STUDENT UNREST IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP76M00527R000700200001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 105
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
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INDONESIA
"There are 400 ways to topple a government,
among them the employment of children to
block streets and roads."
--Sukarno, in conversation
Summary
Indonesia's youth and students traditionally have
been active in times of political crisis. The incip-
ient independence movement of the 1920's, the revolu-
tionary period following World War II, and the post-
coup period of the 1960's have all provided clearly
defined goals and methods.
Indonesian students have now entered a period of
quiescence. Although they have returned to their
classes, they continue to monitor government opera-
tions, paying close attention to economic stabiliza-
tion, the forthcoming five-year economic development
program, and preparations for the 1971 elections. In
the meantime they remain both the army's strongest
ally and staunchest critic. They sit in Parliament,
operate their own press and radio, and organize educa-
tional programs.
Recent Past
The attempted coup of 1965 heralded the appearance
of youth and students as an independent political force
which helped bring down a 20-year-old regime. Prior
to this, Indonesia's youth had not shown themselves
particularly independent or inquisitive. They were
closely channeled by their adult political parties.
There were exceptions, of course. ANSOR, the youth
affiliate of the Moslem Scholar's Party (NU), took a
strong anti-Communist, anti-Chinese position far more
forthright than its parent organization, which has a
long record of opportunism. Christian students, many
educated under missionary auspices often managed to es-
cape the stultifying ideological indoctrination that
permeated the state schools.
Such exceptions were often obscured by the clamor-
ous leftist mobilization of students and youth against
foreign powers "threatening" the Republic of Indonesia.
Indones
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By late 1965 however, non-Communist students
were exhibiting a remarkable ability for organiza-
tion and independent action, often encouraged and
supported by the army. Their actions were now
primarily directed internally against a discredited
political machine, President Sukarno, the PKI, and
rising prices.
Long-standing animosities aroused by Commu-
nist influence broke out in the wake of a Commu-
nist-inspired attempt to seize the government.
Communist China's alleged involvement surfaced re-
sentment of Chinese economic "domination." Sukarno's
early attempts to shield the PKI nurtured suspicion
of his involvement and tarnished the state phi-
losophy so closely identified with him.
The students who took to the streets were not
all anti-Sukarno, of course. Some supported the
embattled leader. Sukarno had early recognized the
need to mobilize his own youthful legions and
leftist student activists took a lead in forming
mass pro-Sukarno federations. Eventually, however,
these were proscribed by the military government
on the basis that they were being used by Commu-
nist elements.
Traditional Roles
The Indonesian educational system has under-
gone an extraordinary expansion since independence
but the concurrent population increase and a ris-
ing demand for education have outstripped avail-
able facilities, In 1968, 35% of Indonesia's
112 million population were of school age; less
than half attended class. Enrollment in higher
education has increased at a faster rate than in
primary and secandary schools. The current en-
rollment of Indonesia's 40 state and 150 private
universities is estimated at 278,000 with about
8,000 graduating annually. With 42% of the popu-
lation under 15 years of age in 1961 and a current
growth rate of 2,3%, severe pressures are certain
to continue.
The major universities are government fi-
nanced and located in urban areas of Java. They
are composed of individual faculties which are
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geographically scattered and separatistic. The
shortage of teachers and materials is acute.
Salaries are low and most professors have other
jobs, reducing tnei r effectiveness in overcrowded
classes. An official 1967 survey of 24 state
universities conducted reported a ratio of 1 fac-
ulty member to every 728 students, Textbooks are
not available or are prohibitively expensive`
while libraries and laboratories are totally in-
adequate.
Universities usually do not have residence
facilities and students must rent rooms or live
with relatives. Most come from the families of
government officials,, army officers? pensioners,
and teachers, and are two to three years older
than their Western counterparts when they enter
college. Many attend part time, working to defray
expenses. Because of this situation, the lack of
a standardized curriculum and an arbitrary examina-
tion system, it is difficult to complete a degree
in the scheduled time of 5 to 7 years, and attri-
tion is high.
A university education traditionally has been
the passport to a secure position in government
and a means of ensuring social prestige. Students,
therefore, tend to study law and the social
sciences. While a medical degree is highly re-
spected, most aspirants lack preparation to com-
plete the difficult course of study.
Limited academic interests and the value
placed on a degree rather than educational train-
ing, have produced graduates who have little in-
clination to change the bureaucratic system. This
has meant a bloated? largely underemployed, over-
extended civil service.
The first Indonesian student associations,
formed in the early Twentieth century; quickly
evolved into nationalist pressure groups. Some-
times they provided the genesis of political par-
ties; members of the Bandung Study Club ? under
the chairmanship of Sukarno founded the Indonesian
National Party (PNI) in 19 27 . As the Dutch became
aware of the political nature of these associations,
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student activities were curtailed and many leaders
were exiled. The student associations were dormant
throughout the 1930's until the arrival of the
Japanese who sought to gain support for the war
effort by creating numerous youth and student or-
ganizations which emphasized Asian nationalism and
Indonesian culture. At the same time, anti-Japa-
nese university students, while effectively pene-
trating the Japanese-sponsored organizations began
overtly and clandestinely to advocate independence.
At the end of the war opinion was heavily against
any association with the Dutch, and Indonesian
students enthusiastically fought in the revolution.
Independence and the departure of the Euro-
peans left many vacancies to be filled by Indo-
nesians in the universities and the government. The
first students---a handful compared with today's
enrollment--to enter the universities after inde-
pendence were highly motivated by job prospects,
the social value of a university degree previously
reserved for an. elite few, and personal identifi-
cation with the spirit and goals of the revolution.
Most students from 1949 to 1957 had full govern-
ment scholarships and living costs were relatively
low.
STUDENTS OUTSIDE SUKARNO'S PALACE
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As this revolutionary generation graduated,
however, it was replaced by another whose prospects
were not as favorable. The rapidly growing stu-
dent population increased the demand for govern-
ment jobs, and political connections, always help-
ful, became even more important in obtaining civil
service appointments.
In addition, as the revolution faded and liv-
ing costs rose more than wages university students
became frustrated and more opportunistic.
Under Sukarno
While the Communist student and youth organi-
zations have often loudly touted membership figures
other organizations have been reluctant to do so.
Membership requirements are often ambiguous.
The term "student" is rather loosely defined and
Indonesia, too, has its share of students without
universities. Both youth and student organizations
have included members from 14 to 40 years of age,
while student organizations count not only enrolled
students, but also recent graduates or people who
contribute time or money. Because of social taboos
and the early marriage of girls, female participation
has been minimal and usually confined to auxiliary
groups.
Most of the student and youth groups are af-
filiates of adult parties and reflect the major or-
ientations that are found in political life--religion,
nationalism, and socialism, which included Marxism
until 1966.
Prior to October 1965, the major Indonesian
parties were the Moslem Scholars Party (NU), the
Indonesian National Party (PNI), and the Indonesian
Communist Party (PKI), all of which had student ad-
juncts. Sukarno's gradual move toward the left
facilitated the growth of Communist and leftist na-
tional groups, while moderate political and reli-
gious groups were increasingly on the defensive.
In 1963 the leftward thrust greatly intensified,
and by mid-1965 only the army offered even minimal
resistance to the nation's move into a Sukarnoized
version of Communism.
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Communist Youth and Student Movements
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) courted
youth and students to counter the traditional values
and behavior that often deadened adult political
life.
As with other Indonesian political organiza-
tions, the PKI differentiated its youth groups
by age, sex, and education. Its most successful
mass organization and the only one with which the
party maintained open ties was its peasant-based
youth organization, The Peso les Youth (PR). Less
successful were the PKI's high school and university
student front organizations, the League of Indonesian
High School Students (IPPI), and the Concentration of
Indonesian University Students Movements (CGMI).
In the early 1950's Communists gained covert
control of IPPI4 . a student organization that had
grown out of a wartime fusion of nationalist high
school and university students. This resulted in
a split which, by 1957, had resulted in two rival
IPPI's--neither of which was effective.
Local university associations were begun by
the PKI in 1950 in Bandung, Bogor, and Jogjakarta.
In November 1956, these were brought together to
form the Concentration of University Students Move-
ments (CGMI), with about 1,200 members. Growth
was moderate and in early 1960 the CGMI claimed
7,000 members, although the actual figure probably
was closer to 4,000. By 1963, CGMI was claiming
17,000 members but this figure was padded by "stu-
dents" from the Peoples University and other PKI-
established academies.
The CGMI never acknowledged its tie with the
PKI, and only a small percentage ever realized it
was a PKI front organization. Many members who dis-
covered its true affiliation withdrew.
CGMI exerted considerable influence during the
early 1960's thanks largely to a convergence of
national policy and PKI sentiment, which made it
easier for the Communists to manipulate the organi-
zation.
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CGMI was the only national student organization
open to students with no political affiliation or
strong religious feelings. Most others joined or-
ganizations affiliated with the national political
parties such as the PNI or the Masjumi. CGMI served
to recruit and season young Communists. The organiza-
tion was banned early in 1966 and many of its members
slipped into leftist national groups where they
would not be so readily noticed.
Much more successful was the general youth
arm of the PKI, the Peoples Youth (PR) , which had
its base in the Socialist Youth of Indonesia and
had been sponsored by the Socialist Party. The So-
cialist Party split in 1948 and many of its members
formed a new Indonesian Socialist Party. The So-
cialist Youth of Indonesia, however, remained with
the old Socialist Party and many of its leaders
and members were involved with the ill-fated Commu-
nist-led Madiun rebellion of 1948.
Its name was changed in 1950 to Peoples Youth
because of the Madiun affair. PR claimed 30,000
members in 149 branches throughout the country
and embarked on an extensive membership drive.
