ESTIMATED SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING IN RUBLES: RECENT TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
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CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
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Publication Date:
December 1, 1977
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 004836
Exempt from C>nsral Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
SK. 58(2)
Automatic*Ny declassified on
date impossible to determine
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Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles:
Recent Trends and Prospects
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
Key Judgments
Total Defense Spending
Our estimates of the ruble cost of Soviet defense activities during the
period 1970-76 indicate that:
? Soviet spending for defense, defined to correspond to US budgetary
accounts and measured in constant 1970 prices, has been growing at
an average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent, from 40-45 billion rubles in
1970 to 52-57 billion rubles in 1976.
? Defined more broadly, as Soviet practice might require, defense
spending grew from 45-50 billion rubles in 1970 to 57-62 billion
rubles in 1976.
Composition and Allocation
Ruble estimates provide insight into the resource composition of the
Soviet defense effort and the trends in resource allocations among the
branches of service. Analysis based on the narrower definition of defense-for
which the estimates are more detailed and precise-indicates that:
? The shares allocated to investment, operating, and RDT&E re-
mained fairly constant during the 1970-76 period. About half of total
spending went for investment, about 30 percent for operating
expenditures, and about 20 percent for RDT&E.
? The Soviet Navy and Ground Forces received roughly constant
shares of investment and operating spending during the period.
Spending for the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Forces
displayed cyclical behavior, and the Air Defense Forces' share of
investment and operating expenditures decreased by about one-fifth.
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Economic Impact
The defense effort has had a substantial impact on the Soviet economy:
? During the 1970-76 period, defense spending consumed an almost
constant share of Soviet GNP-11 to 12 percent or 12 to 13 percent,
depending on how defense spending is defined.
? Defense production consumed about one-third of the final product
of machine-building and metalworking, the branch of industry that
produces investment goods as well as military hardware.
Prospects
The average annual growth rate of 4 to 5 percent implied by these
estimates exceeds the average annual rate at which we expect the Soviet
economy to grow in the years ahead. Econometric projections are that Soviet
GNP will grow at about 4 percent a year through 1980, but that growth will
fall off thereafter-probably to about 3 to 3.5 percent. Yet, the projected
economic slowdown notwithstanding, Soviet spending for defense is likely to
continue to grow at roughly its current rate into the 1980s, whether or not a
SALT II agreement is concluded.
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Page
Key judgments .............................................................................................. i
Preface ............................................................................................................ iv
Methodology .................................................................................................. 1
Confidence in the Estimates ...................................................................... 1
Estimates of Total Defense Spending ...................................................... 1
Resource Implications .............................................................................. 2
Prospects .................................................................................................... 2
Impact of a SALT II Agreement ............................................................ 4
Defense Spending by Resource Category .............................................. 4
Investment .................................................................................................. 4
Operating .................................................................................................... 4
RDT&E ........................................................................................................ 5
Spending by the Services .......................................................................... 5
Strategic Rocket Forces .......................................................................... 6
Air Defense Forces .................................................................................. 6
Air Forces .................................................................................................. 6
Navy ............................................................................................................ 6
Ground Forces .......................................................................................... 7
Command and Support .......................................................................... 7
Page
Figure 1. Estimated Soviet Expenditures for Defense, 1970-76 ...... 2
Figure 2. Percentage Shares of Estimated Soviet Investment and
Operating Expenditures for Military Services .................. 5
Figure 3. Growth of Estimated Soviet Investment and Operating
Expenditures by Branch of Service, 1970-76 .................... 5
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This report presents CIA's estimates of Soviet spending for defense during
the 1970-76 period. It complements our dollar cost comparison of Soviet and
US defense activities ' and expands upon the estimates which the Director of
Central Intelligence presented to the joint Economic Committee of the US
Congress in June 1977.
The estimates are couched in ruble terms to reflect the costs of military
equipment and activities in the USSR. Such estimates are done to assist in
assessing the impact of defense on the Soviet economy, resource considerations
confronting Soviet defense planners, and the relative priorities assigned to the
forces and activities which make up the Soviet defense effort. Constant prices
are used so that the estimates reflect only real changes in defense activities, not
the effects of inflation. The use of 1970 prices permits comparison of
estimated defense expenditures with other CIA estimates of Soviet economic
performance, which also use that price base.
' SR 77-10140, A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1966-76, October 1977
(SECRET).
iv
SECRET
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Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles:
Recent Trends and Prospects
Methodology
In the USSR, information on defense spending
is a closely guarded state secret. Only one statis-
tic-a single-line entry for "defense"-is re-
ported each year in the published state budget.
This figure is uninformative, because its scope is
not clearly defined and its size appears to be
manipulated to suit Soviet political purposes.
(Changes in the announced defense figure do not
appear to reflect the changes we have observed in
the level of military activities.)
To provide the information which the official
"defense" entry does not, CIA annually estimates
the cost of Soviet defense activities. Our estimates
begin with the detailed identification and listing
of the activities and physical components which
make up the Soviet defense program for a given
year. By a variety of methods this data base is
converted into two value estimates, one in rubles,
the other in dollars. For some components, such
as military personnel, the data are costed directly,
using available ruble prices and costs and dollar
prices and costs. For other components, conver-
sions are made from one value base to the other
by applying dollar-to-ruble and, to a much more
limited degree, ruble-to-dollar conversion factors.
Where possible, the results of direct costing are
checked for reasonableness against Soviet statis-
tics.
For two of the main components of defense
spending-investment and operating expendi-
tures-prices and quantities are estimated sepa-
rately for each major element. The remaining
component-military research, development,
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)-does not lend
itself to this approach. Consequently, the cost
of military RDT & E is estimated by another
method-analysis of Soviet information on ex-
penditures for science.
Confidence in the Estimates
Our annual estimates reflect a continuing
effort to acquire more and better data and to
improve our methods. The past year's effort has
increased our confidence in the estimates. Still,
those presented in this report have a margin of
error which could be substantial for some items.
Our confidence is highest in the estimates of the
aggregate total and the investment category.
Analysis of published Soviet economic statistics
and intelligence information relating to the year
1970 yields results which are consistent with our
direct costing estimates for that year. Moreover,
because the direct costing methodology reflects
the actual changes observed in Soviet defense
activities over time, we are confident that the
general upward trend in these estimates is
correct.
