PLANNING PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000800120006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 11, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
ST JJB Z C T Planning Perspective of the Intelligence
Environment
1. Attached is a draft copy of a proposed "Planning Perspective
of the Intelligence Environment."
2. This would replace the "Perspective of the Intelligence
Environment" which was disseminated last August. Part I of the new
draft, "Trends in the World Situation," is an updating of Part I of
the 1973 "Perspective." Part II in the new draft, "The Intelligence
Imperatives," is a completely different approach from that presented
in the 1973 paper. Differences between the two are illustrated by
their sub-headings:
1973
Primary Intelligence Problems
Warning
Current Intelligence
Estimates and Net Assessments
Arms Control Intelligence
International Trade and Finance
Narcotics
Some New Global Problems
1974
The Intelligence Imperatives
Requirements
Collection
Processing and Exploitation
Analysis
Production
Dissemination
Management
3. The new draft has not been circulated outside the Intelligence
Community Staff as yet.
4. If we can get your guidance by mid-week we can have a re-
draft ready for dissemination for comment to USIB and IRAC members,
and to the NIOs by the time you leave on your trip. We would ask to
have these comments back to IC Staff prior to your return.
S\C,IiE0,
25
Lieutenant Gener , USA
D/DCI/IC
Attachment
As stated
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subject: Planning Perspective of the Intelligence Environment
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PLANNING PERSPECTIVE OF THE
INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
11 MARCH 1974
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11 March 1974
PLANNING PERSPECTIVE OF THE
INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT
INTRODUCTION
1. This planning perspective of the intelligence
environment presents an overview of the evolving world
situation, with emphasis on the elements which are expected
to affect US intelligence activities during the next several
years, and identifies areas in which redirection or changes
in emphasis will be required within the Intelligence Community.
2. Part I, "Trends in the World Situation, " is a
projection of political/economic/military developments,
described in terms of the impact which these changes are
likely to have on the intelligence consumer needs to which the
Community must be responsive.
3. Part II, The Intelligence Imperatives," sets forth
planning guidelines for US intelligence in the kind of inter-
national environment described in Part I. The "imperatives"
are discussed in terms of the various elements of the
intelligence cycle -- requirements, collection, processing,
analysis, production and disemmination -- , lets management.
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I TRENDS IN THE WORLD SITUATION
A. General
1. The international environment is changing rapidly and
often in unusual ways. Once-quiescent client states are stirring
and turning away from their patrons; small countries with enormous
resource wealth are challenging the economic practices and positions
of much larger and stronger states; and relations between contending
major powers and alliance systems are shifting into new and some-
times novel configurations. Tension between
East and West has eased, ,but competition between the superpowers
is still sharp and manifests itself in new forms and in new arenas.
(and others)
Clearly, these matters/add to the complexity and volatility of world
politics and impinge on the activities of the United States Intelligence
Community, imposing new tasks, modifying old objectives, and altering
existing priorities.
2. This is not to say that the world and the intelligence business
are being transformed overnight. None of these changes, for example,
has diminished the longstanding national need for timely and sophisticated
military intelligence. On the contrary, such creatures of detente as
effort
SALT and MBFR demand a major / to monitor compliance; the move-
ment of Western Europe into a more independent and self-reliant
position necessitates a closer look at European defense plans and
.concepts; the precarious state of relations between the USSR and China
forces the community to watch the forces on both sides of the Sino-
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B. The Sino-Soviet-US Triangle
3. Few matters of importance in world affairs will arise in
the 1970s which will not be affected by the relationships of the US,
USSR and China. Two basic circumstances have determined the course
of these relationships in recent years: the USSR's achievement of
strategic nuclear parity with the US, and the emergence of the
military confrontation between China and the Soviet Union in Asia.
These factors, for example, have combined in various ways to
reinforce the trend in both Moscow and Peking toward policies of
detente vis-a-vis the West. Specifically, the desire of each communist
power to prevent the other from gaining relatively greater favor with
Washington has encouraged restraint vis-a-vis the US, even in the
face of strong US initiatives.
