INTELLIGENCE AND POLICYMAKING IN AN INSTITUITIONAL CONTEXT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900160045-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: November 18, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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INTELLIGENCE AND POLICYMAKING
IN AN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
by
William J. Barnds
Commission on the Organization of the
United States Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
November 18,,1974
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
fa e
Summary i
Introduction - 1 -
The Raw Material of Intelligence Production - 7 -
The Structure and Production of the
Intelligence Community -1 6-
The Role of Intelligence in the Policy
Making Process
K Issues in the Intelligence-Policy
ey
Making Relationship -3 3-
Establishing Requirements for Collectors -3 3-
Guiding and Evaluating the Reporting of
U.S. Embassies -3 6-
Policy Guidance to the Intelligence
Community -3 8-
Evaluating Intelligence Production -3 9-
Coordination or Competition in Intelligence
Activities -4 1-
The National Intelligence Officer (NIO) System -4 4-
Intelligence Support for U.S. Foreign Economic
7-
Policy -4
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SUMMARY
1. The U.S. intelligence system remains heavily focused on military
considerations and upon discovering and evaluating potential military
threats. However, changing conditions in the world have added new
tasks, particularly in the area of economic intelligence, without
reducing old responsibilities significantly -- a trend that presents
growing problems in a time of fiscal stringency. (pp. 1-6).
2. The information collected for processing and analyzing by the
intelligence community comes from a variety of sources ranging from
the mundane to the esoteric. There has been a rapid rise in the
importance of technological collection methods in the past decade
or so, especially on military matters involving Communist states.
Nonetheless, material in the public domain, reports of U.S. officials
stationed abroad, and'reports from foreign agents continue to play an
important role in the intelligence process. (pp. 7-16).
3. The structure of the intelligence community reflects the basic
decision made shortly after the Second World War that, while departments
with policy responsibilities should have an intelligence capability
of their own, there should also be a central agency to produce its own
studies as well as to coordinate the work of the community as a whole.
Each of the intelligence organizations has its particular strengths
and weaknesses, but the basic structure of the intelligence community
in the area of intelligence production is sound. (pp. 16-21; 27-28).
4. The functions of intelligence in the policy process are: (1) alerting
policy makers to events abroad; (2) estimating future developments;
(3) appraising the likely consequences of possible U.S. courses of action;
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and (4) monitoring conditions that affect U.S. policies or agreements
with foreign governments. Both intelligence officers and policy
makers must perform certain tasks if the relationship is to be success-.
ful. However, differences in viewpoint about the appropriate relation-
ship between intelligence officers and policy makers -- and between
their respective organizations -- remain widespread. Some stress
that this should be an arms-length relationship so as to assure objective
intelligence judgments; others stress the need for continuing contact
and interaction so that intelligence will be relevant to the policy
maker's concerns. (pp. 22-27).
5. Three broad conclusions about the performance of the tasks required
.for an effective intelligence-policy making relationship seem warranted.
First, several of them are being performed in an inadequate manner.
than
Second, the situation is better/it was a few years ago, when distrust
and lack of confidence characterized the relationship. Third, substantial
improvements are possible without major reorganizations or drastic in-
creases in the workloads of busy men, although some changes in working
styles would be required. (pp. 27-31).
6. Despite recent efforts at improvement, deficiencies exist in the
establishment of realistic collection requirements -- a problem which
will become more serious as more sophisticated technologies permit the
collection of an ever-growing volume of information. (pp. 29; 33-36).
7. Policy makers do an uneven job of providing guidance to the intel-
ligence community and evaluation of the intelligence product. The
Nixon Administration's dissatisfaction with intelligence production
led it to establish the National Security Council Intelligence Committee
to guide and evaluate the work of the intelligence community, but this
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body -- which could and should provide guidance and evaluation
by policy makers -- has remained a paper organization. The National
Intelligence Officer system is one attempt to bridge this gap. The
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) could usefully
direct its attention to the problems of guidance and evaluation.
(pp. 29; 31-32; 38-41; 44-46).
8. An even more serious weakness is the failure of high-level policy
makers to keep the intelligence community informed of U.S. policies
under consideration. Under such circumstances the intelligence officer
must try to estimate what his own as well as foreign governments are
doing. There is no satisfactory solution to this problem unless policy
makers are less secretive about their activities and their longer-term
priorities and goals. (np. 30-32),
9.. Adequate arrangements for the organization and coordination of
foreign economic policy -- which involve a large number of powerful
departments -- have yet to be established. Policy formulation and
coordination have fallen partly to the Council on International Eco-
nomic Policy (CIEP) and partly to the National Security Council --
a system that satisfies virtually no one. At the present time most
economic intelligence reporting and analysis are done by the Central
Intelligence Agency, whose work in this area is highly regarded through-
out the government. In view of the lack of any consensus about the
appropriate U.S. government organizational structure and procedural
arrangements for dealing with foreign economic policy, it would be more
sensible to build upon the present arrangements for economic intelligence
,than to make any major organizational changes. One procedural arrange-
ment that might be appropriate, however, would be to make sure that
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there are adequate provisions for the DCI to report to the CIEP --
and for the latter body (as well as departments outside the intel-
ligence community) to have the authority to task the intelligence'
community. (pp. 47-51).
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Introduction
The development of the Cold War and the,with.drawal of the European
colonial powers from Asia in the late 1940s made it clear to American
leaders that the United States would be drawn into a deeper and more last-
ing involvement in world affairs than had ever been the case in peacetime.
During World War II the hastily expanded U.S. intelligence organizations
had given top priority to Germany, Italy, and Japan. Thus, little was
known about America's principal adversary, the Soviet Union, or about the
vast array of new nations stretching from North Africa through the Middle
East and the Indian subcontinent to the South China Sea.
The confusion and uncertainty about the appropriate foreign policies
to adopt regarding the bewildering series of problems facing the United
were
States /? intensified by the lack of institutions and procedures w fl4 in
the U.S. government necessary to formulate and execute an effective policy.
President Roosevelt's highly personalized and informal style of leadership
had obvious deficiencies and was, in any case, not congenial to his suc-
cessors. Institutions and procedures had to be established which would
enable the President to bring together the key U.S. officials who dealt
with the various aspects of foreign policy to consider the relevant facts,
appraise American interests and weigh alternative courses of actions,
make the necessary policy decisions and see that they were carried out.
These needs led to the creation of the National Security Council and
the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. United States political leaders
recognized the need for government departments with policy responsibilities
to retain a capacity for intelligence research and analysis, but they
decided that the task of providing much of the reporting and analysis needed
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should rest with an organization with no direct policy responsibilities
and thus no departmental positions to defend. Thus the former Research
and Analysis branch of OSS, which had moved into the State Department after
World War II, was transferred to the CIA. A growing effort was launched
to collect information of all kinds in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union,
the Far East, and the former colonial territories. Information that would
be needed if war broke out received priority. However, the paucity of
knowledge on the world abroad meant that almost any information seemed
valuable, and thus a vast collection process was set up to gather data on
and
everything from factory locations, road and rail networks,/trade relations,
to the strength and attitudes of various political forces in far-flung
countries. Arrangements for basic research, current reporting, and long-
range estimating were established, and extensive efforts were devoted to
thinking through and working out appropriate arrangements for the utiliza-
tion of intelligence in the policy-making process. Intelligence has had
its successes and its failures over the years, but even its critics acknowl-
an
edge that it has and will continue to play/imnortant role in American foreign
policy.
It is simple to state the formal responsibilities and to describe
the work, varied and voluminous though it is, of the U.S. intelligence
community in the area of intelligence production. It is to give the policy
makers judgments as to what the situation actually is in the world at any
given time, what it will be in the future, and (to a degree) what the impli-
cations of such judgments are. To carry out its responsibilities the U.S.
intelligence community has become one of the largest consumers and producers
of information in the world -- and thus in history. It gathers masses of
facts, rumors and opinions by reading everything from foreign newspapers
and the translations of foreign radio broadcasts to the cables of U.S.
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missions abroad and the reports of secret agents, and from the photographs
taken by satellites to the information in intercepted radio messages.
Selected pieces of this information go directly to policy makers in their
original form, but much of this data goes no farther than the intelligence
analysts themselves. The intelligence organizations, after evaluating and
analyzing it, regularly produce a variety of reports (National Intelligence
Estimates, daily and weekly intelligence journals, special memoranda and
various studies in depth) and send them forth to compete for the attention
of the overburdened and harassed policy makers. These reports deal with
affairs ih countries as far apart as Albania and Zambia and with subjects
ranging from the prospects of an insurgency movement in Iraq to the impli-
cations of Soviet research and development efforts for Soviet weaponry a
decade or more hence.
The responsibility for political analysis has grown as new nations
have been born, and the need for such analysis seems unlikely to diminish.
The amount of effort devoted to scientific intelligence has increased many-
fold in the last fifteen years. In view of the seemingly inexorable march
of science in the industrialized nations and the growth of the scientific
capabilities of some of the new nations, the tasks in this area are likely
to grow in importance, complexity, and volume. The need for accurate
knowledge of the military forces of the major powers has always been sub-
stantial, and despite a somewhat reduced U.S. involvement in the affairs
of other continents it remains important to know the military capabilities
of dozens of countries. Even today the U.S. intelligence community's efforts
are focused heavily upon military considerations and toward discovering and
evaluating potential military threats.