By 1955 the PR claimed a total membership of
616,605--of whom 80% were peasants, 15% workers
and clerks, and 5% high school and university
students. Only 5% were female. By 1961 the organ-
ization claimed 1,250,000 members, of which 7%
were girls. Claimed membership had reached 1.5
million by early 1963 and at its peak prior to the
1965 coup attempt, PR claimed 3 million members,
although this figure probably was inflated.
It is difficult to estimate the number of
full-time cadre active in the PR. Many doubled
as cadre for the PKI or for one or more of the
party's other mass organizations. Indications
are, however, that the PR had more full-time activ-
ists than any other youth organization. As the PR
grew, it placed increasing emphasis on travel to
the Soviet Bloc, both for education and as incentive.
What attracted members to the PR was not so much
its political activity as what its then Secretary
General called the fight for youth's "everyday in-
terests" and the appeal to "the everyday needs of
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every section of youth, in workshops, factories,
offices, harbors, urban quarters, villages, estates,
schools, etc." Political activity meant little to
the ordinary peasant or worker.
The comprehensiveness of the PR's program was
exemplified by demands raised during its Fifth Con-
gress in 1956. On behalf of young workers, for ex-
ample, the PR demanded improvement on wages, social
security and working conditions,, abolition of wage
differences because of sex or age, low-priced dis-
tribution of essential commodities, and scholarships
from employers and government for technical education.
The PR also set up mutual aid groups to assist
members in time of need and organized local "civic
action" teams to repair roads and irrigation ditches.
Through sports and social events, the PR provided ac-
tivities in villages usually beset by boredom as soon
as the sun went down.
All of this did not divert the PR from its po-
litical function. It sought to raise the "progressive"
awareness of many Indonesian youth and students and
passed on members to the PKI and its mass fronts.
The PR, along with S-OBSI, the PKI's labor front,
took the lead in mobilizing the September 1963 sack-
ings of the British and Malayan embassies and the sub-
sequent takeover of British enterprises in Indonesia.
Because of its long known affiliation with the
PKI, and its direct involvement in the coup attempt,
the PR was hit heavily in the anti-Communist purges
after 1965. It was banned in March 1966 along with
the PKI and other front organizations.
The PKI's youth program has not yet recovered
from the 1965 purges. The party has attempted to
establish a covert recruiting program, operating through
its Central Committee Youth Department--mainly on
East and Central Java. Leftist sentiment remains
strong in these areas and there are latent animosities
stemming from the purges.
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Indonesian Students Abroad
During the early 1960s an increasing number of
Indonesian students went abroad to study, predominantly
in Communist countries.
At the time of the attempted coup there were
approximately 1,500 overseas. About 1,000 were in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some 60 were
in Communist China. There were about 800 graduate
students in the United States. Japan and Australia
accounted for the remainder.
Communist governments attempted to influence
the students' political development and sought to
dominate the local Indonesian Students' Association.
Where an association's leadership might.not be sym-
pathetic,, the host government. would set up a rival
rump leadership which could often count on substan-
tial support from among the members.
The group most seriously infiltrated was that in
Communist China, most of whose members refused to return
home after 1965. They remain in Peking, shrilly de-
manding armed revolution in Indonesia guided, naturally,
by the thoughts of Chairman Mao,
Of the 400-500 Indonesian students in the Soviet
Union, about 100 remained loyal. to the Suharto govern-
ment and returned home. The remainder, staunchly
leftist (either PKI or left-wing National Party
sympathizers), had their passports revoked and either
remained in the Soviet Union or drifted away to
Peking and even to Albania. The Indonesian Govern-
ment has reported the existence of 700 fugitives
undergoing guerrilla training near Peking, although
not all are former students.
It is difficult to tell, owing to Djakarta's
inadequate screening techniques, how many anti-
government students returned and are active against
the Suharto government. There is very little oppor-
tunity for "underground" elements in Indonesia to
employ propaganda tactics on anything but a limited,
regional scale.
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Post-Coup
Little attention has been paid to the genesis of
the post-coup student movement and the establishment
of anti-leftist student federations known as "action
commands." Catholic and Moslem student leaders ap-
pear to have taken the initiative late in 1965. Their
university student groups came together to form KAMI,
the University Students Action Command, one of the
most important coalitions of this period. While KAMI
drew its strength mainly from religious student organ-
izations, it regarded itself as nationally rather than
religiously motivated.
KAMI may have been largely the brainchild of its
first. secretary general, Kosmos Batabura, who was at
that time also chairman of the Catholic University
Students Association. It has now been generally ac-
cepted that KAM7: had the early support and protection
of the army.
A government assessment in February 1966, when
KAMI's activities hit a high point, placed its hard-
core membership at 7,500. However, the group was
highly effective in rallying thousands of students
and gaining the support of many labor and professional
groups.
Not unnaturally, student groups proved most ef-
fective in Djakarta. In many areas beyond the capital
they often collapsed in the face of opposition from
leftist, pro-Sukarno students and elements of the
military, especially the leftist-oriented Marines.
The post-coup youth campaign was a fluctuating
thing, often reacting more to the mood of the time
than to any preconceived plan. Student hostility
focused on Communists, then on Sukarno's ministers
and close associates, economic deterioration and
finally on the Chinese.
Insinuations that the CPR may have inspired
the coup became more and more widespread. On 21
October 1965, 50,000 demonstrators protested China's
"intervention" in Indonesia's domestic affairs.
Foreign Minister Subandrio was charged with being
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a "Peking Dog" and if he did not run to Mao's bidding,
it was enough that he occasionally had sat in his lap.
The students' tactics during this period were
those so familiar to the West. Beginning with street
demonstrations, mass meetings, and roll-calls the
students turned to more direct action.
In early January 1966, students had initiated
the boycott tactic. All university activities were
struck until the government retracted price boosts
in gasoline, kerosene, postal rates and train fares.
Sukarno's installation of a new cabinet in late Feb-
ruary 1966 was protested by thousands of students
jammed into the streets of Djakarta, overturning
vehicles and blocking the streets to keep the newly
appointed ministers from attending installation cere-
monies at the palace. Traf-
fic was brought to a stand-
still and Sukarno was
forced to bring in his new
ministers by helicopter.
Pamphleteering, radio, news-
papers, grafitti, rock-
throwing, the "liberation"
of official buildings, and
student arrests of govern-
ment officials became reg-
ular occurrences. Fights
with rival student groups
alternated with demonstra-
tions either supporting or
condemning the "old order."
Student efforts at or-
ganizing often took a mili-
tary tone, with the forma-
tion of brigades, regiments,
and squads usually named
after compatriots wounded
or even killed during con-
frontations with pro-Sukarno
troops or youth groups.
While all this points to a
certain amount of guidance
from the Army, an anonymous.
student leader has said:
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"We learned how to organize and demonstrate from
the Communists.. We have watched and studied their
methods for ten years. Unfortunately, we are a na-
tion trained in Marxism... We have also learned a lot
from the Japanese Zengakuren movement."
Sukarno angrily demanded that the students,
especially KAMI, be disbanded, but his demand went
unheeded. KAMI increased its coordination with
KAPPI. its high school counterpart; and guided
thousands of students in demonstrations. With the
army's support, the leftist nationalists and other
pro-Sukarno forces were largely neutralized. The
Communists earli.er had been destroyed as an overt
political force.
The transfer of executive authority to General
Suharto in March 1966 was preceded by three days
of violence and demands that diplomatic relations
with the Chinese Communists be broken: from 9-11
March, students invaded the offices of NCNA, the
Chinese Consul General, and the Chinese 'Trade Of-
fice. Foreign Minister Subandrio's offices were
also sacked. In May the students finally breached
the walls of the Chinese Embassy.
A feeling that they, perhaps, were the new
protectors of the public welfare, had taken hold.
Sukarno's fall and General Suharto's subsequent
appointment as President relieved the students of
their major thrust. They are now largely concerned
with matters of economic stability, corruption, and
a rediscovery of the world of which they are a part.
The search has led them to parliamentary partici-
pation. In early 1967 they were giver. a total of
18 seats in a revised parliament, divided among
students and worsting youth. How many they currently
hold is obscured in the confusion of nomenclature,
reconstituted parliaments, and obtuse statistics.
More important than numbers, however, is the
influence they exercise. Through approximately
140 "amateur" radio stations they bombard the gov-
ernment and populace with anti-corruption and
economic stability campaigns and dated western
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music. Their major newspaper, Harian KAMI,
enjoys a paid circulation estimated at 9,000 and
it is no doubt read by many more people. It is
regarded as a highly professional effort and
offers some of the best editorial comment of any
Indonesian newspaper.
The Role of Ch~nee e Students
The attitudes, activities, and organizations
of the Indonesian Chinese, both citizens and aliens,
have been influenced by specifically ethnic interests.
The majority have remained largely apathetic and
passive, focused largely on day-to-day concerns.
However, during the pro-Chinese and pro-Communist
Sukarno era the Chinese became important as a
political sub-group.,
While alien Chinese were prohibited by law
from engaging in political activities, Indonesian
Chinese became involved with such "integrationist"
organizations as Partindo and Baperkio The latter
ostensibly was established to investigate ways of
assimilating Indonesia's Chinese. While these
organizations were essentially Indonesian and In-
donesian Chinese, alien Chinese--especially the
staunchly pro-Peking among tham--found ways to in-
filtrate them. The national and provincial lead-
erships of Baperki came to be dominated by Chinese
Communist agents and sympathizers.
The leftward course of Indonesian politics
in the early 1960s was felt most by the young
Chinese who were prone to identify with Communist
China and more anxious to engage in political ex-
pression,, Sukarno's concept of a "Djakarta-
Peking Axis" made the policies of Djakarta and Pe-
king increasingly indistinguishable and political
commitment to one became commitment to the other.
