REPORT ON DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900160040-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: July 29, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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July 29, 1969
Report on Defense Intelligence
Introduction
In the months ahead it is likely that intelligence products which
are as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make
them will be even more critical than they are today. There are serious
and severe problerxis within the Defense intelligence community. Many
of these problems stem from the methods we presently employ to
allocate intelligence resources against requirements. Others relate
to inadequacies in the collection and utilization of intelligence or to
difficulties in the estimating processes.
As a result of my investigation, I have concluded that:
In the area of resource allocation, a new line function
must be established.
-- In the other areas an improved staff element is
necessary in OSD rather than a line function.
participation in the other areas.
This report therefore proposes that a Special Assistant be established
to perform the line resource allocation function and to improve OSD staff
Background
In 1953, the Secretary of Defense established the position-of
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations). This
Assistant recommended policies and provided guidance on planning and
program development to DoD intelligence agencies and components,
reviewed plans and programs, developed DoD positions on intelligence
problems, and :made recommendations to the Secretary on the actions
necessary to provide for more efficient and economical operations.
In practice the position, was almost exclusively concerned with suaer-
vision of NSA. It was seriously handicapped by the lack of a charter
to function as the focal point for DoD intelligence resource management.
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In 1960, a Presidential Task Force, chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick,
was directed to study the organizational and management aspects of the
intelligence community. The Task Force recommended the establishment
of a focal point within OSD to exercise broad management review authority
over military intelligence programs, and to-provide overall coordination
of all foreign intelligence activities conducted by various defense com-
ponents. The report emphasized the operation and use of intelligence
rather than resource management. However, it was one input considered
when DIA was established in.1961. The DoD press release of 2 August 1961,
announcing the establishment of DIA, stated that a "more efficient
allocation of critical intelligence resources, more effective management
of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of duplicating
facilities and organizations" was expected. The position of Assistant
for.Special Operations was disestablished concurrently with the establish-
ment of DIA. His responsibilities vis-a-vis NSA were assigned to DDR&E.
Today, under the umbrella of the Consolidated Intelligence
Program (CIP), the DIA "manages only about 25% of the DoD resources
devoted to satisfying both military and "national" intelligence requirements.
The bulk of the resou; ces are found in a number of other programs such
as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), or are treated outside
any formal program.
The Secretary of Defense is faced with the problem that There is
no review which compares the resources in one program targeted against
-a requirement with the resources committed against the same require-
ment in another program. Similarly, there is no arrangement for
evaluating information requirements in terms of intelligence objectives.
In addition, this situation has been complicated by excessive classification
and security compartmentation, which tend to isolate programs and
thwart comparisons.
Obj ectives
The ultimate objective of good intelligence program is to
provide a better intelligence product to the consumers; a product which
is as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make
.it. The attainment of this overall objective requires improvements in
(1) collection and utilization of intelligence; (2) the estimating processes;
and (3) allocation of resources. The functions of a Special Assistant
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Objective 1. To establish a resource review and decision-
making process for major intelligence activities. By
resource review I mean determining the appropriate level
and mix of significant resources for the satisfaction of
intelligence requirements. There are inseparable rein-
forcing objectives which are essential elements of this
overall Objective. These inherent objectives are: (1)
".To establish a mechanism for making comparisons and
appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activ-
ities and programs so that DoD decision-makers can select
the most efficient and effective systems for collecting,
processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence.
(What form this mechanism takes is relatively unimportant.
It should be simple and understandable. I'll refer to it,
whatever form it takes, as the Consolidated Defense
Intelligence Program (CDIP)); (2) to improve Defense
intelligence resources allocation planning for the mid-range
period by establishing a Five-Year Intelligence Resource
Plan updated annually; and (3) to focus attention on
decisive points in this program by developing major issue
studies on unresolved problems of intelligence resource
allocation and management.
Existing DoD intelligence resource programs (CIP,
CCP, and others)-are institutionalized and are not
evaluated in relation to mutual target objectives or in
terms of mission-oriented information needs.
are different with respect to the operational and estimating processes
of the intelligence community than they are with resource management.
