CIA MEMO ON THE CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400070005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 16, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

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State Department review completed
PLITIRET
'two documeft *00fibu 0j,
Cow ; a e4que ! i i A.
John A. cC.
CU Memo on tM Congo
MR. CCommifts on CIA Meinoran&m
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TNR Co mn ents on CIA' InLe Llir-enee Memorandum,
The Pol'',ical Situation and Prospects in the Congo,
February 'O, l)64
CIA Paragraph One
The Memorandum underestimates Adoula's influence and fails to give
sufficient weight to the considerabole leverage that the central government
The Intelligence Memorandum is accurate in stating that Prime
Minister Adoula lacks a regional political base and in suggesting that
his influence rests primarily in his skill as a mediator and compromiser
of conflicting interests. Adoula wields power as chairman of a coalition
of generally compatible moderates who exercise control over the instruments
of coercion, the ANC and the National Suret:', as well as over central
government sources of financial largesse. Part of his success in this
role may be attribited to his only occasional direct confrontations With
either his lieutenants or opponents in Leopoldville and the provinces.
The members of the so-called "Binza group" appear to have been
unable to resolve their conflicting political interests without Adoula,
who probably is responsible for the group's continued cohesion, and its
accommodation with other forceful political personalities such as Minister
of Defense Anany.
Adoula, on occasion, also has proven capable of strong action. The
successful dispatch of Gizen a' Stanleyville and Kalonji's South Kasai
government, and the termination of the Katangaisecession show that his
manner of governing has merit. Moreover, he has played direct and
significant roles in monetary reform, negotiations with Belgium on
debt settlement, planning for ANC retraining, and curbing provincial
controlover education budgets.
The quasi-federal structure of the Congolese government under the Loi
Fond.omentale precludes Leeopoldville's domination of the provinces, though
there is no doubt that, if the ANC were more effective, it might have been
employed more vigorously to support central government authority. Stability
in the Congo, however, will continue to depend largely on 1) the ability of
the provinces to govern themselves (albeit with the support of the ANC)
and 2) the respect of the provincial governments for the federal principle.
On balance, the cooperation of the provinces with the central govern-
ment has been good since January 1963 -- admittedly with several stark
exceptions.
Though conscious of their local power, the provincial leaders are
aware of their dependence on Leopoldville subsidies and import quotas,
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and also often welcome the stabilizing influence of an ANC physical presence.
The central government's relationship with the provinces has most often
been faulted by an inability to fill the provinces' increasing demands for
funds and services and a tendency to substitute "states of exception" --
military government.-- for central government intervention on the political
plane.
CIA Paragraph Two
The GOC should be congratulated for its recent firm efforts to prevent
provi~ racial squandering of massive education subsidies.
It would be more accurate to refer to the circumscribed powers. enjoyed
by Adoula and his colleagues in dealing with the provinces rather than to
their "lack of power."' The Memorandum points out the considerable political
and economic leverage maintained by the central government. Indeed, in late
1963 the central government took a bold step to reduce provincial waste of
subsidy funds by assuming direct control of education expenditures through-
out the provinces. Adoula's persuasive powers are hindered by his failure
to create a favorable national image. Moreover, his dependence on
provincial leaders for support in the upcoming elections should contribute
to his often exhibited reluctance to bear down on the provinces.
CIA Paragraph Three
The Memorandum seriously underrates the role played by the ANC; viewed
within the context of the Congo, the ANC, as a body, has been responsive to
General Mobutu and has proved to be perhaps the most effective element of
political stability throughout the Congo.
Although the ANC has exhibited an effectiveness and response to
discipline much improved over that exercised by the ex-Force Publique in
1960, INR agrees with the Memorandum that the ANC, judged by normal standards,
is a fragile reed of stability. Despite the Belgian failure to implement its
retraining program for the ANC, this army, according to Consulate Elisabethville,
has performed surprisingly well during 1963 in turbulent Katanga, during which
period Belgians requested ANC protection from bands of ex-gendarmes. ABC
activities in Kwilu -- given transport and communications handicaps -- have
been somewhat fumbling but commendable thus far. The ANC held firm during;
last year's strikes and police mutiny in Leopoldville. There is no documented
"widespread" resentment against the ANC, though isolated forays in the brutal
tradition of the Force Publique have rendered it unpopular in some areas.
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The susceptibility of military elements to subversion and the
attraction of plotting to seize political power should not be expected
to be less than that exhibited by the armies of former French Africa or
East Africa.