This virtually eclipsed the moderate or pro-Na-
tionalist Chinese.
Many of the Chinese youth in the Baperki af-
filiates also joined th PKI's student front organ-
izations. In early 1965 a Baperki official claimed
that 5,000 members of the organization's youth af-
filiate had joined the PKI's high school students'
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front, IPPI. By mid-1965 it had become unpatriotic
for Chinese youth and students not to engage in
pro-Peking and pro-Communist activities. The at-
tack on the USIS cultural center in Djakarta in
February 1965 was largely carried out by students
from Chinese high schools, both Indonesian and
alien.
The reaction to the attempted coup of 1965
largely undermined the position of t1.e Chinese and
while they took to the streets with other pro-Sukarno
elements, they were often placed on the defensive by
charges of Chinese involvement in the coup and
Chinese economic domination.
The Chinese will remain a problem for years
to come. While several thousand were expatriated
to mainland China following the coup and many more
remain in detention camps, the Chinese population is
still engaged iz the day-to-day struggle of making
a living. This has been made all the more difficult
by increased government restrictions on their eco-
nomic and social activities.
Nationalis China has cast covetous glances
their way but i:s desire to influence this large
group of overseas Chinese, estimated at approximately
3 million all told, has been thwarted by Djakarta's
desire not to get involved with National- st China
and risk losing what few strands of a "non-aligned"
foreign policy remain.
ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATORS BURN CHINESE-
SPONSORED UNIVERSITY, OCTOBER 1965
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Indonesian Chinese students are subject to all
the uncertainties of a period in which the Indonesian
government is trying to assimilate the Chinese com-
munity into the national fabric. For this reason,
Chinese political attitudes seem to have entered a
period of suspended animation, a retreat into ethnic
non-involvement in the face of continuing apprehension.
Most student activism in Indonesia is today chan-
nelled through the political parties and through stu-
dent representation in parliament. Much of the united
spirit that marked the immediate post-coup period has
been eroded, particularly by the strains of Christian-
Moslem frictions. Moslem and nationalist political
parties are waiting, anxious to advance their interests.
Leftist nationalist youth and student organizations
hunger after political respectability. While they are
still in limbo, and their rehabilitation will depend in
large part on the discretion of their parent organiza-
tions, they nevertheless provide a locus of unrest.
Indonesia now finds itself with a strong president,
a somewhat weak parliament and an army that holds the
key to stability. The student population has settled
down after the excitement of Sukarno's ouster. The
Suharto government has placed a partial moratorium on
political activity which has somewhat undercut student
activism. National elections have been put off until 1971.
It is unlikely that student activity will erupt
in such force as to paralyze the country as has hap-
pened in France. Youth and students in Indonesia are
largely accustomed to prescribed roles and operate
within the security and discipline of the extended
family and a highly personalized society. Even their
often violent protests following the attempted coup
were subject to these conditions.
One side effect of this is a tendency toward di-
vided loyalties--especially on the part of Moslem stu-
dent organizations, who feel the pull between religion
and government.
In the long run, much depends on the Suharto
government's ability to convince the populace that
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it is working toward economic development. Failure
to do so could lead to serious disaffection among
the nation's elite, especially the youth and students.
Such disaffection would, of course, make it more
difficult for the government to obtain popular co-
operation and could produce a spiralling coercion-
disaffection ]_nteraction that would intensify antagon-
ism and open a breach between the student front and
the army, its main ally up to now. The resultant
loss of army support would leave a vacuum in the
student movement which could be exploited by political
parties.
Much of the same can be said about working
youth, althouch they are not as politically active
as the students. The Communists, who had the most
success in organizing youth, are destroyed as an
overt political force and many of the leftist
nationalist youth organizations which belonged to
the Sukarno-inspired Youth Front are mending po-
litical fences. It would appear that youth organ-
izations active at the present time, sometimes in
conjunction with the students, are somewhat more
closely connected to political parties and labor
unions. In the meantime, the student front, KAMI
in particular, continues to provide a platform for
a new generation of political leaders.
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I RAN
Summary
There has been an upsurge in student unrest dur-
ing the past year. Recent demonstrations appear to
have been aimed primarily at redressing localized edu-
cational grievances and police reaction to student ac-
tivities, and to have had no broader political over-
tones.
Background
Political activism among University of Tehran
students has, until recent years, been endemic; there
were few years between the early 1950s and 1963 not
marked by rioting and often bloody demonstrations.
Traditionally, the activists have been nationalists,
supporters of former Prime Minister Mossadeq, of his
National Front or one of the offshoots of the National
Front. The Tudeh (Communist) Party has also been
heavily involved; Tudeh Party cells were active on
the campus for 15 years. A few of the early Tudeh
Party leaders were university professors, who retain
a shadowy party-in-exile in Eastern Europe.
In the past, student demonstrations were almost
all antigovernment. The Shah provided a natural tar-
get and the demonstrations were for the most part un-
abashedly political, with little attempt to use genuine
student grievances as a pretext. The Shah's increas-
ing confidence in the rightness of his domestic and
foreign policies was accompanied--and perhaps made
possible--by a strict suppression of political dis-
sidence, including that at the university. Student
leaders who promoted demonstrations were jailed, and
officials of the National Security Office were openly
ensconced on campus. Such measures, together with a
generally more optimistic feeling in the country,
have operated to produce a less openly militant stu-
dent body.
Present Student Attitudes
Many young Iranians apparently feel no sense of
identification with the regime and its development
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efforts which are decided at the highest levels of
government. Anti-establishment sentiment is probably
intensified by the lack of an effective political
opposition either in the universities or in the
society at large. No political organizations are
permitted on campus and the security organizations
and their informers keep a close watch for potential
troublemakers. Outspoken opponents of the regime
have been expelled and drafted.
A university education is today probably the most
important requirement for success in Iran. Despite
their dissatisfaction with the political system,
therefore, most students are unwilling to jeopardize
future job security by any confrontation with the
police over political ideology. In the past, many
university graduates were unable to find jobs, and
therefore had less to lose. Now, however, many of
the brightest graduates are absorbed into a burgeon-
ing bureaucracy as participants in the reform pro-
gram, and the problem of an unemployed, disgruntled
educated class is beginning to fade.
Current Unrest
Recent student unrest and demonstrations, there-
fore, have been aimed primarily at complaints about
the educational system and defects within Iran's uni-
versities. A?proximately 30,000 students are enrolled
in nine institutions of higher learning. All but one
of these institutions have experienced student demon-
strations during the past two years. In May and June
of 1967 and a-gain in January and February of 1968 inci-
dents resulted in arrests at the universities of Tabriz
Pahlavi, and Tehran. Pahlavi was closed for several
weeks in February. The students demanded, among other
things, abolition of newly instituted tuition fees,
upgrading of degrees, higher university budgets, and
better facilities.
The demonstrations had a number of proximate
causes. Tabriz University, one of the first to erupt,
was subjected to a complete administrative overhaul
and reform following local disturbances--probably
leading many students elsewhere to feel demonstrations
could produce results. Students in Tehran struck in
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protest against alleged police brutality at Tabriz
in June 1967 and again in sympathy with the Teachers
Training College strike early in 1968. Students from
Tehran University reportedly visited Isfahan University
and encouraged demonstrations in February 1968.
Some government and security officials contended
that Chinese Communist sympathizers were behind the
activities, but this has not been confirmed. A few
Tudeh Party cells do continue to exist at the Univer-
sity of Tehran, but there is no overt manifestation of
their presence and their covert activities are directed
mostly at staying alive.
Iran's universities are in transition, changing
from a system of memorization and learning by rote to
a more flexible, creative approach. Conservative, re-
ligious-oriented students find this modernization
threatening. Thus Pahlavi University's demonstration
centered around dissatisfaction with "foreign" teach-
ers, and "insults to Islam." Other students undoubtedly
believe that modernization is not coming fast enough
and that their training still is not relevant in the
modern world.
The universities have had difficulty in attract-
ing competent and dynamic faculties, despite government
efforts to recruit better qualified teachers. At
Tabriz, for example, until this year's reorganization,
the university was dominated by conservative, long-en-
trenched native Azerbaijanis with questionable quali-
fications.
Although the apparent student/faculty ratios at
Iranian universities are not too bad, these figures are
deceptive. At Tehran University, for example, where
the ratio was 28 to 1 in 1966, faculty members have
been only part-time teachers--medical professors with
private practices, economics professors with their own
businesses, etc. Some top professors reportedly have
not shown up for classes in years. There has been
virtually no faculty/student relationship. Professors
traditionally deliver lectures and depart with little
or no exchange with their students. The government
now has banned part-time teaching, but it is not known
to what extent its ruling has been enforced.
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University chancellors generally have won their
positions on the basis of their ability to maintain
order. Many are poor administrators, with little
ability to conununicate with the younger generation.
Students are well aware of the attempts to keep them
quiet; rumors at Tehran University that the chancellor
was about to create a university-controlled student
organization resulted in a pamphlet declaring that
"we boycott any imposed trade union."
Outside In luencej
There is little evidence cf off-campus influence
on student activism. Security officials, and in some
instances university officials, charged that Commu-
nists were active in recent demonstrations; 20 of the
100 students arrested in the Tehran area in February
1968 were alleged to be pro - Chinese Communist. This
has not been confirmed. There is some Communist ac-
tivity, consisting primarily of the circulation of a
limited amount: of Soviet and Chinese propaganda. Some
students may be receptive to this propaganda, but
generally its effectiveness has been undercut by
rapid economic.; and social development. Many students
turned out in February last year to mourn the death of
a famous wrestler associated with Mossadeq's National
Front, but the front itself has been effectively silenced
by the Shah's reforms and by security measures.