4. Soviet behavior since the signing of the strategic arms
limitation agreements indicates an apparent willingness to accept
parity with the US in numbers of strategic weapons. But the pace
and scope of ongoing research, development, and testing programs
for a variety of Soviet strategic systems suggests the USSR is intent
upon achieving significant qualitative improvements in their offensive
forces. This, coupled with sharp improvements in Soviet strategic
defenses, could enable the USSR to gain a decisive strategic advantage
over the US. This possibility must of course be a principal concern
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5. The Chinese are obviously devoting much energy to
increasing their military defenses and their political strength
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviets for their part are seeking
to contain China--in Asia, in the West, and in the communist
movement--and are continuing to improve their capabilities for
military contingencies along the border. There are differing views
as to the likelihood of a major Sino-Soviet armed clash, but. the
seeds of armed conflict are well planted,
6. At some point in the 1970s, Chinese nuclear power will
almost certainly preclude a rational Soviet decision to resort to
military action. This, together with Peking's possible development'
of a limited nuclear capability against the US, might make it easier
for Peking and Moscow to move toward. some form of rapprochement.
It is also possible, of course, that even independently of developments
in the military sphere, the post-Mao (and perhaps post-Chou) regime
in Peking will seek a real lessening of Sino-Soviet tension. Though
chances of a fundamental reconciliation between China and the USSR
seem very remote, even a limited improvement in relations
could j have a significant effect on US policy.
C. The Multipolar World
7. The new pattern of relations among the three great powers,
the climate of detente in East-V-Test relations, and the growth of an
overall sense of security and self-confidence in Bonn and Paris
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and elsewhere have all helped to thrust another major
power center, Western Europe, into the area of prime intelligence
interest. Preoccupied with their own and European (EC) concerns
and feeling free to serve their own national interests with less regard
for those of the US (and sometimes for those of the Atlantic community
as a whole), the Europeans are at the same time becoming more and
more apprehensive about the durability of the US commitment to
Europe and increasingly suspicious of US motives vis-a-vis the USSR.
And all this has now been further complicated by European unhappiness
about US policies in the Middle East and by the anxiety of individual
European states over the supply of oil from Arab sources.
8. To some extent for similar reasons, though partly because of
its special relationship with China, Japan too has begun to emerge
as an important power center in world affairs. Smaller states once
very closely associated with the US, including Canada, Australia,
and several key Latin American countries, have also tended in recent
years to become more self-assertive and less inclined to follow the
lead of Washington. The same is true of Iran, which has become a
world economic force and a regional military power, and Saudi
Arabia, which is moved in large part by considerations concerning
Israel.
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9. Elsewhere, in the Third World, the large non-aligned
countries, such as India and Indonesia, and the strategically located
states, such as Somalia and Singapore, will continue to attract Soviet
interest and, where Moscow finds it feasible, a Soviet presence.
Competition in these areas with the US and in some instances China
will persist and perhaps grow.
10. Because of trends of this character, the community is likely
to be called upon to provide extensive political, economic, and
rrnlitary intelligence on a wide variety of countries which were once
given only cursory attention. The community must also face the
thorny problem of a probable need by the US Government for reliable
and timely information on the actions and operations of the major
multi-national corporations. It is clear in addition that the US intelli-
gence community will be engaged worldwide in acquiring data on the
availability of natural resources and on foreign technological developments.
D. NATO-Warsaw Pact
11. Serious issues attend the development of detente in Europe.
While skeptical that the USSR will ever allow the erasure of the line
dividing Europe into two blocs, the West Europeans are eager to expand
economic relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe and to achieve
a general political relaxation in Europe. The Soviets, seeking credits
and technology in the West, are anxious nonetheless to preserve their
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dominance in the East. Many of the East Europeans are also torn
between their hopes for the kind of greater autonomy East-West
rapprochement could bring, and their fears that the West might,
in the name of detente, concede to Moscow the permanent right to
rule its own sphere in Eastern Europe. Romania, already in effect
a non-practicing member of the Bloc congregation, is especially
concerned about the possible effects of cordiality among the large
powers on its own future as a small power.
12. Detente has of course also posed problems for the Western
alliance. The cohesion and effectiveness of NATO in an era of
Ostpolitik is by no means assured. Even assuming a basic unity
and common purpose vis-a-vis the USSR, a confident measure of the
relative military strength- -primarily conventional strength--of the
two alliances is a key intelligence problem. So too is the need to
insure high confidence in our estimates of relative strength so that
the US and its NATO allies have a clear and mutual understanding of
the nature of the threat.