Any organization or personnel changes resulting from this
report should be made to achieve the following objectives listed in
priority. (You will notice that these objectives are primarily aimed
at resource management and intelligence policies, and not management
of intelligence operations of a day-to-day nature. This does not imply
that the management of the intelligence operations is flawless. On the
contrary, there is substantial dissatisfaction with certain operations
of defense intelligence. However, improved management and operations
can better result through improved personnel and policies rather than a
radically new organization. ) The objectives are:
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The DoD intelligence community at the present time
does not know the minimum level of information that
will satisfy a stated requirement. While there is no
upper boundary on intelligence requirements, there is
a limit on resources. Therefore, resource limitations
make it important to ascertain requirements as precisely
as possible. We need to insure that all valid require-
ments are met to some minimum level, without going to
higher levels on some requirements while ignoring other
valid requirements. In other words, the risks involved
in acceptance of reduced or alternate levels of efforts
must be known. - "
The focus of intelligence planning and programming
activities tends to be in the near term period (one or
two years ahead). Long lead times for modern technical
collection systems, automated processing systems and
automated analytic and production aids create the need
to develop a long term intelligence resource plan. With-
our such planning, intelligence decisions rely on short
term considerations. Further, there is a. tendency to
develop options made available by rapidly expanding
technology simply because they are available.
In the present programming process, recommendations
reaching the Secretary and Deputy Secretary show
fluctuations in manpower and money from previously
approved levels but more significant issues do not tend
to surface within DoD. Frequently, past decisions on
elements or systems having high dollar value or
significant ramifications in a functional area have been
reached through the mechanism of ad hoc groups con-
vened by the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense to
study each problem when it arises -- generally in a time
frame which does not'permit in-depth analysis.
Objective .2. To improve information flow and policy
transmission on intelligence matters between the DoD
and other government agencies concerned with intelli-
gence resources by functioning-as DoD.focal.point for
interagency relations.
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Currently, below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary
of Defense level, no single agency or individual has the
authority to participate across the board in an effective
dialogue at the highest levels with non-DoD agencies.
Representation today is fragmented among a number
of DoD intelligence officials none of whom possesses
the necessary responsibility for all DoD programs.
Since the Special'Assistant will not be the sole DoD
representative in the intelligence community, it is
indispensable that senior DoD intelligence officials
i do not operate independently of each other.
Objective 3. To obtain a more efficient distribution
of the functional responsibilities of the DoD intelli-
gence agencies and organizations through an evaluation
of their organizational relationships, roles, and missions.
The U. S. Congress, in the HACIT Report of 1968,
and other government agencies have been concerned
that the military Services are performing functions
specifically delegated to the DIA and vice versa.
Additionally, the relationship of the National Security
Agency (NSA) to counterpart a gencies in the military
Services as well as to the Unified and Specified
Commands, has been questioned. The institutional.
structure of the Defense intelligence co'rnmunity is
the result of a piecemeal process which seldom
addressed the interrelationships of the elements in
the community as a whole.
Objective 4. To improve intelligence flow by insuring
that a realistic reappraisal of security policies and
procedures is undertaken with a view toward modifying
standards which lead to unnecessary classification
and over- compartmentation of intelligence information.
(Obviously any activity along this line would have to
be coordinated among all elements of the intelligence
community and with the DCI specifically.) .
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Dialogue between the participants in DoD intelli-
gence programs is restricted. As a result, at times
officials charged with reviewing existing programs are
denied information essential to the formulation of
recommendations.
Organization
I recommend that you name one individual to act as the Special
Assistant,to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for defense
intelligence. He would be responsible for intelligence resource
management. In addition, he would act as staff advisor to the
Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for all other DoD intelligence
activities. The solution to our current problems in intelligence
management will not be found in the panacea of mass reorganization.
There are no clear cut solutions to the problems we face. The
Special Assstant will be feeling his way along a path that will require
the closest cooperation of all members of the intelligence community
to insure meaningful progress.
The Special Assistant will make the trade-offs among intelligence
programs competing for resources. Directors of DoD intelligence
agencies would of course have the right of reclama to the Secretary
or Deputy Secretary of Defense. In other matters, the Directors of
'DoD intelligence agencies would report to the Secretary but the Special
Assistant would act as the Secretary's principal staff element.
On occasion the Special Assistant would undoubtedly direct
certain broad management activities other than resources. When
so doing, he would be acting for the Secretary/Deputy Secretary.
It would serve little purpose to attempt to delineate to what extent
and when the Special Assistant would become involved in day-to-day
operations. Suffice that he will become involved at the pleasure
of the Secretary/'DeptJC :, :;C: C :~ 'r ~C ': :' '. ?.C ^; );C ,: -`'i-~ );' );C ,: Jai= ~C %i: ~;C ~,: %,L?
