THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79B00457A001300040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Balance of Forces
in Central Europe
Secret
SR 77-10100
August 1977
Copy N1 308
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of CIA Report SR 77-10100
1. Recipients of SR 77-10100, The Balance of
Forces in Central Europe, are requested to note the
following corrections:
a. The second sentence of footnote 13 on
page 13 should read: "NATO has an advantage over the
Pact, however, in the number of the more advanced
models used in an antiarmor attack--about 230 US Cobra-
TOW helicopters to some 100 Soviet Hind ATGM helicopters."
b. The map "Peacetime Deployment of Major
NATO and Pact Combat Units" on the last page of the
document should be replaced with the attached map,
which contains corrected unit locations.
2. These changes do not affect the judgments and
conclusions of the report.
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The Balance of Forces
in Central Europe
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
Key Judgments
The balance of military power in Central
Europe-especially as it contributes to deter-
rence there-is not fragile. NATO's military
deterrence is multifaceted, being based on
conventional forces as well as tactical and
strategic nuclear weapons. A shift in the mili-
tary balance great enough to significantly re-
duce deterrence in Europe would require
achievement of a major technological break-
through by one side or a major shift in
numerical force ratios.
Nevertheless, a number of factors have been
operating over the past few years to alter the
military balance to NATO's disadvantage. These
factors include:
? Quantitative and qualitative growth of
Soviet tactical nuclear forces. Over the past
several years, the Pact has matched NATO in
the number of tactical aircraft and missile
launchers deployed in Central Europe and
intended for nuclear delivery missions.
Within the next few years,, the Soviets prob-
ably will field nuclear-capable tube artillery
there, ending a longstanding NATO monop-
oly.
? Modernization and augmentation of Soviet
conventional forces. Since the mid-1960s,
Soviet conventional forces have begun to
receive equipment as sophisticated as cur-
rently deployed NATO weaponry. This is
particularly true of aircraft. The new pieces
of ground and air equipment are replacing
older items on at least a one-for-one basis.
? Continued Soviet political and economic
commitment to improving the Pact's military
force posture. Economic pressures have in-
creased over the past few years on both
Eastern and Western governments, but it does
not appear that the Soviets or their allies are
considering cuts in military spending to
relieve such pressures, as many NATO coun-
tries are doing.
While NATO still enjoys a measure of tactical
nuclear superiority in Central Europe by virtue
of its exclusive possession of nuclear artillery
there and the quality of its tactical surface-to-
surface missiles, the overwhelming advantage
which it had in the sixties is being eroded by
Soviet improvements. The Soviets probably
reckon that the strengthening of their owra
theater nuclear forces has reduced the political
as well as military utility of such forces to
NATO. When the Soviets break the NATO
monopoly on nuclear artillery in Central Eu-
rope, the deterrent value of these weapons will
also be reduced. Moreover, the numerical advan-
tage would swing to the Pact if forces based
outside Central Europe, but likely to be targeted
against Central Europe, were included in the
balance. These peripheral strike forces also are
being improved qualitatively.
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The balance of conventional forces also
seems to be gradually shifting. Military analysts
have long considered that NATO enjoyed a
technological lead that offset the Pact's numer-
ical superiority in conventional forces. Trends
have emerged over the past several years,
however, which suggest that the Pact is reducing
its technological handicap.
Despite a perceptible shift of the theater
force balance in the Warsaw Pact's favor,
deterrence in Central Europe, from the military
standpoint, does not appear immediately threat-
ened. The Pact's gains must be viewed in the
context of its own perception of need, as
dictated by its political and economic weakness
and its self-imposed requirement to be ready to
attack, not merely defend. A force level that is
considered adequate by the Pact (i.e., meeting
Pact requirements for a potential conflict with
NATO) may seem excessive by Western stan-
dards. Soviet planners also continue to be faced
with what they see as an impressive NATO
defense that they could not count on defeating
and with uncertainty about whether the strate-
gic forces of both sides could be kept out of a
war in Europe.
The most serious results of the shift in the
balance of forces in Central Europe could arise
from both sides' perception of that evolving
balance. There is a growing but largely unsub-
stantiated impression in the West that the
vigorous, ongoing Soviet modernization effort
constitutes a major conventional arms buildup
which has caused the balance to shift radically.
Some parliamentarians might believe that the
Pact has pulled so far ahead in conventional
forces that it is not economically or politically
feasible for NATO to try to catch up. They
would argue that it is useless, therefore, for
NATO to spend money on conventional forces
and that the Alliance should return to the
massive retaliation doctrine of the fifties to
deter Pact aggression. But, given the Soviet
achievement of nuclear parity, the "tripwire"
doctrine has even less credibility now than
when it was discarded.
Moreover, should it become widely accepted
that the balance has dramatically shifted, this
view could depress NATO confidence and in
turn increase Soviet assertiveness. Such a devel-
opment could ultimately increase the risk of
war through Soviet miscalculation.
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The Balance of Forces
in Central Europe
Introduction
The nature of the military balance in Europe
has undergone a gradual evolution over the past
two decades. Between the late fifties and early
seventies, both the US and the USSR saw
intercontinental strike forces as a predominant
factor in that balance. Perceptions of the
significance of theater forces and of disparities
in those forces were tempered by both sides'
view that any confrontation in Europe would
soon escalate to a mutually destructive inter-
continental nuclear exchange by the two
powers.
Gradual changes in the doctrine, strategy,
tactics, and armament of the Warsaw Pact and
NATO have now combined to give theater
forces-both conventional and nuclear-greater
prominence in any assessment of the military
balance in Europe. Both sides recognize that the
achievement of rough strategic parity between
the USSR and the US raises doubts about
whether either side would use intercontinental
weapons to resolve a war in Europe. They now
consider that such a war might not precipitate
an intercontinental nuclear exchange and that a
larger fraction of the burden of deterring or
defeating aggression must fall on theater forces.
This appreciation of theater forces has
focused attention on the status of the Warsaw
Pact - NATO balance of such forces and on the
ways in which the Pact might tip the balance in
its favor. This study examines the air and
ground forces in Central Europe in light of
some of the most salient quantitative and espe-
cially qualitative factors, addresses strengths
and weaknesses of both sides, and assesses
trends affecting the future balance there.
Deterrence and Military Planning in Europe
The three postwar decades in Europe, a
continent traditionally beset by major wars,
have been punctuated by coups, violent up-
risings in the East, several crises in Berlin with
attendant ultimatums, and even armed con-
frontation. But none of these incidents resulted
in armed conflict between the two major power
blocs.
This uneasy peace can be attributed to a
number of political, economic, and military
factors, but the principal military deterrent has
been uncertainty as to the scope and outcome
of any conflict, given its potentially cataclysmic
nature. This concern is inherent in the availabil-
ity of nuclear weapons to both sides and the
apparent capability of each side to inflict
catastrophic damage on the other. Under these
circumstances, the side making a deliberate
decision to undertake a major war in Europe
would do so only if it perceived war as the only
available option to protect its vital interests.
Nor would either side undertake an action short
of war that seemed likely to threaten irrecon-
cilably the vital interests of the other.