E. Middle East
13. The evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet
role in the area will remain major targets of US intelligence efforts
in the Middle East. US attention is now focused on the development
of a peace settlement, Arab use of oil resources as a political weapon,
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14, The Soviets will seek vigorously to offset any decline in
their influence in the area stemming from a US-sponsored settle-
ment. Yet the movement toward settlement is not without advantages
for the USSR insofar as it reduces the chances of another round of
hostilities (which could threaten severe damage to the interests of their
and confrontation with the US)
clients and risk both ;their own direct involvement/ and insofar as it
prepares the way for a reopening of the Suez Canal (and freer and
quicker Soviet access to the Indian Ocean).
F. Southeast Asia
15. It is unlikely that the fighting in Southeast Asia will cease
before 1980, if then. All countries in the area face ongoing or latent
insurgencies. Defeat by insurgents of the forces of the incumbent
governments--especially those of South Vietnam, Thailand, and the
Philippines--could have serious consequences for US interests. For
some time to come, then, intelligence will be called upon to provide
extensive reporting.
G. Other Potential Trouble Spots
16. The Balkans, South Asia, Latin America, and southern
Africa (where black and white dominated nations confront each other)
are all areas where eruptions are possible and where US interests
are involved. In the Balkans, the passing of Tito might tempt the
Soviets to try to return Yugoslavia to the orthodox communist fold.
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In South Asia, the situation in Pakistan and the relationship between
Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unsettled. In Latin America, the
USSR's military presence in the Caribbean and its influence in Peru
and the emergence of increasingly nationalistic and often anti-US
regimes pose the principal problems for the US and US intelligence.
Finally, all over the world, and in all types of societies, there is
a growing tendency among ethnic groups to demand, often violently,
that their institutions, cultures, and aspirations be accorded special
recognition. This is a tendency likely to grow and to become more
disruptive as the decade progresses.
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II THE INTELLIGENCE IMPERATIVES
1. The preceding section has described the environment within
which foreign intelligence activities of the United States must be conducted
and has indicated the priority needs to which the Intelligence Community
must respond. The manner in which this response will be made and
the more important of the factors which impact on the size of the National
Intelligence Program deserve brief consideration.
2. The Intelligence Community functions in a world marked by
change and recurring crises, and intelligence resource allocation pro-
cesses should facilitate flexible response as new intelligence needs arise
or old ones change. This calls for close attention by managers to all
aspects of the intelligence cycle -- collection, processing and production.
In meeting crisis and change each of these elements can be orchestrated
to achieve the basic "imperative" -- which is to insure that officials of
the United States Government are provided with intelligence which is
timely, as factual and objective as possible, perceptive, and directly
responsive to their priority needs.
3. The performance measure for all Intelligence Community
managers will be their effectiveness in insuring that:
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-- Close and continuing relationships are
maintained with the primary users of intelligence
as a means of enhacing intelligence responsiveness
to identified needs;
-- Collection activities are focused so
that intelligence analysts can respond to the important
continuing requirements of the intelligence customers,
and also are flexible enough to react to changing
circumstances and to crisis situations;
-- Adequate facilities and professional manpower
are provided to process collected data and produce
finished intelligence;
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-- The sum of national and operational
intelligence capabilities supports both national
needs and the specialized field requirements of
the military commands and forces;
-- Resources are applied with full attention
to cost-effectiveness and to the relative priority
of intelligence tasks;
-- Planning and programming activities fully
anticipate changing future needs even while the
Community is responding to today's problems.
A. Requirements
q; 1 While cons iderable progress has been made to improve
awareness within the Intelligence Community of the particular needs.
of the major users of the finished end products, the.re remains a
need for more direct involvement of the consumer in this process.
The manner in which the I "Key Intelligence Questions for
FY .1974" paper was handled is a move in this direction.
also is the charge to National Intelligence Officers that they
maintain continuing liaison with the principal users of intelligence
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in each NIO area of responsibility. All production elements of
the Community should press toward development of improved
means of getting their consumers to indicate their needs --
future as well as present -- in as specific a manner as possible.