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Changing conditions in the world have added new tasks without reducing
old responsibilities significantly -- a trend that presents growing problems
in a time of fiscal stringency. These new tasks are most striking in the
area of economic intelligence, for the international trade and monetary
upheaval of 1971 and the oil crisis of late 1973 highlight a major shift
in the focus of American foreign policy in recent years. This is the grow-
ing importance of international economic policy relative to the traditional
security concerns that dominated U.S. foreign policy for nearly three decades
after 1941. The decline of American economic predominance by the late 1960s
as a result of more rapid Western European and Japanese economic growth was
one factor in this change, and the growing dependence on imported raw mate-
rials (especially petroleum) added another element. These trends have not
only undermined the structure and procedures of the international monetary
and trading systems that made possible the great postwar economic pro,ress,
but have also raised serious questions about the likelihood of a worldwide
depression and about the economic viability of the resource-poor underdeveloped
nations. Thus the intelligence community must grapple with the analytical
problem of likely trends in U.S. dependence on imported oil, the uses likely
to be--made by the oil producers of their new wealth, and the ability of the
international monetary system to deal with new pressures. Intelligence
appraisals of the strengths and likely courses of action of such men as the
Shah of Iran and King Faisal. of Saudi Arabia are of critical importance,
as are judgments about how they would react to various U.S. courses of action.
Finally, intelligence organizations have the task of weaving judgments
on political, economic, sociological, military, and scientific matters into
an integrated and complete view of an area or an issue. This is as difficult
and complex as integrating the modes of thought and expression of the polit-
ical scientists, historians, economists, military strategists, and scientists
who om ris he i tellizen a communit or the forei n policy apparatus
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of the government. Thus intelligence permeates the entire foreign policy
process. Intelligence activities cost several billion dollars annually,
and intelligence judgments influence decisions involving the spending of
even larger sums and, on occasion, concerning war or peace.
Two developments have increased the difficulties facing intelligence
analysts in recent years. The first is the growing complexity of American
foreign policy. Intelligence organizations operate most easily when the
international system is stable and their government is pursuing a clearly.
defined and well-articulated foreign policy. These conditions were charac-
teristic of the period when the Cold War was at its height, but they have
been less true for several years. The strength of America's principal
adversaries and allies (except the United Kingdom) have increased relative
V h g tee _nd _ .L s t c_ic^. it certain
t of sic United tam > _:u s hac ewr r dc;:~t G.~ a in
the Soviet Union, but the policy of "detente" injects elements of cooperation
into the relationship -- elements which will grow if the policy is successful.
This not only creates new intelligence requirements, such as monitoring
arms control agreements, but also complicates the task of appraising Soviet
policy. The same is true regarding China, with whom U.S. relations have
shifted even more dramatically, and whose policies have fluctuated sharply
in the past. And the rise of terrorism and drug use have resulted in new
demands on the intelligence community for analysis as well as collection of
information.
The second development is the information and knowledge explosion.
The growing interdependence of nations means that a particular event may-
have very serious secondary and tertiary consequences which are difficult
to trace out in advance. New techniques and equipment for processing and
analyzing information should be a help to the analyst, and in some ways they
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areas. The U.S. remains in an essentially competitive relationship with
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are. However, they often provide a flood of information which is more
than any individual can digest. Jobs are then broken up and greater
specialization ensues, but this increases the dangers of parochialism
in outlook and creates new problems in coordinating the work of specialists.
Moreover, neither "intelligence" nor "policy making" exist in dis-:
embodied form. They represent the work of men and women, who are both
supported and constrained by the institutions which employ them. Loyalties,
ambitions, emotions, values, dedication, and vested interests are involved
in ways difficult for the various individuals themselves to disentangle.
Thus it is hardly surprising that the relationship between intelligence and
policy making -- and between intelligence officers and policy makers of
various types and in many different situations -- is a difficult and complex
one. Major-General Kenneth Strong, long a senior official in the British
intelligence structure, has commented:
The relationship between Intelligence officers and
policy-makers is of course difficult and complex.
The generally accepted view that it is the duty of
the Intelligence officer to 'give just the facts,
please' has little relevance in a modern governmental
structure. In the first place, the facts are often
such that the policy-makers are unable to interpret
them without expert advice. Secondly, and obviously,
the choice of facts is critical, and the Intelligence
officer's decision as to which facts are relevant and
which should be presented to the policy-makers is often
the major initial step in the decision process. This
choice between the trivial and sensational, between
the unpleasant and pleasing, is by no means as easy as
it may appear. Intelligence officers are human, too,
and the temptations to prepare a logical story or to
serve personal prejudices cannot be overlooked, espe-
cially in areas where the facts themselves are often
in some doubt and the interpretation of them is as
much a matter of opinion as of logic.
On the other hand, there is a frequent temptation for
policy-makers to use Intelligence data selectively to
suit their own preconceived judgments'or political
requirements.
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7.
The relationship between intelligence and policy making is hardly
as central as a feature of the American system as is that between Executive
and Legislature, nor is it as complex as the military-civilian relationship.
Nonetheless, it does raise important issues, but these have received rela-
tively limited study. This is partly due to the fact that the relationship
in its present form is only a few decades old, but also stems from the
secrecy surrounding intelligence activities.
However, before examining the relationship itself and some of the
problems it poses, it is useful to discuss the sources and types of data
that intelligence is based upon as well as the organizations within the
U.S. government responsible for intelligence production.
~ti c naW iaf'Cii41 %L _L +cU ~?il
Intelligence is a term which has different meanings for different
people. It has come to mean not only information on foreign countries
which has been collected and evaluated, but also sometimes refers to
counterespionage and covert operations as well as espionage. At times
intelligence is used to describe a process, and at other times to describe
a product. Perhaps the most useful definition for the purposes of this
paper is a modification of the one found in the Dictionary of the United
States Military Terms for Joint Usage: Intelligence is the product
resulting from the collection, evaluation, and analysis of all available
information which concerns foreign nations or activities, and which is
immediately or potentially significant to planning and decision-making.
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Thus intelligence is designed to provide policy makers with knowledge
concerning present conditions, trends, capabilities, and intentions of
foreign countries and groups within them. There are, of course, degrees
of knowledge - or rather degrees of certainty about knowledge. Some
matters are known. Others may be unknown but (at least theoretically)
knowable with a high degree of certainty, such as the size and character-
istics of the Soviet strategic forces. It is the task of the intelligence
community to gather and interpret such facts. It is also possible, through
studying the Soviet research and development effort, its industrial produc-
tion capabilities and performance, and its general foreign policy, to pro-
vide fairly reliable estimates -- i.e. those within reasonable ranges --
of probable trends in Soviet military posture for the next several years.
Other matters are not only unknown but unknowable. For example, it is not
possible to give more than a rough estimate of the likelihood of a war
between Greece and Turkey at a particular period in the future because this
depends upon the interaction of many contingent events as well as on the
intentions of leaders who probably have not made up their minds over what
course they will follow. Thus one of the important but difficult tasks
facing the intelligence otficer is to indicate the degree of certainty (or
uncertainty) he attaches to his conclusions.
Intelligence can also be categorized as either strategic or tactical.
(Counterintelligence, or actions designed to counter the operations of foreign
intelligence services, is basically a police function. Neither counter-
intelligence nor covert operations will be considered in this paper.) Strate-
gic intelligence involves knowledge of the capabilities and intentions of
foreign powers which is required by United States leaders for making plans and
decisions regarding national security and foreign policy. This includes
intelligence on current developments as well as long-range forecasts on polit-
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ical, military, economic, and scientific trends in foreign countries.
Tactical (or departmental) intelligence is so designated because it involves,
in the first instance,_information needed by a military commander or a diplo-
mat in order to conduct his own operations. Yet it quickly becomes clear
that there is no dividing line between tactical and strategic intelligence
when we see how a single fact -- the placing of Soviet army units in East
Germany on the alert -- would be tactical intelligence to the U.S. army
commander in Germany and strategic intelligence to U.S. leaders in Washington.
With this limitation in mind, this paper concentrates on strategic or r_a`ional
intelligence.
The information that is collected for processing and analyzing by the
intelligence community comes from a variety of sources ranging from the
mundane to the esoteric. Since the importance of different sources varias
with he country Bing studied and the issue under l;Ulls LueLULiorL, it is
difficult to provide a meaningful statement of the importance of each type
of data in the over-all intelligence process. The comments made on this
matter should thus be regarded as no more than very rough orders of magnitude.
A basic source of information for intelligence production is material
which is open and in the public domain. This includes newspaper and magazine
articles, scholarly journals, books, open radio broadcasts, and the published
documents of foreign governments and international organizations. These
are important sources of information on Communist as well, as non-Communist
countries in many fields -- although seldom concerning Communist military
affairs. Open sources tend to be of more importance in developed or semi-
developed countries than in those parts of the world which have only rudi-
mentary media facilities and statistics-producing systems. Perhaps 20-25
per cent of the information used by the intelligence community come from
open sources.
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Another major source of information comes from the reports of
civilian officials of U.S. government agencies (excluding CIA) stationed
abroad. The most important of these are the reports of the Foreign
Service Officers in embassies and consulates, but also included are the
reports from U.S. aid missions, attaches from the Treasury, Labor, and
Agricultural Departments, and USIS personnel. The cables and dispatches
of Foreign Service Officers, containing as they do the results of con-
versations with high local government officials (as well as background
studies) probably are the most important sourcesof political information
available. Many extremely useful economic studies also come from American
officials, who integrate open source material with information picked up
in their discussions with local officials or provided by local governments.
Official. reporting probably also provides 20-25 per cent of the total
material that goes into the intelligence process.
U. S. military officials stationed abroad (either as military attaches
or as MAAG personnel to oversee the distribution and use of U.S. military
equipment) and routine military operations of U.S. forces abroad also pro-
vide information through their official reports. Naturally, these reports
deal largely with military matters. U.S. military officials provide much
more information on non-Communist than Communist forces. The operations
of U.S. forces abroad may provide information on the capabilities of allied
forces, as when joint maneuvers are held. They may also stimulate actions
on the part of Communist forces which provide useful information through
technical collection methods, a matter that will be discussed shortly.