Our confidence in the estimates at the lower
levels of aggregation varies from category to
category. We have high confidence in our esti-
mates for major naval ships. These are easily
observed and are costed directly in rubles, using
Soviet data which have been found to be reliable.
Reasonable confidence can also be assigned to the
estimates of spending for missile and aircraft
systems and for pay and allowances of uniformed
military personnel. We have less confidence in
our cost estimates for the smaller procurement
items such as general purpose vehicles and some
ground force weapons. We are least confident of
the estimates of military RDT&E costs. These
estimates rely on Soviet data which are ill-
defined and difficult to analyze.
Estimates of Total Defense Spending
We do not know precisely how the Soviets
define their defense spending. This report uses
two definitions: one corresponding to that used in
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Estimated Soviet
Expenditures for Defense, 1970-76
M Estimate defined as
the Soviets might view their defense effort.
Estimate defined for
comparison with US accounts,
the United States and a broader definition includ-
ing additional costs which the Soviets might
classify as spending for defense. These additional
costs include expenditures for military stockpil-
ing, foreign military assistance, and space pro-
grams that are operated by the military in the
USSR but by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration in the United States.
Defined to correspond to US accounts, esti-
mated Soviet spending for defense increased
from 40-45 billion rubles in 1970 to 52-57 billion
rubles in 1976, measured in constant 1970 prices.
Defined as the Soviets might view their defense
effort, estimated spending increased from 45-50
billion rubles in 1970 to 57-62 billion rubles in
1976.
Under the narrower definition, for which the
estimates are more detailed and precise, esti-
Announced Defense Expenditures
(Current Prices)
mated Soviet defense spending increased at an
average annual rate of 4 to 5 percent for the
period. The annual growth rates varied during
the period, however, reflecting primarily fluctu-
ations in procurement outlays for aircraft and
strategic missiles. As in earlier periods, procure-
ment displayed a cyclical pattern as acquisition
of older weapon systems tapered off before that
of follow-on systems peaked.
Resource Implications
Although no single measure adequately
describes the economic impact of the Soviet
defense effort, defense spending's share of GNP
often is used for this purpose. Defense now
accounts for 11 to 12 percent of Soviet GNP
under the narrower definition of defense spend-
ing and for 12 to 13 percent of GNP under the
broader definition. Because defense spending
grew only slightly faster than the economy as a
whole during the 1970-76 period, there was little
change in the share of GNP taken by defense.
Another indication of the economic impact of
defense activities is defense's share of crucial
industrial output. During the period, defense
consumed about one-third of the final product of
machine-building and metalworking, the branch
of Soviet industry that produces investment goods
as well as military hardware. Defense require-
ments also absorbed most of the output of inte-
grated circuits.
These measures give evidence of a substantial
commitment of resources to defense. But there
are also a number of noneconomic considerations
which Soviet leaders would weigh in deciding on
future defense programs. These factors include
the leaders' views of foreign military threats,
their perception of the relationship between mili-
tary power and the success or failure of Soviet
foreign policies, and the strength of the institu-
tional forces which support defense programs.
Prospects
The Soviet economy probably will continue to
grow at its current rate of roughly 4 percent a
year through 1980, but we believe that from 1981
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through 1985 the average annual growth of GNP
will fall-probably to about 3 to 3.5 percent, and
possibly to about 2 to 2.5 percent. (The higher
projection reflects the likely impact of a declining
growth rate in the labor force and continuing
Soviet inability to achieve offsetting growth in
productivity. The lower projection reflects, in
addition, the impact of a projected decline in oil
production unaccompanied by vigorous energy
conservation measures.) 2
Our projections of Soviet spending for defense
into the 1980s are less certain than our estimates
of spending in past years. But the trends revealed
by our estimates and the evidence gathered in
preparing them provide a reasonable basis for
such projections. We believe defense spending is
likely to continue to grow into the 1980s at about
its current rate-some 4 to 5 percent per year.
The increasing costs of new military hardware,
the weapons development programs currently
under way, and continuing capital investment in
the defense industries all lead us to this conclu-
sion. The scant return likely from a transfer of
resources from defense to civilian production and
the Soviet perception of the future strategic
environment also lead us to believe that Soviet
defense spending will continue to grow.
A major factor in the growth of Soviet defense
spending is the rapidly increasing costs of new
weapon systems. As in the United States, the
increasing complexity of new weapons has re-
sulted in escalating development, production, and
maintenance costs. Such cost escalation is clearly
evident in the new systems entering the forces in
the 1970s-particularly in aircraft, ballistic
missiles, and naval ships.
Given the new weapons development programs
now under way, the increasing cost of new
military hardware is likely to become a more
important determinant of defense spending in
the 1980s. Military RDT&E programs include
potentially costly systems for all of the Soviet
armed services. In the strategic forces, new solid-
and liquid-propellant ICBMs, including a large
follow-on to the SS-18, are being developed, as
are new strategic naval missiles. Air defense
programs for improving surveillance and control
and for new fighters and low-altitude surface-to-
air missiles are being pursued. Still other systems
are being developed for the air, ground, and
naval forces. Not all of these systems under
development will be deployed, but several will
enter production by the early 1980s, continuing
to shift the weapons acquisition mix toward more
expensive systems. Even if procured at a slower
pace than their predecessors, these systems will
drive weapons acquisition and maintenance costs
upward.
We also see continued capital construction at
defense industrial facilities-some apparently
related to weapons development programs and
some apparently designed to enhance productive
capacity. Much of the capital construction we
have observed is occurring at facilities associated
with the production of land- and sea-based strate-
gic missiles and high-performance aircraft-
those costly systems that have been driving pro-
curement and maintenance costs upward.
We believe that if the Soviets were to reduce
defense spending's growth as a remedy for their
economic ills, they would have to break sharply
with current spending trends to achieve appreci-
able results. Our econometric analysis indicates,
for example, that freezing defense investment at
its projected 1980 level and reducing military
manpower by 1 million between 1981 and 1985
would increase the average annual rate of growth
in Soviet GNP by about one quarter of one
percent.3 A shift from defense to consumer goods
production-which might seem attractive to
some Soviet leaders-also would yield limited
returns and would be difficult to implement
because many defense production resources could
not be transferred readily to consumer goods
production. Moreover, it would probably encoun-
ter opposition from substantial segments of the
civilian economic establishment as well as from
the powerful leaders and institutions of the de-
fense sector.
