PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000800120008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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aC,
DCl/IC 74-0966
1 March 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCl/IC
SUBJECT : Perspective of the Intelligence Environment
1. Attached for your consideration is a first draft of the 1974 .
version of the DCI's "Perspective" paper. Part I, "Trends in the World
Situation," was prepared by PRG, and Part II, "The Intelligence Impera-
tives," by CS. Copies are being circulated to and the Group 25X1
Chiefs.
2. The organization of this year's Part I is the same as last year,
except for omission of one sub-heading, "The Third World." The sub-
headings retained are:
General
The Sino-Soviet-US Triangle
The Multipolar World
NATO-Warsaw Pact
Middle East
Southeast Asia
Other Potential Trouble Spots
3. Part II, as proposed for this year represents a different
approach from that of last year's paper. Differences between the two
approaches is illustrated by their sub-headings:
1973
Primary Intelligence Problems
Warning
Current Intelligence
Estimates and Net Assessments
Arms Control Intelligence
International Trade and Finance
Narcotics
Some New Global Problems
1974
The Intelligence Imperatives
Collection
Processing and Exploitation
Analysis
Production
Dissemination
Management
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4. If you approve the approach taken in this initial draft, Group
Chiefs will be requested to provide comments and proposed changes to
CS no later than close of business 6 March. Our intention is to have a
completed paper ready for submission to the DCI before you depart on
your trip.
Attachment:
As stated
25X1 DCl/IC/CS1 is (3/1/74)
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - PD/DCl/IC
1 - AD/DCl/IC
Cp- IC Registry
1 - D/MPRRG
1 - D/PRG
1 - D/CPAG
1 - CS subj
25X1 1 - CS chrono
1-
2
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief, Coordination Staff/IC
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FIRST DRAFT
PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
March 1, 1974
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I Trends in the World Situation
A. General
1. The international environment is changing rapidly and
often in unusual ways. Once-quiescent client states are stirring
and turning away from their patrons; small countries with enormous
resource wealth are challenging the economic practices and positions
of much larger and stronger states; and relations between contending
major powers and alliance systems are shifting into new and some-
times novel configurations. The temperature of the conflict between
East and West has declined, but competition between the superpowers
is still intense and manifests itself in new forms and in new arenas.
Clearly, these matters add to the complexity and volatility of world
politics and impinge on the activities of the United States Intelligence
Community, imposing new tasks, modifying old objectives, and altering
existing priorities.
2. This is not to say that the world and the intelligence business
are being transformed overnight. None of these changes, for example,
has diminished the longstanding national need for timely and sophisticated
military intelligence. On the contrary, such creatures of detente as
SALT and MBFR demand new efforts to monitor compliance; the move-
ment of Western Europe into a more independent and self-reliant
position necessitates a closer look at European defense plans and
concepts; the precarious state of relations between the USSR and China
forces the community to watch the forces on both sides of the Sino-
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B. The Sino-Soviet-US Triangle
3. Few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in
the 1970s which will not be affected by the relationships of the US,
USSR and China. Two basic circumstances have determined the course
of these relationships in recent years: the USSR's achievement of
strategic nuclear parity with the US, and the emergence of the
military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union in Asia.
These factors, for example, have combined in various ways to
reinforce the trend in both Moscow and Peking toward policies of
detente vis-a-vis the West. Specifically, the desire of each communist
power to prevent the other from gaining relatively greater favor with
Washington has encouraged restraint vis-a-vis the US, even in the
face of strong US initiatives.
4. Soviet behavior since the signing of the strategic arms
limitation agreements indicates an apparent willingness to accept
parity with the US in numbers of strategic weapons. But the pace
and scope of ongoing research, development, and testing programs
for a variety of Soviet strategic systems suggests the USSR is intent
upon achieving significalt qualitative improvements in their offensive
forces. This, coupled with sharp improvements in Soviet strategic
defenses, could enable the USSR to gain a decisive strategic advantage
over the US. This possibility must of course be a principal concern
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5. The Chinese are obviously devoting much energy to
increasing their military defenses and their political strength
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviets for their part are seeking
to contain China--in Asia, in the West, and in the communist
movement?and are continuing to improve their capabilities for
military contingencies along the border. There are differing views
as to the likelihood of a major Sino-Soviet armed clash, but the
seeds of armed conflict are well planted.