Considerable tactical intelligence is obtained from these sources, but
probably only about 10 per cent of strategic intelligence originates with
them -- although this figure increases sharply in wartime.
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11.
The final source of information. collected by human as against tech-
nical means is that obtained from clandestine collection.* This has been
declining for many decades for a variety of factors. Weapons have become
so complex that few spies could evaluate a modern aircraft even if they
examined it. Even a scientist watching a nuclear explosion can tell less
than an acoustic-listening device thousands of miles away. Moreover, many
societies have become so complex that they must publish increased amounts of
information if they are to he managed. This process has gone very far in
the open democratic countries, which automatically reduces the potential
role of the spy. The police organizations of the Communist countries, espe-
cially the Soviet Union and China, make these societies extremely difficult
to penetrate. However, the death of Stalin and the Sino-Soviet split have
forced Soviet leaders to cc.-,7-.-e for the ^'irgiance of foreign Communist
parties i:y providing information on Soviet thinking and policies. Thus
some success has been obtained against Communist countries by recruitment
of agents from the Communist parties of non-Communist countries. However,
there is always the danger that a seemingly good source will turn out to
be a double agent, who has provided some good information to establish his
credibility in order to mislead at a crucial point.
Nonetheless, agents can sometimes provide the missing pieces of information
.that make it possible to answer key questions. They can be an important
source of information on the intentions as distinct from the capabilities of
a foreign power. However, as governments become larger, more complex, and
more bureaucratic, the amount of information that any single agent can provide
is limited by his contacts. This is why such importance is attached to secu-
ring an agent close to the center of power, who can provide a broader and
more inclusive picture of the plans and policies of his government. The
----------------------
Some collection efforts involve both human and technical collection, as when
an agent makes a physical penetration to implant a technical device.
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difficulty of penetrating the Communist governments an-2 the ease of open
and official contacts with the non-Communist industrial powers have made
agents most useful in the Third World countries, which are usually
not the primary concern of American foreign policy. Probably no more
c orimun i tv_
than 5 per cent of the total information used by the intelligence/comes
from classical espionage operations.
Since World War II technological collection methods have increased
and together these probably account for over a third of the total information.
rapidly in scope anddiversity,f The scientific and technological revolution
of recent decades has not only made it possible to improve collection tech-
nology dramatically, but the increased power and range of modern weapons
have made them more vulnerable to technological collection methods. The
power of nuclear explosions can be detected around the globe, ICBM sites
can be observed. by aerial photography, and a missile being tested emits
signals oiler the course of its several-thousand-mile flight that c.--
picked up hundreds or even thousands of miles away.
Before discussing those types of technical collection which have
arisen and grown in recent decades, it should be noted that there has been
some decline in the importance of the oldest form of intelligence collected
by technological methods. This is communications intelligence (COMINT),
which became a major source of intelligence after the advent of radio
communications. The success achieved by the United States in breaking the
Japanese codes before World War II was a major factor behind American success
in the Pacific War -- just as U.S. failure to utilize such intelligence made
possible Japanese success at Pearl Harbor.
The reason for the decline in importance of this source is that the
senders have come out ahead of the interceptors in the never-ending struggle
to encrypt messages so that they cannot be deciphered. Secure systems have
come to characterize not only the advanced nations -- non-Communist as well
as CcpWffdAid far1le?SDE20#4/Qtt231ei#AcR OM'*1=3 ?0090? 045 the same
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time, the volume of messages is so great that unbreakable systems are not
practical for all communications, even in the military area. Human and
mechanical errors are sometimes made which make not only individual messages
readable but, in at least some ins tances, can lead to the breaking of a sys-
tem. And communications security inevitably declines considerably during
the disarray of war. Finally, it is not necessary to be able to read
messages to obtain valuable information from them by means of traffic
analysis. Communications between two points indicate there is a connection
between them; if what is taking place at one point is known this may provide
a clue to the activities of the other. A rapid increase in communications
between headquarters and a fleet at sea could mean an operation was about
to take place. While most intercept activity can be carried out at a
distance from the target country, it is sometimes necessary to bargain in
order to secure listening posts within friendly countries adjacent to the
target area. The host country quite naturally tries to extract a high
price for its cooperation.
There has been a rapid rise in the importance of electronic intelligence
(ELINT) in the past few decades. This involves the interception of radio
waves of a non-communications type -- from radars and from new and sophisti-
cated weapons being tested. Radars must continually be in operation if they
are to be useful, and there are few countermeasures that can be taken to
maintain security. Locating the radars and determining their characteristics
often involves sending planes or ships close to a country's borders -- sometimes
approaching them as if one intended to penetrate national boundaries, which
can increase tensions and occasionally lead to international incidents.
When certain types of new weapons are tested they are equipped with instruments
which measure their performance and transmit the data to test sites by radio
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telemetry. Interception of these signals -- which can sometimes be done
at great distances -- can provide important information on the character-
istics of the weapon. --Another type of ELINT is the use of radars to
monitor the actual flight of a missile (RADINT), which also provides
valuable information on the pattern of test firings.
STAT
Whatever the importance one attaches to the above technical collection
methods, there is widespread agreement that all are overshadowed by imagery
or photographic intelligence. This provides useful scientific, economic
and military information on the Communist countries that is not available
from other sources. It can even, by detecting the pattern of weapons
deployment, provide clues to political intentions. While photoreconnaissance
was performed by aircraft in the past (as is to a limited extent even today)
the plane has largely been displaced by the satellite. There are two advan-
tages possessed by the satellite: (1) it can photograph a much wider area
much more quickly, and (2) the legality of satellite overflights is now
widely accepted. Indeed, the SALT agreements signed in 1972 specifically
stated that neither side would interfere with national technical means of
collecting information to verify compliance with the agreements.
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Photoreconnaisance, while s.ometimes hampered by cloud cover, also
has the virtue of a high degree of reliability as long as the film is of
readable quality. Arms control agreements would have been impossible with-
out it. Both photographic and imagery intelligence also provide important
information on the location of natural resources, industrial facilities
and on agricultural patterns. (New types of sensors which can detect
crop troubles or failures have been installed in some satellites, and the
Earth Resources Technology Satellite /hRTS/ provides new capabilities for
detection of raw materials of various types.)
The most striking characteristics of the raw information gathered by
the collection process are its volume and its variety -- both as to type
and to quality. Millions of words of open source information, tremendous
numbers of intercepted radio communications and telemetry signals, thousands
of reports-from U.S. officials abroad, seemingly endless rolls of photographs,
and smaller numbers of agent reports reach Washington regularly for proces-
sing and transmission to intelligence analysts and policy makers. Some of
this, such as open source material, requires only routine categorization
and transmission to the appropriate analysts. Other materials,such as tele-
metry signals and most satellite photography, must be examined by specialists
with esoteric technical skills before being sent to analysts. Material col-
lected by one agency or department is generally distributed throughout the
intelligence community, although some information that arises out of opera-
tional activities of the various departments is held much more closely.
(Some critics have charged that collection drives the system rather than
the other way around, and that masses of information are collected simply
because it is technically possible to do so.) While this probably is an
overstatement, the task of guiding and controlling the collection process
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is one that will become more difficult in the years ahead as more sophisticated
collection systems now under development become operational and greatly
increase the volume of data obtained.
An unending problem for the intelligence community is that of evaluating
the quality of information collected. How reliable have a particular agent's
reports been in the past, and does he have access to the type of information
in a particular report? Is the foreign minister of a particular country
telling the U.S. ambassador the truth when they talk or, more realistically,
how is he mixing the truth with statements designed to entice or mislead?
Does an upsurge of unreadable communications between two points indicate
that an operation is about to begin, or is it an attempt to confuse or
mislead people in the National Security Agency engaged in traffic analysis?
Are the statistics of agricultural production given the U.S. by a foreign
government: accurate? If not, is it because their statistical tech-,.jugs
are inadequate or because they want to create a particular impression?
Some of these questions can never be answered with certainty, but meticulous
cross-checking and comparison of reports from many types of sources dealing
with the same subject often enable the processor or the analyst to reduce
the uncertainties substantially.
The Structure and Production of the Intelligence Community
The "production" of the intelligence community ranges from oral inter-
pretations of a particular event by a single analyst in response to a policy
maker's informal query to the formal process involved in drafting and coordi-
nating National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and having them approved by the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB).* Much. of the production appears in
---------------------
USIB is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members are the
Deputy Director of CIA (representing the Agency) the directors of the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA), the Director
of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR), and the heads
of the intelligence sections of the AEC, the FBI, and the Treasury. The heads
of tAPprove311RIPCR a t2.s00 L3 A fR R#9M%W1WQ WV0 `-riot official
members of the USIB, but they attend the meetings and can dissent from its
i i,rlomantc
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written form, but oral briefings occupy an important role in the system,
particularly in the Defense Department.
Primary responsibility for preparing intelligence reports and estimates
for the policy makers rests with the Bureau of Intelligence Research, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central. Intelligence Agency. The effort
of the National Security Agency results largely in the publication of indivi-
dual messages -- or collection of messages -- on specific topics, although
its reports sometimes combine this information with material from other
sources. The intelligence units of the military services concentrate largely
(though not entirely) on tactical. intelligence matters of interest to their
particular services. The production of the FBI and AEC consists largely
of specific reports dealing with their special responsibilities, while the
intelligence unit of the Treasury concentrates on collating and summarizing
intelligence produced elsewhere for use by Treasury and other offiri-ls
concerned with international economic matters.