' See ER 77-10436, Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects,
July 1977 (SECRET).
9 See ER 77-10436.
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Soviet perceptions of the future strategic envi-
ronment also increase the likelihood that the
upward trend in defense spending will continue
into the 1980s. The Soviets are impressed by the
dynamism of Western military programs and are
concerned with the Chinese threat. They are
particularly unsettled by recent US discussions of
the neutron bomb and by decisions on the B-1
bomber, cruise missile, and M-X mobile missile.
The uncertainty with which they view the future
strategic relationship with the West argues for
Soviet prudence in planning future military
forces and discourages measures to reverse the
upward trend in defense spending.
Impact of a SALT II Agreement
A strategic arms limitation agreement along
the lines currently being discussed probably
would not slow the growth in Soviet defense
spending significantly. Strategic weapons devel-
opment and production programs might be
stretched out, and missile procurement levels
could be somewhat lower than otherwise forecast.
But procurement and maintenance of intercon-
tinental attack systems subject to limitation cur-
rently account for only about one-tenth of annual
ruble expenditures for defense, and the impact of
the strategic forces on growth in defense spend-
ing has been muted in recent years by the
increasing importance of expenditures for gen-
eral purpose aircraft. In addition, because many
of the resources devoted to strategic programs are
highly specialized, the Soviets would be more
likely to reallocate them to weapons programs not
limited by the agreement than to civilian uses.
Thus the effects of a SALT II agreement on
economic growth and consumer satisfaction
would be small and probably do not in them-
selves constitute a strong incentive for an
agreement.
Defense Spending by Resource Category
A useful way of analyzing Soviet defense
spending is to break it down into three principal
resource categories-investment, operating, and
RDT&E. Investment spending reflects the flow
of new equipment and facilities into the military
forces; operating expenditures are those associ-
ated with the day-to-day functioning of the
military; and RDT & E expenditures give some
indication of plans for future force moderniza-
tion. The resource analysis that follows is based
on estimates of defense spending defined to
correspond to US accounts.
During the 1970-76 period the relative shares
of investment, operating, and RDT & E expendi-
tures in total Soviet spending for defense re-
mained fairly constant. About half of defense
spending went for investment, about 30 percent
for operating expenses, and about 20 percent for
RDT&E.4
Defense investment consists of the procure-
ment of weapons, equipment, and major spare
parts and the construction of facilities. Most
investment-more than 90 percent-was for pro-
curement, and most procurement spending was
for the acquisition of weapons. The bulk of
weapons acquisition outlays went for large, ex-
pensive items-first for aircraft and then for
missiles and naval surface ships and submarines.
Spending for equipment for the support of de-
ployed forces-such as radar and general purpose
vehicles-was lower but grew rapidly and stead-
ily throughout the period.
Operating
Operating expenditures can be divided into
personnel costs and operation and maintenance
expenditures. Personnel costs-for pay and
allowances, food, personal equipment, retire-
ment, and medical care-averaged about 60 per-
cent of operating expenditures and approxi-
mately 15 percent of total spending for defense
between 1970 and 1976. Operation and mainte-
nance expenditures-for the maintenance of
equipment and facilities, purchases of petroleum
and lubricants, utilities, transportation, and com-
* A previous paper on estimated Soviet defense spending (SR 76-
10121) reported that investment and operating each consumed 40
percent of total spending. The difference between that report and
this one reflects a Change in definitions. Spending for major spare
parts is now classified as an investment rather than an operating
expense. The change makes our reporting consistent with US
Department of Defense practice and with reported Soviet practice
as well.
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munications leasing-were consistently lower
than personnel costs, but increased more rapidly.
Because the ruble cost estimate for RDT&E is
based on highly aggregated and tenuous data, its
Growth of Estimated Soviet
Investment and Operating Expenditures by
Branch of Service, 1970-76
g1 U W U1 dllU C01i1pUSiLuU11 Ca1111UL IJe U1sCUSSeU Will! 160
great confidence or in detail. Nevertheless, the
information on which the estimates are based- 140
published Soviet statistics on science, statements
by Soviet authorities on the financing of research, 120
and evidence on particular RDT&E projects-
suggests that military RDT & E activities receive 100
approximately 20 percent of total defense spend-
ing and that they grew steadily during the 80
period.
60
Spending by the Services
The Soviet armed services are organized into
five branches-Strategic Rocket Forces, Air De-
fense Forces, Air Forces, Navy, and Ground
Forces. Our costing methodology makes it possi-
ble to estimate the allocation of much of defense
spending among these forces. We cannot, how-
ever, estimate how the costs of RDT&E or of
Percentage Shares of Estimated Soviet
Investment and Operating Expenditures for
Military Services
Strategic
Rocket Forces
Air Defense Forces
Air Forces
Navy
Command and
Support
1970 1973 1976
Calculated on the basis of data in 1970 rubles,
I
FIGURE 3
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76
Calculated on the basis of data in 1970 rubles.
574629 11-77 CIA
SECRET
5
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certain command, rear service, and other support
functions are allocated to the separate forces, The
discussion that follows excludes RDT&E and
assigns the command and support functions to a
separate category.' Again, the analysis is based on
the narrower and more detailed definition of
spending for defense.
Strategic Rocket Forces
Spending for the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces
(SRF), which operate land-based strategic mis-
siles, averaged about 7 percent of total invest-
ment and operating spending during the 1970-76
period. But SRF spending moved in a cyclical
fashion. From 1970 to 1972 it decreased both
absolutely and as a share of total outlays, reflect-
ing the decreasing procurement of the SS--9,
SS-11, and SS-13 ICBM systems. Thereafter, the
level and share of spending for the SRF increased
as a new missile procurement cycle began with
the deployment of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19
ICBMs.6
Air Defense Forces
The Soviet Air Defense Forces are responsible
for defending the USSR against attack by hostile
aircraft and ballistic missiles. Spending for this
branch of service averaged about 10 percent of
total investment and operating expenditures dur-
ing the 1970-76 period. Between 1970 and 1972,
however, it fell both absolutely and relatively,
and while the absolute level of the Air Defense
' This category should not be confused with command, control,
and communications, the costs of which are distributed among all
the forces in this analysis.