5. Closely related to this effort must be greater
recognition that there are really three orders of requirements,
and attention must be given to the first order questions before
second and third order requirements can be usefully defined.
First order requirements are the basic, fundamental questions
which the Community must answer. Second order requirements
break the first order ones into their components, and third order
requirements are the specific "collectibles" -- the specific data
which can be used to answer second and first order requirements.
As an illustration:
-- A first order requirement is to determine
whether the USSR poses a significant manned bomber
threat to the United States.
-- A second order requirement, stemming from
this particular first order requirement, is whether the
Backfire is an intercontinental bomber.
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ocusing on third order requirements without c ear awareness
of the first and second order requirements from which the need for
specific collection arises invites an ineffective use of resources which
the Community can ill afford.
B. Collection
7. The ability of the Intelligence Community to cope with its
responsibilities depends in large measure on the effectiveness of key
collection programs. Most of the dollar costs of the US foreign intelli-
gence program are expended on technical collection activities. Rising
costs will certainly press hard on these expensive systems and the
essentiality of some of these projects must be questioned and activities
phased out when careful investigation supports such action.. At the same
time, new capabilities are needed to obtain information not now being
collected, particularly data on the softer targets for which senior-level
policy interest is developing. The demand for timely detail will place
a strain on traditional collection methods, and given budgetary and
manpower constraints harder choices may have to be made as to the
relative priorities of tasks assigned to collectors.
8. The major portion of the dollar cost of the foreign intelli-
gence collection effort is now and probably will continue to be focused on
a few targets of very high concern at senior policy levels of the US
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Government. These targets encompass the intelligence required
SALT verification
MBFR negotiations
The Limited Test Ban Treaty
Southeast Asia
The Middle East
PRC weapons systems
Nearly three-fourths of the "Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1974"
relate directly or in part to these six subjects, as do a large number
of the highest priorities in the Attachment to DCID 1/2, "US
Intelligence Priorities. "
9\ The key word in any description of what the strategic
situation will be like in the late 1970's is "uncertainty" - primarily
uncertainty about the technical, the military and the political
ramifications of Soviet programs. The United States effort in the
SALT negotiations is directed at reducing these uncertainties,
and to achieving a stabilization which will be both safer and less
costly in resources. This effort depends largely on reliable
intelligence
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10. The need for intelligence to support political negotiations
and to support the United States in the worldwide competition for scarce
goods clearly will require increased attention to other types of col-
lection targets and to a new geographic focus. This is particularly
true with respect to intelligence on international trade and finance as
concern rises for the economic security of the United States. . Responding
to the expanding need for political and economic information will
require more than . exploitation of signals intelligence, imagery and
clandestine activities. Greater attention will have to be applied to
overt collection opportunities of all kinds, including more effective
use of Foreign Service and Treasury Department reporting and the
development of closer ties through the USIB mechanism with other
domestic organizations such as the Commerce and Agriculture Depart-
ments.
11. Considerable attention is being given to improving US
capabilities for security posture management on a worldwide basis,
and because of the Intelligence Community's responsibilities for the
provision of warning, it must be intimately involved in the
functioning of the posture management system.
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12. Careful attention also will have to be given to strengthening
liaison arrangements and expanding reliance on non-US intelligence
assets where investigation indicates that foreign intelligence services
can provide a unique capability or can furnish reliable information
at less cost than if US resources were used to acquire the same
information.
13. The past several years have been marked by considerable
progress toward systematizing and improving the guidance provided
collectors. The identification of important information deficiencies
as part of the "Key Intelligence Questions" evaluation process,
the Defense Intelligence Agency's "Current Near-Term Defense
Intelligence Objectives (CNTDIO)," and the assignment of priorities
to intelligence topics by individual country in the revised
Attachment to DCID 1/2 are steps in this direction. But, improved
guidance is not enough. It should be accompanied by evaluation of
the impact of collection guidance on actual results and operations
in a manner which will provide better basis for making choices in
resource allocation and budgets.
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C. Processing and Exploitation
14. Two problems needing a heavy dose of management attention
in this
phase of the intelligence cycle are: (1) improvement of techniques
for gleaning from the mass of potentially useful data that which is
actually needed by intelligence analysts; and (2) better means of
assuring that the processed output is in a format which enhances its utility
to the analyst. The need for the identification and application of priorities
to cope with the volume of information collected or collectable is
at the heart of the difficulties associated with intelligence
processing.
