PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 30, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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USIB/IRAC-D-22. 1/20
30 July 1974
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB Principals
IRAC Members
SUBJECT Perspectives for Intelligence
REFERENCES a. USIB/IRAC-D-22. 1/18, 18 June 1974
b. USIB-M-671, 27 June 1974, Item 6
Pursuant to the discussion at the USIB meeting of 27 June
(reference b. ), the attached final version of the Perspectives are
forwarded herewith for information. Copies have also been provided
to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the
members of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.
Executive Secretary
Attachment
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PERSPECEIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE 1975-1980
( July 1974 USIB/IRAC D 22.1/20) Received 31 Jul 74
COPIES 5 THRU 43 (From USIB/Secretariat)
Cy 7&8 - MPRRD
Cy 9&10-PRD
Cy 11&12 - CPAD
Cy 13 - CS
Cy14-IHC
Cy # 5 - Dr.
Cy 6- Dr.
CY 15 - 29 IC Registry
cy 15 PRD for
Cy 20 - 31 Jul 74,
Cy21-2Aug:
, ES (for MAG Reading)
( 15 Cy s for PFIAB handout 25X1
during meeting, 2 Aug 74. Cys 30 thru 43. USIB instructed that cys
are not to be forwarded to PFIAB. (ADDED 1725: 4 More cys: 16-19)
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ICS Reg 31 Jul 74
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DIRECTOR of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Perspectives for Intelligence
1975-1980
Secret
July 1974
USIB/.IRAC D 22.1/20
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
1975 -1980
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1
Part I-Major World Problems ......................................... 1
General .......................................................... 1
The USSR ....................................................... 2
China ........................................................... 2
Western Europe .................................................. 3
Fn.qtern Europe ................................................... 3
1 1 ........................................................ 3
New owers ...................................................... 4
The Third World ................................................ 4
Social Change ................................................ 4
The Acceleration of Events ....................................... 5
Part II-The Role of Intelligence ................................. .... 5
General .......................................................... 5
The USSR ....................................................... 6
China ........................................................... 6
Europe .......................................................... 6
Economics ....................................................... 7
Other Priorities .................................................. 7
Part III-Implications for Intelligence Planning .......................... 8
General .......................................................... 8
Collection vs. Exploitation ......................................... 8
Demands vs. Resources ............................................ 9
Technical Systems ................................................ 10
Requirements and Evaluation ...................................... 11
Manpower Implications ........................................... 11
Security ................................................... ..... 1.2
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Introduction
1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980 are issued by the Director
of Central Intelligence to provide general guidance for planning for all elements
of the Intelligence Community for the next five years. They are particularly
designed to stimulate early action on programs requiring long-term research,
development, or planning-such as complex technical systems, language train-
ing, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to influence Fiscal Year 1975
decisions whose effects will be felt only after several years. For Fiscal Year 1975,
near-term guidance is provided in the Director's Objectives submitted to the
President, which include both Substantive Objectives (further detailed in Key
Intelligence Questions) and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's
Annual Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence Community will
include comment on steps taken during FY 75 to meet future requirements.
2. These Perspectives open with a general overview of the political, economic
and security environment anticipated during the coming five years (Part I). This
is followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of intelligence in these
situations during that period (Part II). Finally, more specific guidance is given
with respect to activities which should be planned or initiated in order to meet
the needs of the period ahead (Part III).
3. The Perspectives are focused primarily on major national intelligence prob-
lems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal extensively with three addi-
tional categories of important problems:
(a) Continuing lower priority national responsibilities which must be
satisfied with a limited allocation of resources;
(b) Departmental or tactical intelligence support of civilian and mili-
tary elements of the United States Government. This will also require con-
tinuing investment of attention and resources;
(c) Unexpected problems or crises which can pose major political, eco-
nomic or security problems to the United States. To the extent that these
requirements cannot be met by reallocation of resources from less urgent
activities, some reserve capability must be included in planning to meet them.