The Central Intelligence Agency has the principal responsibility for
producing national intelligence, especially for the President and the NSC
apparatus. The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) are technically under
the DCI as head of the intelligence community rather than as director of
the CIA, but they are more a part of CIA than of any other organization.
(Most of the NIOs are from CIA, although State and Defense Department people
are also involved.) Most of the regular current intelligence production is
carried out by CIA, which produces two daily intelligence publications, a
weekly intelligence review, an economic intelliger(-,- weekly, and a weekly
review of international oil developments. However, much of the material
published in the daily publications, and some of the weekly material, is
coordinated with the other members of the intelligence community, who can
register dissents from judgments with which they disagree. A large part
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of the responsibility for economic intelligence has cc-.ie to rest with CIA.
Originally its responsibilities in the economic field were confined to
research and reporting on the economies of Communist countries (including
their international economic activities) but over the years they have
expanded to include virtually all parts of the world. CIA does extensive
research on military affairs -- chiefly involving Communist countries --
which overlaps the work done in the Defense Intelligence Agency. Over the
past two decades the Agency has become a leader in the field of scientific
intelligence, both as regards analysis and reporting on scientific trends
abroad and in developing new technologies for information collection.
CIA has several important strengths, but has also suffered from two
weaknesses . Since intelligence activities -- collection, research, analysis,
and reporting -- are its major function, its senior people can devote most
of their attention to such matters. Its analysts are freer of pol'-; pres-
sures than those of other intelligence organizations, which makes it easier
to maintain objectivity. It is not bound by Civil Service rules, which
gives its greater flexibility on personnel matters. And it has less problems
maintaining continuity of expertise than do other intelligence organizations.
Its first weakness -- and it is difficult to know how serious this is --
results from the unwillingness of some people to work as analysts for CIA
because they do not want to be involved with an organization which carries-
on covert operations. The second, and perhaps more important weakness
involves its distance (both organizationally and physically in view of its
location at Langley) from the policy-making process. This is a particularly
serious problem in view of the lack of systematic guidance by the policy-
makers that has characterized the relationship for many years. The National
Intelligence Officer system is one attempt to remedy this. The institution
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of a daily CIA briefing of. President Ford should be valuable in helping
be
CIA keep in touch with matters causing concern and likely to/the subject
of important decisions.
The activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which was
established in 1961, range from basic research to current reporting. DIA's
efforts are focused principally upon the military capabilities of potential
adversaries -- especially the Communist countries. Yet it must be prepared
to deal with many other matters as well, = ranging from the outlook
for Sino-Soviet relations to whether a natural. disaster in a particular
country is serious enough to warrant the dispatch of naval vessels or air-
craft for relief operations. It devotes a major part of its effort to
briefing senior civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense.
It must also provide_ intelligence for planning; and operations to the Joint
Chiefs, provide intelligence support for the Secretary of Defense, and
take part in the preparation and coordination of national intelligence.
DIA faces a number of serious problems which limit-its effectiveness.
It can be tasked by so many separate people and organizations -- the White
House, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the heads of the military
services, and others -- that it is difficult to plan its activities in an
orderly and efficient manner. Intelligence still. has a low status in the
military services,and only the Army has designated intelligence a career
track. This hampers DIA's ability to secure its share of the best officers,
a problem complicated by reluctance of many officers to serve in an organi-
zation not part of their own service. Personnel turnover is high among
military officers, and civil service rules limit management's ability to
raise the standards of performance. The inherently hierarchical nature
of the military establishment creates a milieu in which it is difficult for
specialists to press their views on officers who are their seniors, especially
on issues involving service or departmental. interests or policies.
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A number of efforts have been made in recent years to mitigate these
problems. DIA has experimented with new methodologies in some fields. A
Directorate for Estimates was set up so that some analysts could concentrate
on longer-term problems with less pressure to respond to current developments.
Efforts are underway to give civilians greater responsibility in certain
areas so as to he able to attract better people and to assure greater con-
tinuity of expertise. DIA no longer publishes its own daily intelligence
bulletin (although it still. produces a weekly review) but instead sends out
its individual reports as they are prepared. These measures should result
in some improvements, but in view of the many problems facing DIA it will
be difficult to achieve a substantially better performance.
INR is the smallest of the major production units. Its production
efforts are concentrated in two areas. The first is intelligence reports
that service the specific needs of senior State Department policy makers.
These are often short reports focused on . very specific develcnments or
issues of current interest. The second is its involvement in the coordination
of current intelligence reports and NIEs produced in CIA. (In addition to
its production activities, INR is responsible for appraising proposed covert
operations and for managing the external research program of the intelligence
community.) If the Secretary of State is a dominant figure in the making of
foreign policy -- and has confidence in the leadership of INR -- the organization
can play an important role, for its proximity to policy-making officials enables
it to focus its efforts on those matters of intense concern to senior officials.
However, it has two weaknesses: (1) its limited resources, which make it impos-
sible to assemble a staff sizeable enough to deal with the range of issues
confronting the U.S. government, and (2) its traditionally low status in the
State Department (especially among Foreign Service officers) and its constant
personnel turnover, which combine to make it difficult to obtain top quality
people with experience and continuity in their jobs.
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The size of the U.S. intelligence community gives it considerable
napacity for research in depth, and also provides great strength for analyzing
and reporting during a_crisis. At the same time, size also imposes limita-
tions,.for subtlety of thought about complex issues is seldom a noteworthy
trait of any large organization. This problem is compounded when various
organizations come together in order to coordinate their judgments. Special
efforts are constantly required to see that significant. differences of
viewsare spelled out rather than glossed over, and to make sure that unortho-
dox views and individual insights are encouraged rather than stifled by the
system.
One other point warrants mention. The various intelligence organizations
are more cognizant of the work underway, and of the strengths and weaknesses,
of the others than was the case a decade or so ago. Less compartmentalization
has resulted in somewhat easier and informal working relationships across
bureaucratic lines, and this provides a measure of flexibility that does not
show up on the organizational charts with their inevitable emphasis on bound-
aries and hierarchies. Organizational rivalries and loyalties have by no
means disappeared, but on the whole the phrase "intelligence community" has
now
more substance/than in the past. Moreover, a serious effort has been made
to expand relations between intelligence analysts and scholars outside the
government. Progress has been made despite the reluctance of some scholars
to become involved with intelligence agencies. This effort warrants continua-
tion, not because outside scholars are more able than government analysts,
but simply because all possible sources of new ideas and different perceptions
should he sought.
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The Role of Intelligence in the Policy-Making Process
Intelligence has four separate but related functions it must perform
if it is to play its profer role in the foreign policy decision-making process.
Its first and most obvious task is that of following events abroad and report-
ing on important developments so as to alert policy makers to impending op-
portunities and problems. A second task is estimating future developments in
other parts of the world so as to reduce the uncertainties and risks facing
the policy maker. A third function also involves estimating, but in the
particular context of requests by policy makers for appraisals of likely
foreign reactions to alternative U.S. policies currently under consideration.
The fourth involves monitoring conditions that could affect U.S. policies
adopted or operations underway. Verification of compliance or noncompliance
by foreign governments of agreements, such as those on arms control, is an
important example of this type of activity. (Conveying judgments to policy
makers about when verfication is and is not possible before agreements are
made is a related aspect of this task.)
If the intelligence officer is to fulfill his essential functions, he
must perform four separate tasks. The first is providing guidance for the
collection process, so that information is collected on the subjects that
the analyst must deal with in his reports to the policy maker. The second
is to keep attuned to the concerns of the policy maker so that the analyst
can produce intelligence that is relevant to forthcoming policy decisions.
The third is to produce high-quality, objective, and relevant intelligence
reports and appraisals, something as simple to state as it is difficult to
do. The fourth task is to convey his reports and estimates in a persuasive
manner, which is essential if the intelligence produced is to have the impact
it warrants.
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The policy maker also must perform several related tasks if the
relationship is to be successful. First, he must provide guidance to
intelligence officers on the types of intelligence needed lest the intel-
ligence officer be forced to operate in the dark -- both as to his own
production and in his guidance of the collectors. Estimating likely
developments abroad is difficult enough without having to guess at the
needs of one's own government. A second and closely related task is to
keep intelligence officers informed not only of policies under consideration
but of actions and operations of the U.S. government. Intelligence officers
can hardly he expected to interpret the actions of foreign governments suc-
cessfully if they are unaware of U.S. actions, promises, or threats that
may be influencing the decisions of other states. Third, the policy maker
must convey his evaluations of the intelligence he receives so that the
intelligence officer knows whether or not what he has produced is meeting
the needs of the policy maker. There are obvious limitations on the ability
of busy men to perform these tasks in a regular and systematic manner, but
if extensive resources are to be devoted to intelligence they are too important
to be ignored.
There would be widespread agreement about the appropriate tasks of
intelligence officers and policy makers as long as they are set forth in the
abstract, as they are above, but everyone with any experience in either aspect
of the relationship would immediately add that reality is never as clear-cut
as the principles would.have it or as neat as the organization charts indicate.
There is considerable friction and tension in the relationship, which stems
from personality clashes, organizational rivalries and conflicts, and different
views about how the tasks of each side should be carried out.
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There are two main views of the appropriate re?.ati.onship between the
intelligence officer and the policy maker. The traditional view stresses
that intelligence should tell the policy maker what he needs to know rather
than what he wants to hear. The relationship should be an arms-length one, so
as to keep to a minimum the dangers of the intelligence officer's judgment
being swayed by the views of the policy maker. The other view agrees that
the intelligence officer must be rigorously honest and independent in his
judgments, but stresses that if the former is to tell the latter what he
"needs to know" he must have considerable knowledge of the specific concerns
of the policy maker. Otherwise, intelligence work becomes the pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake rather than a carefully focused input to the
policy maker's thinking and decision-making process. Even in the latter
case, of course, intelligence is but one input among many involved in a
maker
decision. ? The policy/gathers facts and ideas from many sources, ar-l -Mist
also be concerned with such matters as domestic needs and Congressional
opinion in coming to his decisions
officer
In theory the intelligence /, does not put forward policy recom-
mendations, but his decisions as to which facts are relevant and the way in
which they are presented can make a particular policy look sensible or silly.