' We now believe that the SRF's average share of spending is
lower and its cyclical fluctuations are less pronounced than reported
in our last published estimates. The earlier estimates showed the
share of defense spending allocated to the SRF growing from 11
percent in 1970 to 14 percent in 1975, compared with the current
estimate of 7 percent in 1970 and 8 percent in 1976. A part of the
change in our estimates is due to reassigning some of the costs of
nuclear materials to command and support. This is consistent with
our understanding of the Soviet treatment of such materials, which
are centrally controlled by a Main Directorate of the Ministry of
Defense. Most of the change results from new estimates of Soviet
missile costs. The change does not reflect a decrease in the estimates
of the number of missiles produced and deployed. It does indicate
that these weapons are somewhat less costly than estimated last year.
Forces' spending increased thereafter, their share
of total expenditures did not. In 1976 their share
was some one-fifth lower than in 1970. The
decline in the early 1970s resulted from reduc-
tions in the rate of procurement of the SA-2 and
SA-5 surface-to-air missile systems and of Fiddler
and Flagon aircraft. The rise in the absolute level
of spending after 1972 was due to increased
procurement of interceptor aircraft-first the
Foxbat and then the Flogger.
The Soviet Air Forces include three compo-
nents-Long Range Aviation, Frontal (Tactical)
Aviation, and Military Transport Aviation. Ex-
penditures for the Air Forces averaged about 20
percent of total investment and operating spend-
ing during the 1970-76 period and-like those for
the SRF-moved in cyclical fashion. Between
1970 and 1973, spending for the Air Forces
increased absolutely and relatively. Thereafter it
decreased as a share of total forces spending, but
its absolute level fluctuated slightly from year to
year. Over half of this spending went to Frontal
Aviation. The second largest share-a little more
than 30 percent-went to Military Transport
Aviation, and Long Range Aviation got the small-
est portion.
Investment and operating expenditures for the
Soviet Navy consumed a fairly constant 20 per-
cent of such spending for the military services
during the period. The primary items driving the
growth of naval spending were ballistic missile
and attack submarines. There was also a trend
toward the procurement of ships such as the
Kiev-class ASW carrier and Kara-class cruiser
which are larger, more capable, and more expen-
sive than the major surface ships of the 1960s, but
which are produced in smaller numbers. In the
later years of the period, spending for naval
aircraft-particularly the Backfire bomber-was
also an important factor in the growth of the
Navy's spending.
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Ground Forces
Unlike the other combat branches, the Ground
Forces took a larger share of total operating
expenditures than of total investment spending.
Personnel costs were especially important, in-
creasing in absolute terms and consistently ac-
counting for about one-third of total spending for
the Ground Forces. (The increase in personnel
spending resulted from an increase in manpower
rather than in pay rates.) As for all the combat
branches, however, investment spending for the
Ground Forces was larger than their operating
expenditures. During the period, investment ex-
penditures grew each year. Major procurement
items for the Ground Forces were self-propelled
artillery, mobile tactical SAMs, and tanks and
armored vehicles.
Command and Support
Some costs are not allocated to a specific
combat branch because they relate to general
support provided by the Ministry of Defense
apparatus. Other costs cannot be allocated to the
combat branches because of lack of information.
We assign both types of expenditures-which
include rear services, salaries of Ministry of De-
fense employees, space operations of a specifi-
cally military nature, and retirement pay-to a
category called command and support. During
the period, the command and support share of
spending for the forces was constant at slightly
over 20 percent. Within this category, expendi-
tures for personnel and operation and mainte-
nance were about twice as large as those for
investment.
The author of this paper is
Military-Economic Analysis Cen er, ice o
Strategic Research. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be directed to
telephone 351-5238.
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CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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Approved Fur Re
leatse 200 11081
RECIPIENT
14
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SENT
RETURNED
i7
STATI
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STATINTL
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CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
SERIES NUMBER
.~, (61
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
DISTRIBUTION TO RC
STATINTL
DATE OF DOCUMENT
N BER OF COPIES
NUMBER
IN RC
COPY
RECIPIENT STATINTL
DATE
NO.(S)
c , CI -
Ll
SENT
RETURNED
J/
STATINTL
-
re 2 --
of GZL.
2
Q 7
STATINTL
TATINTL
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A r Fo- F 'eI &,4,2601 /88/ RI 7,~ QO4,5~A 3(_Oc130 01-5
FORM 2353
2-65 (19)
0 SENDER: Cor9plete item El F PR 1
Add your address in the "RETURN TO' space on
I reverse.
I. The following service is requested (check one)
.
how to whom and date delivered ------------ 150
S
ow to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered. ............ 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
E
2. ARTJCLtADDRESSED TO-
(1
P wT / A)Ajk,L 11) r Vl e c~
5td
3. ARTI LED C IPTION:
REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
(Always obtain signature of address., or agent)
I have received the article described above.
SIGNATURE ^ Addressee ^ Aut orized agent
4.
DATE OF DELIV Y
POSTMARK
5. ADDRESS (Complete only if requested)
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
CLERK'S
INITIALS
0 SENDER: Complete items 1. 2, and t,
Add your address in the "'RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one).
ow to whom and date delivered............ 150
Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
Ej RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered ............. 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO:
U S' Array _ITU I iq eUc 54.
~
~i-
A
l~ cJ.4
clc, 4
r 1 z a rU
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
REGISTERED NO .
CERTIFIED NO..
INSURED NO.
I
(
(Always obtain signature of addressee or agent)
I have received the article described above.
SIGNATURE ^ Addresseeuthorized agent
DATE OFDEELIVE
POST /IRK
(Complete only if requests l
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE: \ j,_
CLE*I
88
I.y
A rove-
-For ReI4
omp ere item: ,and
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1. The following service is requested (check one).
ow to whom and date delivered ------------ 154
Sh
own to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 354
[I.RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered_____________ 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO:
1VAUAt `os1
rA
llu~i ~~ ~~e l
~
.e
V
3. ARTICLE DESC IPTION:
REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
(Always obtain signature of addressee or agent)
I have received the article descried above.
SIGNATURE El Addressee Authorized agent
4.
DATE OF DELIVERY
POSTMARK
7
5. ADDRESS (Complete only if requested)
l~p
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
SENDER: Complete items 1, 2, and 3.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
e following service is requested (check one).
