EVALUATION OF CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001100110009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 19, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR' OF~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Copy # p of
19 April 197.5
MEMORANDUM FOR NSCIC MEMBERS
SUBJECT: Evaluation of CIA Intelligence Publication
1. Attached is a copy of an evaluation, prepared at my
request by the Intelligence Community Staff, of a CIA/OSR
report on the "Evolution of Soviet Concepts and Forces for
Nuclear War in Europe."
2. The IC Staff review does not attempt to pass judgment
on the principal findings in the OSR paper. It is, however, an
excellent case study of the contribution made by a variety of
intelligence sources and methods- -particularly, in this case,
human source reporting- -to the development of a paper on a
vital topic.
3. 1 would welcome any comments you may have on
either the OSR report or the IC Staff evaluation.
Attachment:
Copy # CI
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Distribution:
1 - Chairman, NSCIC
2 - Deputy Secretary of State
3 - Deputy Secretary of Defense
4 - Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs
5 - Chairman, JCS
6-DCI
7 - DDCI
8-ER
9 - PRD/OC wo/att
10- PRD Subject wo/att
11 - PRD Chron wo/att
A2--IC/Registry w/att
13- RWS Chron wo/att
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of OSR/CIA Intelligence Report:
"EVOLUTION OF SOVIET CONCEPTS AND FORCES FOR
NUCLEAR WAR IN EUROPE"
(SR IR 74-4, May 1974)
An evaluation prepared by the Product Review Division of
the Intelligence Community Staff at the request of the
Director of Central Intelligence
PRD will from time to time--usually upon request--issue
special evaluations (Reviews) of specific finished
intelligence documents which warrant more extensive
treatment than can be accorded in the aperiodical
publication, the Review of National Intelligence.
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Introduction
Movement in Soviet military doctrine is normally glacial
in pace and circuitous in direction. It is extremely difficult
for outsiders to perceive, partly for these reasons and
partly because it is a matter of great delicacy and extreme
sensitivity to the Soviets themselves. But move it does,
and, given the critical importance of doctrine vis-a-vis the
mission, posture, and development of the Soviet armed forces,
it is crucial that the United States be aware of and responsive
to major changes in the USSR's fundamental military precepts
and objectives.
This Review examines one particular effort, a Report
prepared by the Office of Strategic Research of CIA, to
identify a major change in Soviet doctrine and to inform US
policymakers of its significance. The Review summarizes the
study's findings, traces the development of research, and
assesses contributions made by various means of collection,
notably the Clandestine Service of CIA.
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Summary of the Re ort (OSR/CIA, "Evolution of Soviet Concepts
and Forces for Nuclear War in Europe"--March 1974)
In the late 1950's and through the early 1960's, the
OSR Report states, Khrushchev's view that an East-West war
in Europe would result in an almost immediate global nuclear
exchange dominated Soviet military doctrine and dictated the
character of the Soviet force structure. Highest priority
was assigned to the development and deployment of theater
and intercontinental strategic nuclear systems. Tactical
nuclear weapons were regarded as ancillary to the strategic
forces, and non-nuclear conventional forces were.assigned
the lowest priority.
Following Khrushchev's removal in 1964, proponents of
conventional forces gained greater influence. At the same
time, the United States' new concept of "flexible response"
was winning greater acceptance among the members of NATO.
This doctrine provided for a range of options and actions--
conventional operations, limited nuclear strikes, and massive
strategic attacks--the type and scale of which would depend
on the nature of the Pact assault. These theories were
tested in a 1964 NATO exercise and were reflected in part in
Pact maneuvers the following year. By the late sixties
Soviet military theoreticians apparently were convinced that
a war in Europe would begin with some period of conventional
conflict. This shift in views concerning the nature of initial
hostilities may have helped to accelerate the modernization
of Soviet conventional forces.
While thus conceding that the initial phase of conflict
might be conventional, the Soviets, throughout the late
sixties, persisted in the belief that a war in Europe would
soon escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. This view was
based on the Soviet assessment that NATO would be unable to
contain or overcome Pact forces by conventional means alone.
Citing NATO exercises, the Soviets identified a consistent
pattern of NATO's resorting to the use of nuclear weapons
whenever a Pact breakthrough with conventional forces was
threatened. Then, either in response to NATO's use of
nuclear weapons, or to preempt such use, Soviet doctrine
called for a massive and decisive theater-wide nuclear
strike.
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But at least since 1970, evidence has accumulated that.
the Soviets are increasingly accepting, and even planning
for, nuclear options which would enable them to limit both
the intensity and the scope of a general European conflict.
Senior Soviet Officers have theorized that the use of nuclear
weapons might take a variety of forms, ranging from the
firing of only a few tactical rockets, through larger strikes
by frontal systems, to the participation of USSR-based
strike forces. These views have emphasized the need for
flexibility in Soviet doctrine and capabilities. Subsequent
staff and field exercises have indicated that the Soviets
are indeed seeking such flexibility.
The Report concludes that these developments in Soviet
forces and strategic planning suggest that the USSR is
attempting a more flexible posture for nuclear contingencies
in Europe. This growing flexibility includes options for
the selective use of tactical nuclear forces in Eastern
Europe as an alternative to exclusive reliance on massive
strikes delivered primarily by USSR-based strategic systems.
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The Review: Substantive Background
Much has been written about the Soviet military and the
doctrine or perceptions which would determine its use.
Indeed, no other issue has generated as many requirements
for the Intelligence Community nor had as much influence in
focusing the efforts and products of the member agencies.
But, of all the studies, memoranda, and estimates on this
subject, the CIA/OSR Report must rank among the most significant
in its treatment of an issue of critical importance to the
United States and its European Allies. The paper does more
than merely fulfill the title's promise to trace the evolution
of Soviet concepts and forces for nuclear war in Europe. it
also provides the rationale for US policymakers to reconsider
their own options in a changing nuclear environment.
Clearly, this achievement was not easily accomplished.
The Report was developed over a period of many months and
required the collection, collation, analysis, and reanalysis
of a plethora of information. Particularly noteworthy was
the manner in which the analysts integrated and applied
information from a variety of sources-some of it on hand for
more than a decade, some acquired only shortly before publication.
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