His experiences will have led him to have committed himself to certain views
of men and nations abroad, and he will have his personal views on what U.S.
policy should be in particular instances. No matter how disciplined he is
in trying to keep his views about foreign areas under constant scrutiny
and modify them if unforeseen developments indicate he should, he will be
hesitant to abandon positions to which he has committed himself lest he be
regarded as inconsistent. Yet the intelligence officer . who
becomes predictable risks losing his audience. No matter how hard he tries
to keep his personal policy preferences from influencing his intelligence
judg
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for his own views. Similarly, policy makers sometimes exert pressures --
subtle or otherwise -- on intelligence officers to tailor their judgments
so as to support existing policies, and they cannot always avoid the
temptation to use intelligence selectively in order to secure support for
their policies from the public, the Congress, and foreign governments.
Even more delicate and complex strains arise when there is disagreement
among individual policy makers or departments which lead some to cite
intelligence reports as support for their positions and others to downplay
the significance of such reports.
These differences should he kept in perspective. One holding the
traditional viewpoint would agree that an intelligence organization should
be prepared to answer questions about likely foreign reactions to various
U.S. courses of action. (How would North Korea react to the removal of U.S.
troops frnm South Korea? Moscow to full U.S. diplomatic relations with
China? Other food-surplus countries to an increase -- or the lack of an
increase -- in U.S. food shipments to avert famine?) A person holding the
view that there must be continuing contact between intelligence officials
and policy makers would agree that the former should not tell the latter
which policy he should follow. Those holding the second viewpoint argue
that intelligence officers must be prepared to take the initiative in seeking
out policy makers, gaining admittance to their meetings, making known the
capabilities of intelligence organizations, and in effect pushing the policy
makers to explain what their aims and policies are and solicit their requests
for intelligence reports. The areas of overlap between the two viewpoints
provide the basis for a working relationship, but the differences in emphasis
often produce sharp and bitter clashes. Such disputes constitute one source
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of continuing friction between intelligence officers and policy makers,
particularly when an intelligence failure or an.unsuccessful policy creates
a major potential fracas
Another problem is the tendency of some policy makers to regard themselves
as their own best intelligence officers -- at least on some issues. Few of
the leading officials of the U.S. government would have gained such positions
of influence were they not possessed of considerable self-confidence. They
may still value intelligence reports, but they are much more receptive to
specific facts and hard (measurable) judgenta than to "soft" appraisals
of trends or possible political developments. Moreover, intelligence "judg-
ments" often seem much less significant than the policy maker's own high-
level diplomatic exchanges or private conversations with foreign leaders --
especially if something as dramatic as a "hot-line" is involved.
This tendency has probably been one factor behind the trend toward
increased emphasis on current intelligence reporting and the downgrading
(though not the elimination) of longer-range analysis and estimates. Another
factor has been the increased skepticism about the utility of policy planning
which, in the judgment of some critics, is usually no more than an unimagina-
tive projection of the present into the future in,a way that conveys an impres-
sion of predictability to policy that is impossible in a disorderly world.
Few people who have had any experience in estimating or planning are
unaware of the limitations inherent in such activities. Nonetheless, they
express serious concern about recent trends. Major resource decisions --
such as new weapons programs -- can only he based upon judgments, implicit if
not explicit, about the future. Unless foreign policy has a sense of direction
individual decisions are likely to oscillate with the pressures of the moment
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rather than according to a well-thought-out frame of r2ference or design.
The top official can easily allow himself to be overwhelmed with dramatic
facts about current developments to the exclusion of the less exciting
long-range think piece. Modern methods of communications allow the Secre-
taries of State and Defense, or even the President, to he the country desk
officer in a crisis if he chooses to be. This happened in the Cuban missile
crisis, the Dominican Republic intervention, and the early bombing campaign
against North Vietnam. The record suggests that such a temptation should
be resisted.
How successful or unsuccessful have intelligence officers and policy
makers been in fulfilling their respective tasks in recent years? More
important, what factors have been responsible for the achievements that
one finds and for the problems that exist? The outside observer can make
only tentative judgments, and runs the risk of being unduly influen- by
individual successes or failures that have come to his knowledge. To gene-
ralize, however, three broad conclusions seem warranted. First, many of
the tasks are being performed in an inadequate manner. Second, the sit-
uation is better than it was a few years ago. Third, substantial improvements
are possible without major reorganizations or drastic increases in already
heavy workloads, although some changes in working styles would be required.
Before expanding upon these judgments, several points -- or perhaps
viewpoints of the author -- should be emphasized. First, success or failure
in establishing a mutually beneficial intelligence officer-policy maker
relationship depends as much if not more on the attitudes of the officials
involved toward each other's role as on organizational arrangements, but the
procedures governing their relationship are of considerable importance to
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the whole process. Poor organizations are a handicap, just as good struc-
tures are a help, but the basic structure of the intelligence community at
the present time in the area of intelligence production is sound. Second,
different working arrangements are necessary in dealing with different types
of foreign policy problems. Relations with close allies in an era of increas-
ing interdependence require the participation of a larger number of civil
servants, Foreign Service officers, and military officers than do relations
with adversaries; and the procedures for prodiding intelligence on different
subjects should reflect this.
Third, the advent of a new Administration often results in particular
strains on the intelligence-policy making relationship. Even public officials
who have a proclivity to work through channels in an orderly fashion are
affected by their personal appraisals of the individuals with whom they deal.
When new r.:hlic officials have an instinctive distrust of bureaucracy as such
there will inevitably be serious strains between policy makers and intelligence
officers. This happened during the early years of the Nixon Administration,
when senior men in both groups found it difficult to establish the trust and
confidence in the other necessary for a productive relationship. In this kind
of atmosphere, subordinate officials in the two groups who have worked together
in the past can only mitigate the damage. There are some signs of improvement
during the past year, but given the foreign 'policy challenges facing the
United States there is no room for complacency.
What follows is a brief expansion upon the conclusions regarding the
state of the intelligence-policy making relationship; together with a shott
statement of what can be done to improve it. More detailed comments on these
and other points are contained in the final section of this paper.
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]..' Establishing renuirements for intelligence collectors -- a task
that falls mainly to intelligence officers, but indirectly to policy makers
as well -- has always been a weak point in t1)e process. Some efforts at
improvements are underway, and these are discussed and appraised below.
2. The policy makers by and large do an uneven job of providing
guidance to the intelligence community and evaluation of the intelligence
product. Evaluation in particular tends to he ad hoc rather than systematic.
(Guidance varies over time; many requests for studies were made when the
National Security Study Memorandum /VSSI~% procedure was first initiated by
the Nixon Administration.) Periodic requests for particular studies and
occasional complaints or compliments for a failure or a helpful anpraisal
are not adequate susbtitutes for a systematic effort in these areas. While
some studies are self-initiated, and much of the reporting of any large
organization is routine, a lack of guidance can lead to an effort t.n -void
risks by producing reports on every possible subject, thus, overwhelming the
policy maker with paper. Policy makers complain -- with some justification --
that they find intelligence organizations iinresponsive to some of their
requests. (This is a. particular complaint of middle-level policy officers.)
Instances cited are requests for analysis of the personality traits of foreign
leaders,. the influence of bureacratic interest groups on the policies of
foreign nations, and the underlying goals and rationale behind such matters
as the Soviet strategic arms build-up. Complaints are also heard from some
policy makers that intelligence organizations are extremely conservative in
experimenting with new methodologies or in hiring people with backgrounds
in new disciplines, such as the psychology of organizational behavior. Failing
to get an adequate response, some policy makers gave little attention to
production guidance.
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3. An even more serious weakness is the failure of high-level policy
makers to keep the intelligence community informed of U.S. actions that have
been taken, high-level conversations with foreign leaders, and policies under
consideration. (This poses a particularly difficult problem when some of
the basic conceptions about world politics and foreign policy goals held
by newly-elected leaders are quite different from the ideas of their prede-
cessors.) Under such circumstances the intelligence officer faces an extremely
difficult task in keeping attuned to the concerns of the policy maker -- as
well as appraising actions of foreign political leaders. There are several
reasons for this failure. One is simply the pressure of time on the top men
in the foreign policy establishment. This is a particularly serious problem
when one man, Dr. Kissinger, has more duties than any one person can. handle --
Special Assistant to the President, Secretary of State, chief American
negotiator in a variety of situations, and major spokesman on foreign policy
for the Administration in its dealings with Congress, the press, and the
public. Moreover, no adequate delegation of authority is made for periods
when Secretary Kissinger is out of-Washington. Another reason is his fear
of leaks -- not only to other countries but also to elements in the U.S.
government with different views on foreign policy -- which would make it
more difficult to carry out his policies. (This problem of inadequate knowl-
edge of U.S. plans and actions is not unique to the intelligence community,
but affects other parts of the foreign policy community as well. Indeed,
it is ironic that as compartmentalization has declined among intelligence
officers it has increased among policy makers.)
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4.' In view of these problems, it is surprising that the quality of
intelligence is often quite good. There are weaknesses, to be sure, but
the product often matches the work done at the better universities and
private research establishments. (This does not imply that the intelligence
community is more capable than the-policy-making community, for one could
make a case that the content of American foreign policy has also been good --
even though neither group has made full use of the other.)