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In determing which staffing Alternative to recommend, I
considered each in light of the objectives listed earlier:
Objective 1. (Establish a resource review and decision
making process for intelligence resources management. )
The Special Assistant and his staff would have to: (1) Establish
and conduct an objective-oriented Consolidated Defense Intelligence
Program (CDIP) which would encompass all DoD.managed intelligence
resources (Tactical intelligence resources --.once defined -- would
not be managed by the Special Assistant. However, he must be cognizant
of them to the extent that he can properly evaluate their impact on. the
employment of resources allocated to the satisfaction of the highest
level military and national intelligence requirements); (2) Establish a
Five-Year -Intelligence Resource Plan to improve intelligence resource
allocation planning for the mid-range period; and (3) Formulate major
issues of intelligence resources allocation and management.
Initially, it will take, a considerable number of man years tob_, ,
achieve this objective. I do not think the staff should be set up for
the initial surge of personnel needs. - This initial surge could be met
on an ad hoc basis from within DoD.
This is the highest priority Objective. Presently it is not being
met. Decision makers need 'a framework for selecting alternative
.options and corresponding levels of effort. Establishing a CDIP to
provide this framework, and conducting an annual review-has primary
claim on manpower assigned to the Special Assistant. An early goal
should be the reduction of detail that currently characterizes the
present intelligence reviews (CIP and CCP). There is unanimous
agreement that excessive detail makes these reviews unwieldy and
makes it necessary to devote manpower to these efforts to an
unwarranted level. (The Directors of the Doi) intelligence agencies
will be directly responsible for the development of their respective
programs.)
The Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan will strive: (1) to
permit resource. allocation decisions to be made as early as possible,
especially for long lead-time items; (2) to explore the adequacy of
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resources to meet future needs; (3) to present the. costs and benefits
of satisfying various levels of intelligence needs, and (4) to understand
better the resource implications of satisfying various future require-
m ents.
A major factor in the development of the Plan is the pressing
need to establish a continuing system for review of intelligence collection
requirements against collection resources, taking into account costs
and risks. No means exist at present for accomplishing this, since there
is no measure of value for levels of information. No one knows how
much information is essential and we have. only sketchy estimates of
what it 'costs to obtain the information. (There are a number of efforts
underway which, hopefully, will structure a solution to this problem.
The formulation of major issues is closely tied to the preceding
objectives, -and much of it can be accomplished in the process of _
gaining those objectives. Formulating major issues has never been
attempted successfully in the Defense intelligence community. It is,
however, necessary in order to determine the proper courses to follow.
In theory Objective 1 could be accomplished by any of the three
staffing Alternatives. However, if Alternative 1 (the minimum staff)
were selected, the Special Assistant would operate principally as a
monitor, with the major effort fragmented among DoD agencies. As a
practical matter, therefore, it is questionable wh*Qther Alternative 1
could do the job.
Objective 2. (Improve intelligence communications
among DoD and other agencies. )
It is envisioned that the Special Assistant would act as the DoD
intelligence management contact with DCI, BOB, PFIAB, and other
?non-DoD members of the intelligence community. One of the less
obvious responsibilities would be to keep communication channels
open at all times unimpeded by .a lack of rapport and understanding.
Any one of the three staffing Alternatives could satisfy this
Objective.
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Objective 3. (Evaluate the intelligence organizational
relationship, roles and missions. )
It appears that this could best be.accomplished by an Ad Hoc
study group. (The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel appears to be a likely
candidate.) As a?result, this could be accomplished under any of the
Alternatives.
Objective 4: (Reappraise security policies and eliminate
unnecessary classification and over- compartmentation in
the intelligence field.
This Objective would necessitate a review, under the aegis
of the DCI, of current security policies and procedures. It is a
continuing effort because of the ever present tendency to over-classify
and over- do- compartmentation.
There is a distinct feeling in the community that over-classifica-
tion and over-compartmentation exist. It is a natural tendency and I
observed evidence of it. If it is present in any significant degree, it
C> Co
certainly is bad because over-classification impedes the flow of informa-
tion and over-compartmentation excludes agencies and individuals who
may have a legitimate need for the information.
Both A lternatives 2 and 3 (the middle and maximum staffing
.Alternatives) could accomplish-this Objective. Alternative 1 (the
minimum staffing Alternative) could not accomplish it unless the
`function was farmed out to other OSD elements.
The primary advantage of Alternative 1 (minimum staff) is
that it requires a minimum number of people under the Special Assistant.
Cosmetically, this is advantageous.
The primary disadvantage of Alternative 1 is that it would be
impossible for the Special Assistant to achieve the stated Objectives.
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responsibilities for intelligence.
without relying almost entirely on a number of other elements in DoD.
This raises the distinct possibility of the Special Assistant having the
image of responsibility but not the ability to carry it out.
