(Sanitized) WARNING PAPER (ATTACHED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000900060012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 24, 1974
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80MO1082A000900060012-8
IC 74-2099
24 Octt,ber 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
arning Paper (attached
1. This paper, except for the paragraph on the Alert Memorand ,I,
.is an excellent summary of the mechanisms being developed to lmpro' z
communication within the community during acrisis. I think it
inaccurate, however, to call these mechanisms "A National arning
System" and to imply that their use will enable the community to
provide better warning of impending crises.
2. The national warning system consists of the Alert Memo, and
procedures, the -Watch (or Strategic ,yarning) mechanism, the
procedures being developed under NSDM 242 t-, cope with unclear
warning, and ultimately (but not a responsibility of the inteiligen?.e
community) tactical warning systems, such as BMEW S. N I .!, 0 .,
CONTEXT, etc. can in one way or another support these warnini-
systems but are not in themselves such a system.
Acting Chief, PR D
Attachment:
As stated
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 -
IC Registry
PRD Subj ect
1 - PRD Chrono
w/o att)
Approved For Release 2004/05/05:: ClA
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Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80MO1082A000900060012-8
A NATIONAL WARNING SYSTEM
Introduction
Beginning with Pearl Harbor our ability to obtain and act on warning
information has been conspicuous for its failures rather than successes.
With the exception of the Cuba Missile Crisis, there have been an almost
continuous succession of failures down through the Yom Kippur war and
Cyprus. In almost. every case there was adequate information existing
within the structure of our government but the information failed to
converge to time to allow warning.
Part of the 'probl em derives from the proliferation-of organizations
who are contributers to the warning process. In the area of intelligence
alone, for example, at the time of Pearl Harbor there were only three.
intelligence agencies (Army..6-2, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the
FBI) and now there are over two dozen. The intent here is not to criticize-
these various activities--they all do useful work--but rather to point
out that the problem of converging critical and relevent information is
growing exponentially more difficult.
From time to time there have been major organizational efforts to
consolidate--the creation of CIA and NSA being notable examples--or repeated
efforts to reorganize, such as the current discussions on the role of the
Watch Committee/National Indications. Center.
A different approach is to take organizations as they exist but give
them a new dimension of communication by means of interagency remote confer-
encing techniques. Some efforts are made in the direction of interagency
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communication by the exchange of liaison officers, or, during a crisis,
the creation of interagency task forces, but their efforts are hampered oy
being away from their parent organizations, among other problems.
Current Conferencing Networks
In May, 1973, the then DCI (and later the current DCI) accepted the
proposal to explore the use of remote conferencing networks. In April
1974 the USIB agreed to make the National Operations and Intelligence
Watch Officers Net (NOIWON) operational. The NOIWON consists of the Watch
officers of CIA, DIA, NSA, State, State/INR, J-3 and the White House
Situation Room. The NOIWON proved particularly useful in the Cyprus
crisis, being used as. much as four times within one hour. If any two Wt