5. It is difficult to make any meaningful generalizations about how
effectively and persuasively intelligence is presented to the policy maker.
Considerable flexibility is required on such matters and some is clearly in
evidence. Some policy makers are listeners and some are readers. Brevity
and a few specific conclusions are required for some policy makers on certain
subjects. In other cases much more detail and speculation may be appropriate.
Whatever the format and procedures, important intelligence should be presented
in ay that can lead to discussion and questioning before decisions are
made so that the dangers of the olic maker misunderstanding the judgments
(especially those expressed as probabilities) and the implications of such
intelligence are reduced to a minimum. The lack of such opportunities when
final decisions were being made -- as distinct from options being set forth --
was a weakness of the NSSM system. Moreover, the NSSM system was inadequate
when a crisis arose, as evidenced by the establishment of the Washington
Special Action Group (WSAG).
The Nixon Administration's dissatisfaction with the U.S. intelligence
community led it to make a number of changes in 1971, one of which was the
establishment of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC).
*NSCIC members are the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Chairman), the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and-the DCI.
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The NSCIC was to provide substantive guidance and evaluation from senior
policy makers to the intelligence! community. Despite Administration complaints
about the analytic. quality of intelligence production and its relevance to
policy requirements, the NSCIC has remained a paper organization unused by
those who created it.
Without suggesting that regular utilization of the NSCIC -- or something
much like it, with both consumers: and producers of intelligence participating
-- would solve the complex problems and existing deficiencies in the intel-
ligence-policy making relationship, it has the potential to improve conditions
considerably if used intelligently. Its task is not to provide the week-by--
week, study-by-study policy maker guidance to intelligence organizations.
Rather, it should focus on major long-term issues, specific opportunities
and deficiencies, and examination of the procedures used by each group to
fulfill its functions. For example, *hv NSCIC might examine whether or not
the intelligence community is devoting the right percentage of its resources
to Soviet affairs, to international economic affairs, and to specific areas.
Is a major new effort needed in Southern Europe in view of the importance
-- and fragility --- of this area? This would require some changes in working
styles. Specifically, polio makers would need to be less secretive and more
explicit about their longer-term priorities and goals. (There are, of course,
limitations as to how much precision one can expect about long-term aims
given the periodic turnover at the top levels of the U.S. government, but
some improvements are possible.) Similarly, periodic and systematic efforts
to convey evaluations of the performance of the intelligence community would
make its internal' efforts at improvement more effective. The high-level
officials who are members of the NSCIC would have to rely on subordinates
for the detailed work necessary to make this body effective, but support and
direction from the top are essential, and the amount necessary would not he
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Key Issues in the Intelligence-Policy Making Relationship
Establishing Requirements for the Collectors
There is general agreement that one of the weakest -- and most difficult
-- areas in the entire intelligence effort involves establishing requirements
for collectors in a systematic, efficient and meaningful manner. There are
some people familiar with the intelligence community who believe that far
too much information of certain types are collected simply because it is
because
collectible an.d/someone somewhere has requested it -- and who see the problem
getting worse as technological-capabilities increase. This probably grows
out of the "jigsaw puzzle" syndrome -- the idea that somewhere there exists
a particular fact which, if available, would provide the answer to the analyst's
needs.
Procedures have ueeL1 devibed for levying iudividuai specific requirements
also
on collectors. Arrangements and procedures have/heen adopted for deciding
whether or not to undertake a major collection effort on a particular problem
or to buy a new technological collection system. The latter types of decision
require major coordinated studies involving estimates of likely trends in
foreign countries and long-term American foreign policy priorities. Similar
types of appraisals and decisions are necessary if difficult agent penetrations
are to be attempted in a useful manner.
The essential problem regarding requirements is that of devising a sys-
tematic and periodic tasking of collectors in a way that uses increasingly
scarce resources for the most important needs. There is a major dilemma
involved here. If all the specific questions that the intelligence officer
(and the policy maker) would like answered are put into a list it would be
so voluminous as to offer little practical guidance. At the other extreme,
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a short general list provides little real guidance to anyone. What is
necessary is a continuous surveying of what is known to the intelligence
community, what it is ignorant of, and what elements of ignorance can be
reasonably eliminated. Then -- most difficult of all -- it is important
to establish a priority regarding the importance of the facts that need
to be known and how much it would cost to learn about them. A particular
fact may be only of moderate importance, but if it can be learned at a
low cost it may warrant a high priority. Decisions must also be made about
the degree of certainty required. For example, are the intelligence community
and the policy maker willing to accept 90 per cent certainty of knowing a
particular set of facts? The cost of acquiring such facts will be far less
than if 99 per cent certainty is required, for in many cases it is the most
sophisticated and expensive technology that must be used to eliminate the
last elements of uncertainty. Clearly these are decisions that sh.o" be
made jointly by the intelligence community and the policy makers. An ef-jec-
tively operating National Security Council Intelligence Committee should be
able to provide some guidance on such matters4
Major questions arise about why requirements have been a general weak-
ness of the intelligence community and what is being done to overcome this
deficiency,. There are a variety of reasons for past shortcomings. Some of
them involve the inherent difficulties and complexities of the problem. The
problems can never be "solved"; the most that can be hoped for is that they
are minimized. Jobs or requirements staffs often have had little prestige
in the intelligence community, and few of the best people have wanted to
work in this area. The requirements staffs have little authority over the
collectors, and must obtain high-level support on an ad hoc basis when they
are confronted with unsatisfactory collector performance. Finally, collection
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35.
is to some degree an opp*rtunistic affair with an element of luck involved,
and collectors in the field are tempted to work on the easiest rather than
the most important tasks. Moreover, the collectors themselves have. a valid
complaint in that they are often not given adequate lead time by the intel-
ligence officers and the policy makers, who sometimes fail to anticipate
their needs -- a difficult task in an uncertain and fast-changing world.
One other structural weakness needs to be pointed out before discussing
efforts that are under way to improve the situation. Requirements at present
come under the general jurisdiction of a variety of committees of the U.S.
Intelligence Board. Each of these committees -- such as those dealing with
human collection resources, communications intelligence, and overhead recon-
naisance -- try to collect what is possible with the technology available
to them. What is needed is a more rigorous effort to orcanize and integrate
requirements in their entirety rather r.'-,an only by individual techniques.
A number of efforts are under way to improve the collection guidance
process under the leadership of the DCI, who now has direct authority over
the chairmen of the USIB committees. One of these efforts involves the devel-
opment of the fey Intelligence Questions (KIQs), which are worked out by the
intelligence community in cooperation with the USIB committees, and are revised
annually. Since this method has only been recently adopted, it is too early
to evaluate its usefulness. Secure telephone lines have been established
between a growing number of U.S. embassies and Washington agencies, which
enable the intelligence analysts and the collectors to be in direct communica-
tion. Efforts are also under way to make sure that policy makers as well as
intelligence analysts and collectors understand each other better. One of
the tasks of the National Intelligence Officers is to facilitate this dialogue.
These efforts to short-circuit bureaucratic hierarchies are being supplemented
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by attempts to link collection needs and performance more closely to budgetary
and fiscal planning. Finally, an effort is under way to mesh tactical and
national collection capabilities and needs. All of these activities should
be continued and institutionalized.
Guiding and Evaluating the Reporting of U.S. Embassies
Some of the most important information to reach the intelligence commu-
nity in Washington grows out of the reporting activities of U.S. embassies
around the world. This includes not only the extensive reporting by Foreign
Service Officers (FSOs) on political, economic, and social developments in
their respective countries and on the foreign policy of the governments they
deal with, but also reports by American attaches responsible for agricultural,
financial, labor, and military affairs. Other important information arises
out of the reports of AID Missions, USIS posts, and Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups (IAAG).
Several obstacles exist to making this reporting more useful and respon-
sive to the needs of the intelligence community. The first is simply a prob-
lem of understanding. To the typical FSO, intelligence is basically what is
collected clandestinely by an agent -- or, at the other end of the technological
spectrum -- by advanced technological methods. The FSO seldom looks upon his
reports as a part of the intelligence collection activities. He often points
were
out that if he / regarded simply as an intelligence collector by the local
government, many of his sources of information would dry up. Yet to an intel-
ligence analyst the conversations of a U.S. diplomat with his foreign counter-
parts are a very important type of raw intelligence, just as are the studies
done by the embassy personnel on conditions and trends within a particular
country. There is no point in trying to obtain an agreed definition of what
is or is not raw intelligence. What is needed on the part of the embassy
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personnel is an awareness that these reports do enter the intelligence
process, and more systematic training and evaluation of such personnel in
view of their inescapable role.
At the same time, intelligence organizations need to remain aware that
and purposes of the U.S. embassy personnel
the activities/and intelligence officers only partially overlap. Embassy
reporting must serve many masters. Much of the work of the embassy official
will be directed toward managing routine relationships between governments
or -- if he is a senior official -- negotiating important agreements and
making foreign policy recommendations.
Even increased understanding of these points would still leave unresolved
the responsibility for guiding and evaluating the efforts of U.S. embassies
regarding reporting for intelligence purposes. One obvious improvement
involves devising a better and more meaningful requirement system, a subject
discussed-in, the previous section. According to many people who have served
in embassies abroad, requirements lists are either so general as to he meaning-
less or so detailed as to impose impossible tasks. In either case,, they
receive little consideration.
The DCI is examining various methods designed to foster closer links
between the intelligence community and U.S. embassy personnel as part of his
responsibility for coordinating the intelligence collection activities of
the government. He is considering the idea of sending an annual letter to
each embassy evaluating its reporting in an effort to provide guidance and
stimulate improvement. This is obviously a matter that raises some delicate
issues concerning the relationships between the DCI and the Secretary of.