15;1 Ease and convenience of processing must not be
allowed to override consideration of the utility of the information
being processed. Unless the end result of processing is in a
format directly useful to intelligence analysts, there is great
risk that the collection/processing effort will come to naught.
Improved interchange between analysts and processors is
essential; the analysts must understand the processing problem
and the processors must appreciate the information needs of the
analysts.
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16. The manpower, equipment and other costs associated with
processing activities must be carefully assessed at the time decisions
are being reached on new or improved collection efforts. Care
must be taken to insure, in particular, that imagery and signals
intelligence collection capabilities are not programmed without careful
measure of associated processing and exploitation costs, including any
necessary research and development and arrangements to format processed
data to optimize its use by analysts. Policy deliberations on the flow
of data must be addressed early in the planning process.
17. The "communications explosion" is not an abstract phrase
in exploitation either of the data acquired by technical sensors or
of available open source information. The modes of communicating
finished intelligence to consumers particularly needs reappraisal
as systems take on more sophisticated forms. These forms need
to be understood from both analyst and user viewpoints. Analysts
and consumers must be called upon to participate in their construction.
18. As Vietnam experience clearly demonstrated, particular
attention still needs to be given to improving capabilities for pro-
cessing and exploiting imagery in operational situations. Processing
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16. The manpower, equipment and other costs associated with
processing activities must be carefully assessed at the time decisions
are being reached on new or improved collection efforts. Care
must be taken to insure, in particular, that imagery and signals
intelligence collection capabilities are not programmed without careful
measure of associated processing and exploitation costs, including any
necessary research and development and arrangements to format processed
data to optimize its use by analysts. Policy deliberations on the flow.
of data must be addressed early in the planning process.
17. The "communications explosion" is not an abstract phrase
in exploitation either of the data acquired by technical sensors or
of available open source information. The modes of communicating
finished intelligence; to consumers particularly needs reappraisal
as systems take on more sophisticated forms. These forms need
to be understood from both analyst and user viewpoints. Analysts
and consumers must be called upon to participate in their construction.
18. As Vietnam experience clearly demonstrated, particular
attention still needs to be given to improving capabilities for pro-
cessing and exploiting imagery in operational situations. Processing
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and exploitation capabilities must be. developed to cope with a flood of
imagery data. The alternative would be to insure that photo reconnais-
sance is much more selective than was the case in Southeast Asia.
D. Analysis
1 g,' Raising the quality of intelligence analysis which goes into
the expression of intelligence judgments remains an essential element of
efforts to respond to the President's Directive of November 1971 that the
"quality, scope and timeliness" of the intelligence product must be improved.
The essentiality of focusing attention on analysis was clearly indicated by
the post-mortem on the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1973--while other elements
of the intelligence chain performed creditably, analysis was the weak link.
20. !The improvement of analysis involves continuing attention to
the proper selection and training of individual analysts, to improved
organization of the data bases, and to positive application of effective
quality controls throughout the intelligence production process. Special
promotion treatment for those analysts who most clearly demonstrate high-
quality output could contribute to their motivation. Good analysts should
not have to move into executive or administrative positions to get pro-
moted.
21.. The Intelligence Community is experimenting with
the use of quantitative methodologies which appear to offer
promise of improving the expression of estimative judgments.
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Production organizations should deliberately seek out and test
improved methodologies and techniques of estimative analysis
and presentation, taking advantage of ongoing research and
development in the informational and behavioral science fields.
Particular attention should be given to better ways of describing
and analyzing uncertainties in estimates dealing with the expected
future course of events.
Basic improvement in information handling techniques
and enhanced capability between and among computer-based
systems are essential elements of the effort to upgrade the
quality of intelligence analysis. Much attention has been focused
in recent years on improving the means of collecting data and
the time has come to concentrate more on the means by which
collected data can better be manipulated and presented -- both
for analysts use and for enhancing service to the intelligence
consumer.