Either side might undertake operations-
constrained in geography or in the type of
weapons used-with the intent of limiting the
consequences, but neither could be sure that
such a conflict would remain confined. The
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well-defined alliances in Europe provide a cred-
ible sign that even a geographically limited
attack could quickly involve the entire weight
of the defending alliance. And NATO doctrine
asserts that Pact aggression against one of its
members would be met with whatever level of
force-including nuclear weapons-that was re-
quired to bring the conflict to an acceptable
conclusion.
Both sides have maintained large forces in
Central Europe' for more than 30 years.
Although each considers itself to be a defensive
alliance intended to deter or defend against an
attack by the other, the warfighting concepts of
each differ widely. NATO's overall military
planning reflects the defensive nature of the
Alliance, whereas that of the Pact reflects the
goal of being able to seize the strategic initiative
once war seems inevitable or to launch a rapid
counterattack if NATO should strike first.
This aspect of Pact doctrine probably stems
from a resolve not to repeat the historical
Russian experience of suffering a costly retreat
until a counteroffensive can be mounted against
an overextended enemy. The shock and sudden-
ness of the Pact offensive would be intended to
prevent NATO forces from preparing for an
offensive or establishing a fixed defensive line,
thereby forcing the Pact into prolonged posi-
tional warfare. Subsequent objectives would be
to break into the NATO rear to disrupt mobili-
zation, seize channel ports to prevent reinforce-
ment, and destroy NATO military forces.
Soviet doctrine's requirement for overwhelm-
ing numerical superiority derives largely from
the experience of World War II. Before launch-
ing their counterattack in July 1943 during the
battle of Kursk, for example, the Soviets
achieved overall advantages of 2.5 to 1 in men,
2.7 to 1 in tanks, 3 to 1 in artillery, and 2 to 1
in combat aircraft. During later stages of the
'Defined as Denmark, the Benelux countries, East and West
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia,
war, when more manpower and equipment were
available, the Soviets often did not attack until
they had achieved force ratios as high as 8 to 1
in men, tanks, and artillery.
Soviet doctrine for a conventional offensive
still calls for achieving an overwhelming numer-
ical advantage opposite a few sectors of the
enemy's defense line. Current Pact planning for
attacks against well-prepared defenses appar-
ently calls for advantages of up to 3 to 1 in men
and as high as 5 or 6 to I in tanks and 3 to 1 in
artillery. In light of the offensive cast to Pact
planning, the numerical advantages required by
Soviet doctrine, and the high regard the Pact
has for NATO's capabilities, Pact planners
probably consider what the West sees as a
preponderance of Pact forces in Europe to be at
best adequate for the "defense" of the Pact, but
certainly not excessive.
Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact main-
tains its theater forces at full strength in
peacetime, and each would have to undergo
extensive mobilization to put its forces on a
wartime footing. Both could quickly bring their
standing combat forces up to full wartime
strength, but some of them-particularly NATO
ground forces in northern Germany-would
require substantial redeployment to reach their
wartime operating areas. Both sides also intend
to reinforce in Central Europe in wartime-
NATO from the US, UK, and probably France;
the Pact from the western USSR.
Warsaw Pact Strategy
To achieve the force ratios deemed necessary
to accomplish its objectives, the Pact has
evolved mobilization and attack concepts that
are intended to maximize initial combat
power-on the assumption that a war in Europe
would be short and, therefore, decided largely
by forces in being or quickly available.
Accordingly, those forces in place in Central
Europe (about half of them East Europeans)
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 Warsaw Pact Ground Force Campaign (After 8-10 Days of Mobilization)
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ISLANDS
General Axis of Pact
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would be required to defend against any NATO
assault, initiate the Pact's offensive campaign
and, bypassing strong resistance, carry the
campaign well into NATO territory before
reinforcements would arrive from the western
USSR.2
Pact planning for the Central European
theater evidently calls for three fronts initially:
a Polish front to the north, a Soviet - East
German front in the center, and a Czechoslo-
vak-Soviet front in the south. Upon breaking
through initial defenses in their area, the Poles
would be responsible for advancing into Den-
mark and across northern Germany and the
Benelux countries to the ports on the North Sea
and English Channel. The forces of the Soviet -
East German front are the strongest; once these
forces penetrated NATO defenses, the two tank
armies of this front would launch rapid thrusts
to secure crossings over the Rhine near Essen
and Frankfurt. The' Czechoslovak-Soviet front
would attack into southern Germany, probably
to tie down strong US and German forces there.
Additional fronts, formed from divisions and
army-level units in the western USSR, would
comprise a second-echelon force for reinforce-
ment and subsequent operations in the depth of
the theater.
The tenets of mass and shock which govern
Pact planning for the ground campaign carry
over into air planning as well. The Pact would
seek to commit an overwhelming force of
tactical aircraft and bombers to attack NATO
air forces on the ground in a decisive campaign
at the very outset of hostilities. The objectives
would be to achieve air superiority from the
start and to limit the capabilities of NATO's
tactical air forces to affect the conventional
ground battle or to deliver nuclear strikes in
later stages of the conflict. Another objective
would be to destroy as much of NATO's
2For a fuller discussion of Soviet operational planning for a
conventional war in Central Europe, see SR 77-1002D, Soviet
Concepts for Initial Military Operations Against NATO in
Central Europe, March 1977.
ground-based tactical nuclear capability as pos-
sible prior to a NATO nuclear decision.
NATO Strategy
NATO doctrine, on the other hand, eschews
general offensive designs, embracing instead the
establishment of a strong defensive line well
forward. This defense, to be manned predomi-
nantly by ready US and West German divisions,
would be intended to buy time for decision-
making-particularly on the use of nuclear
weapons-and to contain a Pact offensive until
NATO could realize its mobilization potential,
reinforce its defense, counterattack, and force
the attackers back into Pact territory.
NATO's doctrine of flexible response is
intended to permit fine tuning. It holds that a
Pact conventional attack would be met with
conventional forces. If conventional defenses
were being overwhelmed, small-scale nuclear
strikes could be launched to blunt Pact offen-
sive thrusts, demonstrate NATO's resolve, and
serve notice to Pact leaders that the conflict was
about to take a vastly more destructive turn. If
this failed to halt the assault, NATO's stated
doctrine calls for gradual escalation of the use
of nuclear weapons to whatever level was
required to halt the attack.
The Status of Theater Forces
Although NATO's military potential greatly
exceeds that of the Warsaw Pact, particularly in
terms of mobilization base and overall eco-
nomic capacity, the Pact currently has more
men in uniform than NATO (see figure 1) and
has a larger military force in the critical Central
European region. In keeping with their doctrine
that a military conflict in Europe would be
decided by forces in being or readily mobilized,
the Soviets and their allies appear to have
committed themselves to maintaining a numer-
ical superiority over NATO in Central Europe in
in such key theater-force elements as men,
tanks, artillery pieces, and combat aircraft.
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Selected Indices of
NATO and Warsaw Pact Military Potential
107.4
Other
Pact
216
NATO PACT
Population and Labor Force
(Millions)
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2,083
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FIGURE 1
5,626
NATO PACT NATO PACT
GNP Total Armed Forces
(US $ Billions) (Thousands)
319.0
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Reliance on numerical comparisons alone,
however, can yield simplistic and misleading
results. Greater numbers alone do not assure
either deterrence or victory. Qualitative factors
can affect the outcome of wars more than
numbers of men or weapons, and such factors
must be taken into account to provide a reliable
perception of the balance. In addition to
political and economic factors, such things as
reliability, readiness, organization, geography,
technology, and the ability of each side to
direct and support its military forces in wartime
strongly influence the balance. The following
sections treat the comparison of Pact and
NATO forces in this broader qualitative con-
text.