Part I-Major World Problems
1. General. The balance of power between the US and USSR is unlikely
to change fundamentally. Perception of the balance, however, may change im-
portantly in either Moscow or Washington, or both. Beyond this, many other
nations will play major roles in the international arena. Additional nations possess-
ing nuclear weapons or having significant control over critical economic resources
will be capable of seriously upsetting the international equilibrium. The chang-
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ing balance between the world's supply of and demand for natural resources will
strain the world's political, economic, and social institutions. Thus the US will be
confronted not only with the steady-state Soviet threat to US national interests
but turbulence in other world relationships as well.
2. The USSR. Notwithstanding the probable continuation of detente and an
absence of armed conflict, the USSR will remain the principal adversary of the
US during the next five years. It will regard the US as its major security threat,
and act accordingly. In foreign policy, its continued efforts to expand its inter-
national influence will bring it into conflict with US interests. This will include
political action in Western Europe, the Near East, and South Asia, and, to a some-
what lesser extent, Latin America. In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to
give high priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and its
projection abroad.
The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR, however, have com-
plicated this picture. These are: the need to control local crises lest they lead to
general war; the burden of the Sino-Soviet conflict; and the desire for economic
and technological assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in the
coming years with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square traditional
attitudes with the requirements of a detente posture.
These dilemmas may take an acute form in the strategic field. While con-
tinuing to modernize its ground, naval, and tactical air forces, the USSR is vigor-
ously pursuing the opportunities left open by SALT I. Except to the extent re-
strained by arms limitation agreements, the Soviets will make substantial improve-
ments in their missile forces, including MIRVing, improved accuracy, increased
throw-weight, and better survivability. At the same time, they will continue to
maintain and to improve their defenses. They will be working to develop effective
weapons and supporting systems in such areas as ASW, satellites, and lasers. Ex-
pecting strategic equality with the US, the USSR gives indications of angling
further for a measure of strategic superiority, if that can be obtained at reason-
able risk.
Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of the Soviet system, and
particularly its economic administrative structure, will grow. Prolonged detente
may also eventually have some effect on the Communist Party's ability to wield
its authority effectively in all areas of public life. But these are long-term possi-
bilities, and over the next five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system
are not likely to be substantially altered.
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5. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue to be under Soviet
control, recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties with Moscow will compli-
cate the picture. The five-year period could see an explosion from within one
or more East European countries against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would
quickly reestablish its hegemony (by force if necessary), whatever the price
in terms of other policies. Internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in
these countries so long as they adhere to Soviet guidance in diplomatic and
security matters. Economic relations with the West and with the Third World
will grow in quantity and in independence from Soviet control. The passing
of Tito could open an arena of difficulty and contest over the succession in-
ternally and over the future orientation of Yugoslavia externally.
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New Powers. During the coming years, a number of nations will increa
se
in absolute and relative strength and become at least regional great powers, plus
playing more substantial roles in world international forums. An example is
Brazil, whose economic and political power is increasingly felt in Latin America.
Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined to build that country's relative strength
in the region so as to play a full great power role there. Nigeria and Zaire could
also develop this sort of role in Africa. Aside from these, several nations having
considerable influence within regions will display greater independence from
the close US relationship which has characterized them in the past. This will
be particularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also occur in various
international relationships. Examples of such powers are Canada, Mexico, Aus-
tralia, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia, plus several South American nations such as
Venezuela, Panama, and Peru.
8. The Third World will present a varity of problems. A number of local
disputes will preoccupy not only the leaders of individual countries but the
international community. Examples are relationships between India and Paki-
stan, between black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and within Southern Arabia
and the Persian Gulf. Several existing disputes will continue to be a matter of
concern to the international community and will sow the seeds of potential larger
scale involvement (Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South
Korea, Taiwan and China). A number of Third World countries will become
increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers and their local presence in
the economic, political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and
South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations
divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration against both superpower
complexes, e.g., the Arab nations, the rising black nations of Africa, and the
nations of the Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will
suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism,
and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, et al). Some of the Third
World will find an outlet for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great
power economic relationships and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of
international forums.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums
in a number of areas. These will stem from increased expectations and a percep-
tion of the growing economic gap between less developed countries (and classes
within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly susceptible to
this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco,
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India, possibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Peru, Ecuador
and Bolivia. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by some au-
thoritarian governments, particularly those benefiting from increased oil revenues,
but these will have difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term
and transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present
temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing differences or to great
powers desirous of extending their influence. Such turbulence will also exist
within advanced nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minorities
turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims against more and more deli-
cately tuned and interdependent societies.
