WEEKLY CONTRIBUTIONS LATIN AMERICA BRANCH, ORE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01090A000200010001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1949
• Content Type: PERRPT

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Week Contributions
Latin American L nc i,, ORE
4 January 1949
BOLA directs attention this week to two ana'y es of area problems
Article A on the difficulties facing group action in devoloping attitudes
taeaard new governments, and Article B on the 6o an knot of domestic pro-
grams and international relations in the Caribbean area, The reappraisal
of the Argentine Governments ability to withstand increasing economic pres-
sures also is of more than usual interest (item 6).
GENE L: Latin AmDrican governments are expected to resist group consulta-
tion and group docisions on the question of recognition of new governments
which have coma into being through the use of force (Article i) .
NOfTIEfl DIVISION: In the troubled Central Aneriaan-Caribbean area internal
social pressures and rivalries err n~., governments form the background for gen-
eral instability (Article B). El Salvador's new government has made a state--
ment of its principles and objectives (item 1). Haiti faces problems which
later may sorious],y affect its government (Article C),
SOU%hiE N DIVISION: In Peru, anti-Us articles have appeared in a "seni of-
ficia1" newspaper (item 4); that country appears to be arranging an import-
ant trade agrees nt r tth Argentina item 3), In Paraguay, am and politi-
cal leaders consider President Gonzalez' "fears" of Argentina alarmist (item
2). Chilovs President, anticipating the Larch elections, is, for political
purposes, taking credit for initiating the idea of group consultation before
recognizing near military governments (item 5). Argentina's increasing eco-
nor-ic difficulties both embarrass the regiii ; and complicate Argentine-US
relations (item 6).
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1. EL SALVADOR: El Sal rador'a New Gonrernn nt
e new governing J o#`i . Salvador is reported to
have issued a proclamation announcing the principles and objectives that
will govern the conduct of the now regime. The proclamation indicates
an interest on the part of the new government In a "guaranteed peak in
production", "protection for technical work", and "social justice". Ac-
cording to the proclamation, the junta is also interested in Central
American union. Since President Arevalo.of Guatemala has heretofore
been the principal exponent of Central American union, D/IA estimates
that this statement by the now junta provides further evidence of a re-
alignment of E. Salvador on the side of the "democracies" as compared
with the previous policy of "benevolent neutrality" toward the Som oza
regime. The interest of the nev government in "social justice" possib'].,y
indicates a greater preoccupation with economic natters and reform than
was the case Frith the previous Castaleda government.
2. PARAGUAY: Despite undercurrents of tension Asuncion ream ins relative
ca The contest en si n onza oz and-Me-
and Denoeolo`ra os ("democratic" faction of the Colorado Party) over the
unification of the Colorado Party has not yet been decided. Each side
claims military support and expresses hopes of unification, President
Gonzalez had warned US Ambassador t"iarren that Paraguayan insurgents
gathering in Clorinda, Argentina, might attempt to overthrow his govern--
ment on New Year's Day or shortly thereafter; m onwhile, the Commander
in Chief of the ariy and Democolorado leaders have discounted the pos-
sibility of an attack from Argentina or a domestic clash in the near
future. They consider Gonzalez' warnings as purely alarmist, designed
to vJhip the Democolorado forces in line , Vihile this is probably true,
it is an effective device for prolonging the impasse which permits Gon-
zalez to remain in power. Leansthile, the affairs of the nation rennin
of secondary imzportanee.
3. PERU: A trade agreement between Peru and Ar
is said to provide
that Argentina supply Peru rdth- , ons of eat and 20,000 tons
of mats, fats,, and oils during 199 in exchange for Peruvian sugar,
cotton, yarn, coal, and tropical woods. Recent information indicates
that the t ovornment may authorize higher sugar prices if producers agree
to sell their product to the government for shipment to Argentina in
return for Argentine wheat, i at, and edible oils. The US Ambassador in
lama considers that therm is a possible connection bet,.-men the agreement
and a statement by an agent of the Argentine National Economic Council
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to the effect that goods to the value of J&25 000, 000 will be ex-
changed between Argentina and Peru. If the agreement does come into
farce, it will pave the way for closer economic relations between Argw-
enti.na and Peru and facilitate the expected increase in Argentine
influence (see B/I.A ~,kly for 23 Doc 49).