6. But at some point in the 1970s, Chinese nuclear power will
almost certainly preclude a rational Soviet decision to resort to
military action. This, together with Peking's possible development
of a limited nuclear capability against the US, might make it easier
for Peking and Moscow to move toward some form of rapprochement.
It is also possible, of course, that even independently of developments
in the military sphere, the post-Mao (and perhaps post-Chou) regime
in Peking will seek a real lessening of Sino-Soviet tension. Though
chances of a fundamental reconciliation between China and the USSR
seem very remote, even a limited improvement in relations would
likely have a significant, effect on US policy.
C. The Multipolar World
7. The new pattern of relations among the three great powers,
the climate of detente in East-West relations, and the growth of an
overall sense of security and self-confidence in Bonn and Paris and
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and Tokyo and elsewhere have all helped to thrust another major
power center, Western Europe, into the area of prime intelligence
interest. Preoccupied with their own and European (EC) concerns
and feeling free to serve their own national interests with less regard
for those of the US (and sometimes for those of the Atlantic community
as a whole), the Europeans are at the same time becoming more and
more apprehensive about the durability of the US commitment to
Europe and increasingly suspicious of US motives vis-a-vis the USSR.
And all this has now been further complicated by European unhappiness
about US policies in the Middle East and by the anxiety of individual
European states over the supply of oil from Arab sources.
8. To some extent for similar reasons, though partly because of
its special relationship with China, Japan too has begun to emerge
as an important power center in world affairs. Smaller states once
very closely associated with the US, including Canada, Australia,
and several key Latin American countries, have also tended in recent
years to become more self-assertive and less inclined to follow the
lead of Washington. The same is true of Iran, which has become a
world economic force and a regional military power, and Saudi
Arabia, which is moved in large part by considerations concerning
Israel.
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9. Elsewhere, in the Third World, the large non-aligned
countries, such as India and Indonesia, and the strategically located
states, such as Somalia and Singapore, will continue to attract Soviet
interest and, where Moscow finds it feasible, a Soviet presence.
Competition in these areas with the US and in some instances China
will persist and perhaps grow.
10. Because of trends of this character, the community is likely
to be called upon to provide extensive political, economic, and
military intelligence on a wide variety of countries which were once
given only cursory attention. The community must also face the
thorny problem of a probable need by the US Government for reliable
and timely information on the actions and operations of the major
multi-national corporations. It is clear in addition that the US intelli-
gence community will be engaged worldwide in acquiring data on the
availability of natural resources and on foreign technological developments.
D. NATO-Warsaw Pact
11. Serious issues attend the development of detente in Europe.
While skeptical that the USSR will ever allow the erasure of the line
"It
dividing Europe into two blocs, the West Europeans are eager to expand
economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe and to achieve
a general political relaxation in Europe. The Soviets, seeking credits
and technology in the West, are anxious nonetheless to preserve their
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dominance in the East. Many of the East Europeans are also torn
between their hopes for the kind of greater autonomy East-West
rapprochement could bring, and their fears that the West might,
in the name of detente, concede to Moscow the permanent right to
rule its own sphere in Eastern Europe. Romania, already in effect
a non-practicing member of the Bloc congregation, is especially
concerned about the possible effects of cordiality among the large
powers on its own future as a small power.
12. Detente has of course also posed problems for the Western
alliance. The cohesion and effectiveness of NATO in an era of
Ostpolitik is by no means assured. Even assuming a basic unity
and common purpose vis-a-vis the USSR, a confident measure of the
relative military strength?primarily conventional strength--of the
two alliances is a key intelligence problem. So too is the need to
insure high confidence in our estimates of relative strength so that
the US and its NATO allies have a clear and mutual understanding of
the nature of the threat.
E. Middle East
13. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet
role in the area will remain major targets of US intelligence efforts
in the Middle East. US attention is now focused on the development
of a peace settlement, Arab use of oil resources as a political weapon,
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14. The Soviets will seek vigorously to offset any decline in
their influence in the area stemming from a US-sponsored settle-
ment. Yet the movement toward settlement is not without advantages
for the USSR insofar as it reduces the chances of another round of
hostilities (which could threaten severe damage to the interests of
their clients and risk their own direct involvement) and insofar as it
prepares the way for a reopening of the Suez Canal (and freer and
quicker Soviet access to the Indian Ocean).
F. Southeast Asia
15. It is unlikely that the fighting in Southeast Asia will cease
before 1980, if then. All countries in the area face ongoing or latent
insurgencies. Defeat by insurgents of the forces of the incumbent
governments--especially those of South Vietnam, Thailand, and the
Philippines?could have serious consequences for US interests. For
some time to come, then, intelligence will be called upon to provide
extensive reporting.
