning, the Soviets
began to express concern for the increasing effective-
ness of new antitank missiles. Khrushchev himself
questioned the survivability of the USSR?s large tank
forces after viewing an impressive demonstration of
a new Soviet antitank missile. Soviet planners, how-
ever, have revised tactics and initiated several force
improvement programs in an attempt to cope with NATO's
antitank threat.
Tactics. An important consideration in the Soviet
approach to defeating NATO an~.itank defenses is ai be-
lief that the problem would not be limited simply to
a confrontation between tanks and antitank systems.
Rather, the Soviets envisage integrated NATO antitank
defenses opposing a Warsaw Pact combined-arms attack-
ing force composed of tanks, mechanized infantry,,
artillery, and possibly tactical air forces. Moreover,
they see the Pact enjoying the advantage of massing
forces for an assault along relatively narrow axes of
advance of its own choosing.
Prior to an assault, defensive positions on tt,hese
axes would be subjected to a 40- to 50-minute bombard-
ment by artillery, including multiple rocket launchers,
and possibly by tactical air forces. During the 'barrage,
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the assaulting infantry and tank units, using terrain
to mask their advance, would try to position them-
selves for a rapid move to the dead zones inside
the minimum ranges of the ATGMs. Smoke from shells
and smoke generated by devices on the tanks would also
be used to mask the assault. Antitank strongpoints
which were not destroyed or suppressed by the prepara-
tory barrage would then be engaged and overrun by
assaulting infantry.
Technological Efforts to Defeat ATGMs. Work to
reduce the vulnerability of tanks to ATGMs has been
under way in the Soviet Union since at least the early
sixties, most of it directed at defeating the HEAT
(high explosive antitank) warheads. ATGMs, because
of their relatively low velocity, rely exclusively on
HEAT warheads, which are not dependent on velocity
for penetration. Virtually all infantry antitank weap-
ons in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact employ this same
principle.*
To
provide better protection against HEAT
ammuni-
tion,
the Soviets have developed composite or
layered
armor
arrays for their tanks. The T-55A, for
example,
has a
plastic liner which was developed in the
early
sixties and which, according to the tank's manual, is
designed to attenuate nuclear radiation. Western
analysts have judged the lining's radiation protection
properties to be poor, but tests of a similar lining
against HEAT rounds have shown that it considerably
degrades their effects. Although the liner does not
stop penetration, it significantly reduces spalling,
the behind-the-plate damage of a penetrating HEAT
round, and diminishes the probability of a tank kill
by 30 percent. Some T-62s reportedly also have a
liner material, and the new Soviet tank, the T-72,
reportedly has layered, "sandwich" armor that pro-
vides improved protection against HEAT ammunition.
* Tanks and conventional antitank guns rely primarily on kinetic
energy (KE) rounds to defeat enemy tanks. These rounds are de-
pendent on high velocities for penetration, but the tremendous
recoil forces generated in achieving these velocities prohibit the
use of KE rounds with light antitank weapons.
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Tank Increases. Since the m.id-sixties, Soviet
motorized rifle divisions--mainly those in Eastern
Europe and along the Sino-Soviet border--have been
allotted an independent battalion of about 50 tanks.
In about 1969, Moreover, tank battalions in motorized
rifle regiments began to receive an additional ten.
tanks. Taken together, these constitute an addition
of about 80 tanks per motorized rifle division, or an
increase of about 40 percent. Some first-line
Soviet motorized rifle divisions, such as those in
East Germany, now have as many as 250 tanks--only
75 less than a tank division. Such increases have.
not yet been idE;ntified in all motorized rifle divi-
sions but are believed to be continuing.
The reason or reasons for the increase in tanks
in what is already an armor-heavy force is not clear.
The additional tanks may be simply to compensate for
heavier losses ghat Soviet planners expect to sustain
from improved antitank defenses and to enable assault-
ing units to overwhelm these defenses by sheer numbers.