State. A letter stating that an embassy had done a good job in most areas
but needs to improve its performance on a few matters probably would not
create many difficulties. However, a really critical. letter would in effect
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be an indirect criticism of the Secretary of State. For such a system to
be acceptable to any Secretary of State such letters probably would have
to be coordinated with him -- in effect, with INR -- before they were sent.
If this system is adopted, it might also be useful to require embassies
to make a systematic appraisal of the quality of intelligence produced on
the countries to which they are accredited. Such a practice, if handled in
a constructive manner, would provide one element of evaluation of intelligence
production from the viewpoint of those "on-the ground" and could encourage a
useful Washington dialogue with the field.
Policy Guidance to the Intelligence Community
One of the striking deficiencies affecting the role of intelligence
production is the inadequacy of guidance by policy makers as to their needs.
This is a broad statement, and exceptions are easy to find. Nonetheless,
complaint-s on this point are heard too often to he ignored. Requests for
particular studies are made from time to time by virtually every policy
maker, and regular reports (such as the National Intelligence Daily and
National Intelligence Estimates) are read -- at least partially. One of
the responsibilities of the National Intelligence Officers is to solicit
guidance. Nevertheless, guidance is too often ad hoc rather than systematic.
The National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC), which was to
provide systematic guidance by consumers to producers, has been a paper organi-
zation with no discernible impact. The busy high-level officials on this
committee could hardly spare the time for detailed work in this area, but
without their drive and support any task force or working group of people
more directly involved can make very little progress.
(The problem of inadequate guidance, it should he emphasized, is not
something that developed in recent years. It has been a problem ever since
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the regularized system of policy making through reliance on the NSC system
was abolished by the Kennedy Administration. Previously, the NSC meetings
began with an intelligence briefing, usuallv,hy the DCI; he then learned of
the concerns of the policy makers as they discussed issues, and was
tasked by the NSC if further work was required. The major flaw in the system
was the attempt to present a consensus on policy to the President, which
led to a muting of differences and an emphasis on the lowest common denominator.
Had options or alternatives been presented to the President, the system might
not have been largely ignored since 1960.)
A key factor in whether or not there is adequate guidance is likely
to be the attitude of the President. If he makes a reasonable effort to
provide guidance -- and if he encourages the NSC staff to do the same ---
his example is likely to spur others to take this responsibility more seriously.
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) should mpUe this
subject one of its regular concerns.
Evaluating Intelligence Production
A major weakness in the field of intelligence over the years has been
the lack of systematic evaluation of intelligence production by the intelligence
community as well as the policy maker. Individual analysts evaluated their
own performance on an informal basis, and their immediate supervisors also
did so. Occasionally, major studies of the record on a particular problem
or area were undertaken. At times intelligence officers received comments
about their reports from senior policy makers, but this usually involved
specific complaints when a mistake was made or specific praise for a partic-
ularly good report. (More frequent comments come from middle-level officials.
These are helpful, but no substitute for awareness of high-level reactions.)
What has been lacking is a systematic effort to evaluate performance. The
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various parts of the intelligence community need to evaluate their own
production, not so. much so that they will know what their scorecard is,
but in order to devote serious study to the basic reasons why they did
some things well and others poorly. The intelligence officer also needs
feedback from the policy maker so that he knows when he is answering the
questions the latter needs answered and when he has misdirected his effort,
when he has been persuasive and when the policy maker remains unconvinced.
Criticism is as important as praise, if not more so.
In the past year, a beginning has been made by the Intelligence Com-
munity (IC) staff in this area. A small evaluations staff has been estab-
lished to assemble the production on certain major issues, to appraise the
record, and to see what lessons can be learned. Several points need to
be made about this. Evaluation is a difficult and time-consuming business
when one not only looks at which forecasts were correct and which wAr^
wrong, but tries to discover the underlying reasons and the lessons to be
learned. It is more difficult to judge whether intelligence was relevant
than if it was correct. Some intelligence judgments are conveyed orally
at high-level meetings, and even when these are recorded it is difficult
to get their full flavor.
The present IC staff effort should be continued and a body of case
studies built up as part of an ongoing process of training and research.
More people from the policy-making parts of governments should become involved
in this effort. The NSCIC could play a useful role in this process if its
members would occasionally consider which types of intelligence have been
least -- as well as most -- satisfactory, on what issues and areas intelligence
has been helpful, and thus provide some guidance to the IC staff as to what
matters it `should study.
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The area of evaluation is also one in which the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) can play a helpful role. There is a
tendency for such outside groups to focus their efforts on intelligence
"failures." Yet one of the most important contributions such a group --
which, despite their part-time status, need not operate under the twin
pressures of time and crisis -- can make is periodically to appraise
important parts of the record of the intelligence community when there is
no immediate crisis. People are less defensive and more open to constructive
suggestions at such points, and an outside body is often well-suited to
taking a long view.
Coordination or Competition in Inteiliryence Activities
One question that often arises is the extent to which there should be
competition -- or duplication -- in the work of the various parts of the
intelligence community. This is an important question, but it is a m;:ch
narrower one than is often assumed. There is general agreement that colicction
efforts should he centralized to the extent possible and coordinated to the
extent that centralization is not feasible. There is also general agreement
that where extensive processing of raw data is required -- in photographic
read-outs, telemetry and communications intelligence processing, etc. -- it
need only be done once and should normally he done in one place. (This refers
to routine data, not the occasional crucial piece of information-which will
he checked and rechecked.)
A strong case can also be made for establishing a central data base
within the intelligence community -- and to a degree within the government
as a whole. However, there is considerable wariness about moving rapidly in
this difficult area. Much can be done through the use of computers, but no
analyst wants to give up his own filing system until. he is confident that he
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will have fast and reliable access to a centralized data hank. The initial
equipment and training costs of this are considerable. A more fundamental
problem is the cataloguing of information in the system. A decision as to
what category a particular piece of information falls into is often a matter
of judgment, and the judgments of analysts and cataloguers may differ. A
particular report may touch on many subjects, and it is important that it
he retrievable.by a request for any one of them.
This leaves two broad types of intelligence production to be considered.
The first is current intelligence reporting, and the second is research and
analysis -- including the estimative function. The costs of competition or
duplication are of a quite different magnitude and nature regarding intelli-
gence production than they are for intelligence collection and processing.
In the latter case,the:costs are primarily measured in terms of large amounts
of money, but in the former they often involve claims on the limited time
of high-level leaders.
It is somewhat misleading to describe the current intelligence functions
as "reporting" as if current intelligence publications do no more than report
the facts about the most important events in other countries as quickly as
possible after they occur. The collection of items to be reported requires
judgments as to what is important. More basically, current intelligence
publications include interpretation, analysis, and projection as well as
reporting, although such forecasts are normally of a short-term nature.
Very little duplication exists any longer in the current intelligence reporting
field. DIA still publishes its own weekly intelligence report. However, DIA
has phased out its daily intelligence publication as such. Current interna-
tional reports are now issued item by item as the information is received in
DIA. One reason for this is that the appropriateness of a single daily dead-
line is questionable for an organization whose consumers are not only offi-
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cials in the national capital but also military commanders located in
different time zones around the world. A second reason is the fact that
DIA leaders are satisfied with the National Intelligence Daily published
by CIA. Items in this publication are normally coordinated within the
intelligence community, and those in disagreement with CIA views are
permitted to express their dissents. (It is not always possible to
coordinate last-minute items, but these are designated as being uncoordinated.)
Despite the statements of some senior officers that they want facts
rather than opinions, they are generally desirous of having a variety of
views (opinions) sent to them on basic analytical and estimative matters.
Theoretically, it is not necessary to have different organizations dealing
with the same issues to surface conflicting judgments. A single well-
managed organization which encourages debate and open expression of differences
can do so: Yet the reality, at least in many cases, is less satisfietnry.
Quite apart from the danger of stifling dissent, there would be periodic
conflicts about which subjects were to receive top priorities for research
and analysis. These considerations have repeatedly led those who have
studied this issue to conclude that: (1) a reasonable amount of duplication
(or competition) in terms of research and analysis is desirable, and (2) that
on major questions (especially those involving national intelligence estimates)
the various parts of the intelligence community should coordinate their efforts
by presenting them in a single document so that the agreements and disagreements
are readily apparent to the reader. Despite the attraction of attacking the
conventional wisdom, in this case it seems wise as well as conventional.
It should be emphasized, however, that effective decentralization of analysis
depends upon having a critical mass of specialists (which varies in number
with the type of work involved) necessary to do high quality work.
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The National Intelligence. Officer (NIO) System
During the 1950s and the 1960s one of the key organizations in the
intelligence community was the Office of National Estimates (ONE), which
was responsible for producing the National Intelligence Estimates. This
covered a wide range of topics. There were short "reaction" estimates
requested by the White 1-louse -- How will Moscow react to the mining of
Haiphong harbor? -- written in a few days. There were studies of likely
trends in countries or areas over the next few years, sometimes written
because policy decisions were to he made, and sometimes because the previous
NIE on the subject was outdated. There was also -- and this was one of
the most important -- an annual series of NIEs dealing with various aspects
of Soviet mil.4.tary and strategic developments. Estimates were drafted by
y. h f __ t - :J.. L (who __aC 5T^a1l ICAOP.a~ or .i
r.]}?._.'-L.::~~.S ::S
L:~T:O _~.. .. i..i ... t:,.._f ;. f,~ ONE .S'L (,!?/ on
throughout the government), and reviewed by the Board of National. Estimates,
a group composed of both generalists and specialists. All were coordinated
at meetings with representatives from the intelligence community before
being sent to USIB for final consideration and approval. In some cases,
agreement came quickly and easily. In other cases -- especially the estimates
of Soviet military capabilities and plans, upon which hinged important policy
decisions and budgetary allocations-- there were long and sometimes acrimonious
disputes between different agencies. The pace of ONE was occasionally frantic,
but an effort was made to provide time for reflection as well as production.
