LETTER TO SENATOR JACKSON FROM STAN TURNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M00165A001800080011-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: December 22, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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Attachment: Statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central .
Intelligence, Concerning Personnel Reductions in the Directorate
of Operations, CIA.
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Statement by Admiral Stansfield Turner,
Director of Central Intelligence,
Concerning Personnel Reauctions fif the
Directorate of Operations, CIA
I. Why wire the cuts necessary?
Soon after my arrival in the Agency last March I began
to hear that the Directorate of Operations was overstaffed.
It was almost universally perceived within the Agency that
the DDO had excess people, resulting in over management
and under utilization of talent. Some organizations could-
tolerate this, but not an organization like the CIA where
we are fortunate to have high-quality, dedicated and
ambitious people. Nor, from a broader standpoint, is it
tolerable to have-unnecessary people on the taxpayers
payroll.
At that time the Directorate of Operations was already
engaged in a three-phase restructuring and paring down
program. I encouraged and received a report on.the.ir---
efforts in mid-July.
II. Determination of the size of the reduction.
The report I received presented a range of opinion as to
the extent of the cut that was necessary. I elected to
be conservative and take the smallest number of positions
'for elimination that was suggested--820. This does not
mean that either the incumbents of those positions must
be released or that 820 people are going to be declared
excess to this Directorate. Normal attrition should-
greatly reduce the number whose services will no longer
-be needed in the Directorate of Operations. We also
must make provision for the continuing hiring of new
and young personnel, to ensure the continuing viability
of the service and we also must ensure that there exists
-a reasonable promotion opportunity at all levels for
..those on duty. To accomplish these latter points I have
told the Directorate of Operations to hire 21S people
each year for FY 78 and FY 79. Because of normal attri-
tion many people will be voluntarily leaving the Operations
Directorate and we estimate that over the two-year exercise
approximately 300 individuals will actually be involuntarily
.separated from the Agency. It should also be noted that
nearly 70 percent of the 212 people declared excess 'so
far are eligible for an immediate retirement annuity.
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 III. Timing of the reduction.
App(ovp88 jrTel se?pyp3/1l5 IA-RDP8gMO016 001,800080011 6
e y nc, ~hat, ,zt the ac1di Lionel
pain it causes us, we cannot afford to neglect
either the promotion opportunity for those already
in the organization or the necessity of bringing in.
people in approximately equal annual increments at-
the bottom. We simply must continue to build a
sufficiently attractive career opportunity to attract
and retain the same caliber of people in 1987 as we
had in 1977. Parenthetically, I might say that "at
the bottom" is intended to mean just that. I see
little prospect *for more than a handful of specialists
coming in at middle or upper levels..
Of the alternatives presented to me. for phasing
he reduction,. i opted for the quickest, which was
accomplishable over a two-year period. Given the
changes the last few years have brought to the CIA,
I felt it would be better for morale not to prolong
this action. Extending the reduction over
gear period might nave made it possible to'achieve
the reduction through attrition alone, but that
would have left an air of uncertainty hanging over
the entire organization for that long period and in-
the end might not have brought about the reductions
in the right places. . In addition, I do not believe
I could honestly face your Committee in its budgetary
role
d
an
suggest that the Agency should retain such
a considerable number of people in excess of its
On August 8 I announced this intended reduction ---
i
rst privately to the employees and then publicly to
t:h
di
e me
a. It was in turn well publicized in and out-
side the Agency. I further announced that we would
Fiscal' Year 1978 not later'than~the~firstyof -November
1977; that none of those persons would be asked to
leave prior to the first of '.larch 1978
Those bei
.
ng
asked to leave in Fiscal Year 1979 would be notified
by 1 June 1978 and not required to leave prior to
I. October 1978.
Between the time I notified CI employees in
August that there would be a red - ucti- and the first
announcement to .indi vi du,l s on the first of Love;t her
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Now
as to who would be released. I received no complaints
either as to the necessity for cuts or how they would
be effected. Even since the announcement of who
would be released, I have found no one-in the Agency
who seriously believes that a reduction is not in
order.
IV_ Who is to be released?
In deciding how to allocate the reduction across
grades and skills, my end objective has always been
to maintain at least as much clandestine intelligence
capability as we possess today. We do not have a
surplus of human intelligence collection 'capability,
hence, there will be no meaningful reduction in
overseas strength or activities, nor appreciable
.reduction in the size of the officer operational
corps.
V. Method of selecting the individuals.
For those below the supergrade level, the '
individual's accumulated fitness reports were the
basic determinants of who was to leave. The Agency's
periodic evaluation boards numerically rank individ-
uals within each grade level. These rankings
combined with fitness reports were the basis for a
point system. An explicit explanation of this point
system was published for all personnel in the
operations Directorate in early October. Beyond
this mechanical evaluation, a panel reviewed the,
calculations and used good judgment in making
exceptions where unique skills needed to be retained.