G. Other Potential Trouble Spots
16. The Balkans, South Asia, Latin America, and southern
Africa (where black and white dominated nations confront each other)
are all areas where eruptions are possible and where US interests
are involved. In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the
Soviets to try to return Yugoslavia to the orthodox communist fold.
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In South Asia, the situation in Pakistan and the relationship between
Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unsettled., In Latin America, the
USSR's military presence in the Caribbean and its influence in Peru
and the emergence of increasingly nationalistic and often anti-US
regimes pose the principal problems for the US and US intelligence.
Finally, all over the world, and in all types of societies, there is
a growing tendency among ethnic groups to demand, often violently,
that their institutions, cultures, and aspirations be accorded special
recognition. This is a tendency likely to grow and to become more
disruptive as the decade progresses.
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FIRST DRAFT
(PERSPECTIVE) 1 March 1974
H THE INTELLIGENCE IMPERATIVES
1. The preceding section has described the environment within
which foreign intelligence activities of the United States must be con-
ducted and has indicated the priority needs to which the Intelligence
Community must respond. The manner in which this response will be
made and the more important of the factors which impact on the size
of the National Intelligence Program deserve brief consideration.
2. Much of what follows will be familiar to key officials of the
Community, but this does not detract from the usefulness of once again
focusing attention on problem areas. Their continued existence indi-
cates that awareness of difficulties has not yet provided solutions.
3. Melding planning for intelligence resource allocation with an
assessment of the implications which trends in the world environment hold
for the Intelligence Community requires close attention to all aspects of
the intelligence cycle. The "intelligence imperatives" are viewed, there-
fore, in terms of their impact on collection, processing, production and
managerial aspects of the intelligence effort. Together these combine
in the basic "imperative" -- which is to keep senior officials of the
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United States Government convinced that the intelligence output is
responsive to their needs and that intelligence missions are being effectively
handled.
4. In sum, responsible US intelligence officials face several
key problems:
-- insuring that the collection effort is focused on
data which the intelligence analysts need to respond to
the important information requirements of the intelligence
customers;
-- providing adequate facilities and professional man-
power for processing collected data and producing
finished intelligence;
-- enhancing responsiveness of the intelligence effort
by maintaining close and continuing relationships with
the primary users of intelligence;
-- insuring that the interface between national and
operational capabilities supports the readiness of military
commands and forces to meet specialized field requirements;
--accomplishing planning which gears US intelligence
to meet future needs even while the Community is re-
sponding to today's problems;
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-- developing means of assuring that resources are
being applied against the intelligence tasks not only
efficiently but also in an ordered priority which insures
full attention to the more important tasks.
A. Collection
5. Most of the dollar costs of the US foreign intelligence program
are expended on collection activities, and the ability of the Intelligence
Community to cope with its responsibilities depands in large measure on
the effectiveness of key collection programs. Rising costs will quite
certainly raise questions as to the continued essentiality of some projects,
new capabilities will be required to obtain information not now being
collected, and greater attention undoubtedly will be needed to the better
ordering of information needs on a priority basis as guidance to collectors.
6. The major portion of the foreign intelligence collection effort
is, and must continue to be, focused on those few targets of highest con-
cern at senior policy levels of the US Government. These targets encompass
the intelligence required for:
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SALT verification
MBFR negotiations
The Limited Test Ban Treaty
Southeast Asia
The Arab/Israeli crisis
PRC weapons systems
Nearly three-fourths of the "Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974" relate
directly or in part to these six subjects, as do a large number of the
highest priorities in the Attachment to DCID 1/2, "US Intelligence Priorities."
7. The key word in any description of the emerging strategic balance
of the late 1970s is "uncertainty" -- uncertainty about the technical, the
military and the political ramifications of Soviet programs. The United
States effort in the SALT negotiations is directed at reducing these un-
certainties, and making the balance both safer and less costly in resources.
This effort depends largely on dependable intelligence, and therein lies a
major challenge -- particularly as regards collection.
8. More than has been the case in the past, tight fical constraints
on intelligence budgets will force difficult decisions in the collection field
which will accommodate to requirements for better technical sensor sys-
tems by trade-offs with existing systems to keep capital investment costs
manageable.
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9. A global surveillance system probably will be vital to US
posture management in the coming decade, and because of its responsibili-
ties for the provision of warning, the Intelligence Community must continue
to be very intimately involved in the effective functioning of this system.
