PROPOSED OPERATION OF U-2 AIRCRAFT FROM AIRCRAFT CARRIER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500100045-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2003
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: July 23, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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23 July 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy, Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH :. Acting Deputy Director (Research)
SUBJECT : Proposed Operation of U-2.Aircraft from Aircraft.
Carrier
This Staff Study contains recommendations for the approval of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence; these recommendations are contained in
Paragraph V.
I. PROBLEM:
To determine the feasibility, cost, and level of effort required to furnish an
operating capability for U-2 aircraft from aircraft carriers.
A. Advantages of Carrier Operations:
1. Carrier operations would permit a wide choice of operating locations
for the launch of IDEALIST U-2 overflights. In theory at least, the
oceans of the, world (minus the territorial waters of hostile countries)
are available as launch and/or retrieval areas. This flexibility and
mobility can deny unfriendly radar nets the advantage of monitoring
activities and known or probable IDEALIST U-2 bases.
2. IDEALIST operations. conducted from aircraft carriers would be
entirely under the control of the United States Government. This
would eliminate the involvement of second or even third countries in
IDEALIST operations, simplfying the political clearance problem.
immeasurably and theoretically cutting down the time lost in deploy-
ment in those cases where deployment cannot take place until political
negotiations for land bases have been consummated. 25X1
NRO and Navy
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3. Although not designed for carrier operations, preliminary engineer-
ing analyses indicate that at relatively small cost and within a
reasonable time span, a minimum of two U-2 aircraft can be struc-
turally modified to permit the proposed carrier operations. Exami-
nation of available United States aircraft carrier facilities by
principal members of OSA and senior contractor personnel within
the past sixty days discloses no area of disabling. deficiency in terms
of logistics, communications, or operational support.
4. Within the general statement above, it is a fact, however, that of
the presently in-commission United States Navy carriers, considera-
tion.of U-2 operations should be in all probability limited to certain
of the attack carriers (Navy designation "CVA"). The most feasible
CVA's for U-2 operations are the SARATOGA, RANGER, and
INDEPENDENCE, all of which offer an ideally situated and physically
segregated operating facility known as the Airborne Systems Support
Center (ASSG). The balance of the seven CVA's favored for this
operation would ultimately be modified to include the ASSC, but
probably not until calendar 1964 and thereafter as funds are available.
5. In addition to the flexibility alluded to above, it should be noted that
based on present evidence, those carriers with the ASSC facility
offer the additional advantage of adequate space for the complete
processing and initial flash readout of both "B" camera and tracker
film. Original negatives can be produced and PI'd on board with
only a small modification to existing Navy processing facilities on
ship. Present Navy carrier processing capability in equipment and
trained manpower is inadequate, having been designed for other
reconnaissance systf:ms with different technical parameters. Present
estimates are that the on-board processing capability would cost in
the neighborhood of from in capital equipment, 25X1
depending upon numbers of copies to be produced and titled. This NR
equipment could be moved on and off the carrier when not required.
Supplemental technical representatives (a total of twelve in all) to 0
furnish a full processing capability on board would be. furnished by
Eastman Kodak as a team at approximately per 25X1
month based on three missions per month for that period when their NRO
services aboard ship were required. Adoption of an on-board
processing and PI capability would eliminate one of the potential.
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disadvantages of carrier operations, namely the time lost in trans-
portation of mission take from the carrier to an adequately equipped
processing facility on shore, as well as the hazard of losing the
original negative before it has been duplicated.
6. In addition to offering advantages tactically in the launch phase of
operations, a carrier-based U-2 can return to its launch point under
carefully controlled approach conditions from as far as 300 miles
away from the ship. In addition, the ship itself can maneuver to
receive the aircraft under conditions of optimum weather, wind,
and visibility, a feature not enjoyed by a fixed land base.
B. Disadvantages of Carrier Operations:
1. The principal disadvantage of carrier operations would be the exposure
of the U-2 capability to as-large a group of uncleared individuals as
would be present on a CVA attack carrier with its air group aboard.
Such a carrier would have in the neighborhood of 4, 200 people, not
including the U-2 Detachment, and even though Navy carriers can
today operate without supporting task forces, it would be impossible
to conceal the existence of the U-2 on board ship and to deny from the
crew the knowledge of when flights took place. Certain steps can be
taken to minimize the exposure of the aircraft and to prevent unauthori-
tative speculation as to its mission, but no such system offers airtight
security.