Certainly the additional tanks will improve the stay-
ing power of the units in light of the incremental
equipment losses that could be expected in a con-
ventional conflict. The addition of an independent
tank battalion t:o the motorized.. rifle division will
provide the division commander with a reserve maneu-
ver force to conunit at a critical point or to use
piecemeal as replacements to sustain the combat
regiments.
Soviet Combined--Arms Concept for the Offensive
Breakthrough
In a conventional assault, the commander of a
Soviet wartime front with three to five subordinate
armies probably would hold his tank armies in reserve
and commit the combined-arms armies to break through
the enemy's defensive positions. (see diagram
at right.) A modern combined-arms army with three to
five motorized rifle and tank divisions would usually
have an offensive operational zone 70 kilometers or
so wide. In a breakthrough attempt, however, the army
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Probable Soviet Concept of Movement By Tank and Combined-Arms
.-,Armies of a Wartime. Front __
Enemy Enemy
Reserve Defense
Area Positions
? io E.p on Bra kin.~,~gn awe e
E^eaee nnoene c~e.,.r aese.~~s
Probable Operation of Individual Combined-Arms Army
enemy Defensive
Positions
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moving large attacking forces covertly, committing
them from the march, dispersing them, and replacing
anticipated large losses.
Tank Forces in a Modern Offensive
The Soviets envision three basic roles for tanks
in a modern ground offensive.
The tanks in motorized rifle divisions
would be used to support infantry by
providing mobile firepower during their
assaults on enemy defenses.
Once the defenses were penetrated, tank
units would advance quickly through the
gaps to defeat enemy reserves in a "meeting
engagement."
Tank units would then pursue retreating
enemy units to the depth of the theater.
As Infantry Support. Because of their critical
role in virtually every phase of an offensive, tanks
are organic to all Soviet motorized infantry units
from regimental echelon through army. Motorized
rifle units down to battalion and company level--
although without organic tanks--probably would be
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assigned tanks from the regimeMtal tank battalion
for assault operations.
In a conventional campaign the Soviets would re7_y
on motorized infantry supported by tanks and artillery
to create conditions favorable for the commitment of
the larger tank units.
In an assault the tank companies of a motorized
rifle regiment would generally'be used to form an
initial echelon with motorized rifle companies. Yf
heavy antitank defenses were encountered, .they would
first be engaged by artillery and long-range tank fire
and then by dismounted infantry supported by machine-
gun fire from their armored personnel carriers. ~'he
Soviets, in fact, anticipate that, in a conventional
offensive, their infantry in most cases would be at-
tacking on foot. (See photograph, page 2I .)
If weak defenses were enco~.ntered, or if nuclear
weapons were employed to nE,utralize enemy defensive
positions, then tank units would be in the vanguard
of the attack, followed by APC-mounted infantry.
In Meeting Engagements. Ih the Soviet view, the
decisive blow in a ground operation would be deliv-
ered in a confrontation between the attacker's large
tank units, wYiich had been committed to exploit the
breach in the enemy's defenses, and the enemy's armored
forces, which had been held in: reserve for counte~-
attack purposes. (See diagram at right.) In both
Soviet and Western military texrninology, this con-
frontation is known as the "muting engagement."
The meeting engagement is a battle of maneuver
in which highly mobile forces pn both sides engage
each other from the march, with neither side in a
defensive .posture. In most cases, the combatants.
would come upon each other suddenly with little
opportunity for preplanning or reconnoitering. Under
such conditions the side with the superior commanders
and the more responsive command and control probably
would prevail. The Soviets believe that meeting en-
gagements would be especially common on the nuclear
battlefield and. have stressed this form of combat in
field exercises and tactical war games.
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Conceptual Meeting Engagementina Breakthrough
Enemy Defenses
Mobile Reserve Area "~- Forwa~f~nsive
f- P~?~iQrt,'s
Meeting Engagement
The Battle Between
Mobile Tank Forces
on Each Slde
In Pursuit. According to the Soviet concept,
pursuit of withdrawing enemy units would begin after
a Soviet breakthrough and a successful meeting engage-
ment. Tank units, with their mobility and shock power,
would play the key role in pursuit operations.