Ground Forces
Reliability. The Pact's numerical advantage in
ground forces in Central Europe (see table 1) is
tempered by the questionable reliability of the
East European forces. The East Germans,
Czechoslovaks, and Poles provide nearly half of
the Pact's manpower and more than half of its
divisions in Central Europe, yet they probably
would respond with a total military commit-
ment only to a clear and present danger to their
homelands. Nevertheless, Soviet doctrine calls
for these forces to assume a critical offensive
role:
? The Soviets would count on attacks by
Polish forces in the north and Czechoslovak
units in the south to tie down large NATO
forces and permit the concentration of Soviet
and East German forces in the critical central
sector.
? The major Pact lines of communication
from the USSR run through Poland, East
Germany, and Czechoslovakia, and nationals
of these countries are chiefly responsible for
operating and maintaining them.
? East European air defenses are intended to
provide forward air defense for the western
USSR and to protect the Pact's logistic and
rear area support.
Refusal by any East European ally to partici-
pate fully in an offensive against NATO would
severely lessen Pact capabilities. Soviet forces
located on the territory of the recalcitrant ally
would be tied down with "policing" and with
logistic transport responsibilities, and the
Soviets probably would have to bring in addi-
tional forces from the USSR prior to hostilities,
thus affording NATO additional warning and
reaction time.
Leadership. The proficiency and leadership
of tactical unit commanders, especially at pla-
toon and company levels, is another potential
limitation of Soviet-and presumably other
Pact-ground forces. Analysis of Pact writings
reveals widespread concern within the Soviet
military over the quality of its junior leadership
cadre.3
NATO Forces in
West Germany,
Benelux, and
Denmark
Warsaw Pact Forces
in East Germany,
Poland, and
Czechoslovakia
762,000
928,000
Divisions % ........................
25
58
'ranks ...............................
9,200
18,600
Artillery 9 .........................
3,000
5,800
Major Antitank
Weapons * ...................
5,600
Surface-to-Air Missile
Launchers ? .................
1,300
' Excludes national air defense personnel and national administra-
tive staffs. Includes Polish and West German territorial forces.
2 See tables 3 and 4 for a summary of the differences between
NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions.
s Guns and multiple rocket launchers.
'Guns and missiles with a range of 1,000 meters or more which
have a primary antitank mission. Excludes missiles mounted on
personnel carriers.
' Excludes man-portable systems.
Much of the concern of senior Soviet military
leaders is over the lack of initiative in tactical
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operations stemming from the rigidity of the
Soviet command structure and the stereotyped
nature of tactical training. Apparently the
military hierarchy has been unable to resolve
the conflict between initiative and imagination
on the one hand and the need for "undeviating
adherence to regulations and instructions"4 on
the other.
Ground Force Manpower in Central Europe
Table 2
Divisions and Nondivisional
Maneuver Units ...........................
429,000
523,000
Combat-Support Units ....................
114,000
129,000
Command and Control ..................
44,000
72,000
Service-Support Units .....................
134,000
132,000
Territorial Defense Forces ............
41,000
72,000
Total ..............................................
762,000
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Taken together, these factors bring into ques-
tion the utility of simple comparisons of num-
bers of divisions.
By virtue of their larger size, most NATO
divisions have more combat and combat-sup-
port manpower and a larger inventory of most
types of combat equipment than their Pact
counterparts US and west 25X1
German div ns, or examp c, have more
armored vehicles and generally more antitank
weapons than Soviet divisions, and German
armored divisions have more artillery. In the
number of tanks, however, Soviet divisions are
roughly equal to their NATO counterparts.
The relative capabilities of NATO and Pact
ground forces, in quantitative terms, are per-
haps best expressed as a function of the number
Organization and Logistics. On a force-wide
basis, NATO and Pact combat-to-support ratios
are roughly the same: about 70 percent of each
side's ground force manpower is assigned to
frontline units (divisions, nondivisional maneu-
ver units, and combat-support units) and 30
percent to support elements (see table 2). At
division level, however, there are a number of
differences between the two sides, including the
size of Pact divisions relative to NATO's,
combat equipment levels, and staying power.
4Red Star, 24 August 1971.
of armored division equivalents (ADE) each side
has there.5 By this measure, each NATO and
Pact combat unit is rated according to a com-
mon standard which is based on the quantity
and quality of its combat weapons. The resul-
tant application of ADE scores to major NATO
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and Pact combat units (when mobilized to war-
time strength) in Central Europe yields the Pact
a 1.7 to 1 numerical advantage in ADES over
NATO as opposed to the 2.3 to 1 advantage in
numbers of divisions.
The organizational structures of Pact and
NATO divisions also reflect fundamental doc-
trinal differences, particularly with respect to
logistic support. Soviet doctrine stresses imme-
diate firepower over organic logistic support
capabilities. Unlike NATO forces, Pact forces
are not organized with the extensive support
structure at battalion level and below that is
necessary to provide divisional units with in-
dependent staying power (see table 5). The Pact
would rely upon second-echelon and reserve
forces to replace frontline units worn down by
NATO defenses (in other words, a unit replace-
ment system). NATO, on the other hand,
stresses independent staying power and unit
integrity. NATO divisional combat units have
more extensive organic logistic support and
would rely chiefly on replacing individuals, not
units.
The Pact's weaker logistic support at battal-
ion level and below would likely be a disadvan-
tage against a well-prepared NATO defense in a
prolonged conventional war. Although a unit
replacement policy would be advantageous in a
nuclear war, the need to bring in fresh units as
others were worn down might disrupt the
momentum of an offensive in a conventional
conflict. NATO divisions in the defense, on the
Battalion Manpower Combat-to-Support Ratios Table 5 other hand, would be less likely to suffer the
Percent of Total Battalion confusion that often accompanies unit replace-
Manpower ment in a tactical environment.
Soviet Tank Battalion ........................
88
12
US Tank Battalion ..............................
73
27
Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion .....
91
9
US Mechanized Infantry Battalion..
81
19
Soviet Howitzer Battalion .................
91
9
US Howitzer Battalion .......................
72
28
Soviet AAA Battery ............................
89
11
US AAA Battery .................................
73
27
Combat Readiness. A large fraction of both
NATO and Pact ground forces-some of their
divisions and much of their rear-area support
and command-and-control structure-would re-
quire a major increase in personnel to reach
wartime strength.6 Of the 58 Warsaw Pact
6For the peacetime deployment and readiness posture of NATO
and Warsaw Pact divisions, see map on page 25.
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divisions in Central Europe, 42 are estimated to
be maintained at between 80 and 90 percent of
their intended wartime strength. These divisions
could be filled out in about 24 hours, but it
would require four days to get them and the
bulk of those support forces essential for a
coordinated offensive, which are maintained at
about half strength or below, into position.
Even then, this force would still lack some
nondivisional service support, and initial com-
mand-and-control capabilities would be low.
The remaining Pact divisions in Central Eu-
rope could be filled out in about 72 hours, but
it would take at least eight days from the begin-
ning of Pact mobilization before all 58 divisions
and the army- and front-level support elements
were in position to launch an offensive.