10. The acceleration of events will be characteristic of the years ahead.
This will come from improved communication and transportation, sharply re-
ducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international
problems. It will also raise many local events to international prominence and
inflate national or political pride, posing further handicaps to successful ne-
gotiations. There will be a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans
for individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception and manage-
ment of a multiplicity of international relationships. Many national or interna-
tional institutions are simply not structured to cope with accelerating change.
Such change will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology,
but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological,
industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and economic impacts.
Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and their effects will be
needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate basis.
Part II-The Role of Intelligence
1. General. The primary charge on intelligence during these years will be to
provide accurate and pertinent information and assessments with respect to
the increased range of problems requiring US decision. In particular, the need
will be for advance notifications of forthcoming policy problems and, of course,
for tactical early warning as well. These responsibilities will be especially im-
portant in an era of accelerating events so that diplomacy, negotiation, or other
benign initiatives can head off military confrontations between states or other
disruptive events. The acceleration of events and the explosion of information
will also require a major effort by the intelligence community to identify major
policy and negotiating issues, to process raw information into manageable form,
and to devise adequate techniques to identify for consumers the essential ele-
ments of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments, and the likely
impact of alternative policy decisions. Intelligence will increasingly be expected
to provide assessments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign
powers, in addition to their basic capabilities. To do this will require inter-
disciplinary analysis which melds economic, technological, sociological and
cultural factors with political and military data.
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tion will be kept by the Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinar
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intelligence target. Its
military power, its economic role in the world, and its foreign policies will con-
tinue to pose major problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be ex-
pected to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and economic
activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire advanced scientific and tech-
nological assistance and the potential impact on both military and economic
capabilities. It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of Soviet
political dynamics and intentions. These must be supplemented by clear and
accurate forecasts of likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic,
and military fields. While a small percentage of this material will become avail-
able through open exchange and access, vast fields of highly important informa-
efforts to obtain and understand them.
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5. Economics. Economic intelligence will increase in importance world-
wide. This will include economic situations in nations having a major impact
on the world economy and on relationships with the United States, such as the
Arab oil states, major economic powers such as Japan, major suppliers of food
and raw materials, and nations where internal economic chaos can create major
world problems out of sympathy or resonance (e.g., India). Economic intelli-
gence of value to US policy makers is necessarily international in scope, includ-
ing such topics as the activities of multi-national corporations, international de-
velopment programs, regional economic arrangements, and the working of in-
ternational commodity markets. In some cases, nations with close political and
military bonds to the United States may become important economic intelligence
targets, I tc., raising complicated problems
for intelligence coverage.
6. Other Priorities. Intelligence will increasingly be expected to warn of and
explain new situations posing problems to American interests. An example will be
to identify the causes of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third
World countries, so the component elements of these problems can be isolated,
negotiated about or countered with appropriate mechanisms. This may require in-
tensified efforts on our part to understand and communicate the differences
between societies, cultures, and nation personalities. Intelligence will be called
upon more often to assess the threat of terrorists against US installations and
private enterprises abroad and, beyond that, the risk that some terrorists may
acquire nuclear weapons.
7. A few of the major problems which will be either the subject of dispute
or negotiation, or sometimes both, and consequently will be priority intelligence
requirements, can be listed:
(a) Rates of production, consumption, and pricing of raw materials and
energy sources and international commodity arrangements;
(b) Price and non-price restrictions on international trade, including
transportation and communication services;
(c) The international payments mechanism and the coordination of na-
tional fiscal-monetary policies;
(d) National policies with respect to military sales and foreign business
activity and investment, including policies toward multi-national corpora-
tions;
(e) Arms limitation, nuclear proliferation, and crisis avoidance;
(f) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships in the oceans and on
sea beds.
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public's right to information about its Government's activities. This may require
new legislation, the development of new ways of informing the Congress and the
public of the substantive conclusions of the intelligence process and clear standards
for compliance with the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652
(and their exceptions) in the Intelligence Community.