CIA Paragraph Four
The Adoula government deserves greater credit for its political
survival and, concomitantly, the maintenance ci' the country'_ national
political and economic structure than was accorded it in the Memorandum.
Adoula's indecisive and unimpressive performance should in fairness be
judged against the unimpressive showing of his political opponents.
The Memorandum points out that political survival together with the
containment, through timely political action, of the troublemaking potential
of opposition forces are the major achievements of the Adoula government.
Certainly the government's efforts, though characterized as dilatory by
some, have assisted-1n the isolation of Gizenga (still under detention),
the decline -- at least temporarily -- of Tshombe, the factionalization of
the MPTC/L, the defeat of parliamentary attempts to censure the government,
and the voluntary exiling of radical opponents. The expulsion of Soviet
Embassy personnel in November 1963 also has hampered opposition efforts.
These actions by the central government have served to maintain the country's
national political and economic structure.
CIA Paragraph Five
The Memorandum's contention that the Kwilu tribal violence "is only a
few degrees greater than that of some other provinces" is in error. While
the Kwilu uprising is serious, it is?not more effectively organized than
the earlier efforts of Gizenga in Stanleyville or Kalonji in South Kasai two areas subsequently reincorporated into the Congo.
The Katanga secession, the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville, and the
Kalonji state in South Kasai were more effectively organized than the current
Kwilu upheaval. Whatever the political aspirations of Pierre Mulele, the
origins of the Kwilu troubles are clearly tribal. Mulele's contact with
the Committee of National Liberation (CNL) does not necessarily mean that
he is obtaining meaningful support from the CNL or that the CNL as yet
is able to provide assistance. Though Mulele probably received encourage-
ment from Communist China, the role of the communists in Kwilu to date appears
to be limited. The ANC probably can eventually contain and quell the Kwilu
disturbance. This will require a major military commitment over many months.
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While military action may be able to subdue terrorists such as those of
Mule le, it cannot resolve historic tribal rivalries. Fortunately, none
of the other provinces at present are troubled by violence approaching
that which has disrupted the Kwilu area.
CIA Paragraph Six
The I morandum fails to recognize the fundamental dependence of the
predominantly Belgian business community in the Congo upon GOC cooperation
and foreign exchange allocations. The export industries certainly are not
'self sufficient," and the conflict between foreign business interests and
the central government has been a major political issue since independence.
The Memorandum notes the encouraging fact that production in the
modern sector of the economy compares favorably with pre-independence
levels. There is, however, a change from the Belgian administration in
that mining enterprises and agricultural plantations are now dependent upon
the central government for foreign exchange allocations for foreign personnel
and imports, including machinery and vehicles. Moreover, the central govern-
ment's failure to insure physical security could prompt the departure of
many technicians an3.other foreigners now resident in the Congo, thus
crippling the productive capacity of key export industries. The central
government also has prime responsibility for the maintenance of the Voic
Nationale and other transport links. Basic to the prospects of the Congolese
economy are the decisions made by individual firms. If they determine that
returns on their investments do not warrant continuing production, they well
may decide to curtail or even cease operations.
CIA Paragraph Seven
The fact that the "centralist" bloc is reported to h acre sufficient
votes on the constitutional commission to blockextremist provincial demands
for local autonomy should not be overlooked.
The objective of the constitutional commission is to produce a draft
constitution to replace the complex, often unworkable, and unratified Loi
Fondamentale. We understand that the "centralist's"retain sufficient votes
to block extreme provincial demands for local autonomy. Moreover, Kasavubu --
who seldom whistles in the dark -- expects a constitution to emerge from the
commission. While we are not sanpnine, neither can we prejudge the outcome.
CIA Paragraph Eight
While we have no major difference, we comment as follows:
Given its uphill fight in reaching accommodations with provincial leaders,
Radeco now appears to have significant though not firm support. Moreover,
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Nendaka probably realizes that Radeco -- whatever its final strength --
can be no more than a loose association of provincial political leaders.
Worthy also of inclusion in the Memorandum Is another major national
party, Anany's PDC, which has shown as much potential as Radeco. Though
consolidation of Radeco and PDC has not yet been serioiisly broached by
either, it remains poosible as elections approach.
Adoula's failure to back one or the other of these moderate parties
probably has hindered their coalescence. But we believe that lie is
biding his time until he is forced by approaching elections to choose
to back one, or to press for fusion. The latter course seems more likely.
It seems most unlikely that elections will be held in mid-196)+.
