SNIE 85-60: COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CUBA (EXTRACTS)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200030014-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: March 23, 1960
• Content Type: SNIE

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CLASS. C'1ArT7,-~1 TO: TS S C 23 March 1960
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SNIE 85-60 : DA?TCOMMUNI SfE~3 'UM4_1( CUBA
(EXTRACTS)
The first part of this special estimate reviews the trend of
events in Cuba, the acceptance of local Communists "as participants
in the process of remaking Cuba," and the development of "significant
contacts with the Bloc." It states, "Prolongation of the present
situation will result in even greater Communist influence in Cuba
and will further encourage Communists and other anti-US elements
throughout Latin America," and continues:
"6. However, Fidel Castro remains the dominant element in the
regime and we believe that he is not disposed to accept actual direc-
tion from any foreign source.... We consider it extremely unlikely
that the PSP /communist Party7...could soon develop sufficient strength
to make openly an effective bid for power on its own....
"7. We believe that for some time Communist leaders will continue
to concentrate on influencing the formulation and implementation of
policy and on covert infiltration of the government--and that they
will avoid any challenge to Fidel Castro's authority or any claim to
formal PSP participation in the government.... /The Soviet leaders7
probably believe that the present state of affairs is weakening the US
position and advancing their interests, not only in Cuba, but through-
out Latin America. The Communists probably also believe that the US
will lose in influence and prestige so long as Castro's successful
defiance of the US (including his acceptance of Bloc assistance) continuel
and that the US is faced with the dilemma of tolerating an increasingly
Communist-oriented Cuba or of arousing widespread Latin American op-
position by intervening. Above all, the Soviets probably wish to
avoid a situation in which the US could secure broad Latin American
support for action to curb Castro. While Castro's regime has lost
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 Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001200030014-6
prestige in Latin America,...few popular leaders in the area are pre-
pared to dismiss Castro as merely a pro-Communist demagogue....
"8. We believe that Fidel Castro and his government are not now
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demonstrably under the domination or control of the international
Communist movement.... Yet, we believe that the Cuban regime is in
practice following the line set for Latin American Communist parties
at the time of the 21st Party Congress in Moscow in February 1959 and
that it will continue to pursue policies advantageous to the Communists
and to accept Communist assistance and advice in carrying them out....
/astro7 appears intent on pressing ahead with is anti-US campaign,
which might come to involve attempted expulsion of the US from its
Guantanamo Base, abandonment of Cuba's privileged position in the US
sugar market, a complete diplomatic rupture, and danger to the lives
of American citizens. The more he becomes embroiled with the US, the
more he will look to the Bloc for support, including provision of
military equipment, although both the Bloc and the Cubans would prob-
ably seek to avoid any accusation that Cuba was being made into a
Soviet base. Should the Castro regime be threatened, the USSR would
probably do what it could to support the regime. However, the USSR
would not hesitate to write off the Castro regime before involving
itself in a direct military confrontation with the US over Cuba, or,
t least during the present state of Soviet policy, in a major
diplomatic crisis with the US."
Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001200030014-6