The greatest incremental increase in Pact
manpower and divisions would result from
reinforcement by the 31 Soviet divisions in the
Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military
Districts of the western USSR. These divisions
and their support structure probably could
mobilize, move to Eastern Europe, and be ready
for offensive operations in about two weeks.
With concurrent preparations-or even with a
warning lag of one or two days, which is more
likely-NATO could rapidly mount a credible
defense against a Pact offensive. Within about
two days, NATO could expect to have up to 21
divisions and eight separate brigades in forward
defensive sectors. The level of nondivisional
support available in forward positions in this
short time would vary from one national force
to another. Many of these support units are
located in rear areas, and their forward deploy-
ment progress would depend largely on the
amount of warning NATO had and their alert
status at the time the order to move was given.
Nonetheless, most of the 21 divisions would be
expected to have their essential nondivisional
support available.
Seventeen of the 25 active NATO divisions-
the 11 West German, four US, and two French7
divisions-plus the three German airborne bri-
gades and three US separate brigades are
manned at roughly 90 percent of full strength.
These could begin moving out of garrison in a
matter of hours and, together with their essen-
tial nondivisional support, probably would be in
forward positions within 48 hours.
The three British divisions in NATO's North-
ern Army Group (NORTHAG) also could de-
ploy forward with most of their essential
support, although at reduced strength.' Belgian
and Dutch forces in NORTHAG could deploy
rapidly, but their corps sectors would be less
well covered initially than those of West Ger-
many, the US, and the UK. The Belgians
maintain units which equate to one full division
in Germany in peacetime, and these units would
have to move some 250 kilometers from their
peacetime garrisons. The Dutch maintain only
one reinforced brigade in West Germany, and
adequate early coverage of the Dutch corps area
would require temporarily shifting the German
3rd Armored Division into the area.
Mounting the full NATO defense along the
West German border with the Pact would
require from seven to 10 days' mobilization and
reinforcement-roughly the same time the Pact
would need to organize its 58 divisions.9 At the
end of this period, NATO probably could have
7Two French divisions are permanently stationed in West
Germany under a bilateral agreement. Although French forces
are not under NATO command and have not agreed to any
forward deployment, the Pact almost certainly regards at least
the two divisions in West Germany as contributing to NATO
capabilities.
8The British divisions initially would be short about five
combat battalions that are located in Northern Ireland. These
units would require at least 72 hours to return to Germany.
9There are a number of possible scenarios for a Pact buildup in
Europe. Those that are considered most plausible are covered in
greater detail in NIE 4-1-77, Warsaw Pact Concepts and
Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for
Warning of War in Europe.
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a force of some 29 divisions and eight separate
brigades, with their support units, in forward
defensive areas.
Reforger units from the US-two brigades of
the 1st Mechanized Infantry Division, an ar-
mored cavalry regiment, and several artillery
units-are the only additional NATO reinforce-
ments that could support initial combat opera-
tions. These units probably could not arrive in
West Germany for at least two weeks, and they
probably would not be capable of participating
in combat operations for three to seven days
upon arrival.
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Major Weapon Systems. There has been much
modernization of Warsaw Pact ground forces
over the past few years, and recently fielded
Soviet weapon systems and equipment have
tended to match those of the West in quality.
The Pact's numerical superiority in most major
ground force systems (see table 1) is still
tempered, however, by NATO's overall superi-
ority in technology and by differences in
doctrine and force structure. With the size of its
forces constrained by both economic and politi-
cal factors, NATO has tended to rely on fewer
but qualitatively superior weapon systems to
counter the Pact's numerical superiority. While
the Soviets in some instances have surpassed the
West with sophisticated application of on-the-
shelf technology, they have generally lagged
behind the US and Western Europe in develop-
ing and applying new technology in most major
ground force weapon systems, except for battle-
field air defense systems. In the past, the
Soviets looked to quantity to compensate for
qualitative shortcomings. As more advanced
weapons have been fielded, the Pact has not
sacrificed its quantitative edge.
Tanks and Antitank Weapons. Soviet reliance
on the tank is both a strength and a potential
weakness. The tank is the chief source of the
Pact's preponderant ground force strength in
Central Europe and would be the mainstay of a
ground offensive.'' The Pact has twice as many
tanks as NATO, and Soviet and East European
divisions are generally more tank heavy, relative
to their size, than their NATO counterparts. On
the other hand, because the type of offensive
that Pact planners envision in Central Europe is
so dependent on the mobility and shock effect
offered by large numbers of tanks, the Pact
would be more vulnerable than NATO to a
breakthrough in armor-defeating weapons tech-
nology or tactics. Thus, NATO planners have
11 For a detailed discussion of the role of armor in Soviet
strategy for Central Europe, see SR RP 75-4, Flexibility in
Soviet Offensive Concepts: The Roles of Armor and Other
Ground Forces, July 1975.
sought to counter the Pact's numerical advan-
tage in armor with increasing numbers of highly
sophisticated antitank weapons and with a
defensive doctrine that is keyed to defeating
tank forces.
The current generation of tanks-the Soviet
T-62 for the Pact, and the West German
Leopard I, British Chieftain, French AMX-30,
and US M-60 series for NATO-offers neither
side an overall qualitative advantage. NATO's
inventory is relatively more modern, however.
Modern tanks comprise less than 50 percent of
the Pact tank force in Central Europe; nearly all
East European forces still have the older
T-54/55s. On the other hand, modern tanks
make up nearly 80 percent of NATO's inven-
tory in the area.
Although both the Pact and NATO are
engaged in tank modernization programs, the
bulk of each side's armor force probably will
continue to be comprised primarily of the
current generation of tanks for the next few
years. The Soviets began producing their new
T-72 tank in 1974, some 13 years after initial
deployment of the T-62. The T-72 is being
deployed in the USSR, and about 1,300 have
been delivered to Soviet forces in East Ger-
many, apparently replacing T-54/55 series
tanks-which in turn have replaced obsolete
heavy tanks.
Two new NATO tanks, the West German
Leopard II and the US XM-l, are in the final
stages of development. Series production should
begin in West Germany by 1978 and in the US
by 1980, but these tanks will not appear in
significant numbers until the mid-eighties, by
which time the Soviets could have delivered as
many as 5,000 T-72s to Central Europe. In the
interim, several NATO tanks-the M60A 1, the
Leopard I, and the Chieftain-are being up-
graded with many of the same components that
will be found in the new tanks: more sophisti-
cated fire control, including ballistic computers;
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new suspension systems; laser rangefinders; and
new fin-stabilized, armor-piercing ammunition,
which is a significant improvement over older
tank rounds.
The two new NATO tanks probably will be
superior to the newly deployed Soviet tanks,
largely because of their advanced armor. This
armor will greatly increase protection against
known Soviet antitank rounds, particularly mis-
siles. The NATO tanks also have advanced
stabilization, suspension, and fire-control sys-
tems, providing an improved capability for
firing while on the move and greater accuracy at
long ranges.
The T-72 incorporates a number of improve-
ments over its predecessor, the T-62, including a
larger gun, a new engine and suspension system,
an automatic gun-loading system, and probably
a laser rangefinder. It also appears to have
improved ballistic protection, but probably not
as much as that provided by the advanced
armor on the new NATO tanks.
NATO appears to be ahead of the Pact in
developing and deploying antitank weapons
technology, especially "second generation"
antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).' 2 The num-
ber of ATGMs fielded has grown in recent
years, especially in US and West German forces,
and these weapons now comprise some 70 per-
cent of NATO's larger inventory of major anti-
tank systems, in contrast to less than 60 percent
of the Pact's.