4. The recant strongY a nti-US and somewhat proAr !ermine senti--
1
me resse byi -rue Tier Tie. now i4daily, ragas; Lng ie
US Depa nt of Staters - nouncen ent of policy on the overthrow of
popularly elected governments are of more than passim; interest because
it is reasonable to believe that these viers r have the tacit approval
of the Odria governn nt. This newspaper defends the right of Latin
Anmricans to have revolutions, and attacks the "diabolical theory of
interamericanism". It maintains that military revolutions do not neces-
sarily sinify a set )ack for democracy and that, contrary to the opin-
ion of the US Department of State, popular election is not the sole or
principal prereq,3site for democracy. The government reportedly turned
the shops and presses of La Tribune, Aprista daily, over to a. private
company headed by Federico :.:ore, whore it has co::u .ssioned to develop
the government's social program, for publication of Nuevo Tiempo0
Mile Jose Diez-Cansoco, probably the most widely roe co urmjst in Peru,
wrote similar anti--US articles in the daily -- La Prensa -- his state-
rreents in that organ are of less significance, a _5-Trensa has no appar-
ent connection with ? the -government and its attitu o-mard the US has
been traditionally cool. The appearance of anti-US articles in this
"semi-official" paper does not necessarily mean that the gover!imant
intends to adopt an anti--US stand officially. It is more likely that
the government, by this reans, is trying to bolster its internal support
by an appeal to nationalistic sentiments.
5. CHILE: The enthusiastic reception President Go?,zalez has given the re-
cen a cession of concern re a g the overthrow of pop r
governmein Latin America spars to an indication of the domestic
political advanta re th.ich he intends to rake of it. The LAS statCelrent
has already been cited publicly in .Chile as (1) L'S acknowledgriont of
the truth of Gonzalez' earlier and repeated warninu=s that democratic
government throughout Latin America is being threatened, and (2) the
ii adiate result of tho accusations rode by the President in his speech
at Concepcion on 16 December 194.5,; this speech reportedly aired at the
W., charged that the threat to democracy is due to indifference of
d?xnccratic peoples and their Covernrlents. In govornront circles, Gonza-
lez mk.r consider the US statement as satisfying his request for reassur-
ances of US friendship asload after recent Peruvian reco nition-border
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4 January 1949
incident. Hcs vor, the "resident's seal in presenting the US statement
as a demorcho achieved throuugh his efforts rrd*3eate his concern over
his continuing inability to arrange an effective coalition in anticipa-
tion of the Larch elections.
6. A WR t
tion of Peronts Difficulties Underlines IAutual Used
Yon;-Arnie a ct
n Sena. ica i nodr 9rgew7.iITats economic difficulties stem-
ming from adverse terms of intertttiora3l trade, mounting inflation ?nd
growing labor discontent poses potential threats to the Peron regime
and ermiplicatee US relations Yrith that country. Ambassador Bruce has
recently Indicated that previous estimates to the effect that the Peron
regime can withstand the impact of economic dislocations for eight or
nine months are over-optimistic. There is much to justify the Assay
dor t s reappraisal. Controversies between labor and the government over
strikes and some demands have been growing in frequency and bitterness
(the government's suspension of publication of wage and price data since
April is widely interpreted as indicating a desire to conceal trends
adverse to labor). Production has declined in certain important lines
as Argentina's international trade and finanela3. crisis has become more
serious, and as labor problems have multiplied. Finally, the admimla tra-
tion has failed to da'tc, partly because of internecine quazTu .s among
key figures, to decide on any coherent program to ease the crisis.
US relations with Argentina are complicated as the crisis
becomes more acute. One difficulty is that resulting from allegations
that ECA has discriminated against Argentina and has monopolized euro-
poan trade; because this charge receives wide credence the position of
the Communists is strengthened and they embarked on a campaign appealing
to "democratic forces of Peronisn and the opposition against the furry
cial and economic pressure of the US and against any participation what-
soever in the notorious Marshall Plan". A second complicating develop-
rent from the US point of view is seen in the Peron administration t n
evident belief that its present trade dilemma trill enhance its oppor-
tunities for enlisting Latin American sympathy and support at the ' co-
nomic Conference scheduled to take place in Buenos Aires in March against
the US denial of LarsIn1l, Plan aid for this hemisphere.