10. Pressures are rising, however, for increased attention to a large
number of other types of collection targets. This is particularly true
with respect to intelligence on international trade and finance as concern
rises for the economic security of the United States. Responding to the
expanding need for economic and political intelligence will require more
than exploitation of signals intelligence, imagery and clandestine activities.
Greater attention will have to be applied to overt collection opportunities
of all kinds, including effective use of Foreign Service and Treasury
Department reporting from overseas.
11. The past several years have been marked by considerable
progress toward systemitizing and improving the guidance provided col-
lectors of all types, but more remains to be done. The identification of
important information "gaps" as part of the "Key Intelligence Questions"
evaluation process, the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Current Near-Term
Defense Intelligence Objectives (CNTDIO)," and the assignment of
priorities to intelligence topics by individual country in the revised
Attachment to DCID 1/2 are steps in this direction. Establishment of relative
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priorities among competing requirements for information has proved to
be extremely difficult, but the effort to do so must continue.
B. Processing and Exploitation
12. Two problems needing increased attention in this phase of
the intelligence cycle are: (1) improvement of techniques for handling
large quantities of data to glean from the mass of potentially useful data
that which is actually needed by intelligence analysts; and (2) better
means of assuring that the processed output is in a format which enhances
its utility to the analyst. The need for the application of priorities to
cope with the volume of information collected or collectable is at the heart
of the difficulties associated with intelligence processing.
13. Ease and convenience of processing must not be allowed to
override consideration of the utility of the information being processed.
Unless the end result of processing is in a format directly useful to
intelligence analysts, there is great risk that the collection/processing
effort will come to naught. Improved interchange between analysts
and processors is essential; the analysts must understand the processing
problem and the processors must appreciate the information needs of
the analysts.
14. Because data processing resource use can loom so large, the
manpower, equipment and other costs associated with processing activities
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must be carefully assessed at the time decisions are being reached as to
the desirability of new or improved collection efforts. Care must be
taken to insure, in particular, that imagery and signals intelligence col-
lection capabilities are not programmed without careful attention to the
associated processing and exploitation costs, including any necessary
research and development.
15. The "communications explosion" is not an abstract phrase
in exploitation either of the data acquired by technical sensors or of
available open source information. US intelligence must utilize sophisti-
cated computerized data handling procedures on a scale not yet attempted,
or actually forego working effectively on some types of collectable data.
16. As Vietnam experience clearly demonstrated, particular attention
still needs to be given to improving capabilities for processing and exploita-
ting imagery in operational situations. Either photo reconnaissance must
be more selective, or processing and exploitation capabilities must be
developed to cope with a flood of film.
C. Analysis
17. Raising the quality of intelligence analysis which goes into
the expression of intelligence judgments remains an essential element of
our efforts to respond to the President's Directive of November 1971 that
the "quality, scope and timeliness" of the intelligence product be improved.
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18. The improvement of analysis involves continuing attention
to the proper selection and training of individual analysts, to improved
organization of the data bases, and to positive application of effective
quality controls throughout the intelligence production process. Special
promotion treatment for those analysts who most clearly demonstrate high
quality output could contribute to their motivation.
19. The Intelligence Community is experimenting with the use of
quantitative methodologies which appear to offer promise of improving
the expression of estimative judgments. Continuing attention should be
given to such methodologies in all major production organizations to
take advantage of ongoing research and development in the informational
and behavioral science fields. Analysis which provides the intelligence
consumer with a clear view of the nature and relative likelihood of alterna-
tive future international developments is sorely needed.
20. Intelligence production organizations should deliberately seek
out and put to use improved methodologies and techniques of estimative
analysis and presentation. Particular attention should be given to better
ways of describing and analyzing uncertainties in estimates which fore-
cast the expected future course of events, particularly when such estimates
deal with matters on which _considerable differences in judgment may exist.
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21. Basic improvement in information handling techniques and
enhanced compatibility between and among systems must be sought as
part of the effort to upgrade the quality of intelligence analysis.
D. Production
22. While successful collection, timely processing and sound
analysis of data are the foundation of an effective foreign intelligence
effort, it is the responsiveness of the end product to user needs which
provides the basis on which the US intelligence program is judged.
Constant attention must be given to insuring that the finished intelligence
output responds in a timely fashion to the actual needs of the intelligence
customer.
23. Encouraging progress is being made, but is is essential that
the Intelligence Community sustain its efforts.