2.. Although the range and altitude performance of a carrier-modified
U-2 will not be known accurately until after a vehicle so configured
is test-flown, the process of "beefing up" the aircraft's structure and
installing adequate arresting gear and modifying the landing gear will
add a certain weight penalty. The aircraft designer is currently
forecasting a net penalty in the neighborhood of 300 pounds for the
carrier modification. It may be that this penalty will eventually be
larger than that conservative figure, which itself is less than half of
what might be referred to as a "normal weight penalty" associated
with this modification. Although it is theoretically possible to land
a U-2 on a carrier deck with the ship underway without carrier arrest-
ing gear, such an operation would be decidedly marginal from a safety
point of view, and is consequently not recommended.
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3. Modifying even so small a number of U-Z's as the pair now under
consideration will require carrier conversion training for all
IDEALIST Detachment pilots. In addition, T/O provision will have
to be made for a Navy, Landing Signals Officer to not only qualify in
the aircraft himself, but to be present on the carrier at all times
when U-2 flight operations are taking place. Once carrier qualifi-
cation has been established for IDEALIST pilots, repeated requali-
fication will be required as long as the carrier capability is kept
alive.
4. 'Resupply for a carrier-based IDEALIST Detachment cannot be
accomplished as readily as it can for a land-based unit, despite the
Navy's excellent under way replenishment system. A ship-based
detachment will require enlarged kits of special items, such as
spare parts, electronic and camera equipment, etc. Fuel must "be
loaded aboard and segregated from other fuel, possibly well in
advance of anticipated use. In view of the periodic repositioning of
carriers in the Fleet, it may be advisable and necessary to preposi-
tion fuel on several such ships, thus adding somewhat to the complexity
of the operation.
5. Even as modified for carrier operations, the U-2 will not in any
sense be a fully-qualified carrier aircraft. Its handling, launching,
and retrieval will always have to be considered as a special opera-
tion, requiring the exercise of considerable technical skill both from
ground support personnel and pilots. As an example of the aero-
dynamic limitations of the U-2 in the converted configuration, it
should be noted that in designing a true carrier aircraft, Lockheed
made the TZV trainer, capable of withstanding arresting landings
where deceleration is as high as from 17 to 20 feet?per second.
These were the specifications called for by the United States Navy.
In its modified configuration, the U-2 will probably not be stressed
for deceleration greater than 10 feet per second, which is approxi-
mately twice its present stress and still only about 60 percent as
much as a true carrier aircraft. The designer holds, however, that
this disparity is not critical when the aircraft is operated at the
prescribed approach speed of roughly 85 knots and when the carrier
is moving at its maximum recovery speed of roughly 33 knots. The
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relative speed reduces the arresting impact to the redesigned
maximum tolerances. It would impose an unacceptable weight
penalty on the U-2 to make it capable of being arrested at the 85
knot figure. The pitch rate of the aircraft after hook engagement,
perhaps the most critical aspect of carrier landings with the U-2,
is said to be well within acceptable safety limits according to
present computer calculations made by Lockheed. The only on-
deck modification to the carrier itself would be the substitution
of smaller diameter arresting cables to reduce stress forces on
the U-2 in landing or takeoff as cables are overrun. Standard
cabling is on the order of 1 1/2 inches in diameter. A 1/2 inch
cable 'is proposed for use during U-2 operations.
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A. Since 1 May 1960 and following the torrent of world-wide publicity
associated with the U-2 incident, the problem of obtaining oven temporary
staging rights in friendly foreign countries has been growing progres-
sively more complicated. Because of the notoriety associated with the
aircraft, its appearance in a foreign country, if detected, is quite apt
to produce political problems for the host country. This is apt to be
true even in those instances where the host country is not subject to
immediate pressure by the Soviet Union'and is sometimes a function of
internal domestic politics within the host government.
B. Given the state of affairs alluded to above, resorting to carrier opera-
tions is a hopeful prospect not only for coverage of those targets not
easily reached from friendly foreign soil, but for any critical operations
where valuable time cannot be expended in protracted political negotia-
tions. The basic question then is whether or not this aircraft can be .