The Pact, however, is well ahead of NATO in
providing missile antitank protection for its
armored personnel carriers (APCs). Soviet- and
Czechoslovak-made BMP infantry combat vehi-
cles-in service with all Pact forces in Central
Europe--mount a Sagger ATGM launcher, and
some Czechoslovak and Polish APCs also are
believed to have ATGMs. The West Germans
12These improved ATGMs are distinguished primarily by their
use of semiautomatic guidance as opposed to the manual
guidance systems of their predecessors.
plan to retrofit their Marder mechanized infan-
try combat vehicle (MICV) with the MILAN
missile; some US M113 APCs are being retro-
fitted with TOW ATGM launchers; and the new
US MICV-scheduled to be operational by the
mid-eighties-will mount a TOW launcher.
Substantial additional procurement of ATGM
systems is programmed over the next several
years throughout NATO. Plans call for the Brit-
ish to procure the MILAN, the Germans to
purchase some 3,000 ATGM systems, the Bel-
gians to procure 400 second-generation ATGM
systems, and the US to acquire the Hellfire
laser-guided ATGM. In addition, both West Ger-
many and the US will have begun fielding ad-
vanced attack helicopters by the early eight-
ies.1 3
The Soviets too have developed a new family
of ATGM systems-some of which apparently
have already been fielded. The antiquated
Swatter and Sagger missiles have been up-
graded: the Swatter with infrared terminal
homing and the Sagger with semiautomatic
infrared guidance. Three newer systems include
a man-portable system, a long-range ground or
air-launched system, and another long-range
system for the Hind helicopter. The first two
systems probably are already in use, and the
third is likely to be operational by 1980. All
three systems probably employ semiautomatic
guidance systems and may have better mini-
mum-range capabilities and accuracy. These
developments may lessen, but are not likely to
overcome, NATO's lead in these weapons.
The Soviets also are responding to NATO's
improved antitank capabilities by revising
tactics, by using artillery and motorized infan-
try units to suppress or overrun antitank de-
13Most NATO and Pact helicopters deployed in Central
Europe-except heavy-lift cargo and light observation types-
can mount ATGMs. NATO has an advantage over the Pact,
however, in the number of the more advanced models used in
an antiarmor attack-about 500 US Cobra gunships to some 100
Soviet Hind helicopters.
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fenses, and by attempting to reduce the vulnera-
bility of tanks to antitank missiles, mainly by
defeating the missiles' high-explosive antitank
(HEAT) warheads.
Artillery. Soviet doctrine has traditionally
stressed the role of artillery on the conventional
battlefield, and the Pact now has in Central
Europe more than twice as many artillery pieces
as NATO. But again, NATO holds the qualita-
tive edge. Although Soviet artillery has greater
range, NATO artillery is more accurate, is
generally of larger caliber, and fires more
advanced and effective ammunition.
In addition, more than 75 percent of NATO's
artillery weapons are self-propelled, versus
about 10 percent of the Pact's. Most self-pro-
pelled artillery weapons have armor-protected
crew compartments and high mobility-attri-
butes that enable them to withstand counterfire
better and to accompany rapidly advancing
mechanized and armored maneuver units more
easily and closely than towed artillery.
One area of Pact artillery superiority is in the
large number of multiple rocket launchers
(MRL) deployed with their forces. These weap-
ons have a greater range than most NATO
artillery, have the capability to deliver a massive
volume of fire over a large area in a short time,
and thus would be well suited for counterbat-
tery fire or suppression of antitank defenses. In
NATO, only West Germany has deployed MRLs
with its forces.
Pact artillery doctrine stresses a preplanned,
massed barrage, which is a particularly effective
tactic in nonnuclear breakthrough operations
requiring a heavy concentration of fire against
relatively static defenses. In the highly fluid
tactical environment following a-breakthrough,
when speed, mobility, and fire-support flexibil-
ity are critical, massed fire is less effective.
Under these conditions, NATO probably would
have some advantage. Its artillery is highly
mobile, and it has more sophisticated fire-con-
trol systems which provide better accuracy
through adjusted rather than barrage fire and
which stress aimed or observed fire rather than
preplanned strikes.
The Soviets evidently also lag behind the US
in advanced artillery munitions. They have only
recently fielded ammunition with proximity
fuzes, and there is no evidence that the Soviets
have deployed equivalents to such US advances
as rocket-assisted projectiles or have developed
cannon-launched, laser-guided projectiles
(CLGP).' 4 These types of artillery ammunition
are much more accurate at long range and make
indirect antitank fire practical.
Standardization. One of the major disparities
between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces lies in
their relative levels of standardization. This is
particularly apparent in ground-force weapon
systems. Most major Pact weapon systems are
Soviet-made or are produced by the East
Europeans under Soviet license using basically
Soviet designs. Such homogeneity reduces the
cost of weapons and enables simplified logistic
support.
NATO's general lack of standardization, most
notably in equipment, tactical communications,
and logistics, derives from the nature of the
Alliance. Unlike the Pact, NATO is an amalgam
of economically competitive states, most of
which have highly developed arms industries.
Competition among armaments producers and
national control over weapons procurement
have led to duplication in research and develop-
ment within NATO and to loss of the eco-
nomies gained from large production runs. Such
competition has contributed to the high cost of
research, development, and procurement and
has resulted in the fielding of a variety of
weapon systems that are incompatible, espe-
cially in terms of ammunition and spare parts.
14CLGP systems are not yet deployed with US or other NATO
forces.
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Another problem for NATO arises from
difficulties in rapidly and effectively coordi-
nating operations among units of different
nationalities because of deficiencies in tactical
communications. Language differences com-
plicate international military communications
in any case, but variations in equipment, oper-
ating techniques, and frequency ranges heighten
the barriers. Progress is being made, but achieve-
ment of fully integrated tactical communica-
tions is still far off.
Another serious impediment to NATO de-
fense planning under the present force structure
is the lack of a common, integrated logistics
system. Logistic support remains the responsi-
bility of a military unit's parent government,
and an allied commander could not be assured
of logistic support and supply of his multina-
tional force by the host nation.
The Pact also lacks an integrated logistic
system. Because of greater standardization,
however, it could more easily shift the materiel
of one national force to another and carry out
other ad hoc support measures. Attempts are
being made in both NATO and the Pact to
improve logistic support through bilateral ar-
rangements between national forces and host
countries.
Competition and diversity are not all to
NATO's disadvantage, however, for they con-
tribute to its technological lead. Competitive
development of the West German Leopard II
and US XM 1 tanks, for example, will eventually
give each country a better tank than either
prototype. Warsaw Pact forces, for the most
part, have to buy or'coproduce Soviet equip-
ment without such competitive evaluation.
Tactical Air and Air Defense Forces
The USSR, and to a lesser extent the rest of
the Warsaw Pact, has modernized its air and air
defense forces extensively in recent years. Im-
provements in tactical air forces have enhanced
the Pact's ability to conduct the large air
offensive in Central Europe that Pact planners
consider critical to the success of a ground
offensive. Growth in Pact air defenses has
increased the challenge for NATO's air forces.
