RESISTANCE IN TIBET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01006A000100090001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 21, 1958
• Content Type: IM

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Co No. 2
GEOGRAPHIC
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
CIA/RR-GM-9
21 July 1958
RESISTANCE IN TIBET
DOCUMEi9IT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
11 -
LASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: H 70-2
DATE: 11X7-1-- REVIEWER: 03537
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within
the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission
or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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 Approved For Release Aftffff
Since the occupation of Tibet* in 1951, Communist China has been faced with
sporadic resistance. During the past two and one-half years, resistance has
hardened and grown despite, Chinese countermeasures that include military force
as well as partial withdrawal of Chinese cadres and postponement of "reforms"
and other programs leading toward socialization. Retreat and retrenchment
notwithstanding, Communist goals remain unchanged: the socialization of Tibet
and its complete integration -- political, social, and economic -- with Communist
China. Basic factors in the Tibetan situation -- its historical status, the
rigorous terrain and climate, and the rigid structure of Tibetan society --
suggest that the realization of Chinese goals will be difficult and protracted.
A major obstacle to Communist political control in Tibet is the Tibetan
legacy of independence. In antiquity Tibet was a fully independent state con-
trolling a territory extending considerably beyond its present confines. Not
until the early 18th century, when Manchu armies invaded and occupied Lhasa, did
Tibet come directly under the domination of the Emperor of China. Even then
Tibet retained its autonomy in local affairs. Boundaries were established, with
Lhasa's jurisdiction extending east to the Upper Yangtze (the Chin-sha Chiang)
and north to the Thanglha Range. Between Outer Tibet and the areas under Chinese
control in Szechwan and Kansu, however, were the turbulent Tibetan-inhabited
borderlands in which little or no control was exercised from either Lhasa or
China.
When Manchu control in Tibet weakened in the late 19th century, Tibet
attained autonomous status under Chinese suzerainty. Attempts were made to
reassert Chinese control by military action in the early 1900's, but the overthrow
of the Manchus (1911) removed the last vestiges of Chinese authority. From then
until 1951 Tibet remained autonomous, although during much of this period its
policies were pro-British as a result of British action (the 190+-05 Younghusband
Expedition) to improve trade and maintain an independent buffer state north of
India. After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, unsuccessful
attempts were again made to reassert Chinese control over Outer Tibet. In 1928,
however, the Chinese Nationalists carved out two ostensibly Chinese provinces --
Sikang and Tsinghai -- that included part of Outer Tibet and almost all of the
Tibetan Borderlands. Actually, in both provinces, Chinese authority was limited
to a few of the larger towns. Although the western boundary of Sikang was
arbitrarily drawn some 80 miles east of Lhasa, the Chinese were unable to extend
their de facto control farther west than the traditional Upper Yangtze boundary.
Various aspects of the physical. environment in Tibet -- particularly terrain,
climate, and location -- pose serious obstacles to Chinese Communist operations.
Vast, desolate plateaus to, the north and high mountains and deep river valleys to
the east are formidable barriers that isolate and protect the major centers of
Tibetan authority in Southern Tibet,, located principally in the middle reaches of
the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) and its tributaries. Here are located the chief urban
centers, and much of the cultivated land, as well as Lhasa, the capital and seat
of political and religious power. Consequently, Chinese activity has focused on
Southern Tibet and major efforts have been directed toward construction of com-
munication links with Chinese bases across the outlying barrier regions.
Eastern Tibet (loosely known as Itham) is the second most important region of
Tibet, containing the upper reaches of the Salween, Mekong, and Yangtze Rivers
that flow in tremendous, rocky, north-south-aligned gorges. On the interfluvial
divides at 13,000 to 15,000 feet are grassy plateaus that support considerable
grazing. The topographic complexity iE'olates the productive areas and severely
restricts communications, thus contributing to the political fragmentation of
Kham, the continuance of petty feudatories, and a favorable milieu for guerrilla
warfare. Communist activity in Eastern Tibet has been concentrated on the con-
struction and maintenance of the Szechwan-Lhasa road and connecting routes and on
the control of major urban centers such as Ch'ang-?tu.
*As used here the term "Tibet" refers to the area traditionally controlled
from Lhasa, the "Tibet Region" of the Chinese Communists, which consists of Tibet
and the Ch'ang-tu Area. According to other definitions, Tibet is also synonymous
with the terms "Outer Tibet" and "Political Tibet". Tibetan-inhabited territory,
however, extends far beyond the core of the area into what is sometimes referred
to as the "Tibetan Borderlands", or as "Inner Tibet". These Tibetan-inhabited
areas have been organized into several tzu-chih thou (autonomous districts) in
the provinces of Tsinghai,Szechwan;, Kansu, and Yunnan.