economically adapted to work from carriers with an acceptable margin
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of safety in flight operations, and, once so adapted, can it operate with
frequency varying from occasional to repeated in this manner without
affecting the Navy's disposition of forces under existing Navy Single
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) commitments. As indicated earlier,
present engineering analyses confirm that the aircraft can be so oper-
ated theoretically as to produce a viable carrier capability for rec.on-
naissance purposes. Aside from the unknown range and altitude
characteristics of the converted aircraft (which will depend upon arresting
gear weight for the most. part), the only apparent aerodynamic question
is associated with the behavior of the aircraft in the landing configuration
when it is approaching a fast moving carrier from the stern. One sug-
gestion which has been made is that the standard angle of attack for such
an approach with Navy aircraft which is three or four degrees to the
horizontal be reduced to approximately 1 1/2 to 2 degrees in the case of
the U-2 to permit a flatter angle of approach with power on so that
"ballooning" of the aircraft prior to contact with the deck will be mini-
mized. In a normal landing attitude, the U-2 rides tail high, which
unless it is compensated for by a skillful power-on approach just above
the stall speed may make the engagement of a carrier hook relatively
difficult. There is a possibility that a problem may exist in wind pattern
over the stern of a fast moving carrier, which according to Navy
statistics, normally produces a down-draft immediately to the rear of
the stern, followed by an up-draft from 1, 000 to 1, 500 feet aft of the
carrier. With its sizeable wing area and with flaps fully extended,
there may be some adjustments in technique which will have to be
accomplished in order to overcome the possible adverse effects of these
phenomena. Stack wash from the carrier's funnels can largely be
eliminated as a deterent characteristic, since carriers on which the
U-2 would be landed make their arrested landings on the angled deck,
approximately nine degrees from the central axis of the hull away from
the island, and the captains of both the USS LEXINGTON and USS
INDEPENDENCE stated categorically that they "could put the stack
wash wherever the pilot wanted it". This, of course, means that they
could adjust the carrier's steaming angle to take maximum advantage of
existing wind conditions to deflect stack wash. The only time this might
be a modest problem would be when the aircraft is landed in a no wind
condition, at which time it must rely solely on the carrier's forward
momentum for relative wind.
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C. Movement of the aircraft from the hangar deck to the flight deck and
conversely can be accomplished, despite the fact that no carrier in
the United States Navy has elevators large enough to accommodate the
U-2 without a portion of the wing extending beyond the outboard edge of
the elevator. The largest elevator in the Fleet measures only 70 by
52 feet, while those on the carriers in the group most likely to be
employed in U-2 operations (CVA's 59 through 62), measure 63 by 52.
feet. Lockheed has designed a special fuselage cart called a "LOWBOY",
which permits side castering operations essential to movement from the
hangar deck floor to the elevator and from the flight deck to the eleva-
tor, etc. This will be equipped with adjustable brakes to prevent any
incident should the aircraft be on the elevator during period of rough
weather. In addition, Lockheed has manufactured a special sling using
a fuselage cart as the basic ingredient, which will permit on and off-
loading of the aircraft from the carrier when it is necessary to remove
it or replace it aboard other than under its own power. The hangar deck
offers adequate space for a compartmentalized working and refueling
area. Minor adjustments in the aircraft component of an operational
carrier must be made to provide adequate storage space on the hangar
deck, but Navy assures us that this is an administrative problem which
can be encompassed by proper direction from higher authorities, begin-
ning with the Chief of Naval Support and the CNO, augmented by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in those cases where such temporary depletion of
the Air Carrier Group would affect the Navy's SLOP capabilities.
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E. On the subject of modified costs and equipment proposed for the U-2
in the carrier configuration, present estimates are that the complete
carrie tion on two aircraft can be furnished by Lockheed at
a cost This figure represents the. savings
implicit in accomplishing e modification at the time these aircraft
are also converted from J-57 to J-75 models, a course of action now
underway. According to present plans, the first carrier-configured
U-2 should be rolled out of the Lockheed plant at Burbank late in
November 1963. It is expected that the second aircraft would follow
approximately nine weeks thereafter. A program of flight test and shake-
down will follow roll-out and is expected to take up to sixty days. Thus
it is probably realistic to assume the existence of a single aircraft
carrier capability no earlier than 1 February 1964, with the full two-
plane capability by 1 April 1964 barring unforeseen difficulties. At
present it is our feeling that maximum flexibility in terms of the oper-
ating envelope will result from equipping one of the two aircraft with
ARS and beacon, while leaving the other essentially out of this capability.