Tactical Air Forces. The continued influx of
new and better Soviet tactical aircraft into
Central Europe and the relatively slow pace of
NATO air force modernization have narrowed
NATO's qualitative advantage. Although NATO
air forces still are generally superior in such
areas as pilot training, munitions, and avionics,
NATO and Warsaw Pact FIGURE 2
Tactical Aircraft'
Assigned
to Units
Central Europe
Total Inventory plus Three Military
Districts in
Western
USSR
Central Europe plus UK &
France3
Central
Europe
llncludes cohibat-capable trainers and support aircraft for
such missions as reconnaissance and electronic warfare.
2lncluding Denmark.
3France has a total inventory of 770 tactical aircraft of which
520 are assigned to units.
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the Pact is lessening two of NATO's longstand-
ing advantages-aircraft range and payload-
while maintaining its numerical advantage.
But the Warsaw Pact's growing tactical air
capabilities in Central Europe are mitigated by
several factors. The Pact's numerical advantage
in aircraft in active units there (see figure 2) is
cut significantly (from nearly 2 to 1 to only 1.4
to 1) if NATO aircraft capable of striking
targets in Central Europe from bases outside the
area are included in the equation.15 These
other aircraft include those in the French
tactical air force and British and US aircraft
(including the F-111) stationed in the UK. On
the Pact side, Frontal Aviation assets in the
three western'Soviet military districts would be
included, but most of these would have to be
relocated to bases in Eastern Europe to reach
NATO targets. In addition, the Soviets have
more than 500 medium bombers in the western
USSR that would be committed to operations
against NATO even in a nonnuclear war.
The range and payload characteristics of such
new Soviet fighter aircraft as the Fitter C/D and
Flogger B/D (see figure 3) are distinct improve-
ments over those of older Soviet aircraft and
exceed those of the Phantom F-4-the most
advanced NATO ground attack aircraft now
deployed in significant numbers in Central
Europe.16 The new Soviet aircraft make up
only about 25 percent of the total Pact inven-
tory there, however, and NATO's tactical air
forces still can deliver the greater overall ord-
nance payload.
The greatest potential weakness in NATO's
air capabilities is the age of tactical aircraft in
151n terms of combat potential-as reflected by total combat
aircraft inventory-the Pact advantage also is less formidable.
The Pact has an inventory of some 4,900 combat aircraft in
active units, training units, and in storage in Central Europe and
the western USSR. NATO has a total inventory of nearly 3,900
combat aircraft in Central Europe, the UK, and trance.
16The t-4 retains a payload advantage over these Soviet aircraft
at distances up to about 350 nautical miles.
Tactical Aircraft
Radius/Payload Performance
pounds
non-US NATO forces. The US Air Force inven-
tory in West Germany and the UK is comprised
entirely of the F-4 Phantom and the F-111,
respectively, and some of the F-4s are now
being replaced by the advanced F-15 fighter.
The bulk of NATO aircraft in non-US forces in
Central Europe, however, is composed of older
models such as the F-104. New aircraft that will
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enter NATO inventories represent a jump in
technology over current models, but these will
not be available in significant numbers until the
early eighties. The number of new aircraft in
the Pact's inventory will have grown signifi-
cantly by then.
The Soviets are flight testing a new ground-
attack aircraft with increased ordnance-delivery
capabilities similar to the US A-10. Initial
deployment, which could begin by mid-to-late
1979, probably will be limited to East Euro-
pean units in Central Europe and Soviet units in
in the USSR.
Combat Readiness. Because of differences in
aircraft range and basing patterns, NATO could
direct more aircraft against enemy targets than
could the Pact within 24 to 48 hours of an
alert. After about 72 hours of mobilization and
redeployment, the Pact would gain numerical
superiority in aircraft that were within range of
enemy targets, but a concurrent augmentation
of NATO forces with aircraft from the US
would hold this Pact advantage to about 25
percent.
Under normal peacetime conditions, no more
than about 5 percent of the Pact's air forces are
kept in full combat readiness, primarily for air
defense. To prepare for sustained offensive
operations, Pact air force units would require
extensive preparations, including:
? Mobilization of some support personnel
(Pact combat air regiments may be manned
as low as an average 70 percent of their
wartime strength).
? Establishment of command-and-control
nets, including forward-based ground-con-
trolled intercept and navigation sites.
? A buildup of POL and munitions stocks
from depots off base.
SECRET
? About 1,500 aircraft in Eastern Europe
that are based well within range of NATO
targets. The units to which they are assigned
could be ready for sustained offensive opera-
tions within 24 hours of notification.
? Another 600 aircraft in Eastern Europe
that are based beyond the range of NATO
territory and, along with ground-support
equipment, would have to be moved to
forward bases. This would require about 24
to 48 hours.
? About 1,000 tactical aircraft and associ-
ated ground support that are in the USSR's
three western military districts. These would
require about 72 hours to move to forward
bases.
These 3,100 aircraft comprise the tactical air
strike force that probably would be targeted
against NATO. Another 700 Soviet and East
European tactical aircraft in Central Europe and
the western USSR are believed to be designated
for air defense missions. About 400 training
aircraft assigned to active units could supple-
ment these forces.
NATO's entire inventory of tactical aircraft
intended for initial operations in Central Eu-
rope is based within striking range of Pact
forces in Eastern Europe. In response to the
threat of a Pact incursion into Western Europe,
NATO could employ:
? About 2,950 aircraft within 24 hours
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? An additional 150 dual-based US aircraft
that can be deployed to predetermined bases
in Europe from the US within 24 to 48 25X1
hours.
Under wartime mobilization conditions, the
Pact probably could deploy:
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? Another 250 aircraft in the US designated
for rapid reaction and as SACEUR reserves
that can be deployed within 72 hours.
These 3,350 tactical aircraft would comprise
NATO's offensive and air defense capability in
the Central Region after immediate reinforce-
ment. Although most NATO aircraft are-like
the F-4 Phantom-multipurpose, about two-
thirds of those based within the theater prob-
ably would be designated for offensive missions.
The remainder would be for air defense and
such other missions as reconnaissance. At least
half of the 400 US dual-based, rapid-reaction
aircraft would be designated for offensive mis-
sions.
emphasis than has NATO on passive defense
and decontamination capabilities, but it is
problematical how effective these preparations
would be in a nuclear war.
Air Defense. Both NATO and the Warsaw
Pact recognize the vulnerability of their ground
forces to air attack. Yet, possibly because of
NATO's longstanding emphasis on ground at-
tack and the qualitative superiority of NATO's
tactical air forces, the Pact has placed greater
emphasis than NATO on air defense. The Pact
air defense system is dense and technologically
advanced and has helped to partially offset
NATO ground-attack capabilities. The deploy-
ment of large numbers of highly mobile tactical
SAMs also has lessened the ground forces'
dependence on fighter aviation for battlefield
air defense, thus freeing more aircraft for
offensive roles.
NATO recently has come to recognize the
weaknesses of its own battlefield air defenses in
light of the improving ground-attack capabilities
of Pact air forces. It is introducing several new
weapon systems designed to enhance both the
density and mobility of its battlefield air
defense, particularly at low altitudes.
Tactical Nuclear Forces
The military doctrine of both sides considers
that a war in Europe-even if it began with
conventional weapons only-could escalate to
nuclear warfare. The Pact has placed far greater
The numerical advantage in delivery systems
would swing to the Pact, however, if forces
based outside Central Europe but likely to be
targeted against Central Europe were included
in the balance. For the Pact, such forces would
include ground force rocket and missile units
and nuclear-capable tactical aircraft and bomb-
ers deployed in the western USSR and the bulk
of their strategic forces for peripheral attack.