Before elections take place, a constitution should be adopted, the question
of the disputed territories resolved, a census taken, and an electoral
law adopted. Furthermore, we believe the failure to hold elections by June
is advantageous to the government, particularly in view of troubled
provincial situations that threaten to become serious disorders if
exacerbated by electoral campaigning.
CIA Paragraph Nine
While we have no major difference, we comment as follows:
We agree with the Memorandum that neither postponement of elections
nor wrangling over the constitution will greatly exacerbate the problems
presently confronting the central government. We also agree that the UN
military presence serves as a psychological deterrent to disorders in
Katanga and Leopoldville, a deterrent that may be totally removed by July.
CIA Paragraph Ten
We would go farther than the Memorandum and state that there is no
satisfactory short-term solution for the West in the Congo. It will be
a major achievement si_:rrply -o maintain a national structure in the Congo
over the coming years.
The phrase "satisfactory solution for the West in the Congo" appears
to us to demand qualification. The complexities of the Congo seem to
impede any quick "solution" of the country's problems. Given the foreign
involvement in the Congo and the extent of Congolese domestic problems, the
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Congo is likely to remain for the foreseeable future an international
stepchild.
More important, we feel, is that the political structure of the
Congo still retains a national form three-and-one-half years after
independence and that major se?nents of the economy have often maintained
or even increased their pro-independence production levels.
CIA Paragraph Eleven
Adoula is no more "politically shopworn" than the vast majority of
Congolese political figures. While we cannot discount the possibility of
Adoula's ouster at any time, Adoula has been considered on the brink of
overthrow on various occasions during his two-and-one-half years as
premier.
It is difficult to estimate Adoula's capacity for political survival.
His premiership reflects the volatile nature of Congolese politics. When
he and Gizenga were rival candidates at the Lovanium conclave in 1961, the
contest was judged as a toss up; Adoula won almost by acclamation. By
December 1962 it seemed probable that the i C/L and its tactical allies
had the ability to topple the Adoula government; their censures of
individual ministers were halted abruptly by the UN military sweep in
Katanga and the recess of Parliament. April saw another major assault on
the Adoula regime, one which-Adoula himself turned aside during a personal
confrontation of Kiwewa before the Senate. Again Adoula's political future
was being discounted in autumn 1963, but his arrest by the military governors
of Leopoldville did not materialize.
The possibility of an ANC takeover, perhaps in association with the
"Binza group" cannot be discounted. Though the !"Binza group" comprises
several of the more dynamic of the Congolese leaders, the prospect that this
leadership could manage the country's affairs more effectively than the Adoula
government is unlikely. Other formidable opponents include the CNL,
Tshombists, factions within the ANC, and labor. The most articulate
criticism of Adoula has come from the modest labor movement, which at one
time supported a national austerity program. Labor's strength, while largely
confined, to Leopoldville, could provide a focal point for others who
might wish to embarrass the present regime.
It would seem prudent to consider the political pressures generated
by the shortage of foreign exchange available to the Congo. Including
technical assistance, the Congo probably can expect no more than $90 million
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in foreign ussisi.ance during 1961i. The allocation of present foreign
exchange earnings has cauroed some hardship among the business community.
In 1960 major Belgian business concerns took an active interest in the
Congolese national elections; during the period of Katangan secession,
the Union Miniere and, in broader perspective, the Socidt(~ Gen4rale,
played a pivotal role. Given Belgian investments in excess of 2 billion
throughout the Congo, Belgian businesses can not be assumed to be passive
observers of the Congolese political scene.
CIA Paragraph Twelve
While we have no major difference, we comment as follows:
We agree that the subjugation of ethnic and provincial interests to
a national political organization does not appear to be an attainable
objective in the Congo at present. This is tree for the government and
the opposition alike. In seeking to align sufficient support among provincial
leaders to swing an electoral victory for a national coalition of moderates,
the. coalition leaders well might find Adoula the most suitable candidate to
head a moderate slate.
CIA Paragraph Thirteen
While we have no major difference, we comment as follows:
The Memorandum points out several groups or individuals who could
become involved in a pDwer grab. Elements of the ANC most probably would
be called upon to provide the force required for such a move. This would
heighten the danger that the ANC might split into separate units loyal to
contending aspirants to power, thus returning the country to the chaotic
security conditions of 1960-61. It is also correct to emphasize the
distinction between a "strong man" who can topple a Congolese leader and
one capable of effectively managing the government. While the thought of
a Nasser-like "strong man" may appeal to those who become impatient with
temporizing political actions of the central government, the fragile
structure of Congolese politics seems to exclude such a prospect for the
present.