Actually there are many indications that Peron would like
to collaborate with the US in .resisting Communism in the Hemisphere and
in international trade if he could do so on his ov ? terms. Furthermore,
it is not un.Lia~ly that if and when his government is gravely threatened
by a general strike he may endeavor to solve the labor problem and earn
US approbation by undertaking a publicized and vigorous anti-Communist
campaign. Over the longer torn, there are three seriously complicating
possibilities in the Argentine s itust ion, from the US point of view.
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Iirat, there is the possibility that Peron has over-estimated the ef-
footiveness of his anti'-Conmi,.x iat measures of surveillance and allevia-
tion of conditions conduoin;; to Cor rdsm. Secondly, Peron may delay
too lord; in adopting masures to relieve the economic crisis. Finns y,
she id a struC :;].e ensue between the army and :labor, assume; either one
to have rejected Poron's leadership, the Uorrmmists then r i ht be nble to
to entrench themselves vrith labor.
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B/M
ARTICLES
4 January, 1949
A. Bogdta Resolution XXXV
The desire of the Latin American countries that the Estrada doctrine of
recognition be made a formal part of inter-American policy resulted in the
adoption of Resolution XXXV at the Bogota Conference. This is a development
which bids fair to give these countries more embarrassment than comfort and
security. Regardless of the rhetoric attending the debates, there is reason
to believe the resolution was adopted in order to commit the US more clearly
and definitely to a formal renunciation of the use of recognition as an instru-
ment for influencing and controlling political developments in Latin American
countries. Since the adoption of the resolution, three governments have been
overthrown by military juntas -- events which have caused throughout the
Hemisphere renewed consideration of the implications and desirability of Re-
solution XXXV.
Down to the time of the establishment of the Good Neighbor policy, the
US openly took sides in Latin American revolutions by the exercise of its
right of recognition. Revolutionary governments inimical to US interests, of-
fensive to our sense of political morality, embarrassing to our international
relations and policies were not recognized. Governments not so characterized,
or those which overthrew unacceptable governments, were at times recognized
with unseemly haste. Naturally, under these conditions,, the exercise of the
right of recognition was at times marred by being applied in vays more bene-
ficial to US interests than to the social, political, and economic necessities
of the countries involved. Because the US is the only great power in the Test-
ern Hemisphere, the political and economic realities are. such that recognition
by the US was practically imperative to the continued existence of any new
revolutionary government. Moreover, arty expression of refusal to recognize
a revolutionary party was, by the same token, one of the best defenses the es-
tablished government had against revolutionaries. For years,, Latin American
peoples and governments censured "The Colossus of the North" for seriously
and unfairly handicapping them in their political development by what to them
often seemed capricious exercise of the right.
The establishment of the Good Neighbor policyy and the subsequent meticu-
lous implementation of this philosophy of Hemisphere relations by the US Gov-
ernment created a climate favorable to a discussion of the whole question of
the exercise of the right of recognition. The US renunciation of arty exercise
of the right for political advantage is clearly implied in the Good Neighbor
policy, but the Latin American governments wanted a more formal renunciation
clothed in the. solemnity of a multilateral resolution. A resolution to which
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all these governments were parties would aircam,saribe the US freedom of so-
tioa in that guy abusive a mr'oiee mould henceforth be a more serious offense
against international aora11t r because it would than violate an established
interzttona3. lkmdsphere policy. At the same tim, the Latin American gov-
ernments marentay desired that the lotion be vague37 warded, because,
while wishing to circumscribe the US, are by no means yet willing to
oirotanscribe themselves by having the community of American states mains
group decisions conoeradng recognition of revolutionary gamertaesnts. For,
although group d tionn might be an obstacle to :evolutions of the
right, it could also emt ar raes revolutions of the left as U.
.
lbe trend away tromp military gav+erna t and soups seemed assured vdien
the Bogota Conference was in session. An iMosing list of free elections,
peaaOM transfers of power, eta. could be cited at that time. Latin Ameri-
can go~nerrsvonts felt there was little reaspn to fear military coups or re-
volts. under such circumstances, by be explicit and clear in the wording
of a reealutian? It might embarrass dmoaratio tendemies in the more con-
aervative countries and leftist tendencies in the more liberal. ry keeping
g~ vague, Qa~ ~freedom American g~~ meeting each sita~etia~n an
vague or otherwise, the Latin Ax erioan governments w u resolution
d have a more affect..
ive weapon for the control of $ actions in that each a resolution furnished
a fine rallying point and baeie for united opposition to the US should it br
coma necessary in the future.