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Northern Tibet is a vast plateau (the Chang Thang) 14,000 to 16,000 feet in
elevation, enclosed on the north and south by mountains more than 20,000 feet
high. It is a region of internal drainage with numerous large brackish lakes,
particularly in the southeast. Although extensive grazing grounds -- mainly in
the southern half -- support nomads and their flocks, much of the Chang Thang is
desolate and uninhabited. Except for mineralogical explorations and small-scale
exploitation of borax, Chinese activity in this barrier region has been nil.
Adjoining the Chang Thang to the northeast is an outer plateau -- Northeastern
Tibet -- having physical features similar to the Chang Thang but differentiated
by external drainage, somewhat lower elevations (12,000 to 14,000 feet), and more
extensive grazing grounds. Major Chinese effort has been expended in the con-
struction and maintenance of the road from Tsinghai and Kansu to Lhasa, which
crosses this region. In Northeastern Tibet the Chinese have also engaged in
mineralogical exploration and, to a limited extent, in political activity among
the Tibetan nomads.
Western-Tibet (A-li), largely isolated from the rest of Tibet, consists of
mountains, plateaus, and the gorges and ravines of the Sutlej and Upper Indus
Rivers. The principal activity of the few Chinese troops quartered here is
directed toward political security -- a matter of some concern to the Chinese
because of the considerable trade and pilgrim traffic with India and Nepal. A
recently constructed road connects A-li with Chinese supply bases in Sinkiang,
and infrequent truck convoys provide another tenuous link across the Chang Thang
with Hei-ho (Nagchhu Dzong).
Terrain factors have made construction and maintenance of communication
facilities to and within Tibet difficult and costly and, in many areas, have
severely complicated Chinese control. Agriculture is also a precarious enterprise
since the amount of arable land in Tibet is limited by excessive elevations and
severe climate. Most of the food required for Chinese personnel in Tibet has
been trucked in from China or imported from India. The specter of food shortages,
aggravated by an influx of Chinese colonists, has been an exacerbating factor in
Sino-Tibetan relations.
Possibly the most important basic factor obstructing implementation of Chinese
Communist plans in Tibet is the rigid and unyielding structure of Tibetan society.
Tibetan society is inseparable from Lamaism, or Tibetan Buddhism, which in itself
is virtually the State. Supreme spiritual and temporal authority is vested in
the head of the Lamaist Church -- the Dalai Lama -- whose spiritual influence
extends far beyond the limits of the political control of Lhasa. The many monas-
teries found in Tibetan-inhabited areas provide visible evidence of the spiritual
dominance of Lamaism. The monasteries also possess great economic influence
through their large landholdings and control of wealth. The clergy is an extreme-
ly conservative force and, even before the advent of the Communists, had strongly
resisted modernization or modification of the traditional Tibetan way of life.
Although the Tibetan nobility is numerically small, it has considerable power.
through hereditary positions in the government and ownership of land and trading
concerns.
Most Tibetans, however, are neither monks nor nobles but peasants, often
tenants, or nomadic herders. Although the chief domains of the nomads are the
southern half of the Chang Thang, Northeastern Tibet, and parts of Kham, they are
found throughout Tibet. Their mobility makes them less susceptible to control
than the sedentary agriculturalists. The Goloks, a particularly turbulent group
of nomadic tribes inhabiting the southeastern part of Tsinghai, have remained
outside the pale of control by either the Chinese or Lhasa. Despite the social
and economic inequalities between the upper and lower levels of Tibetan society
a situation likely to be exploited by the Communists -- feudal traditions continue
to be a significant impediment to change.
From 1951 through 1954 the Chinese Communists moved cautiously in Tibet.
Aside from establighing and maintaining their military garrisons, Chinese programs
were largely limited to local agricultural assistance and public health. During
1955 and 1956, however, the Chinese either initiated or announced intentions of
initiating numerous programs, including the organization (March 1955) of a
Preparatory Committee for a Tibet Autonomous Region (inaugurated April 1956), the
setting-up of an administrative hierarchy staffed mainly by Chinese officials,and
the establishment of limited economic and social construction projects. Addition-
ally, the Chinese began in certain areas to institute "democratic reform," a term
covering such acts as land redistribution, abolition of certain "feudal." practices,
and general measures designed to prepare the populace for future steps on the
road to socialism.