Show to whom and date delivered--.-.-..-... 150
Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered------------- 65?
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
A D
2. ARTICLE DRESSED TO:
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
REGISTERED NO. CERTIFIED NO. INS
(l URED NO.
w.. fit
ys obtain signature of addressee or agent)
I have received the article describe
SIGNATURE E3 Addressee
CLERK'S
INITIALS
se 2001/681T -
01708%14
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE,
USE TO A ID P~I((YYMENT
OF STAG. $300
(Street or P9 Box)
UNITED"STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below.
? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse.
? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article
if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja-
cent to number.
RETURN
TO
WASHINGTON, DI C. X0545
PENIN.TY FOR PRIVATE
USE TO AVOID PAYMENT
OF POSTAGE, $300
CENTRAL 13TELL'GENCE AGENCY
f0 1(C G
(Street or P.O. ox)
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the spece below.
? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse.
? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article
if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja-
cent to number.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE
USE TO AVOID PAYMENT
OF POSTAGE, $300
RETURN I All
Cfl~ LIAi. ' ENCT
WASNINCI r , D, C. X3`05
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in the space below.
? Compete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse.
? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article
if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja-
cent to number.
PEf LTY FOR PRIVATE
USE TOF PAVOID PAYMENT
OSTAGE$00
RETURN 7 !'T .~ 4 .CF AGENCY
TO t t ?A1 11. ; E.~~~.
WASIIINGTON, 61 C, ii 05
(Name of Sender)
ICE
UNITED STATES pPOSTA LRV
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS
Print your name, address, and ZIP Code in:00- spbas 01bw.
? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the rrssgg
? Moisten gummed ends and attach to nt/d )ar~iole
if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse article "Return Receipt Requested" adja-
cent to number.
RETURN Cc Tp i ^ ~~-Y
TO EN i R iL Ii'~ LL1G !! !':-E:RC ~f
WASIIII~ GTGI~, D. C1 `0505
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130Q0I-5
0 SENDER: Complete items 1, 2, and ,.
Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space on
reverse.
1 following service is requested (check one).
Show to whom and date delivered............ 150
[] Show to whom, date, & address of delivery.. 350
F1 RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom and date delivered............. 650
RESTRICTED DELIVERY.
Show to whom, date, and address of delivery 850
2. ARTICLE ADDRESSED TO:
/'fir CJwiU,erSt
3. ARTICLE DESCRIPTION:
REGISTERED NO.
CERTIFIED NO. INSURED NO.
II
y
(Always obtain signature of address., or agent)
I have received the article dzv bed above.
GNATURE ^ Add
L
h
i
d
ressce
ut
or
ze
agent
>4
.
DA TE Qif ERY
5. ADDRESS (Complete only it reque t-Wd
J
V
6. UNABLE TO DELIVER BECAUSE:
CLERK'S
INITIALS
}x GOP: 197f -.:{t-2D3-456
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE
SENDER INSTRUCTIONS below
Print your name, address, and ZIP We in the space
? Complete items 1, 2, and 3 on the reverse.
? Moisten gummed ends and attach to front of article
if space permits. Otherwise affix to back of article.
? Endorse artide "Return Receipt Requested" ad)a-
RETURN c i ~?
TO CEI T A ~ i T I tL~ U ~ KIGE AC.ENCT
WASMIN T QN U, C, w 2fl5
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5
38 01/` r/1~L
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79BOO457AO01-qk
J
D-?I-S-S.WL-M-1. 1N--A. -T-I-O-~} L-I-S-T I' --O--R:
REPORT NO.
9 - /CZ/sf6
SUBJECT:
ORIGINATING BRANCH
'NO. OF COPIES TO BE MADE:
'l>
TOTAL:
Cys. required for codcword reports(
S NOT INCLUDE
ved~or Release 200140814: IRA-RDP7~9B0045d7A001 0013 ~ 1-5
ys. requi_a ec or on co ewer ( PERSONAL COPIES
reports
DISSEMINATION LIST FOR BLUE NOTES AND PERSONAL COPIES OF OSR REPORTS
'Alf ,prove IlF ,s F be ,s )2001/08/14: CIA-RDF,7PB0045769~WR13
Copy #
0 P&PD/FIP Rm. 154 (Microfiche Copy)
President - Jimmy Carter
WHITE HOUSE
lAssist. to the President for National Security Affairs
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Col. William Odom (Military Assist.)
Director, ACDA -- Paul C. Warnke, Rm. 5930
Asst. Director, ACDA International Security Program Bureau
ACDA ISP) Jain Newhouse. Rm. 4498
Office of Operations Analysis
(ACDA/OA) Alfred Lieberman Rm. 5672
1 Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau
(ACDA/WEC) Robert Behr Rm. 5843
AIR FORCE
Secretary, USAF - Honorable John C. Stetson Rm. 4E871 Pentagon
Under Secretary, USAF - Honorable Hans. Mark Rm. 4E871 Pentagon
Chief of Staff, USAF - Gen. David C. Jones Rm. 4E929 Pentagon
Vice Chief of Staff, USAF -- Gen. Wm. V. McBride Rm. 4E936 Pentagon
Assist. Chief of Staff for Intelligence - Maj. Gen. James L. Brown
Rm. 4A932 Pentagon
Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, DCS/P&O
Lt. Gen. Andrew B. Anderson, Jr. Rm. 4E1032 Pentagon
Director of. Doctrine Concepts,_Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Ops.
q
it,
ST+TI NTL
Maj. Gen. James R. Brickel Rm. 4D1083 Pentagon
Assist. Chief of Staff Studies and Analysis
Gen. Jasper Welch,
Jr.
Rm. 1E388 Pentagon
Commander-in-Chief, USAF in Europe
APO, N.Y. 09012
De u Chief of Staff for R&D
Lt. Gen. A. D. Slay Rm. 4E334 Pentagon
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
-2-
Copy 4 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
ARMY
Secretary of the Army - Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. Rm. 3E718 Pentagon
Chief of Staff - Gen. Bernard W. Rogers Rm. 3E668 Pentagon
ACSI Arm - Maj. Gen. E. R. Thompson Rm. 2E464 Pentagon
Deputy Actin Chief of Staff, ACSI/Armor
Brig. Gen. John A. Smith Jr. Rm. 2E464 Pentagon
I JConce is Analysis Agency (Cannot receive codeword material)
Maj. Gen. E. C. Whitehead 8120 Woodmont Ave., Fethesada, MI
20014
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Develop.ment & Ac--uistion)
Dr. Percy A. Pierre Rm. 3E390 Pentagon
Commander, US Arm. Material Command
Gen. John R. Deane, Jr., 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alex., Va.