Since the Bogota Conference, military revolts have taken place. Now,
it is the very vagueness of the resalutian which has returned to plague the
Latin American gavozmaenta. It is this eery vagueness which enables the US
to eschew a position of dynamic leadership against the ad3.itary juntas arh3 eh
some of the other governments wish we would assume. The disinclination of the
tS to act nni1atera1 y and its efforts to promote consultation as the method
of solution for the impasse deprive the Latin American governments of clear"
out US leadership. Such leadership would greatly increase the likelihood of
arriving at a solution, or, on the other hand, furnish a scapegoat (the tS)
an which to heap all the bl hm,.
Since Resolution XXXV has relieved the US of the necessity of being
either leader or scapegoat in determining reooggnition pol.ioy, the only re-
maining recourse would be formal multilateral judgment of each new government.
An impressive aeries of incidents, however, shoes that the Latin American
governs nt8 as a group have no desire to grant the inter-American community
authority to sit in Judgment on the dean, racy, 1egitiu cy or propriety of
their governments, no matter how vociferously individual governments may fraan
time to tinge appeal for inter'1mrarioan action against particular goveu mente
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Lich they dislilk. A Uruguayan proposal that the existence of a government
denying the rights of in and V w citizen be oons idered a threat to the peace
of the Iiemisphore was quashed at Rio in 1947. A soma hat similar proposal
from the eame country in 1945 had been received with enthusiasm only by the
US. At the conference in I x co City in 1945, Guato ]a proposed that the
inter-American community derma recognition to may governments establ iehed by
coups d"it. The proposal, referred to the Inter-American Juridical Comit-
eoe,iaae avorab]y reported ors, the US diseonting from the report. In addi-
tion to listing manor practical difficulties inherent in such a proposals the
coiwittee went on to point out that miy revolutions in Latin America have
constituted an historical process for the renovation of political regimes and
have in themselves contributed to press.
Since Latin American governments have meter times refused to authorise
group decisions as to recognition, it is unlikely that the group as a whole,
no matter how strongly some approve the Ups suggestion for consultative action
in particular cases, will approve amy such technique for general application
either as an amendment to, or as a substitute for Bogota Resolution XXXV.
B. Central American XnetablYU
rrra.r~.^~ ~.~
The general instability in the Central American-Caribbean area has devel-
oped out of a combination of (1) social pressures resulting from the inability
of established governing groups to promote orderly development of domestic
institutions] and (2) competitive relations among the various governments.
In Costa Rica, the presence of the Caribbean Legion, with its avoid
political aim of destroying the Somosa regime in Nicaragua and with its under-
lying concepts of social reform and new norms of authority, has provoked Gera
eral So1za to counter-measures. Unless the governments concerned can re-
establish their inter-governmental relationships on a satisfactory basis and,
at the same time, separate such relationships from the need and demand for in-
ternal social and political reforms, the unrest and bitterness which General
Somaseis action has generated will not easily be dissipated.
In El Salvador, those in authority have once again de=nstrated their
inability to transfer paoifically and by the electoral process governing author-
ity from one group to another. The electoral process was deliberately evaded
in favor of barrack--room conspiracy and armed revolt. Neither those formerly
in power nor the various other contending factions for power (nor friends and
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associates in neighboring countrio) dared risk a popular decision when so
much sooxd at. stake - their own material prosperity, the pov or of labor,
. "social justice", the efficacy of conservative tradition, the array as a social
and political force, and the position of El Salvador viss-? its neighbors,
In Guts temala, the same forces have recently threatened the position of the
existing government. There, however, the groping for social progress is a
matter of public discussion and elections have been held, presumably to deter-
ii ine policy. But agaian, with so much at stake both for the country and those
who run it, and z7ith a trex ndous intellectual and moral gap betimen the
elite and the illiterate masses, and with the foreign relations of Czatemala
and its neighbors in an unsatisfactory condiition, the electoral process could
easily be nullified or circumvented. This is especially true because internsl
problems cannot, in the area, be judged from a national standpoint alone,
buts on the contrary, have become subject to pressures and interferences from
neighboring countries.
Ideologic differences among the Central American and Carib1 can republics
in combination vrith internal gropings for social reform and new not of
authority have thus complicated their international relationships. Unless a
clear distinction can be made by. them betvwoen foreign and domestic policy,
international relationships in the area -rill, it is believed; be subject to
unusual stress and dislocation.