The US Embassy believes that in universities
such as Pahlavi, which are located in less urban
areas, Muslim religious leaders still have an influ-
ence over youth. About 50 religously conservative
Shirazi citizens were arrested follDwing disturbances
at Pahlavi in February 1968 on charges of fomenting
the strikes.
There is no evidence that student revolts in
the US, France, and other countries have influenced
the Iranian students, or that Iranian dissidents abroad
have had an irlpact on the local. scene.
GovernmentApproach_;o St;~dent Problems
Iranian officials, from the Shah on down, are
aware that the regime has not been accepted by many
intellectuals, They are anxious to keep youth satis-
fied and to encourage students to support and partici-
pate in the government. There is no visible effort to
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train youth for political responsibility, however; in
fact, the government attempts to keep students from
engaging in political activity altogether.
The government is trying to improve and modern-
ize Iranian universities through increased enrollment
and expansion of facilities, improved and enlarged
faculties, establishment of technical institutions,
and a more creative and relevant method of instruc-
tion. Further improvement is slated under the new
five-year plan, but progress is slow--particularly
when change threatens the university's status quo and
is fought by elements both in faculties and student
bodies.
The regime-sponsored Youth Organization has es-
tablished a Youth Palace in Tehran elaborately equipped
with sports facilities, a snack bar, and occasional
entertainment. There are plans for similar facili-
ties in other Iranian cities and for centers open to
nonuniversity youth, as well.
Political and social pull--being a descendant
of one of Iran's "1,000 families"--is still important
in the rise to success, but less so than before.
More middle-class youth are attending universities,
and with the government's increasing emphasis on
skill and technical competence, more of them are now
able to get jobs without political connections. Of
greatest impact, however, has been the increasing
availability of government jobs. Both high school
and university graduates are employed in large num-
bers in the Literacy, Health, and Development Corps.
Iranian Students Abroad
Iranian officials estimate that some 25,000 to
37,000 Iranians are studying abroad, including 5,000
to 12,000 in the United States. Surveys have shown
that many of the best do not return home because of
better opportunities abroad, while average students
are likely to come back. Most of the sizable number
of dropouts and failures (only 50 percent of the
Iranian "students" in the US are thought to be ac-
tually enrolled in schools) get nonprofessional jobs
with good pay abroad and do not return to Iran.
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A degree from a US or European university is
considered tax mere prestigious than cane from an
Iranian university, and many youths go to fantastic
lengths to study abroad. For example, private enter-
prises in Iran sell admissions to small, often unac-
credited universities in the US to students who are
unable to gain admission to better US schools. Poorer
students often seek education abroad because they are
unable to gain entrance to Iran's universities,
A small but vocal segment of Iranian students
abroad an estimated 500 are in the US) engage in ac-
tive anti-Shah activities. They hoi..d meetings, issue
sporadic publications, and make grandiose plans, but
their major activity is to harass the Shah when he
travels. Anti-Shah demonstrations, cined by radical
students in the US, Germany, Austri&, and England,
among other piaces, have been a macr irritant to the
Shah, have strained relations with list governments,
and have often red to supersecrecy and extremely tight
security during his journeys:
The largest organizations of Iranian students
abroad--the Iranian Students Association in the US
and the Confederation of Iranian Students in Europe--
appear to be a conglomeration of Communist sympathiz-
ers, National Front - oriented leftists, middle-of-
the-roaders, and religiously oriented rightists.
They have no ideciogical cohesiveness; only opposi-
tion to the Shah and the present regime unites them.
The leftists, who tend to be more active, almost al-
ways assume conti3i but do not necessarily reflect
the attitudes of the maocrity,. Most of the funds
apparently come room membership dues Those who are
in the forefronr A anti-Snah activities are well known
to Iranian authorities and most of them find it impos-
sible to return to Iran.
The government is also concernec by the so-called
"brain drain" problem. During the last year, it has
initiated a number of steps caiculated to lure over-
seas residents ba'k--draft exemptions, the promise of
good jobs in government and private industry, and ac-
tive recruiting for teaching jobs at Iranian universi-
ties. The regime may also be making it more difficult
for Iranians to g: abroad in the first place.
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The Long View
There will likely be no dramatic changes in stu-
dent attitudes over the next ten years, assuming that
the. Shah's economic development programs continue to
provide challenging employment to increasing numbers
of university graduates. It is also unlikely that
many Iranian students will risk political activism
while economic and social advancement appears possible.
Nevertheless, as long as political activity is pro-
scribed--and it is likely to be for as long as the
Shah is in power--the regime will probably not win
wholehearted student support, and resentment of its
authoritarianism, however benevolent, will pervade
university life.
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ITALY
Summary
Student agitation during the past 18 months ex-
tended throughout Italy. Except for the summer vaca-
tion hiatus of August and September, demonstrations,
sit-ins, marches and other agitation have characterized
the student scene. In recent months, secondary stu-
dents have followed the example set earlier by university
students and increasing numbers of them have agitated
for their own reforms.
Student violence is not new to Italy. There was
violence, reportedly concerted at several universi-
ties in 1962-64, 24-hour strikes in a number of univer-
sities in 1965, and clashes between right and left
extremists in 1966. The last year and a half, however,
is the first period when student unrest has involved
the whole peninsula.
Recent disorders began with a sit-in at the Cath-
olic University of Milan in November 1967. The most
violent demonstrations, however, have taken place in
Rome. On the first of March 1968, there were serious
disorders and clashes with the police near Rome's School
of Architecture. Both police and private vehicles
were destroyed by demonstrators. On 27 April 1.968,
some 2,000 university and secondary school students
demonstrated in a central plaza against the arrest of
several School of Architecture students. The students
used iron bars, chains, Molotov cocktails, and stones
as weapons against the police. Serious student dem-
onstrations, sometimes involving as many as 10,000
marchers, have also taken place during the past 18
months in Bologna, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples,
Padua, Palermo, Trieste, Turin and Venice. Several
hundred people have been wounded in clashes with the
police.
Degree of Participation
An average of about 10 percent of the students
in the 34 Italian universities has been active in
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the demonstrations. Proportions have varied con-
siderably, however, from a third of the student body
at Palermo to a few isolated students at one of the
very small universities.
The majority of studenta are not activist, but they
have either been sympathetic with the minority or silent
about their opposition. Press and public opinion have
generally been sympathetic to the students, largely
because of the recognized inadequacies of the univer-
sity, but are now becoming somewhat impatient with the
excesses of some demonstrators.
The Objectives
Student agitation is directed primarily toward
educational reform, but there is some evidence of a
broader dissatisfaction with the "system." Possibly
in line with modern anarchist thought, young Italians
often seem uncertain of the objectives they seek, and
lack both organization and over-all leadershirn. Their
specific demands are an admixture of local complaints--
which provide a spark for trouble--and deep-seated,
often long-discussed grievances over the antiquated
character of the curriculum, the inadequacy of build-
ings, and the crippling lack of facilities for scien-
tific and technical training. With these complaints go
demands for far greater participation by the students
in the actual running of the university and criticism
of the government's inflexibility.
Causes of Student Agitation
A basic cause of agitation in Italy is the rise
in the number of university students. While in ele-
mentary school the increase in students is only slightly
in excess of the general population growth,20 percent
more enrolled in a single recent year for the first
year of study for university degrees. The relatively
static number of professors and an outdated curriculum
have added to frustration. At Rome, for example, many
students believe that it is absurd for them to be
forced to achieve competence in the Latin of ancient
Rome; but the requirement cannot be abolished except
by act of parliament. In a smaller school such a
requirement can be evaded by faculty-student collusion,
but at Rome with 60,000 students evasion is impossible.
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The general mood of restlessness has proved in-
fectious. Disaffected youth, known locally as
"capelloni" (the long-haired ones) were first notice-
able in mid-1965. Some 200 of the capelloni gathered
from all over the country to demonstrate at Carrara
in June 1967, with the support of the Federation of
Italian Anarchist Youth. They were also in evidence
at the small International Anarchist Congress at Car-
rara in September 1968.
The extremists, with their rejection of all po-
litical order, their exasperated search for "direct
democracy," and the weight they attach to the social
and political criticism of Herbert Marcuse, have
gone beyond the limits of homegrown Communism.
outside Aqitat,,.on
There is no evidence of foreign instigation or
guidance during the seemingly spontaneous demonstra-
tions of 1967-68. Television coverage of demonstra-
tions elsewhere contributed to some degree, as did the
exchange of literature and "experience" with foreign
students and between Italian student groups. The ex-
tremist leaders of two university demonstrations in
northern Italy in May 1968 had just returned from
France.
In Italy, as in France, the orthodox Communist
Party was surprised by the student outbreak and proved
unprepared to endorse the aims or methods of the stu-
dent agitators. The Italian party, with a membership
of over one-and-a-half million, has been in the fore-
front of those free world Commun--st parties that have
struggled to minimize their subservience to Moscow
and to attain the role of a more or less regular po-
litical party. The Italian Communists have reacted
ambiguously to the student disturbances, trying to
capitalize on the move of events while refraining from
taking an official position on the violence. Leaders
of the party's left have argued for a more militant
stand, rather than backing away as they believe the
French did, so that the Communists might take advantage
of disorder. But most of the party, particularly its
right wing, has been afraid that involvement in the
student demonstrations would disrupt the party's long-
term goal of winning a governmental role by peaceful
means. The party also fears that the disorder, coupled
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with the restiveness evident in the Communist youth or-
ganization, could loosen its hold over party members
in the universities. Communist youth increasingly
are of the opinion that parliamentary reform is too
slow a process and that the "Italian road to socialism"
supported by the party's leadership "will lead in-
evitably to social democracy."