22333
Maj. Gen. M. R. Thurman Ran. 3C718 Pentagon
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research Development and Acquisition
Director Programs and Analysis Evaluation Office
Staff/Army
)7
Lt. Gen. Howard H. Cooksey, Rm. 3E412 Pentagon
Assistant.'De ut Chief of Staff for Research Development and
Acquisition
Maj. Gen. Philip R. Feir Rm. 3E412 Pentagon
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary of Defense - Harold Brown
Mail to:
_ Deputy Secretary of Defense - Hon. Charles Duncan, Jr
RXIAssistant Secretary (International Security Affairs)
Sec. of Defense
Attn: Classified
Control
Rm. 3A948
Hon. David E. McGiffert Rm. 4E806 Pentagon
c~I ~l IDirector_, Net Assessment 'OSD
Andrew W. Marshall, Rm. 3A930 Pentagon
a_ ~j~ Assist. Secretary (Program Analysis & Evaluation) OSD(PA&E)
Honorable Russell Murray Rm. 3E966 Pentagon
Princi D r to - RVAane 2981of08/8 : C&T-a ' 9R@ #_ A001300130001-5
Dr. Robert J. Hermann, Rm. 3E282 Pentagon
%~~aac a 1. i u.L & 1 - ' .i
Secretary, Program Analysis & Evaluation(OSDLPA&E)
(Deputy Assist. Secretary, Regional Programs (OSD/PA&E)
Paul D. Wolfowitz Rm. 2E334 Pentagon
Actin Director, Pro rams Analysis & Evaluation, Europe Div. (OSD/PA&E)I
Robert L. Schneider Rm. 2C270 Pentagon
Cost and Economic Analysis (DASD/PA&E)
Milton A. Margolis Rm. 2D278 Pentagon
ist. Secretary for Euro can and NATO Affairs, ISA
James Siena Rm. 4E840 Pentagon
ist. Secretary (Eaasst Asia and Pacific Affairs)
Morton I. Abramowitz Rm. 4E830 ' Pentagon
Militate Assistant to Secretar. of Defense
dam. Thor Hanson Rm. 3E880 Pentagon
Director, DOD MBFR Task Force (OASD/ISA)
Louis G. Michael Rm. 4B880 Pentagon
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, OSD
Dr. Wm. J. Perry Rm. 3E1006 Pentagon
istant Secretary, Policy, Plans, and NSC Affairs (ISA)
Dr. Lynn Davis Rm. 4E820 Pentagon
DIA
Director, DIA - Lt. Gen. Eugene Tighe, Jr. Rm. 3E258 Pentagon
3 \,' (Vice Director for Production - R. Adm. Wm. Robertson Rm. 3E259 Pent.
Director for Estimates - Brig. Gen. James A. Williams
Chief, Eastern Division, DB-2
-3-
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (cont.)
Chief and Deputy 'Chief, Long Range Forecast Division
Rm. 1006 Pomponio Plaza
Rm. 1085 A.H.S.
"A" Bldg-FATINTL
Rm. 1021 Pomponio Plaza
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
-4-
Approved For RdWamMM8/14f Cft4jXN~qj?BQ A001300130001-5
---
Copy it
y 31I,- tkOJO
Hon. James R. Schlesinger, Sec. of Energy, Wash., D. C.
~ 20 Mass. Ave., N.W
Director, International Security Affairs
Ray E. Chapman Germantown, Md.
*Wants 1 copy only of codeword reports to be sent to Ray Chapman
Germantown, Md. per SSO/ERDA 29 Sept. 1976
**Has SI and TK clearance but does not have storage facilities.
De ut Assistant Administor for National Sec urit
Gen. Edward ller Germantown, Md.
JCS
Director, Joint Staff, JCS
V. Adm. Patrick J. Hannifin Rm. 2E936 Pentagon
Chief Studies Analysis and Gaming nc
Brig. Gen. Eugene D. Scott Rm..1D936 Pentagon
Chairman, JCS - Gen. George S. Brown, USAF Rm. 2E865 Pentagon
Director, J-5 (Plans and Policy)
Lt. Gen. Arnold W. Braswell
1 l/"_
Rm. 2E1000 Pentagon
I De u Director International Negotiations J-5, JCS
Adm. Edward Welch, Jr.
Pentagon
Director of Naval Tntelli ence
Rear Adm. Donald P. Harvey Rm. 5C600 Pentagon
Secretary of the Navy - W. Graham Claytor, Jr. Rm. 4E680 Pentagon
Chief of Naval O erations - Adm. J. L. Holloway III Rm. 4E660 Pentt
Director, S stems Analysis Division
R. Adm. Carl A. Trost, USM Rm. 4A526 Pentagon
Commandant,' US Marine Corps - Gen. Louis H. Wilson Rm. 2004 An. Annex.
De u y Chief of Naval O erations (Surfa'ce Warfare)