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June 27, 1974
TO: -l" John Clarke
AD/DCI/IC
SUBJECT: Perspectives
The "Perspectives" were circulated
within the NSC staff. Attached for
your information are comments
received from two staff members.
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,SEGRET -
Shouldn't the Sino-Soviet conflict be given greater prominence
among major world problems that will affect intelligence planning?
More information about this conflict could allow us to tailor our
defense and diplomatic efforts in significant ways.
We are witnessing a rapid development of Soviet ability to project
its military forces beyond its borders. This development applies
not only to naval forces but to air lift. Even if a nuclear war by
the US and USSR becomes less likely, the prospects of confronta-
tion in the world should grow, particularly as Soviet trade be-
comes more orientated to overseas supplies and sales. We should
look on the unexpected problems of such a crisis as a major intel-
ligence problem, not one that (as in the Perspectives) will require
a reduced amount of attention and resources in the coming years.
We think the intelligence community must decide to look for more
imaginative means of early warning and intelligence background
for at least two critical areas of the world: (i) the Middle East
and Persian Gulf area, (ii) Indochina.
On page 15, item C says that "the coordination of national fiscal-
monetary policies" will be priority intelligence requirements.
We assume this refers to policies of this nature in foreign countries.
11L into tnese
0 "Perspectives"?
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9. Social Change
Social change will not invariably be disruptive and destabilizing.
In much of the Middle East, the increase in oil revenues are likely
to accelerate development and could bring about some very positive
forces for stability and progress. This tends to focus too much on
what is likely to go wrong. We need to be alert for other trends as
well, if reporting is to be balanced.
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
6 JUN 1974
S-1151/DP-lA
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Perspectives for Intelligence (1975-1980) (U)
1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum and its
attachment dated 18 June 1974, subject as above, which
requested comments on the attachment.
2.' (C) Based on a comprehensive review of the subject
paper, I have attached for your consideration a list of
suggested minor changes which will enhance the editorial
accuracy and/or completeness of the document. Neverthe-
less, I submit DIA's concurrence on this excellent paper
and offer this Agency's support and readiness to join in
a cooperative effort in fulfilling pertinent stated
objectives.
1 Enclosure
Recommended Changes,
3 pgs, (S)
WILLIAM E. POTTS
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
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DEPARTMENT
OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: IN
Perspectives for Intelligence, 1975-1980 (S)
TO: Lieutenant General Daniel 0. Graham
Deputy to Director, Central Intelligence for
the Intelligence Community
Central Intelligence Agency
2 7 JUN 1974
(S) While concurring with the general thrust of the Perspectives we are
concerned that tactical intelligence is not considered a "major" problem
and is given a relatively low priority. Degrading the importance of
actical intelligence could seriously affect our already decreased
capability to support our combat commanders. For this and other reasons
given in our attached comments, we recommend that paragraph 3(b), page 2,
be deleted and that tactical intelligence as a major problem be included
in Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning.
JOT S. PUSTAY, Brig)ten, USAF
Acting Asst-Chief of Staff. Intelligence
1 Atch
AF/IN Comments on Perspectives,
1975-1980 (S) (1 cy)
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a't~
INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES ADVISORY COMM
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS
IRAC MEMBERS
SUBJECT Perspectives for Intelligence
The DCI has requested your comments on the attached Perspectives
for Intelligence. Please forward any comments you may have to the
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, Room 6E2914, CIA
Headquarters Building by 27 June 1974.
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USIB/IRAC-D-22.1/18
18 June 1974
PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
Introduction
1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980
are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to
provide general guidance for planning for all elements
of the Intelligence Community for the next five years.
They are particularly designed to stimulate early action
on programs requiring long-term research, development, or
planning such as complex technical systems, language
training, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to
influence Fiscal Year 1975 decisions whose effects will be
felt only after several years. For Fiscal Year 1975, near-
term guidance is provided in the Director's Objectives
submitted to the President, which include both Substantive
Objectives (further detailed in Key Intelligence Questions)
and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's Annual
Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence
Community will include comment on steps taken during FY '75
to meet future requirements.
2. These Perspectives open with a general overview
of the political, economic and security environnment anti-
cipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is
followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of
intelligence in these situations during that period (Part II).
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Finally, more specific guidance is given with respect to
activities which should be planned or initiated in order
to meet the needs of the period ahead (Part III).