The Extreme Left
The political organizations that fall to the
left of the orthodox Communists all have sought to
profit from the student movement and to stimulate
its protest activities. The Federation of Youth of
the Proletarian Socialists is reportedly the most
popular political organization for the student ex-
tremists. The Proletarian Socialists have put their
propaganda and organizational apparatus at the dis-
position of those in the university movement who
would accept it. Many of the young people attracted
by this party have concurrently put themselves at the
head of anti-imperialist Castroist groups called "Che
Guevara clubs" or at the head of associations of
pro-Chinese or Trotskyite inspiration.
The pro-Chinese movement, represented by the
three competing organizations--the communist Party
of Italy (Marxist-Leninist) the Federation of Marx-
ist-Leninist Communists of Italy, and the League of
Marxist-Leninist Communists of Italy--of late has
obtained an unprecedented degree of support in the
university milieu. Previously, little success at-
tended these groups' demonstrations, which were
usually built around the theme of US involvement
in Vietnam, complete with little red books and
Maoist banners and maxims.
The Trotskyite movement is represented by two
feeble groups and has profited little as yet from
the student agitation. In one city, however,
several university students have founded the "League
of Revolutionary Students" which proposes to link
student and worker power and to organize street
demonstrations.
Pro-Castro sentiment has not given rise to any
disciplined organization in Italy. There has, however,
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been an increase in the number of "Che Guevara clubs,"
where protest of a variety of ideological tendencies
is reportedly expressed. A left-wing Italian pub-
lisher distributes a considerable volume of liter-
ature romanticizing Castro and Che Guevara and also
disseminates texts on guerrilla methods and tech-
niques. Several people in Italian Government circles
have expressed fear that the spread of such literature
could lend an increasingly violent cast to student
demonstrations.
Th_a Extreme Right
The extreme right--particularly the neo-fascist
movement--is divided between those with a nostalgia
for the past and others who stress political survival
in a time of rapid social evolution. Thus the rightists
are torn between the dangers of adopting so reactionary
a line that they will be separated from the mass of
students, and an association with the far left that
might lead to their absorption. In some universities
the far right led actions to evacuate or to prevent
the occupation of the schools. In others, the rightists
competed with th extreme leftists in occupying build-
ings. In general, however, the far right has not been
a major factor La the student demonstrations.
Attitude of Moderates
The Italian students may have a better chance of
winning high level support than student agitators elsewhere.
For example, Ami:-itore Fanfani, a key Christian Demo-
cratic leader, has given lectures at Rome which were
based on his con-:emporary experiences as foreign
minister and were designed to meet: student demand
for academic work relevant to the present day. Civilta
Cattolica, the influential Jesuit weekly, stated edi-
torially that protesting students were substantially
correct in their demands and new forms of democracy
would have to be found to give everyone a meaningful
role in society.
By early 1969, however, the attitude of the es-
tablishment toward the student demonstrations had be-
come considerably more critical. Italian observers
generally believe that reform of curriculum, administra-
tion and student--teacher relations is inevitable, given
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the increase in the student population. Demonstra-
tions have given the government a sense of urgency
about reform in education, but unfocused extremist
agitation may now be delaying progress on legisla-
tion.
Prospects
Both university and secondary students are likely
to continue demonstrations for some time to come. The
extent and seriousness of their actions probably de-
pend on two factors: the prospect for sympathetic
government enactment of school reform and the degree
of student-worker cooperation. This last in turn
probably depends at last in part on the stand the
orthodox Italian Communist Party will take toward stu-
dent unrest.
The incumbent government of Mariano Rumor, which
took office only last December, has given priority to
educational reform in its program. It is generally ex-
pected that reform will eventually take place but that
considerably more serious student agitation will occur
first. Even after legislation is passed, the students
on the extremist fringe are expected to continue con-
spicuous agitation.
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PAKISTAN
Summary
Localized student unrest has periodically dis-
rupted the universities in Pakistan but has only
recently become an actual threat to the government
of President Ayub Khan. The violent student-led
riots of the past three months that have occurred
in both wings of Pakistan are an expression of frus-
tration and dissatisfaction with the status quo--
political, economic, and educational. Ayub's so-
called "Decade of Reforms" has stultified develop-
ment of political leadership and a feeling of un-
ease throughout the country has created a receptive
climate for student grievances.
Background on the University Set-Up
Pakistan has 12 universities, each with a
broad network of affiliated colleges. Theoreti-
cally autonomous, the universities receive offi-
cial funds and are more directly influenced by cen-
tral and provincial governments than any other part
of the educational system. The total university
and college enrollment is approximately 300,000.
Pakistani universities are organized on the
British model. The titular head is the chancellor,
usually an important dignitary and most often the
governor of the province where the university is
located, i.e. East or West Pakistan. The vice
chancellor is the actual administrator, and over-
all control is exercised by a Senate made up of
university and non-university personnel. Since the
Senate meets only occasionally, the immediate work-
ing body is the Executive Council--senior university
staff members, representatives of the affiliated
colleges, and representatives of government.
The Student Community
The Pakistani student community is as diverse
and regionally varied as other sectors of the soci-
ety. Although students are generally more leftist
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than the rest cf the population, there are pockets
of intense conservatism, such as in Peshawar.
Across the country, students seem to have a paro-
chial outlook and a simplistic and emotional view
of the outside world. The causes that have stirred
them to action in recent years have been political,
regional, personal, or religious rather than social.
The dissidents have always represented a small per-
centage of the enrollment, but support for their
opposition views has been increasing as disenchant-
ment with the Establishment has grown within the
student community.
Many serious students have recently become
frustrated with the third-rate curriculum and in-
struction in Pakistan's pseudo-British educational
system, which is designed to educate a small ruling
elite. They recognize that the system is inadequate
for educating large numbers of people in many dif-
ferent fields and that it does not provide the
skills needed by a modernizing society. A very
basic grievance underlying the general student dis-
satisfaction with the status quo is uncertainty
about jobs after graduation. Students somewhat
unrealistically expect that a college degree guar-
antees prestigious and remunerative employment.
They inevitably run up against the hard reality
that most jobs in government, as well as in busi-
ness, are awarded on the basis of family connec-
tions rather than merit. All examinations are
considered to be subject to manipulation and fa-
voritism, and cheating has assumed the proportions
of a national :scandal.
Disenchan-:ment with the entire corrupt estab-
lishment has made some students receptive to the
appeal of a radical solution--Islamic "socialism"
or even a Chinese--style "socialist" experiment--on
the assumption that it would be more equitable.
(Although Communism per se has made few converts
among Pakistani students, Communist countries,
particularly Communist China, exercise a consid-
erable attraction.) The students' desire to change
the system sets them apart from many of the older
opposition leaders who want to throw the rascals
out" and take their places in a substantially un-
changed social order. This accounts for the appeal
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of younger, more radical opposition leaders such
as Bhutto, the former foreign minister, who has be-
come one of the government's sharpest critics. The
regime is reportedly worried about Bhutto's increas-
ing influence on the campus. Bhutto's arrest in
mid-November for inciting violence has only aggra-
vated student discontent.
Student Organizations
Student organizations have existed in Pakistan
since partition. Established to pursue both polit-
ical and educational goals, the organizations have
lacked full-fledged programs and generally accepted
goals. They have tended to lie dormant until stirred
by major emotional issues. They have found effec-
tive allies hard to come by, with the exception of
a student-labor opposition tie of some significance
in East Pakistan. Most of the effective student
groups are subsidized by particular political
parties--or the regime.
Pakistani student organization is fragmented
and varies widely among regions. The arrangements
are most coherent in East Pakistan where student
political involvement is much greater than in the
West and where violence among student groups is a
routine occurrence. Three province-wide student
organizations serve as campus arms of adult polit-
ical groups. The largest and oldest of these is
affiliated with an opposition party preoccupied
with provincial autonomy. The second significant
organization is affiliated with the Communists, but
is split between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions.
The weakest of the three is sponsored by and almost
entirely dependent upon government support.
In Karachi, the two largest student groups are
influenced by factions of a leftist party that has
been heavily infiltrated by the Communists. Other
Karachi student unions of individual colleges typ-
ically go their own way, although the fundamental
Muslim parties exercise some influence. Karachi
students are given to intermittent activity, but
they can generate considerable pressures on issues
to which they are committed. In Lahore, there are
numerous opposition- and government-sponsored youth
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movements. Lahore students have been militant on
issues which have engaged their emotions, such as
the 1966 anti-government demonstrations following
the Tashkent Declaration. Elsewhere in West Paki-
stan, student organizations are usually organized
as college or department unions and are generally
inactive. Weak and transitory student groups come
and go with little fanfare, typically being sparked
by a few activists with an apathetic following.
Students and the Current Unrest
The present anti-government unrest, which is
presenting Ayub with the greatest challenge of his
decade of rule, was initiated by West Pakistani
students in November 1968. Students had begun
marching and striking in a number of urban centers
in early October. The demonstrations took on an
increasingly political and anti-government flavor,
although at the outset they were based primarily
on legitimate academic grievances. Violence erupted
on 7 November when a student was shot in Rawalpindi
as police tried to disperse a crowd waiting to
greet former Foreign Minister Bhutto. Bhutto, at
the time was engaged in a political tour of West
Pakistan, criticizing the government and apparently
beginning a campaign for the presidency.
Rioting broke out throughout West Pakistan as
other disaffected elements joined the students in
the following days. President Ayub and his regime
came increasingly under direct attack. An alleged
attempt on Ayub's life on 11 November sparked a
round-up of troublemakers, among them Bhutto, who
has been in jail ever since. His arrest further
aroused the students and aggravated the protests.
The disturbances continued intermittently,
finally spreading to East Pakistan. Schools were
closed much of the time, a usual procedure in times
of unrest. All the while, students were involved,
although attention shifted to the adult politicians
when several former government officials joined the
opposition. Still, the most active, unpredictable
and volatile element in the protests continued to
be the students, whose leaders increased in compe-
tence and control as they gained experience. The
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activists remai:zed only a small percentage of the
student community, but their colleagues joined in-
creasingly in agitation against the establishment,
especially in East Pakistan.