Alternative 2 (the middle staff) has the advantage of providing
sufficient staff to meet all of the objectives and establishing the Special
Assistant as the intelligence manager for the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense. All the staffing would be under the supervision
of the Special Assistant.. It also clearly reduces fragmentation of DoD
The disadvantage, if it really is one, is that this level of staffing
will not allow the Special Assitant to become involved in the day-to-day
operations of the intelligence agencies. Another disadvantage, if it is
one, is that the Special Assistant will spend a good deal of his time
dealing with DoD agencies and the rest of the intelligence community
because staff will not be available.
-certainly require a lot of attention. Once the new organization is
started and running, you may perceive that it is indeed a full-time job.
'At that time the billet can be so designated. The 'same reasoning
applies to the size of the staff: as more is learned about the workload,
you will be better- able to determine the size of the Special Assistant's
staff. As of now, about 15 professionals appear to be adequate to get
the system started.
At this stage, it is impossible to say whether or not the Special
A'ssistant's duties will require his full-time attention: in other words,
will the workload prevent assigning the job to an ASD as additional
duty? From all my observations and conversations, I feel that it will
not be a full-time job, although getting the new system started will
Alternative 3 (:maximum staff) has the advantage of being able
to accomplish all objectives -- and then some. It not only allows the
Special Assistant to be primarily responsible. for intelligence
resource management but could permit him to become deeply in the
day-to-day intelligence operations. . The primary disadvantages of
Alternatives 3 are the cosmetic one of added manpower and the
disruption caused by major reorganization. Both Congress and the
intelligence community.would react adversely to this.
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Alternative 3, because of the considerable additional OSD
manpower and disruption, does not make sense at this time.
Alternative 1 would be.an improvement over the present but
the lack of sufficient staff supporting the Special Assistant would
probably leave responsibility diffused.
I recommend Alternative 2. It is a happy compromise. It
would accomplish the four stated objectives with a minimum of
reorganization and personnel.
Location of the Special Assistant
The nurnber?of options available for the location of a Special
Assistant for Intelligence narrows down to five:
Option 1, "Normalize" present intelligence resource.
management and allocation with a Five-Year Intelligence
Resource Plan, Development Concept-Papers (DGP's)
from the Director, Defense Research and Engineering,
and Major Program Memoranda (MPM's) from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis),
with a minimum role being played by the Special
Assistant.
Option 2. Assign to an existing Assistant Secretary of
Defense the responsibilities described in this report
for the Special Assistant for Intelligence.
Option 3. Establish the Special Assistant under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Option 4. Establish a Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense as a separate office directly subordinate to
the Secretary.
Option 5. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence).
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Analysis of the Options
Option 1 does not truly integrate the DoD intelligence effort,
and it puts sizing and development of intelligence forces under officials
who have an interest in intelligence products for use in developing
weapons or in setting force levels. It has the effect of placing the
intelligence resource management responsibilities in the hands of
officials who are customers for various parts of the intelligence
product. (This Option actually lends itself only to staffing Alternative 1. )
Option 2 furnishes the man charged with the job with the prestige
and authority, both inside DoD and with other government agencies,
possessed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Further, the intelligence
management function envisioned should not require the full-time attention
of an ASD. However, when required, the authority of his office as an
ASD is available.
Option 3. The JCS are oriented primarily toward strategic
planning and direction and tp those activities of the military Services
which.supply these functions. The assignment of intelligence resource
management to the JCS.would short-circuit those responsibilities for
resource allocation and management charged to the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. - The JCS
are also customers for major portions of the intelligence product.
Their responsibility in intelligence management is more properly
one of providing views based on the intelligence reeds of the JCS and
the combat forces.
Option 4 would probably accomplish the objectives but is
handicapped by the lack of position and authority normally associated
with an ASD. The Special Assistant in this Option is solely dependent
on his relationship to the Secretary to accomplish the objectives. As
a'result, there is an aura of the "ad hoc" about a separate Special
Assistant.
Option 5 would require redesignation of an existing ASD or
Congressional action to add an ASD because of the statutory limit
of seven Assistant Secretaries. The magnitude of the intelligence
function suggested in staff Alternatives 1 and 2, in terms of manning
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.levels and percentage of. the total DoD budget managed, is relatively
small and therefore militates against Option 5.
Recommendations
I eliminate location Option 1 (normalize present practice) and
3 (JCS) because it appears to me that either could result in the Special'.
Assistant being unable to achieve the stated objectives.
I recommend Option 2 (assign to an existing ASD).
If there is some reason that Option 2 is not selected, I would
recommend Option 4 (Special Assistant) and finally Option 5 (New ASD).
.Respectfully submitted,
Robert F. Froehlke
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