3. The Perspectives are focused on major intelligence
problems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal with
three additional categories of problems which will require
attention and resources during the coming years
(a) Continuing lower priority national responsi-
bilities which must be satisfied with a limited allocation
of resources.
(b) Departmental or tactical intelligence support
of civil and military elements of the United States
Government. This will also require continuing
investment of attention and resources, but at a lower
priority than national priority matters.
(c) Unexpected problems or crises which can pose
major political, economic or security problems to the
United States. Some reserve capability must be included
in planning to meet them.
Part I - Major World Problems
1. General. The balance of power between the US and
USSR will continue relatively unchanged. Many other nations,
however, will play major roles in the international arena.
Additional nations posessing nuclear weapons or having
significant control over critical economic resources will
be capable ff s riouslyy upsetting the international equilibrium.
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The changing balance between the world's supply of and demand
for natural resources will strain the world's political,
economic, and social institutions. The steady-state Soviet
threat to US national interests will thus be compounded by
turbulence in other world relationships.
2. The USSR. Notwithstanding the probable continuation
of detente and an absence of armed conflict, the USSR will
remain the principal adversary of the US during the next
five years. It will regard the US as its major security
threat, and act accordingly. In foreign policy, its
continued efforts to expand its international influence
will bring it into conflict with US interests. This will
include political action in Western Europe and, to a somewhat
lesser extent, in the Near East and Latin America. In its
economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority
to the kinds of growth which increase national power and
its projection abroad.
The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR,
however, have complicated this picture. Moscow recognizes
the necessity of controlling local crises lest they lead
to general war, the burden of China's hostility and competition,
.and its own need for economic -- particularly technological --
assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in
the coming years with a number of dilemmas as it attempts
to square traditional attitudes with the requirements of
a detente posture.
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This dilemma may take an acute form in the strategic
field. While continuing to modernize its ground, naval,
and tactical forces, the USSR is vigorously pursuing the
opportunities left open by SALT I. Except to the extent
restrained by arms limitation agreements, the Soviets will
make substantial improvements in their missile forces,
including MIRVing, improved accuracy, increased throw-
weight, and better survivability. At the same time, they
will continue to maintain and to improve their defenses.
They will be working to develop effective weapons and
supporting systems in such areas as ASW, satellites, and
lasers. Expecting strategic equality with the US, the USSR
gives indications of angling further for a measure of
strategic superiority, if that can be obtained at reasonable
risk, although adequate defense is likely to remain the
primary Soviet security concern.
Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of
the Soviet system, and particularly its economic administrative
structure, will grow. Prolonged detente may also eventually
have some effect on the Communist Party's ability to wield
its authority effectively in all areas of public life.
But these are long-term possibilities, and over the next
five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system
are not likely to be substantially altered.
4~ r, In r, r,
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7. New Powers. During the coming years, a number of
nations will increase in absolute and relative strength and
become at least regional great powers, plus playing more
substantial roles in world international forums. An example
is Brazil, whose economic and political power is increasingly
felt in Latin America. Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined
to build Iran's relative strength in the region so as to play a
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full great power role there. Nigeria could also develop
this sort of role in Africa. Aside from these, several
nations having considerable influence within regions will
display greater independence from the close US relationship
which has characterized them in the past. This will be
particularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also
occur in various international relationships. Examples of such
powers are Canada, Australia, Mexico, and Thailand, plus
several South American nations such as Venezuela, Panama,
and Peru.
8. The Third World will present a variety of problems.
A number of local disputes will preoccupy not only the
leaders of individual countries but the international community,
Examples are relationships between India and Pakistan, between
black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and within Southern Arabia
and the Persian'Gulf. Several existing disputes will continue
to be a matter of concern to the international community and
will sow the seeds of potential larger scale involvement
(Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South
Korea, Taiwan and China). A number of Third World countries
will become increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers
and their local presence in the economic, political and cultural
spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and South Asia. In
this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations
divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration
against both superpower complexes, e.g., the Arab nations,
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the rising Black nations of Africa, and the nations of the
Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will
suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences,
economic extremism, and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, et al). Some of the Third World will find an outlet
for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great power
economic relationships and in hamstringing the effectiveness
of a variety of international forums.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly
create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem
from increased expectations and a perception of the growing
economic gap between less developed countries (and classes
within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly
succeptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain
other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly Indonesia,
the Philippines.,, and, in Latin America, Peru, Ecuador and
Bolivia. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled
by authoritarian governments, but they will have difficulties
in maintaining themselves over the longer term and transferring
power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present
temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing
differences or to great powers desirous of extending their
influence. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced
nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional
minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their
claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent
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l0. The acceleration of events will be a characteristic
of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication
and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to
reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems.
