INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000100070023-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 5, 1953
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2002/01
6Ai
INDONESIA
e of crisis.
A. New anunist-influenced. cabinet is widening
cleava
e b
t
g
e
ween right and left.
This causing political confusioasss Which
Communists exploit
C. Other results may be increasing lawlessness,
a military coup, rebellion to pct Ind
i
ones
a
and serious economic deterioration.
11. Now this Situation developed.
way for this cabinet.
These parties, Nasjumi and National,
broke over latter's cooperation with
Communists.
Cabinet created only through Communist support.
1. CommunIsts have no posts but key
ministries fillod by Communist
sympathizers..
2. Communist vote in parliament
necessary to cabinet's parlia--
as entary suppor
III. Vulnerability of government to Communist
A.
of Communist program.
1. Create a Political impasse and then
propose a "national front,-
"National front" eventually sril
_
replaced by a "peoplesss' democracy.
Communist program well under way.
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gatent of Communist influence in cabinet.
1. Defense, Justice, Finance and
*oonoaics headed by pro-Communists.
Perhaps also foreign affairs and communications.
2. Moderate premier All a front be probably cannot control his colleagues.
C. Probable Communist--influenced cabinet policies.
1. Anti-western acts like cancellation
of 'CA.
2, Cessation of war on Communist guerrillas.
3. More trade with Soviet Orbit.
e, Closer diplomatic relations with
Moscow and Peiping.
IV. Coming tensions
A. President Sukarno's role and rift with Vice
President Etta.
1. Sukarno's acceptance of cabinet
unexpected; looks like he more
leftist than hitherto thought.
2. Pro-1 Vice President Satta may
break with Sukarno and rally
moderates to halt leftist trend.
B. Masjumi will probably try to overthrow cabinet
in parliament. Its success uncertain.
C. Prospects for 1954 elections.
1. This cabinet would try to rig or
postpone them.
2. Nationalists and Communists knob
llJuati more popular and fear
defeat in elections.
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URUTY_INFORMATtt
B. Military coup attempt is possible.
1. Rightist army and police officers
sight try a coup or league with
Moslem insurgents, the Darul Islas.
2. in event of a coup attempt, however,
certain military commands, particu-
larly in East Indonesia, would remain
loyal to Sukarno.
Greatest danger is that no political or military
action will unseat the cabinet.
Communists could then consolidate
control over the cabinet and
eliminate the opposition piecemea
V. Economic situation is also gloomy.
A. Economic deterioration is result of falling
world rubber prices.
B. Now cabinet expected to pass nationalization
and labor lave crippling to industry.
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L. _