E. Production
23. 1 While successful collection, timely processing and
sound analysis of data are the foundation of an effective foreign
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intelligence effort, it is the responsiveness of the end product
to user needs which provides the basis on which the US
intelligence program is judged. Constant attention must be
given to insuring that the finished intelligence output responds
in a timely fashion to the actual needs of the intelligence
customer. Encouraging progress is being made, but it is
essential that the Intelligence Community sustain its efforts.
24. Programs are underway to enhance the performance
of the Community in crisis situations and to develop a "family"
of national intelligence production which, hopefully, will provide
senior government officials with a lesser volume of paper but
more in terms of Community judgments-on matters of policy
interest.
25. ~ Establishment of the National Intelligence Officer
system is intended to provide a means to improve liaison with
key users of intelligence and to enhance the direct responsiveness
of Community end products to the identified needs for intelligence
in support of policy making. Full Community support of the
NIOs is essential.
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26.; The need to enhance intelligence performance in
crisis situations calls for a continuing focus on the efficient
functioning of the indications and warning system, on avoidance
of stereotyped approaches to analysis of the situation in periods
of developing crisis, and on provision of intelligence judgments
to consumers on a timely basis. Programs underway to use
secure communications nets as a means of speeding the
production of coordinated factual bulletins and timely analyses
must have full Community cooperation. Automated data support
for analysts is particularly important in crisis situations, and
the Intelligence Community must keep abreast of the state-of-the-art
in this field.
27. I Efforts are underway to identify areas in which
national and operational intelligence production can better
interface. This is a two-way street, and in the interest of
efficient use of limited resources, care is needed to insure
that unnecessary redundancies are avoided in the exercise of
national production capabilities and the capabilities of operational
field elements of the Department of Defense.
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F. Dissemination
28.' The Intelligence Community is operating in a
milieu in which sensitive classified information appears to be
"fair game" both for the public media and for some few persons
authorized for access to classified intelligence who, for whatever.
reason, are inclined to "leak" information, to the media. The
end result is that sensitive intelligence judgments and sensitive
sources and methods appear to be more at risk from unauthorized
disclosures than is acceptable.
29.E The Community should pursue two related courses
of action. First, every effort should be made to instill in all
personnel engaged in intelligence activities a sense of personal
motivation for the protection of intelligence information and
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Second, while those who need access to intelligence in pursuit
of their assigned responsibilities must have it, dissemination
of publications or other documents containing sensitive information
must be handled on a strict need-to-know basis.
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G. Management
30. Problems of the variety and magnitude of those thus far
described involve all management levels. Guidance to all levels
can be achieved if top intelligence managers establish well-defined
objectives and milestones to accomplish the essential elements of their
missions. Such objectives will range from enhancing personnel compe-
tence and productivity to the creation of methodologies for diverting
major elements of their resources from one target to another. Develop-
ment of means of measuring performance against objectives is as
important as identification of the objectives themselves. Every manager
should be able to identify deficiencies, define approaches to overcome
them, and relate these approaches both to new investment need and to
proposed resource adjustments in their budget formulation.
31.. It is important, of course, that the objectives of the individual
managers at all levels be related in such a way that they enhance the
contributions of individual organizations to the total US intelligence
effort and support the overall performance of the Community.
32. The President has provided a foundation for intelligence
management objectives by his approval of the Director of Central
Intelligence memorandum of 6 September 1973, "Objectives for the
Intelligence Community." This memorandum was built around the five
primary responsibilities assigned to the DCI in the President's
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memorandum of 5 November 1971, "Organization and Management of
the US Foreign Intelligence Community." These responsibilities
stressed the need for (1) improving the intelligence product and
making it more responsive to national requirements, (2) assuring
authoritative and responsible leadership for the Community as a whole,
(3) making more efficient use of collection resources, (4) reviewing
the assignment of intelligence functions and revising such assignments
as necessary, and (5) insuring the provision of the intelligence needed
for US policy making and for the planning and conduct of military
operations by US forces.
33. A specific listing of management problems of current
importance is contained in the statement, "National Foreign Intelli-
gence Management Objectives for FY 1974," issued by the Director of
Central Intelligence in December 1973 after consultation with the Intelli-
gence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC). A copy is attached as
Tab A. These objectives, coupled with the management objectives for
FY 1975 -- currently under development -- are intended to make the
identification and implementation of management objectives a central
element of the functioning of the Intelligence Community.