Pentagon
V. Adm. James H. Doyle Jr.
De ut Chi.ef of Naval Operations (Flans Policy, & Operations)
V. Adm. William J. Crowe Rm. 4E592 Pentagon
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO013001300D1-5
-5-
ApproAi6aAFd le 2009M ? MA- EW
Director, NSA - Adm. B. R. Inman
d0,1-Z1e a de )
NSC (Rm. 381 EOB)
NSC Staff Member (Security Analysis) Victor Utgoff
JNSC Staff Member (Intelligence) Samuel .Hoskinson
. 'STATE ,
Secretary of State - Cyrus R. Vance 7th Floor
Director of Bureau Intelligence and Research (State/INR)
Harold H. Saunders Rm. 6531
Deputy Director for Research,' Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Martin Packman Rm. 6535
(Director, Bureau of Politico--MilitarV Affairs
Leslie Gelb
Ambassador at Large -"Ellsworth Bunker Rm. 7260
Director, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control (PM DCA)
Vincent Baker Rm. 7424
Counselor for the Dent. of State
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
Richard N. Cooper Rm. 7250
Director of Economic Research & Analysis (INR/DDR/REC)
Michael H. Ely Rm. 8722
Director Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the
Pacific (INR/DDR/REA)
Herbert Horowitz Rm. 8840
IDirector Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affi-)-irs
IEUR RPM Stephen Ledogar Rm. 6227
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
Approved For Release 2001$Q : qUfibRq?PJ'9B00457A001300130001-5
Copy #
Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe INR DDR/RSE) Paul K. Cook
Director, Political-Military Affairs and Theater Forces
NR~DDR PMT) Robert H. Baraz Rm. 6638
Director Strategic Affairs, Bureau of Intelli.cLence and Research
INR DDR STA) Ross Cowey Rm. 6524A ~
De ut Director for Coordination (INR DDC)
William McAfee Rm. 6635
Economic Relation (RE~C/!CER)
Martin J. Kohn Rm. 8666
Director, Bureau of Eur peanAffairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
(EUR/SOV)
John E. Reinhardt
*Deputy Director USIA
Charles W. Bray III, Rm.. 700, 1750 Pa., Ave., N.W. DC)
*Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors, 314 Old EOB
Honorable Charles L. Schultze
Director, Office of Management and Budget, EOB
James McIntyre (Acting)
** Can receive SI material, only
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
encr
Wants 1
cy. only
Rm. 700, 1750 Pa., Ave., N.W. DC) of
)codeword
) reports
Approved For Release 2001/08/1.: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
Copy #
>5 20319
*Commandant National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Wash., D. C.
Attn: Classified Lib Rm. 30
:*Superintendent, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, Calif. 93940
**President, Naval War College, Newport, R. I. 02840
*Commandant, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013
*Commandant, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va. 23511
*Commanding General/Commandant, U. S. Army Command and General
Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 60027
*Commanding General/Commandant, U. S. Army Intelligence School,
Ft. Hauchuca, Az. 85613
*Commander, Air Universi, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
* Can receive TK material
** Can receive SI material only
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
Page 8
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
SPECIFIED RECIPIENTS FOP PERSONAL DISSEMINATION
AGENCY COPY NO. RECIPIENT
The Honorable Fred P. Wacker
B DOD 971 Assist. Sec. (Comptroller) 3E854 Pent.
Ltc. Michael Higgins
OASD (MRA&L)WR Rm. 2B323 Pentagon
Bruce Clarke
Sec. Def. Rep, to--M F R Neck 4B880 Pent.
Dr. Robert J. Hermann
(1 personal,
DIA 12 supp. c s.
Principal De Asst. Sec. Def.
.Commando Control, Communications and
jIntelligence Rm. 3E282 Pentagon
OASD Rm. 3A874 Pentagon
Deputy Comptroller(Plans & Systems)
Eugene C. Fubini
Chairman, Def. Science Bd. 3D1040 Pent.
Deputy Asst. Sec. for International
Economic Affairs, ISA Rm. 4E830 Pent.
Robert Turner Rm. 3C125 Pentagon
Office of Asst. Dir. (NTA) ODDR&E
OASD(LA) Rm. 3E822 Pentagon
DIO/USSR Rm. 2C238 Pentagon
DIO/Strategic Forces Rm. 2C288 Pentagor
TL
DIR4E Rm. 2801 AHS
AHS
P DIA /1 o 0,-
J. Dale Pa fen erg STATINTL
Daniel Gallik
ACDA ACDA _ Sth F l oOr SA-6 Bldg
USAF AF /INS Rm 4A882 PPntagern
NSC
- /o
f Ft. Meade, Md.
CIA
STATINTL
Deputy Asst. to the Pres. NSC for
National Security Affairs Rm 381 EOB
Chief SALT Support Staff 3F22 Has.
Asst. to DCI 7E12 Has.
D/CRG 7G50 Hqs.
STATINTL STATINTL
P State // 1,' John Polansky, EUR/RPE__ 64261) a e
Same Westbrook
b 0 NSC tiff
P ACDA ___, Barr Blechman Rm. 5843 New State
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
Personal
Copy ,No,
-9-
RlesN?~1/$/S1~RtQ~j9~~j1L3~0130001-5
ApprovedC,fA
D'C I
~, DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) Adm. Stansfield Turner
via SA/DCI
Acting DDCI (Deputy Director of Central Intelligence) STATINTL
John F. Blake
AD DCI (Assistant to the Deputy Director)
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY '(IC)
EA DCI (Executive Assistant to the DCI)
Acting D'/DCI/IC (Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community) John McMahon
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
D NFAC Mr. Robert Bowie
DD/NFAC Sayre Stevens
SA/NIO (Special Assistant)
STATINTL NIO/CH (China)
~r1? _ I NIO CF (Conventional Forces)
NIO/E (Economics)
(NIO)
NIO- EAP (East Asia Pacific) STATINTL
NIO/LA (Latin America) (acting) STATINTL
NIO/ AF (Africa) STATINTL
NIO/NE/SA (Near East South Asia) STATINTL
STATINTL
NIO/SP (Strategic Programs) .
NI'O USSR (USSR and East Europe)
NIO E (Western Europe)
NI-o SS (Special Studies)
NIO/NP (Nuclear Proliferation)
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
CIA INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION (PERSONAL)
-10-
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATION (DDA)
DDA (Deputy Director for Administration John F. Blake=-=
A/DDA (Associate Deputy Director for Administration)
Michael J. Malaniek
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (DD/S&T)
IDD/S&T (Deputy Director for Science and Technology) Leslie Dirks
ADD/S&T (Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology)
Ernest J. Zellmer
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER (O/Comet)
Comfit (Comptroller) James H. Taylor
AC Com t (Assistant Cpmptroller and Resources),
Compt/R&E (Asst. Com troller, Re Requirements and Evaluation
Staff) STATINTL
NIO/SA/Compt (NIO/Special Activities) Rm.5G00
STATINTL
OFFICE OF IMAGERY ANALYSIS (OIA)
D/OIA;(Director, Imagery Analysis) Noel Firth
DD/OIA (Deputy Director, Imagery Analysis) -
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457A001300130001-5
Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79B00457AO01300130001-5
CIA. INTERNAL DISTRTBUTION (PERSONAL)
Personal
Copy No.