Final configuration will not be fixed upon until the results of the 5 August
carrier launch trial are known. The net difference in weight between
these aircraft then would be approximately 325 pounds, and the stalling
speed of the ARS equipped aircraft would be approximately 2 to 3 knots
higher than without ARS. The inclusion of ARS in one aircraft provides
a capability to operate under the worst situation anticipated in carrier
operations, namely launch from a carrier at sea followed by refueling
in order to reach an appropriate land base in friendly territory. No
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weight penalty in terms of additional airframe strengthening is
required for the ARS configured aircraft. Both carrier aircraft will
be equipped with single side band radios which are compatible with
carrier SSB installation, thus permitting not only mission recall, but
emergency communications from the ship to the aircraft in the event
of hostile action or mechanical malfunction. Such equipment is
standardized within the IDEALIST U-2 fleet.
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G. Carrier operation is a new and unique experience for IDEALIST Detach-
ments, and it will require some familiarization training. Both pilots
and ground handling personnel will have to meld into the life of the car-
rier so that IDEALIST missions can be launched expeditiously. On the
other hand, IDEALIST staging detachments being small and all pei'sons
involved providing mutual support, the carrier detachment should operate
as a unit. A United States Navy officer thoroughly familiar with carrier
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operation can provide guidance for planning at Headquarters and also
provide briefing and advice for IDEALIST Detachments prior to moving
aboard a carrier.
H. The ultimate use of .aircraft carriers for the U-2 depends on the availa-
bility of carriers in or near the desired area of launch. To direct a
large carrier to support a U-2 sortie or series of 'sorties, requires
approval by the highest levels of the Department of Defense. A clear
plan for execution which requires carrier support for the shortest
possible time span will go far toward getting a carrier when it is
requested.
1. Contact was established with the Office of the Commander, Naval Air
Training Command, NAS, Pensacola in June for the purpose of dis-
cussing carrier conversion training for IDEALIST pilots. The Chief
of Staff, NATC, stated that such a group could be accommodated with
little inconvenience and furnished a syllabus which would include ground
school in the training aircraft, plotting board navigation classes,
checkout in the T2A jet trainer, and approximately twenty arrested
carrier landings on the USS LEXINGTON (CVS) utilized for this purpose
by NATC. The total flight tim,:? involved would be approximately thirty
flying hours, and the duration of the training at Pensacola would be
four or five weeks, depending upon weather. Reimbursability for this
training was not discussed. An alternate training location of NAS,
Monterrey (California) is also under investigation for this purpose by
Navy. N
IV. CONCLUSIONS:
A. The employment of U-Z's aboard United States Navy aircraft carriers
of the CVA attack carrier type is both possible and productive. There
appear to be no technical or engineering obstacles to their projected
use in this manner.
B. United States Navy assistance in establishing operational. procedures,
as well as pilot training, is advisable.
C. Two U-2 aircraft can economically be modified for carrier operations
within an acceptable time span.
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D. The frequency of carrier-launched U-2 flights will depend upon the
priority of targeting requirements.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS:
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A. Tr-t concurrence of the D/NRO in this program be obtained.
B. That Lockheed Aircraft Corporation be authorized to modify two U-2
.aircraft now in J-75 conversion for carrier operations without delay.
Final configuration of the carrier version should be fixed only after
.results of the August launch trials are known.
C. That Navy assistance be sought in training all IDEALIST U-2 pilots
in carrier operations.
D. That Navy authorities be consulted to determine methods of operation
and procedures for minimizing inconvenience to normal Navy carrier
routines.
E. That the United States Navy be asked to detail a Landing Signals Officer
(carrier-qualified pilot) for coordination checkout in the U-2 and
assignment to the IDEALIST Detachment.
F. That a set of communications procedures for projected carrier opera-
tions he expeditiously accomplished with Navy assistance.
G. That the development of a carrier-based processing facility be approved
in principle. This capability would provide a minimum of one original
and a duplicate negative to be provided on board ship.
H. That a suitable cover story for long range carrier-based U-2 operations
be promptly drawn up with Navy assistance and coordinated with the so-
called Ad Hoc Cover Committee.
JAMES A. CUN N .
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)
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Recommendations in Paragraph V APPROVED:
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director
Distribution:
1 - DAD/OSA
2 -DDCI
3 - DDCI
4 - ADD/R
5 - DD/NRO
6 - AFIGO-S
7 - AD/OSA
8 - D/FA/OSA
9 - D/TECH/OSA
10 - SD/OSA
11 - COMMO/OSA
12 - SS / OSA
13 - SAL / OSA
14 - C/PS/OSA
15 - RB/OSA 16 - Capt. Carmody
DAD/OSA: JA Cunningham, Jr. /mm (23 July 1963)
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