The demonstrations appeared to be running out
of steam late last year. In mid--January 1969, the
aging and quarrelling East Pak politicians were
cowed by government threats and did not go into
the streets for a scheduled opposition protest day.
Furious, the students seized the initiative and
the government reacted with repressive measures.
The death of another student exacerbated the situa-
tion and rioting again spread across the country,
with West Pak students overcoming regional antago-
nisms and taking up the banner of their East Pak
colleagues. The army had to be called into most
of Pakistan's major cities to restore order.
During these three turbulent months, the regime
has used both carrot and stick tactics, offering
the greatest number of concessions to the students
in hopes that educational reforms would make them
forget political demands. The repressive West Pak-
istani University Ordinance was repealed and the
Student Union--a body of elected student represent-
atives--was re-established at the University of the
Punjab in Lahore. An education service on the pat-
tern of the civil service was set up to provide in-
centives for the teaching profession. The conces-
sions were too little and too late, however; the
students' academic grievances had long since been
eclipsed by their political demands. They are now
vowing to continue pressing the government until
all their demands are met, and they will almost
certainly be unwilling to accept any compromise
which results from the recently proposed government-
opposition dialogue.
Prospects
The generation gap is an acute problem in Pak-
istan where Ayub's "Decade of Reform" is regarded
by the students more as a "Decade of Corruption and
Disparity." A new batch of student leaders has
emerged from the current turmoil--leaders who com-
mand the respect of fellow students and who appar-
ently are able to exert a degree of control over
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demonstrators. The protests have provided a way to
develop leadership in the absence of more normal
channels. Although the opposition leaders have
happily ridden the wave of student discontent and
espoused student demands against the regime, there
is little evidence of student admiration for any
opposition leaders except Bhutto. For the first
time, students probably believe that they have be-
come, on their own, a viable and effective politi-
cal force. What this realization will mean for fu-
ture student activities is as yet uncertain. The
various student groups are temporarily collaborating
in opposition to the regime, but Pakistani students
have never been able to establish a lasting nation-
wide organization. Fragmentation among student
groups will certainly become the dominant feature
again. It seems likely, however, that disorders
will continue until there is some drastic change
in the political system.
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POLAND
Summary
Polish youth has shunned open conflict with
the regime for over a year, but is as determined as
ever to press for recognition, responsibility, and
a role in shaping the country's future. It is do-
ing so against a regime which young people view as
opposed to change, jealous of past "achievements,"
and increasingly repressive. The crisis between gen-
erations now facing Poland will grow worse.
Fifty percent of the population is under the
age of 25 and sixty percent under the age of 30.
Polish youth do not oppose the basic economic or
social tenets of East European Communism as such.
They do not, for example, favor a return to private
ownership, nor the reintroduction of the pre-war
social system based on wealth and semi-feudal in-
fluence. They do, however, want far-reaching changes
in direction of a more democratic model of "social-
ism," and the fulfillment of some of the promises
originally held out by the country's leaders.
The bleak, grey facade of the Communist estab-
lishment seems effectively to exclude youth from
meaningful participation in the country's future.
The regime, constantly harking back to a history which
today's youth did not shape and much of which it wishes
to forget, is viewed as an anachronism.
The youth appear most to oppose the stagnation
and the lack of movement, the exclusiveness, and the
corruption of the establishment. The Communist frame-
work within which these features emerge, with its
totalitarianism, significantly reinforce these attitudes,
but do not appear to be a root cause of them. This
is particularly true of the ideologically unmotivated
members of the younger generation who have left school.
Most appear to regard Communist ideology as irrele-
vant to the issues facing the country--a dead letter
with only its institutional forms still prevailing.
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Versus Commitment
Faced with the coercive power of the establish-
ment, youth have become apathetic to the regime's
goals and to Communism as an ideology promising
consistent development. They view the established
Communist regime in Poland today as a negation of
the very ideas on which it theoretically rests.
More than other segments of the population, youth
have long been aware that the Polish party, like
other Communist parties in power, has become the core
of a stagnant society rather than a dyanamic stimulant
to change. This was made clear by the party itself,
when politburo member Kliszko warned last summer that
"anarchist-leftist" youth leaders in the "contemporary
world" only fulfill a "diversionary role" on behalf
of conservative elements against the "real" revolu
tionary forces of the.left. In the eyes of Polish
youth, the party's fear of "anarchism" neatly under
scores its total identification with an intolerable
status quo.
Generally, educated Polish youth tend toward a
form of Western European social democracy as a po-
litical and social order, nonsectarianism in reli-
gion, and experimental freedom in art. They favor
individual rather than collective responsibility in
social relations, and their nationalism is tempered
by vague feelings of supranationalism and a strong
allegiance to Europe as an entity.
In terms of specific domestic policies, they
make it clear that they want a free interplay of
ideas, and above all, a regime responsive to public
opinion.
This whole range of demands was clearly embodied
in a declaration passed by dissident Warsaw Univer-
sity students ir. March 1968, in the wake of the first
major student disturbances since 1957. The most suc-
cinct of numerous such resolutions passed by various
student bodies that month, the Warsaw University thesis
called for freedom of assembly and expression, freedom
of political association, legal and institutional
guarantees for such freedoms, true rule of law in the
judicial system, the repudiation of and guarantees
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against abuse of governmental power, the abolition
of censorship, and the repeal of repressive legal
codes. It also called for popular representation
in parliament, although it stopped short of calling
for free elections. Finally, the students demanded
an overhaul of the economic system and a thorough
shakeup of the bureaucratic establishment'.
Although student demands during the initial
stages of the unrest were limited to issues of aca-
demic freedom, the 28 March declaration illustrates
the degree to which these demands were widened under
the stimulus of stern repression by the regime. The
government and the party were faced with no less than
a demand that they divest themselves of a monopoly of
power.
The "March Events"
The student disorders and the violence from 8
through 23 March 1968 gave climactic impetus to a po-
litical struggle already under way within the regime
and paved the way for a slow but irreversible infu-
sion of new blood into the Polish party leadership
by year's end. The demonstrations began largely as
a spontaneous expression of genuine grievances in the
academic milieu and related issues of individual
liberties. The students, however, clearly were aware
of the almost simultaneous political events in Czecho-
slovakia, and had been emboldened by the resistance
of the Warsaw Writers Union to dictates of the regime
a month earlier.
The relative uninvolvement of Polish students in
previous regime crises stemmed from the wish not to
be sucked into the intricate power rivalries within
the party. Most of the party's factions, from (omulka's
old guard to more hard-line rivals, appear aware of
the "mischief" potential of youth and the uses to
which dissident youth can be employed to advance a
partisan cause in any factional infighting. Some
party groups have courted youth's favor, even to
the extent of placing themselves at the head of the
party's critics. Others, correctly, see youth as the
spearhead of a movement which could threaten the
bureaucracy and as the driving wedge of "ideological
subversion."
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Thus, until March 1968, the youth tended to avoid
actions that would have been exploitable by the party
factions just as they had rejected occasional court-
ship. In fact, the inability and unwillingness of
the youth to view any party faction as a true champion
of their interests was the fundamental reason that
student disorders in March lost momentum. Students
maintained action as long as the whole regime, i.e.,
all the party's factional strata, was, "shaken to
attention." It soon became apparent, however, that
the student movement was being exploited for intra-
party factional purposes. Conclusive evidence emerged
when clearly excessive police force was used and
"hooligan" provocateurs were employec among the stu-
dents. This, together with the early and false allega-
tions of "Zionist" instigation o= the riots, reportedly
convinced most of the student dissidents that the
party's hard-line faction, which controls the police
apparatus, was more interested in having the disturb-
ances run their course than nipping them in the bud.
By the last week in March, most of the student resolu-
tions and declarations passed at various universities
throughout the country specifically included denials
of "anti-socialist' intent and expressed strong desires
to remain outside the framework of the "oolitical
arena," i.e., party factionalis:-1.
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Another major factor in ending overt student
action was the failure to secure worker support.
The regime's propaganda blaming the riots on Jews
and revisionist intellectuals skillfully played to
the residual anti-Semitic and anti-intellectual
bias of the average Polish worker. Although there
were strong expressions of moral sympathy from work-
ers and other strata of the population, active sup-
port was limited to scattered instances of collect-
ing funds to pay jail fines. The absence of an im-
mediate economic issue around which worker discontent
could coalesce also dampened labor support. In addi-
tion, many of the students--mainly those who did not
take part in the disturbances--were working-class
children whose parents evidently were fearful of
jeopardizing their educations.
Regime Countermeasures
The impact of the regime's countermeasures
against the students and the educational system in
the wake of the "March events" has been uneven, and
in some areas remains unclear. No complete totals
for arrests and trials have yet been published, al-
though it appears that the lengthy piecemeal trials
AUTO WORKERS CONDEMN WARSAW UNIVERSITY
STUDENT RIOTS. MARCH 1968
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of several score of student leaders begun, last fall
may soon be ended.
Party boss Gomulka revealed on 19 March of last
year, in the midst of the student disturbances, that
a total of 1,208 persons had been arrested up to that
time. Only 367 of these reportedly were students.
The remainder, according to the regime, were "hooligans"
and other "misguided elements." Over half of the stu-
dents arrested reportedly were released within two
days. Additional information provided by the Ministry
of Education by :mid-1968 indicated that "disciplinary
procedures" had been initiated against. 424 students,
of whom 111 were "temporarily suspended." This data,
however, apparently does not take into account the
1,600 Warsaw University students who were required to
re-register after the cessation of the student riots.
Most sources conservatively estimate that over 70 of
these were expelLed.