For NATO, potential theater assets include
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operational, a fifth is under construction, and a
new class of SSBNs apparently has been funded.
The French also have a multiple-warhead missile
under development for their SSBN fleet.
Chemical Warfare Capabilities
The capability of the Warsaw Pact to conduct
ground force operations in a toxic chemical
environment is superior to that of NATO. Some
analysts believe that this disparity and the
potential advantage of the surprise use of
chemical weapons could lead Soviet planners to
use such weapons in a conventional conflict.
Others believe that, given NATO's relatively
poor defenses against chemical strikes, Soviet
planners probably would view the use of chem-
ical weapons in a nonnuclear environment as
risking a NATO nuclear response. In any case,
chemical weapons are classed in Soviet doctrine
with nuclear weapons as "weapons of mass
destruction," and the employment of toxic
chemicals would require a decision at the
highest political level. Pact exercises generally
reflect the employment of chemical weapons
only in conjunction with, or as a local alterna-
tive to, nuclear strikes.
Warsaw Pact ground forces train regularly in
the use of individual protective equipment, and
most Pact field training exercises incorporate
operations in a simulated toxic environment.
Pact chemical planning emphasizes both protec-
tion and rapid decontamination, and combat
units down to regimental level have organic
chemical defense units capable of providing a
full range of reconnaissance and decontamina-
tion support.
NATO troops are supplied with individual
protective equipment, and most NATO armored
vehicles, like those of the Pact, have collective
filtration systems providing protection against
toxic agents.'s NATO forces do not engage in
18The US-built M113 armored personnel carrier provides
protection for only its crew. US M60 tanks are being upgraded
and will incorporate a collective filtration system.
extensive training under simulated CBR condi-
tions, however, and their overall defensive
capability against chemicals-particularly in the
area of decontamination-is limited. Only the
US and West Germany have chemical defense
units capable of performing more than marginal
reconnaissance and decontamination at division
and corps levels. At brigade and lower levels,
NATO has almost no capability for extensive
decontamination.
The Soviets have developed a variety of toxic
chemical agents and the tactical doctrine for
their use. Although numerous facilities in the
USSR have produced and stored toxic chem-
icals, there is little evidence upon which to base
a quantitative estimate of offensive capabilities.
There is good evidence the Soviets have stocks
of chemical agents in Eastern Europe, but we
do not know the amount stored there.
Outlook
The balance of military power in Central
Europe-especially as it contributes to deter-
rence there-is not fragile. Any significant shift
in this balance would require a major change
either in the quality of weapons fielded by one
side or in the numerical force ratios. Except for
the political collapse of one side or a rapid
unilateral military buildup during a grave politi-
cal crisis, such a shift in the balance almost
certainly would occur only gradually over the
long term-thus increasing the possibility of
long warning time.
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French nuclear forces, British strike aircraft and
Polaris submarines, US aircraft based in the UK,
and some Poseidon submarines.
Despite the Pact's potential advantage
theater-wide, the availability of nuclear artillery
provides NATO with a flexibility in its theater
nuclear planning that the Pact lacks. Nuclear
artillery weapons have distinct advantages over
missiles and aircraft in reaction time, accuracy,
and- most important-low warhead yield. Lack-
ing similar low-yield systems, the Soviets would
have either to tolerate limited NATO low-yield
tactical strikes or respond in escalatory fashion
with larger yield systems.
Soviet Improvements. The Soviets apparently
have developed nuclear artillery munitions for
heavy artillery pieces. Heavy artillery brigades,
believed to have a nuclear mission and equipped
primarily with obsolete 203-mm howitzers and
240-mm mortars, have been identified since the
early seventies at several locations in the west-
ern USSR. The Soviets are beginning to replace
these weapons with a new, heavy, self-propelled
howitzer and mortar. Heavy artillery has not
been identified in Central Europe, however, and
there is no convincing evidence that the Soviets
have developed nuclear rounds for their widely
deployed 152-mm weapons.
Soviet tactical nuclear capabilities will be
enhanced with the deployment-apparently
already under way in the USSR-of a new
missile (the SS-21) to replace the FROG-7
rocket at divisional level. The SS-21 offers
significant advantages over the FROG-7, such as
increased range, accuracy, and mobility. Its
deployment with Soviet units in Central Europe
will permit the transfer of FROG-7s to non-
Soviet Pact forces to replace even older systems
in these forces.
The Soviets also are improving their periph-
eral nuclear strike forces. They are expected to
begin deploying this year the SS-X-20 IRBM, a
multiple-warhead, mobile system that is less
vulnerable and more accurate than the SS-4 and
SS-5 missiles it will replace. The Backfire
bomber now being deployed in the USSR also
enhances Soviet conventional and nuclear strike
capabilities, especially against targets deep
within heavily defended areas of Western Eu-
rope. Unlike the obsolescent Badger and Blinder
bombers that comprise the bulk of Soviet Long
Range Aviation, the Backfire is designed to fly
at low altitudes, has a supersonic dash capabil-
ity, and probably is equipped with more ad-
vanced electronic countermeasures against
enemy air defenses.
NATO Force Improvements. NATO has re-
sponded to the Soviet advances by program-
ming significant improvements to its own tacti-
cal nuclear forces. For example, the number of
US F-111 aircraft stationed in the UK is being
doubled. The new aircraft are replacing F-4s,
which are less versatile in the nuclear delivery
role. NATO's nuclear strike capabilities will be
further improved by the replacement in the
early eighties of Belgian F-104 aircraft with a
nuclear-capable version of the F-16, which has
greater range and payload, better avionics, and
more maneuverability, and by British and West
German deployment of the nuclear-capable
MRCA (multirole combat aircraft).
NATO's ground-based tactical nuclear capa-
bility will be improved substantially by the
deployment of the US Lance tactical missile
with West German, Belgian, and British forces
in the Central Region. This program will be
completed next year. The Lance, which has
already replaced Honest John rockets in US
units in Germany, is much superior to compar-
able Soviet systems, especially in accuracy and
range.
France, too, is continuing to upgrade its
nuclear forces. It has deployed 24 launchers for
the Pluton tactical missile, which is similar to
the US Lance, and is expected to add six more.
A fourth ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is
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The reaction by either side to important
shifts in the balance-even if such shifts are
identified-could be tempered in various ways
by the political-economic background. For
example, much of the Soviet modernization
effort in Europe took place while the US was
preoccupied with the war in Southeast Asia.
The size and structure of both sides' forces
have been relatively stable over the past few
years; changes in the balance have resulted
almost exclusively from qualitative gains arising
from the application of improved technology.
Soviet and East European forces facing NATO
in Central Europe have not been expanded
structurally (no divisions or brigades have been
added) since 1968, when the Soviets established
a five-division garrison in Czechoslovakia after
intervening there.
Similarly, there have been few significant
structural changes and almost no increase in
manpower in NATO forces since the late sixties.
Two new US combat brigades are being added
in Germany, but this is being accompanied by a
corresponding reduction in support troops
there. The Germans also have added three
brigades to fill out three understrength divi-
sions.