CQ Current Situation in 16-iti
The political situation in Haiti is calm at the mordent. The present goir
or=. nt, however, is subject to certain unrelated problerrw and pressures that
could result in a purely political upsut before 1952. This should be distinm-
guished from the more remote but far more consequential possibility that a
turbulent uprising of the people right be precipitated by sores as yet unfore-
seen national catastrophe.
One of the most ixenediate problems facing the l!;stin rc i is the fact
that the fTovexnnz snt is reportedly so short of cash that it is unable to meet
some of its primary obligations, including a , ?00, 000 loan f rc the Banque
National do la IZQ ubue dti!aiti. Officers of the army arc carefuIV7'raTch-
dotauwgs with the ianaue Tlational since their pension funds are
on deposit with that institution. I government inconn continues to decline,
as seems liasely in visa of diminishing, export revenues, the administration
may have difficulty in meeting its payrolls and thereby create considerable
disaffection among government workers.
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In the face of dwindling revenues and an increasinr;ly low level of n -
eral com wrcial activity, Haiti has undertaken the largest (,,a3 ;,el
budl;et in its history, with million allocated for the 1 December 19
International Hxposition to celebrate the two hundredth anniversary of the
founding of Port-au-Prince. If,, as seers likely, the L'xposition is a finan-
cial failure - not only because of the dishonest practices of responsible
officials, but also because of the probable lack of interest on the part of
tourists - the opposition can be expected to inflate the public vrith re-
ports of rd+sm3nagernent and official malfeasance.
Another and recurxont threat to the stability of the regine is the an-
nual springtime grain shortage that results from lack of storage facilities.
Unpredictable but frequent variations from favorable weather conditions,
such as a drought or excessive rain: can pasrtially or totally destroy other
crops produced at that time of year and thereby cause widespread senml-
starvation. In I.ay of 1947, food shortages caused riots in Port-au-Prince
which the govemrent ras able to suppress, Id combination with other diffi-
culties, a repetition of these disorders this coning spring *i.ght have more
seriota consequences for the administration.
Despite the difficulties enumerated above, the i-:stirse regir.,e rri7.1 sur-
vive as long as.it continues to have army support, At present the arnyr is
the dominant factor in Haitian politics and is capable of overthrovemg F s-
tirce at will.. The army deorm sufic cent the influence which it now has over
Pres"srient mistime, who has initiated many rseasuras favorable to it, and who
has permitted ranking, officers to enrich themselves through graft. Thus an
army coup of the type that occurred in Peru and Venezuela does not appear
likely. If the inefficiency of the present, regime should become hopelessly
apparent, horever, the army would probably replace Estirn with another black
politician. (The key military figures are unalterably opposed to pen fitting
the vie attoea to return to power.)
The political and social situation in iiaiti is closely identified with
its primitive econo y. There is so little time-lag bet men an event and its
political and social consequonces that a sudden drop in the ' rld price of
sisali., an unfavorable turn in the weather, or the whim of a for; hundred
tourists can be transla*;ed almost overnight into terms of stability or in-
stability for the incumbent government. President 11atime is an astute and
resourceful politician vho has der:nstrated his ability to surmount political
crises in the past. He may yot =asolve his admittedly difficult problems, if,
for example, favorable marketinu opportunities for Haiti's export cora.*sodities
can b..-: found, or if bonefits accrue fron the recently granted 7*3 aibank ..2
million loan. If he is unable to oopo successfully with these problems, the
arty may be forced to replace him with some equally tractable figure.
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In the event of a rovolutionaay change of government before 1952 (the
end of Eetime's term), it trill probably be relatively peaceful, Such e
change, horaaver, would be of minor importance in comparison Sxith the havoc
that could be created $' a full-seals upr e:Ing, a poes3bility which history
has shown to be within the capabilities of this erratic people. An assess--
m nt of the basic temper of the three million people in the Haitian hinterland
is irpossible because of the lack of reporting on that subjoet. trhilo there
has been no recurrence of IIiti's historic saturnalia of bloodshed since the
1915-33 iE occupation, present-day Ilaiitians, like their Dahor. yan ancestors,
arc fur ntally warlike and bloodthirsty. An epidemic (emanating poasib7,y
from the inadequate and unsanitary rater-supply), a famine (resulting from a
serious breakdoon in the ovoz-precaz oue food-supply system), or any other of
a number of possible national calamities, could result in violence among
the masses,
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