.'These were rare exceptions, however, and the rule of
the numerical ranking was closely followed.
In June this year we initiated an annual process
by which a senior panel composed of officers at the
Executive position level rank all supergrades. The
Direct or for Operations used these rankings as the
basis for his recommendations on release of super-
grades to me. Again, there were exceptions to the
ranking order, but they were rare.
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There are two additional points that I would
like to make on these selections:
As far as I can determine, there was no
bias by type of service, agreement with
current management, race or sex. in the
selection of these individuals. There
were, for example, only 17 s.,-omen, 4
blacks, and 3 Hispanics in .-the total
of 212 forced reductions for Fiscal
1978.
C There is no question that we were forced
to terminate some very capable people.
The Directorate of Operations has been
shrinking continually since our with-
drawal from Vietnam. The majority of the
marginal performers have already been
eliminated. There is no way today to
reduce further without. asking very
competent people to leave. This is'
unpleasant, unfortunate, but I believe
necessary!
V1. Style of notification.
The method by which notifications were issued
to individuals has been criticized. I regret that
individuals may have been offended or felt- that
their prior service was not fully appreciated. Such
is not the' case. Everyone of these individuals has
made sacrifices and many have endured privations and
risks for their country- Being fully cognizant of
their past contributions, we are determining whether
any of these 212 people can be relocated in other
directorates within the Agency to fill existing
vacancies. Consequently, while individuals have
received a notification that their release has been
recommended, we are still exploring alternative
employment possibilities. Until those alternatives
have been exhausted, no final- determination on their
employment will be mr:ade.
1 anticipate that 25`. o_ tnese 21-2 people will
be offered alternative positions. Additionally, I
am personally aLproachin ? the c hic.fs D= all the
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other intelligence services of our country to ask
that they give the residual of these 212 special
consideration in their hiring requirements.
.Finally, in a few cases, notices went to those
who would be able to retire if permitted to serve a
small amount of additional time. In these cases,
we have arranged that no one will be forced to
retire before the end of Fiscal Year 1979, when the
program must be complete, if he would qualify for
retirement by that time.
VII. Is there a security risk?
It has been suggested that the departure of
sizable numbers of employees risks their being -
suborned by enemy intelligence agents.. Frankly,
I have too much confidence in their loyalty and
dedication to take such a suggestion seriously..
There was no such experiencer to the best of my
knowledge, under former Director James. Schlesinger
in 1973, when 632 employees were separated. Our
unfortunate experiences with former employees
violating their secrecy agreement have come
entirely from individuals who have left the Agency
of their own volition.
VIII. Next phase of the reduction.
The Fiscal 1979 cut will require approximately
-the same number of reductions, perhaps more if
attrition does not meet expectations. We intend
not to wait until the first of June and then send
out all of the notifications at once but to.commence
notification as early as possible. None will-be
required to depart before the first of October 1978.
XI Conclusions.
Many are concerned that this reduction may have
hurt the morale of the Directorate of Operations.
There is no question that in. the short-term it has.
The long-term objective, however, is quite the
reverse; it is to rebuild morale by ensuring opera-
tional efficiency and full utilization of talent.
More than that, morale in the Directorate of Opera-
tions will he further stre-;cthened through the
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Noe
sustained expression of support for its viFal
activities such as has come from this Co: mittee
and which also must come from a broader range of
citizens. We must lift the pall of_ suspicion
which-hangs over the Intelligence Co' :unity in
general and the Central Intelligence Agency in
particular, which obscures the exceptional con--
tribution these organizations have made in the
past and are making today.
I would not have encouraged and approved this
sizable reduction had I not thought that in the
long run it would strengthen the Directorate of
Operations and the Central 'Intelligence Agency.
We need the capabilities of this Directorate as
much today as ever. Although new technical means
of collection permit us to extend our collection
efforts, they only compliment, they do not super
cede human collectors. Only human collectors can
gain access to motives, to intentions, to thoughts,
and plans. They will always- be- vital. to our. -coun'
l y's security.
It would have been much easier for me to have
avoided this issue and attempted to continue over
.strength until you or the appropriations committees
or the Office of Management and Budget uncovered
sese excesses and made the reductions in my behalf-
Contrary to media reports, I was not directed to
mike these cuts either by the Vice President or
David Aaron of the National Security Council staff
as reported in some media. I have talked to neither
an 'the subject except to keep the Vice President
Informed of my decisions. in sum, it is my opinion
that I would have been avoiding my duty and would
have been placing short-term considerations ahead
of long-term necessities in putting the cuts off.
We simply must build a foundation today for a
Central Intelligence Agency that will be capable
during the past thirty years..
future the out-
standing performance it has given our coon try
of continuing into the indefinite
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