Several developments, however, have the
potential of altering the balance of forces in
Central Europe to the Warsaw Pact's advantage.
Chief among these are the actual and antici-
pated improvements in Soviet theater nuclear
forces and in Pact ground and tactical air forces,
and a flagging of the defense effort on the part
of some NATO countries.
Tactical Nuclear Forces
Among the most significant of the recent
changes in Pact forces in Europe is the increased
capability of their tactical nuclear forces. De-
ployment of additional tactical nuclear missile
launchers and tactical nuclear delivery aircraft
since the late sixties has given the Pact a small
numerical advantage over NATO in these sys-
tems. NATO still has a numerical superiority
and some qualitative advantage in tactical
nuclear weapons, however, by virtue of its
exclusive possession of nuclear artillery rounds
deployed in Central Europe. These weapons-
with their low yields and high accuracy-give
NATO artillery the capability to provide close,
responsive battlefield support to engaged
ground force units.
This monopoly is likely to be broken in the
next few years, however. At the same time, a
large part of the deterrent value of battlefield
artillery will be lost because even with a few
nuclear artillery pieces the Pact could respond
to NATO use without the potentially escalatory
use of larger yield systems.
The USSR's increased confidence in its tacti-
cal nuclear capabilities has been reflected in
recent exercise scenarios that display much
greater flexibility in handling the transition to
nuclear war than had previous exercises. The
more recent exercises show the Soviets respond-
ing in a variety of ways to NATO's initial,
limited use of nuclear weapons. This suggests
that, as Soviet tactical nuclear forces improve,
Soviet planners are becoming more comfortable
with, and testing new ways of adapting to,
NATO's doctrine of gradual nuclear escalation.
Conventional Forces
While conceding the Pact an advantage in
most measures of conventional ground and air
forces, military analysts have long considered
that NATO enjoyed a technological lead which
offset that advantage. Trends have emerged over
the past several years, however, which suggest
that the Pact is reducing its technological
handicap. Recently introduced Soviet equip-
ment designed in the mid-to-late sixties is in
many respects as sophisticated and effective as
currently deployed NATO equipment. Because
the new equipment is replacing older, less
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capable equipment on at least a one-for-one
basis, technological improvements have thus far
not been at the expense of force levels.
This pattern is most prominent in the tactical
air forces, where the destabilizing potential is
greatest. Newer Soviet aircraft being deployed
to Central Europe far outperform the models
they are replacing. Although they cannot match
NATO's current aircraft in such things as
avionics and ordnance, and although NATO has
superior pilots, the new aircraft are so improved
over previous Pact aircraft as to raise doubts
about NATO's ability to continue its air domi-
nance by pitting quality against quantity. The
balance of air power will be at issue over the
next few years, as the Pact deploys more of its
late-generation aircraft but before new NATO
aircraft, such as the F-16, A-10, and MRCA, are
introduced in significant numbers in the early
eighties.
The evolution of Pact ground forces has been
as pronounced as, and more publicized than,
that of the tactical air forces. Since the late
sixties, the Soviets have introduced a complete
new generation of ground force equipment,
ranging from tanks, self-propelled artillery, and
air defense weapons to sophisticated electronics
and support equipment. Again, the introduction
of improved equipment brought no decrease in
the number of weapons deployed. The Soviets
apparently intend to maintain their numerical
advantage as they make qualitative improve-
ments.
As with tactical air forces, the ground force
balance almost certainly will shift in favor of
the Pact for at least the next few years. NATO
has better equipment under development than
the Soviets are deploying, but the NATO
equipment has not yet been fielded, whereas
much of the Soviet equipment with which it is
compared has been in service for several years.
The XM-l and Leopard II, for example, appear
to be far superior to the T-72, but, depending
on production and deployment patterns, the
Soviets could deliver as many as 5,000 T-72s to
Central Europe before the new NATO tanks are
fielded in significant numbers.
Economic Considerations
Economic pressures are likely to have a
greater impact on NATO's military capabilities
than on those of the Pact. Both alliances
apparently are feeling the competition for
resources between the military and the civilian
economy. Growing pressure in the East Euro-
pean countries to move further and faster
toward a consumer-oriented society could force
leaders of these countries to reexamine prior-
ities. But the Soviets almost certainly will keep
pressure on their allies to sustain their defense
efforts. While economic pressures may slow
modernization efforts-particularly with the
East European forces-it is doubtful that such
pressures will be allowed to cause any signifi-
cant diminution in Pact force levels.
Several NATO allies, on the other hand, have
already responded to economic and political
pressures by reducing their force commit-
ments-albeit with little impact on NATO's
military capabilities thus far. What is more
important in the long run, however, is the
tendency on the part of some NATO allies to
make unilateral force cuts-an example being
Belgium's plan to withdraw from the NATO air
defense belt-which suggests a reduced indi-
vidual commitment to the common defense.
Recently several NATO countries pledged
to increase spending to arrest the continuing
decline in their conventional forces' capabilities
relative to those of the Pact. Even if these
pledges are kept, it will be a few years before
any increased expenditures can be translated
into more capable forces in the field.
A Continuing Balance
Despite these perceptible shifts of the force
balance in Central Europe in the Pact's favor,
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the ability of NATO's military forces there to
deter conflict does not seem to be immediately
threatened. The Pact's numerical advantages and
qualitative gains must be viewed in the context
of its own perception of need, as dictated by its
political and economic weakness, and its self-
imposed requirement to be ready to attack, not
merely defend. Many of the Pact's improved
weapons have not been deployed in large num-
bers and thus cannot yet be said to give the Pact
a true technological advantage over NATO. And
future Pact technological gains will be slow.
Even if the Soviets began deploying nuclear
artillery in Central Europe immediately, for
example, they probably would need several
years to develop the doctrine, storage, handling
procedures, training, and stock of nuclear
rounds needed to match NATO's capability with
nuclear artillery.
Future changes in the balance of forces in
Central Europe probably will continue to be
marked by qualitative, not quantitative, gains,
thus offering NATO the opportunity to take
advantage of its more advanced technological
bases. As noted, NATO is preparing to field a
new generation of more sophisticated weapons,
and, although history has shown that the West
does not always fully translate its technological
advantage into fielded weaponry, it has never
lost its overall lead.
In sum, for at least the next few years, Soviet
planners will continue to be faced both with
what they see as an impressive NATO defense
that they could not count on defeating and with
uncertainty about whether the strategic forces
of both sides could be divorced from a war in
Europe.
The most serious results of the shift in the
balance of forces in Central Europe could arise
from both sides' perception of that evolving
balance. There is a growing but largely unsub-
stantiated impression in the West that the
vigorous, ongoing Soviet modernization effort
constitutes a major conventional arms buildup
which has caused the balance to shift radically.
Some parliamentarians might believe that the
Pact has pulled so far ahead in conventional
forces that it is not economically or politically
feasible for NATO to try to catch up. They
would argue that it is useless, therefore, for
NATO to spend money on conventional forces,
and that the alliance should return to the
massive retaliation doctrine of the fifties to
deter Pact aggression. But, given the Soviet
achievement of nuclear parity, the "tripwire"
doctrine has even less credibility now than when
it was discarded.
Moreover, should it become widely accepted
that the balance has dramatically shifted, it
could depress NATO confidence and in turn
increase Soviet assertiveness. Such a develop-
ment could ultimately increase the risk of war
through Soviet miscalculation.
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