The cases o:= another group of students numbering
about 200 were dealt with piecemeal by government
authorities throughout the summer, with the majority
gradually released. Most of those released, however,
have been reportedly expelled from their schools, many
conscripted into the armed forces, and others required
to take up blue collar jobs in areas of the regime's
choosing.
A minority of this group, apparently including
those considered the most active of the student ring-
leaders, have been dealt with in a series of relatively
unpublicized trials since late last fall. This course
of action apparently suits the government's inten-
tions to keep individual trials inconspicuous enough
to prevent a potential revival of those issues which
sparked the student riots, while at the same time
driving home the point that no repetition of last
year's events will be tolerated. What may be the
last of the trials was in progress in Warsaw in mid-
February. Most of the trials so far have resulted in
relatively light sentences of 18 months to three years,
with parole provisions after half the sentence is
served.
There is no evidence that the trials and other
restrictive measures against student activities within
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universities have generated meaningful new unrest
among the students. The majority of the students
appears to have understood the message and, with
most of their leaders incarcerated or otherwise out
of circulation, appear demoralized and apathetic
toward any renewed anti-regime activity..
Despite this revival of apathy in the short term,
there is considerable evidence that Polish youth re-
main on the watch for another chance to lend impetus
to change within the system. In this sense, they
are both evolutionary and revolutionary in their
thinking. For the time being they appear to view
open rebellion as counterproductive, given the repres-
sive tools and determination of the "establishment."
They are convinced, however, that the government has
neither the desire nor the capacity to evolve without
carefully channelled external pressure. Polish youth
appears anxious to provide such pressure at the appro-
priate time.
Student Coordination and Foreign Contacts
Although there is abundant evidence of rapid co-
ordination between groups of dissident students through-
out Poland soon after the outbreak of demonstrations
in Warsaw on 8 March 1968 no information exists of
prior planning. The peak of coordinated action ap-
pears to have come between 11 and 14 March, when sym-
pathy demonstrations and student meetings in pro-
vincial cities closely echoed the action and demands
of the Warsaw dissidents. Then, after 13 March, when
tactics in Warsaw were changed to concentrate on dec-
larations and resolutions rather than on street ac-
tion, student response at Krakow's Jagellonian Univer-
sity was quick. Elsewhere, however, sporadic demon-
strations continued until 17 March.
Student couriers traveling throughout the coun-
try during the demonstrations apparently were the
principal means of contact, although there was one
unconfirmed report that technical students in Wroclaw
had attempted to use a shortwave raio. By 14 March,
the regime had curtailed student travel, in order to
prevent coordination; some student couriers report-
edly were arrested.
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Despite the arrest or intimidation of many of
the leaders of the student disturbances in March, a
viable, if tempo:=arv, underground network between
students in Poland probably still exists. Following
the cessation of all overt student action by 23 March,
when sit-ins in Warsaw and Krakow were peacefully
broken up by police, there were again reticrts of more
sophisticated nay:ionwide coordination, probably be-
cause of the relaxation of travel curbs. The fruits
of such coordina-:ion have not become apparent, however,
and it is probable that either dissension among stu-
dents over the practicality of further action or in-
filtration of their ranks by provacateurs has short-
circuited any plans. In recent months virtually no
open resistance has been evident.
There is no hard evidence that prior contact with
students in Czechoslovakia or elsewhere played a major
role in sparking unrest in Poland, although during
the initial stages of the student demonstrations in
Warsaw slogans o: "Greetings to our Czech brothers"
and "We need a Dubcek too," were heard.
Nor is there convincing evidence that Polish
students sought or that Czechoslovak students were
anxious to provide any "export" of their experience
to Poland. Indeed, by March 1968, Czechoslovak stu-
dents were caugh- up in supporting and consolidating
the new regime in Prague, having little in common with
the problems faced by their Polish counterparts.
Nevertheles,3, the Polish regime, in late March
and early April, added stringent travel curbs on all
but official travel to and from Czechoslovakia to
the general restrictions and visa curbs on foreign-
ers, specifically Western journalists. Most of these
restrictions appear to have been lifted by mid-April,
although a careful screening of student travel con-
tinued until the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the
five Warsaw Pact powers in August 1968.
There is little information to suggest that ex-
changes among Polish and Western European students
influenced the ferment. Although Polish universities
maintain lively exchange programs with several European
countries, Polish students have remained relatively
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uninfluenced by the various student movements in the
West. They are well aware of the writings of Marcuse
and the ideas which motivate student syndicalist
groups, but there is very little evidence to show that
these have taken hold in Poland. Many students con-
tend that the daily reality of "alienation" in Poland
and specific indigenous issues facing Polish youth
dictate goals, strategy, and tactics which can borrow
from Western student experience only in the broadest
possible terms.
The reaction of Polish youth, as that of intel-
lectuals in general, to the invasion of Czechoslovakia--
and more specifically to Poland's role in the venture--
was one of shame, disgust, and in some cases frustrated
rage. As positive and strong as these emotional reac-
tions were, however, they appear to have been superseded
in most cases by fears of cumulative violence in the
Eastern European area perhaps leading to a world con-
flict. Later, these fears, in turn were displaced by
a shame-laden but apathetic reaction to the event,
especially when it became evident that both, Washington
and Moscow were intent on preventing the Czechoslovak
issue from seriously affecting their long-term rela-
tions.
In some cases, the reaction of Polish youth to
the invasion was similar to the more simplistic view
of average Polish workers and peasants. The lingering
bias of these groups against the Czechoslovaks, whom
they tend to view as "Teutonic Slavs" facilitated an
attitude that the Czechoslovaks had never really ap-
preciated the voracious side of Communism, and that
for the first time in August 1968 they were forced to
face a reality much more familiar to, say, the Poles.
Students and the Educational System
Despite the rapid growth and democratization of
the educational system in interwar Poland, schools
of higher learning before World War II were still
characterized by exclusiveness and overemphasis on
legal and humanistic studies. Interwar Poland,
therefore, had its problems with a qualified, unem-
ployed, and "alienated" intelligentsia long before
the term became popular elsewhere.
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One of the few real achievements of the postwar
Communist regime was the rapid expansion of mass
education. Universities and other schools of higher
learning increased -in number from 32 in 1938 to 76
in 1966 and the student body from under 50,000 to
more than 250,000 over the same period. This virtual
explosion in the numbers of educated youth within
the framework of a system unable and unwilling to
satisfy either their material or spiritual demands
is central to the regime's current: problems.
Children of the workers and the peasantry have
made significant gains in higher education, although
the party continues to decry their relatively low
percentage in the total student body. Only 27 per-
cent of the students are children of workers, and
less than 17 percent are children of peasants. Since
students from these backgrounds apparently were the
least involved in the March disturbances, one of
the regime's current goals is to increase their num-
ber, at the expense of the sons and daughters of the
"affluent" or of middle-class background, who have
been singled out as the ringleaders of the unrest.
Rumors that children of prominent party and
government personnel played key roles in the March
disturbances have been plentiful, although evident
bias on the part of many of the sources of these
rumors casts some doubt on their reliability. The
children of influential Jews, for example, have
been singled out for condemnation by the hard-
line party elements for clear political reasons.
It is true, however, that students of middle class
and intellectual backgrounds did, in fact, play a
central role in the unrest, and they have formed
the majority of those who have been penalized by
the regime.
Repercussions on the educational system of the
student riots and to almost year-long intra-party
crisis that followed. were quick in coming in some
areas and laggard in others. Influential liberal
professors, other academicians, and scores of graduate
assistants were pureed during April of last year, with
less publicized purges continuing up to the present.
Many of those di =missed were Jews. In;tit:utional
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changes have been slower in coming, but piecemeal
legislation affecting higher education has been passed
over the past several months. Its main impact has been
to increase party control over the internal organiza-
tion of universities, in most cases by abolishing the
autonomy of institutional subunits in many university
faculties. For instance, the virtual elimination of
the traditional system of chairs, which permitted pro-
fessors holding these positions significant independence,
has been coupled to other measures that tend to central-
ize control over both faculty staff and curricula.
Organized Student Activity
The regime's main effort to prevent a repetition
of the March 1968 disturbances is likely to center on
propaganda activity by the mass youth organizations.
The largest of these, the 900,000-member Union of
Socialist Youth (ZMS), and the 850,000-member Union
of Rural Youth (ZMW), have long been under the re-
gime's direct control, and their effectiveness has
been hampered by bureaucratic bungling and the un-
responsiveness of the youth. The ZMW caters mainly
to peasant youth in rural areas; while the ZMS has
"academic" branches, its main appeal is to working
youth for whom membership is a means of job advance-
ment. Although the regime has tried to use both
organizations as instruments of indoctrination, in-
ternal stresses and strains have gradually polarized
their memberships into a handful of Communist zealots
on the one hand and a mass of apathetic opportunists
on the other.
Most university students belong to the 145,000-
member Polish Students Association (ZSP), which has
concentrated on catering to their material and recrea-
tional needs and has succeeded in functioning without
undue regime interference. The ZSP appears to be
divided into an officially approved leadership and
a rank-and-file membership which pays little heed to
directives issued from above.
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The ZSP's leadership prides itself on its "cos-
mopolitanism," reflected mainly in the organization's
membership in the Prague-based International Union
of Students (IUS). A ZSP member receives an IUS
identification card when travelling abroad. More
importantly, there appears to be some interchange
between ZSP and IUS leaderships. The present ZSP
chairman, Jerzy Piatkowski--not a student, but a re-
gime-installed leader--previously held the post of
secretary in the IUS. He was replaced in this post
early in 1966 by another ZSP functionary, Wlodzimierz
Konarski.