It was seldom easy to know how much impact the NIEs had on policy deci-
sions. This varied considerably with the topic under consideration, the
other sources of information available to the policy maker, the persuasiveness
of the particular document, and the extent to which the minds of top officials
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were opened or closed on a particular subject. NIEs were sometimes not
read, sometimes read but ignored, sometimes used by those whose views
they buttressed (as witness George Ball's unsuccessful use of the NIEs
on Vietnam to argue against U.S. involvement there) and sometimes had a
clearly discernible effect on U.S. policy.
The NIES were originally designed to fit into the orderly processes
of the NSC under Truman and Eisenhower. The more informal style of the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations somewhat reduced the status of the
NIEs, though more in the political than in the military area. NIEs faced
more competition from ideas generated by columnists, professors, and others
outside the government. The influence they had stemmed more from the
persuasiveness of their arguments than from their status as NIEs.
The Nixon Administration was not happy with the NIE process or the
Office of National Estimates. Its leading figures claimed ONE was nn-illing
or unable to grapple with the issues that concerned it, and looked upon the
NIEs as too bland and lacking in intellectual rigor. People in the Office
of National Estimates felt that the Administration's displeasure arose
largely because ONE was unwilling to tailor its views on developments abroad
-- such as on Vietnam or Soviet weapons developments -- to the preconceived
views of the Administration. It would probably be unfair to the Administration
to dismiss the first reason, but it would he naive to exclude the second one.
The replacement of ONE by the NIO system in 1973 was an attempt to do
several things. The DCI wanted a group of high-level advisors on particular
areas. These were to he generalists in terms of covering all intelligence
functions -- collection, analysis, operations, and relations with policy
makers -- for their particular areas rather than generalists on world affairs.
Thus the NIOs are responsible for advising the DCI on collection needs
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and proposed covert operations, as well as supervising the production of
NIEs. The NIO seldom draft the NIEs, but assign that task to snecialists
on the particular topic elsewhere in CIA or the intelligence community.
It is too early to appraise the effectiveness of the NIO system in
terms of the quality of NIE production. However, one can point to potential
strengths and weaknesses of the new system. It probably is more responsive
to consumer needs since the NIOs are in closer touch with policy makers,
and this should make it possible to give the NIEs a sharper focus on the
issues under consideration. The production process is more flexible; bureau-
cratic lines can be crossed and the most knowledgeable specialist can be
given the assignment to draft an NIE.
There are also several problems and potential. dangers to the new system.
One involves quality control; the most knowledgeable specialist is not always
an adept drafter, and the drafts are Y^.iewed only by the individual ?IO
before being sent to other agencies for consideration. Another is the decline
in intellectual interchange across areal or functional responsibilities.
This was a stronc point of ONE, but the press of time and the multiple resnonsi-
bilities of the NIO reduce the opportunities for this. However, the greatest
potential danger -- and I have heard no evidence that it is more than potential
so far -- is that the present system is inherently more vulnerable to pressure
than was the old. ONE was not only fiercely proud of its independence of
judgment, but as a corporate body was able to protect it. This will be more
difficult for an individual NIO, and will require occasional doggedness on
the part of both the NIO and the DCI. A more subtle variation of this is
that repponsibility for drafting some NIEs will be assigned to other agencies
where the analysts are subject to more intense policy pressures. This may
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47.
affect the tone more than the key judgments -- which will remain the DCI's
but tone can have an effect on the impression left with the reader.
It would be useful to explore ways to give the NIOs as a group more of a
corporate existence so as to minimize these dangers without damaging the
flexibility of the present arrangements.
Intelligence Support for U.S. Foreign Economic Policy
The growing importance of international economic affairs during recent
years has brought to the fore many difficult questions regarding U.S. foreign
economic policy. (In reality the U.S. does not have a foreign economic policy,
but a series of policies dealing with trade, energy, finance, food, transporta-
tion, etc.) Key issues include not only the appropriate policies to be pur-
sued but also what departments should have what responsibilities, how their
efforts should be coordinated, and where the responsibility should be placed
for providing economic intelligence sunnort.
The formulation and execution of foreign economic policy are extremely
complex and.difficult matters. A large number of departments are involved ---
State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Interior -- as well as organi-
zations of various types dealing with resources, aviation, shipping, central
banking, communications and environmental issues. There is a growing awareness
that many economic problems transcend national boundaries, and that the inter-
national institutions and procedures established at the end of World War II
need major restructuring. Coordination within the U.S. government, which
would he needed in any case,is doubly important in such circumstances. More-
over, foreign economic policy affects -- and is affected by -- domestic eco-
nomic conditions and policies to a marked extent. Each agency and department
involved has its domestic clientele, whose support gives it power and whose
particular interests it strives to protect and advance. Finally, foreign
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economic policy is foreign as well as economic, and must be coordinated
with U.S. military and diplomatic policies.
There are four broad choices available regarding the organization and
coordination of foreign economic policy, and the appropriate organizational
and procedural arrangements for economic intelligence are to some extent
dependent upon which of the four is chosen. The first would involve the
establishment of a Department of Foreign Economic Affairs, which would take
over the foreign economic responsibilities of all departments. Such a
would
change/provide a clear final point of responsibility, but would have the
disadvantage of creating an artificial division between foreign and domestic
economic activities at a time of increasing interdependence. (It probably
part
would also be politically impossible to strip strong departments/of their powers.)
A second possible arrangement would he to give the coordinating responsi-
bility to.a single department, along the lines of proposals periodically
made to give the responsibility to the State Department for foreign policy.
The difficulty here is that no one department has the combination of technical
competence, breadth of vision, and political support necessary to play such
a role.
This leaves two interdepartmental approaches. One involves the use of
something like the Council of International Economic Policy with the responsi-
bility for broad policy planning and coordination, with a small staff of its
own but relying on inter-agency committees to deal with particular issues.
Such a body would have to rely on individual departments to negotiate with
foreign governments. The final possibility is to give the National Security
Council responsibility in this area,with departments which are not in the
NSC framework being brought into deliberations involving their areas of
responsibility. A major drawback is the tremendously expanded workload. this
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49.
would create for the NSC. In the past, policy formulation and coordination
have been undertaken partly by the CIEP and partly by the NSC -- a system
that satisfies virtually--no one.
These developments raise several important questions: First, which
organizations within the U.S. government should have the responsibility for
collecting economic information, and by what methods against which targets?.
Much of the information needed for foreign economic policy is either unclas-
sified or available from normal government reports, but some useful material
may be obtainable only by agents or as a by-product of sophisticated tecl-no-
logical collection methods by such organizations as the National Security
Agency. This poses a particular problem with regard to the economic acti-
vities of U.S. citizens or corporations. Is collection of information on
such activities -- when they have international implications -- a reasonable
function of inteli35,auce orga:LizaLiors, or does till. itivoly. "LiL
l-cm, in do ues 1
affairs outside their jurisdictions?
Second, where should the analysis of foreign economic trends -- and
their implications for the United States -- be carried out? At the present
time it is to some extent scattered throughout the government. Originally,
CIA was responsible only for national economic intelligence on Communist
countries (including their foreign economic activities). The State Department
had responsibility for the non-Communist world, although other departments
did some studies in their particular fields -- departmental or tactical as
against national intelligence. Over the years, however, State's role has
diminished and that of CIA has increased. CIA's economic support is highly
regarded throughout the government; its output appears to be of high quality
and relevance. However, most of the departments with economic policy respon-
sibilities are not members of USIB, and it is not clear how effectively their
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needs will be met by the intelligence community over the long term under
the present arrangements.
A third question arises out of the need to share the results of
economic research and analysis with other governments and international
organizations on certain occasions. (Some of these reports are distributed
by the State Department, which is a logical arrangement for the present.)
But if foreigners become aware that some of these studies originate with
CIA, will they fear they are being given distorted information or is this
he
no more of a problem at present than it would/if the reports originated
elsewhere within the U.S. government? Yow much influence should any problems
that develop along these lines have on organizational arrangements for eco-
nomic intelligence production?
Fourth, how should information on the state of technology in foreign
countries be made available on a systom tic basis to thaw government agencies
responsible for licensing the export of U.S. technology? Are there adequate
procedures for allowing such agencies to ask the intelligence community what
the security implications of such technology transfers are?
Finally, what standards and procedures should govern how commercially
useful information obtained through intelligence collection efforts should
be released to U.S. firms? Obviously, it should be done on a nondiscriminatory
basis. But that is the easiest part of the answer. Does the intelligence
community decide when security overrides possible economic advantage, or
should those departments which a specific responsibility for furthering U.S.
economic interests have a voice in these decisions?
In view of the uncertainties about the extent and likely duration of
the turmoil in the international economy -- and the lack of any consensus
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51.
about the appropriate U.S. government organizational s*ructure and pro-
cedural. arrangements for dealing with foreign economic policy -- it
would be more sensible to build upon the present arrangements for economic
intelligence than to make any major organizational. changes. One procedural
arrangement that. might be appropriate, however, would be to make sure that
there are adequate provisions for the DCI to report to the CIEP -- and for
the latter body (as well as departments outside the in.tell.isence community)
to have the authority to task the intelligence community. If the CIEP (or
a similar organization) gradually acquires something approaching the status
of the NSC, there will he time enough to decide whether it should have its
own intelligence research unit.
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