Kamitatu's stature has been much diminished by the Kwilu revolt.
His vaunted "pilot province" is now a political shambles. Never popular,
Kamitatu is likely to find himself henceforth even weaker at the political
bargaining table.
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Anany and Mobutu do not -;et along well. At least for the moment,
Mobutl.i's support of Annoy would be essential if he were to succeed. Adoula.
CIA Paragraph Fourteen
We do not'agree that "Tshombe has made it clear that his objective
is power at trio national level. Many of his efforts seem directed at
the reestablishment of his power base in southern Katanga. It is premature
to assume that Tshombe in fact would be willing to join the central govern-
ment.
We cannot agree that the "3inza group" would relish Tshombe's return
to an "influential position" in Leopoldville, though several members may
see in this a possibility for reaching a better accommodation with Katanga
in preparation for the upcoming elections. MOST; members of the'$inza
group" are said to fear Tshombe's capacity for intrigue, and the power
of his bankroll. It is not certain that Tshombe's primary objective is
power at the national level. As the Memorandum points out, Tshombe remains
the best-known figure in Katangan politics. He apparently is finding it
awkward, however, to remote-control from Spain the rebirth of Conakat.
It can be argued that the only central government position acceptable
to Tshombe would be. that of Prime Minister. In this context, a tactical
alliance with the "nationalists" -- with whom he cooperated in early
December 1962 -- is possible. We do not feel, however, that Tshombe would
be able easily to obtain ANC support, vital to any political aspirant. The
ANC is not likely soon to forget the humiliation it suffered at Kongolo and
elsewhere at the hands of Tshombe's mercenaries and gendarmes.
With Tshombe as Prime Minister, Leopoldville's relations with the
provinces might improve for a time, but they would be likely soon to founder
on the basic requirement that the central executive be able to carry out
its constitutional responsibilities in the provinces. Revenues must accrue
to the central government for redistribution to the unviable provinces.
Moreover, the central government must have the authority to protect the
country's foreign exchange position through the allocation of import licenses
and foreign exchange quotas.
In sum, any future Congolese chief executive would face many of the
,same problems confronting Adoula and the responses of a responsible national
leader are likely to be similar to Adoula's.
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CIA Paragraph Fifteen
The Memorandum's prediction that "a labor-radical government is likely
to emerge sometime during; the next year or so" is not substantiated by the
considerable evidence available on the moderate political posture of the
major Congolese unions. We would also point cwt the prospect that a
radical central government would exercise less authority over the provinces
than would a moderate coalition in Leopoldville.
Labor leaders generally have not proven radical elements in the
Congolese political equation. Though they opposed some of Adoula's
policies, and disapprove of the "politicians," they now appear to be
collaborating with central government representatives at the constitutional
conmlission in Luluabourg. Moreover, they have shown no evidence of
leaguing with the so-called "nationalists"exiled in Congo (Brazzaville).
We feel that it is exceedingly premature to suggest that a labor-
radical government is likely to emerge during the next year or two. Strong
and often justified dissension exists among labor, the military, the
political outs, the youth, the unemployed, and some members of the govern-
ment. No matter what government is in power, this discontent will persist.
To maintain stability under these conditions, the executive must be
endowed with an effective coercive instrument to impose its will during the
period that it is getting on with the tasks of reorganization of the
government and rebuilding of the economy. Thus, it is imperative that the
ANC be strengthened.
At the some time, it should be recalled that the Congolese have a
strong sense of legality in their concept of the proper, conduct of govern-
ment. Thus, there will be strong pressures in Leopoldville and the provinces
to construct a viable central government related meaningfully to the
provincial administrations.
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The Honorable Thomas L. .ghee
Director of Intelligence and Research
ith reference to your memorandum of
16 March concerning differences in appraisal on the
situation in the Congo. I agree completely that the
cxperts from CIA and from the Department af State
should gat together to discuss differinS; views. More
importantly they should make sure that they are
sharing fully all the information available.
The situation in the Congo is a complicated
and important matter on which I would readily expect
differing appraisals. I have asked Asir. Cline, Deputy
Director for Intelligence, to follow up on the arrange-
z >ents proposed for a meeting of the experts from CIA
and the Department of State.
JOHN A. McCONE
L )irector
WWTElder:MMW (17 Mar 64)
Orig - Addressee
cc - DC1
'ER
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