34. For the longer-term future, the following conceptual goals
are proposed as basis for the development of intelligence objectives:
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a. Changing the concept of the Intelligence Community
to something more nearly representing a true Community
through participatory management.
b. Developing mechanisms for Community-wide
planning.
c. Creating meaningful measures of the cost effective-
ness of intelligence activities.
d. Keeping intelligence programs firmly in phase with
stated requirements and priorities.
e. Promoting an understanding of the operating dynamics
of the Community as a foundation for any needed changes
in roles, missions and functions.
f. Increasing personnel productivity.
35. !The President has called upon the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to assume responsibility for leadership of the Intelligence Community
and to report to him on both Community needs and performance. Ful-
filling this role requires Community-wide involvement of the DCI. To
accomplish what the President expects, however, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence and all intelligence program managers also
have important roles to play which extend beyond the confines of their
departmental or program responsibilities. The Department of Defense
should insure full participation by the intelligence organizations of the
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military services and of the field commands in all areas in which they
can contribute. The goal is active involvement of all elements of the
Intelligence Community with the DCI in furtherance of Community
interests. Even though the Community consists of a considerable number
of separate organizational elements there is a growing tendency on the
part of the President, the Congress and the National Security Council
to look upon it as a true Community for which the DCI is the spokesman.
Participatory management should enhance the development of the Community
planning which is essential to respond to the President's Directives.
36. Community-wide planning today exists only in a relatively
few large-scale activities involving technical collection sensors. The
kind of world environment described in Part 1, however, requires
broadening the use of the IRAC and considering individual planning
initiatives from a Community vantage point as well as individual agency
posture. The USIB and IRAC, plus the Intelligence Community Staff,
provide the DCI a foundation from which this kind of planning review
can evolve.
37. Integral to Community-wide planning is the devising of
an "audit trail" from important substantive end products of the Intelli-
gence Community back to the costs for collecting, processing and
analyzing the data. The cost effectiveness of each contributor par-
ticipating in each phase of the intelligence cycle needs to be related
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to values assigned to the resulting end product by the users. The
"Key Intelligence Questions" and the process developed for evaluation
of Community performance thereon will help define where dollars can
best be allocated. Regular quarterly reporting to IRAC on how funds are
being expended in the current year help identify and give visibility
to the present program direction. These steps are a start on what will
become an important ingredient in resource allocation.
38. Inflation in operating costs clearly exists. These realities
will require that much of management's time be devoted to planning,
controlling and matching intelligence activities with stated intelligence
requirements and priorities. There is likely to be little relief from
time consuming budget reviews and special studies.
39. Performance is intimately related to structure. It can be
expected that close attention to objectives and efforts to improve the
overall performance of the Community will call for adjustments in roles,
missions, functional assignments, and perhaps to changes in basic
regulations. Any such changes must be based on a good conceptual
understanding of the operating dynamics of the Intelligence Community,
but study and analysis which could lead to such changes is encouraged.
Management and analysis methodologies and techniques are available and
should be applied.
40. Increasing personnel productivity is essential, and accomplishing
this will require careful attention. It is critically important that fully
adequate numbers of personnel be made available for analysis and
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production, but this is only part of the problem. The man-machine
interface must also be improved to cope 'with the quantitites of data which
collection systems are making available. Facilities for information
handling are the nervous system of the Community. The more effective
this system is, the better personnel productivity can become. A rise
of 2 or 3 percent per year in productivity, where this can be measured,
could provide the flexibility needed to support advanced off-the-job
training for intelligence personnel as well as permit space needs to hold
level. Inter-agency integration of training offers further opportunities
for productivity enhancement and operating economics. Such training
also should offer an assist to creativity and to the interchange of ideas
and understanding among intelligence personnel.
41. Not the least complex of the various actions involved in
increasing personnel productivity will be efforts to attain true "state-
of-the-art" capabilities. Much has been done to push acquisition of
state-of-the-art capabilities in complex collection systems, but far less
attention has been given to the problem of providing improved support
for analysts. Technology as advanced as that applied to the develop
ment of collection sensors may well be needed to optimize capabilities
in other parts of the intelligence cycle and to devise better methodologies
for processing, exploiting, analyzing and presenting intelligence to
its users.
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