24. Programs are underway to enhance the performance of the
Community in crisis situations and to develop a "family" of national intelli-
gence production which, hopefully, will provide senior government offi-
cials more by way of Community judgments on matters of policy interest
and less in terms of volume of paper.
25. Establishment of the National Intelligence Officer system is
intended to provide a means of improving liaison with key users of intelli-
gence and of enhancing the direct responsiveness of Community end
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products to the identified needs for intelligence in support of policy
making. Full Community support of the NIOs is essential.
26. Enhancing intelligence performance in crisis situations calls
for a continuing focus on the efficient functioning of the indications
and warning system, on avoidance of stereotyped approaches to analysis
of the situation in periods of developing crisis, and on provision of
intelligence judgments to consumers on a timely basis. Programs under-
way to utilize secure communications nets as a means of speeding the
production of coordinated factual bulletins and timely analyses must have
full Community cooperation. Automated data support for analysts is
particularly important in crisis situations, and the Intelligence Community
must keep abreast of the state of the art in this field.
27. Efforts are underway to identify areas in which national and
operational intelligence production can better interface. This is a two-way
street, and in the interest of efficient use of limited resources, care is
needed to insure that unnecessary redundancies are avoided in the exercise
of national production capabilities and the capabilities of operational field
elements of the Department of State.
E. Dissemination
28. The Intelligence Community is operating in a milieu in which
sensitive classified information appears to be "fair game" both for the
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public media and for some few persons authorized for access to classified
intelligence who, for whatever reason, are inclined to "leak" information
to the media. The end result is that sensitive intelligence judgments and
sensitive sources and methods appear to be more at risk from unauthorized
disclosures than is acceptable.
29. The Community should pursue two related courses of action.
It is important that every effort be made to instill in all personnel
engaged in intelligence activities a sense of personal motivation for the
protection of intelligence information and intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure. Secondly, while those who need access
to intelligence in pursuit of their assigned responsibilities must have it,
continuing careful attention needs to be given to limiting dissemination of
publications or other documents containing sensitive information on a
strict need-to-know basis.
F. Management
30. Coping with the problems of the magnitude of those thus far
described poses management challenges of the first order from the highest
to the lowest management levels.
31. The Intelligence Community is going to have to get more out of
its investment and more output from fewer personnel in order to match
the inroads of ongoing inflation in all types of costs. The combination of
tight fiscal constraints on budget ceilings and the pressures which con-
tinuing inflation exerts against those ceilings, creates the cutting edge
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of the problem -- a cutting edge which can be blunted only by constant
attention to costs, to efficient use of manpower, to application of priorities,
and to the elimination of activities which are not demonstratably worthwhile.
32. Sound planning and strict financial controls must be the
keystone in this process. Rigorous application of carefully identified
requirements and priorities, including the elimination of low-priority
collection and production activities, must be accepted. Research and
development must be applied to manpower intensive activities, such as
intelligence production, as well as to technical sensor systems.
33. Major among the matters to which continuing attention must
be devoted are ways and means of strengthening mechanisms for Com-
munity coordination and the development of arrangements to avoid
unnecessary redundancy in functions and activities among the various
organizations involved in national intelligence. Adjustments in roles,
missions and functional assignments -- where careful study indicates a
need for such -- cannot be avoided if the Intelligence Community is to
maintain its viability.
34. Such adjustments must, however, be based on a good con-
ceptual understanding of the operating dynamics of the Intelligence
Community. Policy changes and perhaps restructuring of elements of
the Community may be needed, but any such proposals will require careful
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study and analysis. Management and analysis methodologies and techniques
are available to do this and should be applied.
35. One of the most important tasks is to devise an "audit trail"
from important substantive end products of the Intelligence Community back
to the costs involved in collecting, processing and analyzing the data
involved. The cost effectiveness with which each contributor participated
in each phase of the intelligence cycle must be related to the value of the
resulting end product. The "Key Intelligence Questions" and the process
developed for evaluation of the Community responses to these questions
are steps in the right direction. More needs and will have to be done.
36. As a more detailed indication of management questions of
current importance, at Tab A is the statement of "National Foreign
Intelligence Program Management Objectives for FY 1974," issued by
the Director of Central Intelligence in December 1973, after consultation
with the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC). Management
Objectives for FY 1975 -- currently under development -- will strengthen
ongoing efforts to cause Management by Objectives (MBO) to become an
integral part of the functioning of the Intelligence Community.
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