It will also raise many local events to international pro-
minence and inflate national or political pride, posing
further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be
a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans for
individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception
and management of a multiplicity of international relation-
ships. Acceleration will also mark the process of change.
To a major degree this will occur in the fields of science
and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects
on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional
change, with resultant political and economic impacts. Iden-
tification and accurate assessments of such changes and their
effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even
immediate basis.
Part II - The Role of Intelligence
1. General. The primary charge on intelligence during
these years will be to provide
rate and pertinent information
and assessments with respect to the increased range of problems
requiring US decision. In particular, the need will be for
early warning, because of the acceleration of events, to
permit the resolution through diplomacy, negotiation, or other
benign initiatives of matters which might otherwise involve
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political, economic or military contests or uz est. The
acceleration of events and the explosion of nformation will
also require a major effort by intelligence to process raw
information into manageable form and to devise adequate
techniques to identify for consumers the essential elements
of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments,
and the likely impact of alternative policy decisions.
Intelligence will be increasingly expected to provide assess-
ments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign
powers, in addition to their basic capabilities. To do this
will require interdisciplinary analysis which melds economic,
technological, sociological and cultural factors with political
and military data.
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intel-
ligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the
world, its foreign policies will continue to pose major
problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected
to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and
economic activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire
advanced scientific and technological assistance and the
potential impact on both military and economic capabilities.
It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of
Soviet political dynamics and intentions. These must be
supplemented by clear and accurate forecasts of likely Soviet
courses of action in the political, economic, and military
fields. While a small percentage of this material will become
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available through open exchange and access, vast fields of
highly important information will be kept by the Soviets
within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts
to obtain and understand them. A particular requirement will
be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitations
agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field
special attention will be focused on Soviet research and
development, in particular with respect to weapons and supporting
systems which could substantially affect the balance of power.
These will include antisubmarine warfare, anti ballistic missiles,
satellite and advanced technology systems. Intelligence will
be required to identify and maintain a base-line capability
for tactical intelligence coverage, for rapid augmentation
in case of local or general confrontation or conflict. Trends
and factions in Soviet leadership and political doctrine
will be a major subject of interest to assist in negotiations
and to warn of undesirable developments ahead. The Soviet role
abroad, either directly through diplomatic means or indirectly
through party or subversive means, will be a matter of
particular attention with respect to the turbulence of the
Third World .
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Part III - Implications for.Intelligence Planning
1. General. The prospect is for further reduction of
resources through inflation, with a need to cover a greater
range of intelligence requirements and an information
explosion. New collection systems must be developed to cope
with technological advances in target entities., Because of
the greater increased date flow expected from collection
systems already under development, greater emphasis will have
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to be applied to the development of more sophisticated processing
systems and dissemination techniques. A third major planning area
will be in the refinement of requirements and evaluation systems
to ensure the application of available resources to priority needs
and the most effective distribution of intelligence tasks among
components of the Community. The Community will need, finally,
a different mix of manpower to meet both the substantive and
technological problems which will be confronting the Community in
future years.
2. Collection vs Exploitation. Over the past decade,
management focus and the allocation of resources have been
directed especially to the application of advanced technology to
the collection and, to a lesser degree, the processing of
intelligence data. This has been highly successful, resulting in
major substantive advances in our knowledge, particularly with
regard to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. This
investment has made a major contribution to the negotiations
required for detente. This forward technological progress will
soon reach a point with new capabilities in the photo and SIGINT
fields. This plateau will present large problems of success.