The objective of pursuit operations is the early
destruction, isolation, or entrapment of the retreat-
ing enemy armies. Soviet tank forces would in effect
be racing retreating units to likely defensive barri-
ers such as the Rhine, and to resupply and embarka-
tion points deep in the enemy rear area. Soviet com-
manders would seek to keep continuous pressure on
retreating enemy forces day and night to prevent them
from regrouping or occupying a new defensive line and
to complicate their attempts to use nuclear weapons.
If possible, Soviet armies would use routes parallel
to those used by the retreating enemy, hoping to out-
distance him and turn his flanks or seize critical
areas astride his withdrawal routes. It is this re-
quirement which underlies the emphasis in Soviet plan-
ning on achieving and sustaining high rates of advance.
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Secret
Secret
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 2.5X1
Appro
d For Release 2004/05/05: CIA-RDP80 0.1133A001100
THE aIRECTOR UE CENT'RAL INTELLIGENCE
}nteliigence Community Staff
2 2 OCT -1975
25X1
Deputy Director for stoma es
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20301
25X1
Dear Jim:
Thank you for alerting us to DIA's reaction to the OPR study
on "Chinese Politics and the Sino-Soviet-US Triangle."
I concur with DIA's view that the study, while controversial,
is extremely useful. It concerns issues which are difficult for
the Community to resolve but which are obviously of great signifi-
cance. I plan to see how high-level consumers, as represented on
the NSCIG Working Group, react to this study. I would also like,
by the wa to bring to the same group's attention the study written
by on Soviet Support for Wars of Liberation."
I'll let you know about reactions to both papers.
Thanks also for the background paper you forwarded on "PRC
Statements Concerning the United States' Warld Position," a timely
and well-executed update.
Sincerely,
Signed
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community
25X1 ,approved or Release 2004'/05/05 : CIA-RDP8 M01133A001100110012-2
JLVI\~~
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/05/05: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100110012-2
IC 75-2553
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - D/DCI/IC
1 - C/PRD {& PRD Chrono)
,~' IC Registry
/ 1.- RJA Chrono
1 - Wh1H Chrono
1 - AB Subject
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 Approved=For Rele
001100110012-2
IC 75-2551
20 October 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the intelligence Community
THROUGH: Chief, Product Review Division
SU6JECT: Reply to for Materials He Forwarded 2 5X1
for your n o
i. The Director of Estimates in DIA has sent you a copy of General
Graham's comments on OP R's Executive Overvietir of "Chinese Politics an d_
the Sino-Soviet-US Triangle." General Graham takes excepticn 'to the
approach and some findings of the study. See Attachment A.
2. We have included the full version of the OPR study in the
"new business" section of your briefing boost for the NSCIC Working
Group meeting on 22 October. We thought it sufficiently well-done and
yet controversial enough to deserve soliciting the. Working Group's
reactions. In effect DI:A has admitted seeing the same qualities in the
study. All the mare reason, perhaps, for you to propose sending it to
the NSCIC Working Group. It would seem appropriate to send the equally
controversial DIA/DE memorandum, "Soviet Support for Wars of Liberation,"
to the 4' rking Group. That is also in your. briefing book. 0 2 5X1
has informally agreed to have it vetted to the 49orking Group.
3. Attachmen~ B is a DIA/DE background paper sent far your info
by In Attachment C we have prepared a note from you
to thanking him for the paper and indicating that you
intend to solicit the reaction of the NSCIC Working Group to both the
OPR study and the DE memorandum.
25X1
25X1
Attachments:
A - General Graham's Comments on
Executive Overview
B - DIA/DE Background Pa er
C - Draft Letter to
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e 2004/05/05: CIA-RDP80M01133 001
25X1
25X1
C'~.:~~~~.,.
 Approved For Release 2004/05/05: CIA-RDP801VI01133A001100110012-2
IC 75-255 1
Distribution:
Original - D/DCI/IC (w/atts.)
1 - C/PRD (& PRD Chrono)
~'- IC Registry (w/atts.}
1 - WP4H Chrono
1 - RJA Chrano (w/atts.)
1 - AB Subject (w/atts.)
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