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In late 1955 and early 1956, armed uprisings occurred in Kham -- specifical-
ly in the vicinity of Li-yang, Pa-an (Batang), and Te-ko, but possibly in other
areas as well -- and in the Golok-inhabited region of Tsinghai. The revolts in
Kham reportedly were triggered by the imposition of "democratic reforms" that hit
particularly hard at the power of the monasteries. Military action was necessary
to quell these revolts. Information is meager as to the extent and duration of
the fighting, but it was sufficiently serious to cause refugees to flee to Lhasa.
Sporadic fighting still isreported, and there are indications that even larger
areas are involved. Furthermore, the road from Szechwan reportedly was cut in
several places. This is probably true since natural conditions such as heavy
rains and landslides are sufficient to render certain sections inoperable for days
or weeks; and with only a little human assistance, long sections of the road could
be put out of operation for indefinite periods, thus blocking the movement of
Chinese personnel and supplies. Finally, the events of 1956 brought to light a
Tibetan underground movement, the Mimang, which has operated both with and without
Tibet using pamphlets and similar media in a psychological warfare campaign
against the Chinese Communists.
The violent Tibetan reactions caused the Chinese to take stock, and several
speeches in early 1956 attempted to allay Tibetan fears. Despite these assurances,
however, Chinese plans for reform continued apace. In this political climate the
Dalai Lama left Tibet for India, in December 1956, to participate in a Buddhist
celebration; and while there he talked with Nehru and Chou En-lai. For Tibetan
aspirations, the timing of the discussions was favorable, coming shortly after
the world-wide indignation generated by the suppression of the Hungarian Revo-
lution.
Whether or not the discussions in India had a bearing upon future develop-
ments in Tibet, Mao shortly thereafter (27 February 1957) aired the Tibet problem
in his famous speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People."
In it, Mao stated that although reforms of the social system in Tibet were
inevitable, the time was not yet ripe, that implementation would not take place
during the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1963), and that the introduction of
reforms must wait until "the great major:Lty of the people of Tibet and their
leading public figures consider it practical." At this time, however, Communist
socialization measures had already been instituted in the Tibetan Borderlands.
Announcements from Lhasa later in 1957 revealed that "most" of the Han Chinese
cadres were to be withdrawn., much of the Chinese administrative and social
superstructure was to be dismantled, and most economic construction projects
curtailed. Communist efforts continue, however, with emphasis upon indoctrination
and training of Tibetan cadres, increased cultural exchanges between Tibet and
China, and continued construction and improvement of communication facilities.
Although the timetable for the socialization of Tibet has been postponed,
the machinations of Peking could easily result in abrupt policy reversals.
During the past year, for example, dissatisfaction with Tibet's obduracy toward
socialism has been noted in speeches and editorials in the Chinese press.
Basic unifying factors,' however, indicate that the process of leading Tibet
to socialism may be prolonged. The traditional spir:Lt of independence has been
given new life by the revolts and by the partial withdrawal of Chinese civilian
personnel. Despite road construction and improved communications, great areas
remain isolated; and the mobility of nomadic groups favors continued dissident
activities. Although the Dalai Lama has publicly endorsed Peking's policies, he
has resisted complete domination and continues to be a vital national symbol to
the Tibetans. Also, it is unlikely that the age-old suspicions and hostility of
Tibetan toward Chinese will diminish, or that the arrogance (Pan-Hanism) of a,
Chinese toward a Tibetan will. be easily overcome. Finally, a harsh Chinese
policy in Tibet and punitive military actions might create unfavorable reactions
in Asia, particularly in such "neutral" nations as India and Burma. The Chinese
Communists are in military co:trol of Tibet; but the fires of Tibetan resistance
remain smoldering.
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RESISTANCE IN TIBET
4
Vlap 1: TERRAIN 8REGIONS
AND TRANSPORTATION
Motorable road
--- Motorable road, under
construction
Area of 1956 revolts
ND
M
Map?.~_o
A MI VISIONS
I AND
c,
International boundary .............. Autonomous Chou boundary SIB ~1~
(Lund. of -Tibetan Autonomous vChou) ince (fl
Ptoylpce or ~?tonop ous~~~~~~ Boundary of former Sikang Pyrovince
region boundary
Major population Minor population Sparsely populated - 7/7 concentration concentration area (mainly nomadic)
srH tin
LA
00300 400 Kilometers
UNCLASSIFIED
C H_ q
Tatchti4
Boundaries and names arfnot necessarily
those recognized by,the U. S. Government.
`WANG,
?TE.CH'ING
i. M. A. R.
Y0N\NAN
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CONFIDENTIAL.
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