-11-
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
D OCR (Director, Office of Central Reference)' Harry C. Eisenbeiss
DD/OCR (Deputy Director, OCR) STATINTL
OFFICE OF GEOGRAPHIC AND CARTOGRAPHIC RESEARCH (OGCR)
7
D/GCR(Director, Geographic and Cartographic Research)James P.Lynch
DD/GCR (Deputy Director, OGCR) STATINTL
OFFICE OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (ORPA)
D/ORPA (Director, Regional & Political Analysis) John K. King
DD/ORPA (Deputy Director, Regional & Political Analysis
CIA OPERATIONS CENTER (CIA/OPS/CEN)
C/CIA OPS CEN (Chief, CIA Operations Center) Vincent Heyman
STATINTL
DC/CIA/OPS/CEN (Deputy Chief, CIA Operations Center)
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH (OER)
if D OER (Director of Economic Research) Maurice C. Ernst
__ DD OE.R (Deputy Director, OER)
((
OFFICE OF TRAINING (OTR)
/OTR (Director. of Training) Harry E. Fitzwater
DD/OTR (Deputy Director of Training)
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OFFICE OF SIGINT OPERATIONS (OSO)
r DD/OSO (Deputy Director of Office of Sigint Operations)
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (ORD) STATINTL
D/ORD (Director fo Research and Development) Phili K. Eckman
DD/ORD (Deputy Director of Research and Development)
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE (OSI)
OFFICE OF WEAPONS INTELLIGENCE (OWI)
f I`~ ID/OWI (Director of Weapons Intelligence) R. Evan Hineman
OFFICE OF DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING (ODE)
DOMESTIC COLLECTION DIVISION (DCD)
C/DCD (Chief, Domestic Collection Division) M
DC/DCD (Deputy Chief, Domestic Collection Division)
D/OSO (Director, Office of Sigint Operations) Edward_R anQTQTiNiTi
D/OSI(Director of Scientific Intelligence) Karl H. Weber
DD/OSI (Deputy Director fo Scientific Intelligence) -
DD/OWI (Deputy Director of Weapons Intelligence)
JD/ODE (Director of Development and Engineering)
DD/ODE (Deputy Director of Development and En ineer'n STATINTL
NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER(NPIC)
D NPIC
/ (Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center)
John J. Hicks
DD/NPIC(Deputy Director, NPIC)
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r-1 DCI (via SA/DCI) 7E12 Hqs.
/c2 3
A/DDCI 7E31 Hqs. STATINTL
2 / (/ DCI/IC, Rm. BW09, Community Hq. Bldg.
1. DCI/IC
1. D/OPEI
1 ~oZ
1 12 -2
6 _/ 4_- /3
NFAC (unmarked) 7E44 Hqs.
NFAC Staff, 2F28 Hq.
NFAC/Registry, 7E47 Hq.
2. SALT
1. CSS
1. NFAC CAR
1. NFAC/CL
1. NFAC/Registry
1.3~/ Inspector General, 2E24 Hq.
f
/3, OGC, 7D07 Hq.
13 ~ - /.?j CRG
1. Director
1. PDB
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ORPA, 7G15. Hq.
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L/ -'I - /'-/3 2. Lr- s npro1ved G 5 S/2
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1. D/OCR
2. ISG
1. CLD/DSB/DOC
O/COMPT. 4E12 Hq.
3E63
O/COMPT/RES, 7G0-0 Hq.
1. SIGINT
1. RECCE
2. HSG
1 /'.Sr3 DCD/SD, Rm. 811 Key Bldg.
1 Op s . Cente 7F33 Hq. STATINTL
4 D/OGCR, Rm. 1232 Ames Bldg.
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2 Q, /(/ DD/S&T 6E45 Hqs.
1 /(, OLC 7D35 Hqs.
1 OSO 1D06
1 / 6 L ORD 612 Ames Bldg.
4 65 ODE 1B19
C 0 `---- -
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D/EBIS 1005 Key Bldg.
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STATINTL
OTR 936 C of C
1 -- II
2 ODE
1
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OSI 6F24 Hqs.
OER 4F21 Hqs.
OWI 1D0401 Hqs.
DDO GB38 Hqs.
OIA 1S518
NPIC/Info Br. 1S315
COMIREX BW09
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OP-96, Dept. of Navy
4A684 Pentagon
1 ,2c a
1C925 Pentagon
USSR, E. Europe, and Asian
Communist Countries only) STATINTL
80
6
ACDA/IS Rm. 6510A State
D/NSA Attn:
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1 .
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1
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Agency Archives
Records Center -- Supplemental Dist.
Air University/INS
Attn: Ted A. Cherry
Principal Deputy Assist. Secretary
(International Security Affairs)
Mr. Walter Slocorte Rm. 4E813 Pent.
(Gep s._--s-ent--to- -C/PPG,- SA/t' L PDB,
C/ 1 B and C-aster ~...,_)
STATINTL
R istr
STATINTL
*64 OSR Registry except--
68 cys if Far East countries and not NFD or NDA
42 cys. if NFD or NDA and on the Far East countries
38 cys. if NFD or NDA
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MICROFICHE
1
Camera original to Agency Archives
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Diaso Copy to Agency Archives
1
Silver Duplicate to OCR/CLD/DSB,
Rm. ?H1129 Hqs.
1
Diaso Copy to OGCR, Rm.
1232
Ames Bldg.
1
Diaso Copy to PPG/R&D,
Rm.
7G09
Hqs.
1
Diaso Copy to OSR/SF/N,
Rm.
3F50
Hqs.
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Office of Strategic Research
MEMO BUM F~K ele a Yio~no 1a 'le IA DF179 00 rn 0e3001 e
Director, US Arms Control &
Disarmament Agency
This report on Soviet defense
spending in rubles elaborates upon
the estimates which the Director of .
Central Intelligence presented to the
Joint Economic Committee of the Congress
in June of this year.
30001-5
This report on Soviet defense
spending in rubles elaborates upon
the estimates which the Director of
Central Intelligence presented to the
Joint Economic Committee of the Congress
in June of this year. gyn.
Chief
Military-Economic Analysis Center
14 DEC 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: General David C. Jones
2 Chief of Staff, USAF
TiZt'tr Room 4E929
The Pentagon
proven r. or