Within the time frame of this document, an important and
pervasive problem facing the Intelligence Community will be to
ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous amounts of information
it will be collecting. Exploitation means not only sifting, selecting
and analyzing the most relevant data, but also the application
of advanced techniques to transfer
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that data from collectors to analysts and the analytical
product, in turn, to the ultimate users of intelligence --
all in the most meaningful and useful form we can devise.
New styles of using information and the relationships they
can portray may force new styles of policy deliberation that
will differ markedly from those of the past.
Action: Study and planning must be initiated by
Intelligence Community agencies in:
(a) Processing in rapid time the raw information
received, to include selection and discard of non-
essential material at the earliest possible time,
identification and acceleration of critical material
and reducing manpower and investment on lower priority
material.
(b) Development of improved techniques and
disciplines of analysis and production.
(c) Development of improved methods of presentation.
3. Demands vs. Resources. Another problem of great
magnitude facing the Community over the next five to ten years
will be the changing (and in all probability increasing) demands
for intelligence while available resources for intelligence
decrease in real terms.
In the past, the major portion of our intelligence effort
has necessarily been deployed against the military capabilities
of the Soviet Union and our other adversaries, actual and
potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much of
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this military focus must be maintained because of the importance
of this subject to national security and the need for information
on the quality of enemy weapons systems. It must not only
serve to keep us alert militarily, but also support negotiations
and verify arms limitations agreements. At the same time, the
demands for other types of intelligence are growing. The
result is a probable net increase in demand with a new
proportionate mix among political, economic, military and
technological target objectives.
This simultaneous shift and increase in requirements
is occurring in a period of serious resource constraint and
continuing inflation. Until very recently we have had the
freedom to invest resources in a number of functional areas
simultaneously without undue difficulty. This is no longer
true. We will have to accomplish our objectives without the
benefit of significantly greater resources. We must find
trade-offs in the systems we use, the areas we cover, and the
depth of the data we seek.
One area which holds promise for greater efficiency is
the national/tactical interface. Current studies seek to
identify ways by which national programs can better support
tactical requirements, and vice versa. As more capable and
flexible systems come into the national inventory, they must
be made to serve the needs of operational forces as well as
national-level consumers. Modernized systems and procedures
which, by their design, permit greater mutuality of effort
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Advanced information processing and presentation
techniques will pose particular manpower training requirements.
Indeed, the Intelligence Community should be in the forefront
in placing new technologies in the service of users. New
methods of analysis, forecasting, coordination and presentation
of information must be energetically explored and applied
where appropriate. Care must be taken in the application
of such new methods and systems to ensure they are designed
for the people who will use them and that adequate training
in their use is active and integral to the process.
The Intelligence Community must study and plan to:
(a) Assure that training and familiarization
are undertaken in new methods of collection, analysis
and production, particularly in the use of new techni-
cal capabilities to increase productivity and precision
and save manpower.
(b) Develop selection and training programs in
those foreign languages and cultures which will be
important intelligence targets of the particular agency
in the 1975-1980 time frame (especially Russian and
Chinese).
(c) Ensure the availability of technical and
academic talents and expertise in the subjects which
will be of importance in the years 1975-1980, e.g.,
economics.
(d) Flexibly reduce manpower commitments to
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lower priority activities and reduce (or reorient to
new requirements) the persons freed by such change in
priority.
(e) Develop and apply affirmative action plans
for equal employment opportunity.
7. Security. The Intelligence Community must develop
a satisfactory resolution of its needs for the protection of
sources and methods and the American public's right to
information about its Governments activities. This may require
new legislation, the development of,new ways of informing
the Congress and the public of the substantive conclusions
of the intelligence process and clear standards for compliance
with the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652
(and their exceptions) in the Intelligence Community.
SECRET
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 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350
IN REPLY REFER SO
Ser 009F/ 514372
27 June 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subj: Perspectives for Intelligence
Ref: (a) USIB/IRAC-D-22.1/18 of 18 June 1974
Encl: (1) General comments to reference (a)
(2) Specific comments to reference (a)
1. In reply to reference (a), enclosures (1) and (2) are forwarded.
Capty.n, USN
Director, Estimates, USIB Matters
and Departmental Support Division
Copy to:
DIA DR
Army (ACSI)
Air Force (AF/IN)
SZ1UET
/4J
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