Most students consider the ZSP, and to a lesser
degree the ZMS, as useful vehicles for contacts among
universities both within Poland and in foreign coun-
tries. Much of the students' more significant politi-
cal activity, however, has taken place on the periphery
of the ZSP--in various "discussion clubs," only a few
of which are sanctioned. The small minority of stu-
dents taking active part in these clubs nevertheless
have proved infectious sources of dissent for the rest
of the student body.
The most active student political groups are
thought to exist at the Universities of Warsaw,
Krakow, Poznan, and Lodz. Although the political
views of student members range from "democratic"
through "revisionist" to various shades of unorthodox
Communism--including idealistic Trotskyism--they
share opposition to various aspects of the present
regime, and concern themselves mainly with discussion
and promotion of political, social, economic, and
philosophical alternatives to the present system.
According to one source, in 1967 there existed
at Warsaw University seven generally "democratic"
groups, two "revisionist," and five "Communist," to-
gether totaling about 500 students. Other groups
have been identified only when the regime broke up
their activity. Among these were a "national-demo-
cratic" group broken up in April 1961, a small al-
legedly pro-Chinese "conspiracy" broken up in late
1964, and a Troyskyite "revisionist" group dissolved
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in 1965. During the student unrest in March of last
year, the regime charged that students belonging to
a "Zionist" group at Warsaw University, the "Babel"
discussion club, were the ringleaders of the unrest
there. It is these leaders who have been prominent
among those singled out for trial this winter.
It is likely that the heavy hand of the regime
has descended on all of these groups, perhaps forcing
them to go underground. There are also hints that
the regime may be planning to expand its previously
sporadic and generally unsuccessful use of officially
sponsored "political discussion clubs" loosely
sponsored by both the ZSP and the ZMS. These clubs
were generally regarded by students either as safety
valves approved by the regime or as centers where
students', political, opinions could be monitored by
the security apparatus.
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SOVIET UNION
Summary
Soviet leaders have, to fudge by their speeches,
worked themselves up into a state of high distress
over what they call "the apolitical attitudes" of
the country's youth. This "political apathy" con-
travenes the ideology of the Soviet regime, which
defines every aspect of life in political terms and
demands the active political support of all members
of society. Moreover, the leadership seems to re-
alize that what they choose to call "apathy" often
represents absorption in less approved concerns,
even with political questions of an unofficial na-
ture.
As best it can be generalized, the attitude
of Soviet youth is expressive of two aspects of its
psychological condition, a mood of political pes-
simism and a preoccupation with personal discovery.
The young suffer from disillusion with the political
regime, despair over the possibility of working ef-
fectively through the political system, and lack of
belief in any alternative to the system and its de-
mands. At the same time, the young have been launched
into a realm of individual discovery of personal
values long repressed and of material comforts and
pleasures long denied. While speaking with a West-
ern journalist in Moscow recently, a young Soviet
intellectual observed that for the past century in
Russia every new generation has interested itself
in something outside of itself: either revolution,
or religion, or some special purity in relationships.
Now, he said, for the first time members of the new
generation, born about 1945, are interested above
all in themselves.
The young in this regard, and also by their
general acceptance of the basic elements of the social
order, represent a force for stability. Interest in
themselves, however, may grow into a desire to have
the concerns of the young recognized within political
councils. In early 1968 some young people
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joined a petition drive--the first organized,
broadly based attempt at political action. There
is little doubt that the young generation would
make itself felt politically if controls were re-
laxed. How long the regime persists in its harsh
enforcement of controls will in large measure de-
termine whether the future holds evolutionary change
or repression and violence.
For most of the young generation of the Soviet
Union today, those roughly between the ages of 15 and
30, politics is keyed to the revelations of Stalin's
crimes in 1956. The message of Khrushchev's "Secret
Speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress affected no
group of Soviet people more than the young. It is
the central cause of their disillusion with the Soviet
regime, their alienation from the generation of their
fathers, and their loss of purpose in national and
world affairs.
Stalin's mystical and terrible image commanded
the allegiance of the people more than could any
ideology or principle itself. Then, in 1956, those
who had written verses in grade school dedicated to
Stalin's "glory" were told at Komsomol and party meet-
ings that they had been duped. The desanctification
of Stalin caused an emotional and political trauma.
A God had slipped out of their universe, and the
question remained: what can be believed?
The question went to the very heart of the re-
gime's legitimacy. Young people wanted to know how
the Communist Party had permitted the sway of such
a tyrant for so many years, whether his tyranny was
not the product of the system rather than of particu-
lar circumstances and an aberrant personality, and
what guarantees there were against a repetition of
such tyranny. Acknowledgement that these doubts per-
sist twelve years after the "Secret Speech" can be
found in the report of First Secretary I.I. Bodyul to
the Plenum of the Moldavian Republic Party's Central
Committee in May 1968. Among a catalogue of prob-
lems concerning ideological work with youth, Bodyul
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noted that an improper attitude of the young toward
authority is compounded by a treatment of the Stalin
question that does not adequately instill respect for
""revolutionary veterans and leaders of our Party and
State." The problem was not helped by the, public
disgrace, including charges of administrative misrule,
subjectivism, and "hare-brained schemes," heaped upon
Khrushchev after his fall. According to its own
history, the Party has been dominated during most of
its years in pcwer by a cunning demon and a willful
bumpkin.
The doubts extend beyond the regime to the ideo-
logical foundations on which it rests. The revela-
tions of evil have undermined the Russians' conception
of themselves as the elect and their belief that they
have a unique mission to remake the world that de-
rive from the Revolution and their Communist scriptures,
as well as from their earlier Slavophile traditions.
Soviet intellectuals under Khrushchev were like
missionaries withcut a mission. Furthermore, it will
be difficult for them, and more so for the younger
generation of intellectuals on whom the main burden
will fall, to re-establish that mission.
The moral problems of guilt and sacrifices with-
out justification have turned the young away from
their elders and in upon themselves. "The campaign
against the cu --t of personality," said one student,
"did more than just unmask a dictator, it unmasked
a whole general-ion." The only heroes that remain
for the young are the survivors of the Siberian prison
camps and a few writers of their grandfathers' genera-
tion. The camps are an obsession with the young. They
collect the songs that have come out of the camps
and their own poetry returns constantly to the sub-
ject. They respect writers such as Boris Pasternak,
Ilya Ehrenburg, and A.T. Tvardovsky, who have dealt
with the moral problems posed by the camps and ques-
tions of individual values and personal responsibility.
While de-Stalinization has been central to the
disillusion of the young generation, other developments
have aided the process. In general, the trend has
been to discredit the official dcology and the pol-
icies that go with it by reveal:-ng the enormous gulf
between theory and reality. The young generation has
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the advantage of a better education and a growing so-
phistication. In 1962 only 29 percent of the popula-
tion in the appropriate age group was enrolled in gen-
eral secondary schools. This percentage rose to 36 per-
cent in 1964, and to an estimated 45 percent in 1966.
Eight years of schooling are now compulsory, and the
regime has the goal of universal 10-year education by
1970. In 1967-68, the total enrollment in higher
educational institutions was 4,311,000--1,887,000 full-
time students, 654,000 in night schools, and 1,770,000
in correspondent courses.
The awareness of the young has also been expanded
by increased contact with the West through the medium of
Eastern Europe and directly through tourists, students and
cultural exchanges, and foreign radio broadcasts. Ac-
cording to figures, the Soviet Union was visited in
1967 by 1,5 million tourists and 189 youth delegations.
Student travelers to the USSR number 180,000 yearly,
and 24,000 foreigners are enrolled in Soviet schools
and colleges. The Soviets claim that 200,000 young
Russians travel abroad every year, presumably for the
most part to Eastern Europe on vacations, in delega-
tions, or with the armed services. Delegation tra-iel
between the Soviet Union and East European countries,
although based on careful selection and a programmed
itinerary, can involve large groups. A Czechoslovak
Cultural Festival traveled to the USSR in the spring
of 1968 reportedly with 500 performers, and appeared
in several important cities; 800 Soviet students went
to Czechoslovakia in June for the Second Festival of
Czech-Soviet Friendship.
Western literary works are translated (in 1966
Ionesco's Rhinoceros and Capote's In Cold Blood, for
example) and reviewed in Innostrannaya Literaturnaya
(Foreign Liberature), a popular publication among
students. Za Rubezhom (Abroad) is a Soviet magazine
that reprints a broad range of articles from the West-
ern press. The choice of Western newspapers on Moscow
nev.-Fstandsis limited to those published by Communist
parties, and many of these disappeared after the in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia. Students seize what is a-
vailable. An American exchange student remarks how
students at Moscow State University used to rush down
in the morning to get the British Communist Party's
The Morning Star, the French Party's L'Fumanite. and
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the Italian Party's L'Unita. They also bought papers
from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. The
Morning Star WEELS the first paper to inform Soviet stu-
dents that Western Communists had condemned the trial
of Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. During the trial,
copies of The Star and L'Humanite were snatched up im-
mediately. The US exchange magazine, Amerika, is popu-
lar with students, but the number of copies put on sale
does not meet the demand.
Most other information from abroad comes by foreign
radiobroadcasts. Jamming of Radio Liberty was extended
to other stations, including the VOA and the BBC, after
the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the stations
still appear to have an influence throughout the terri-
tories and among all the age groups of the Soviet Union.
Nowhere is their influence greater than among students
and intellectuals. Radio Liberty estimated that in 1967
40 percent of its audience in Communist countries was 30
years old or under and that another 28 percent was 31 to
40 years of age. The intelligentsia, including members
of technical, scientific, or cultural professions and
university students, comprised 58 percent of its audience.
Soviet students report that foreign stations provide a
chief source of information on events such as the defec-
tion of Svetlana Alliluyeva, the trial of underground
writers Aleksar.-dr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov, and un-
rest in Eastern Europe.
Attempts to ensure the ideclogical purity and
zeal of this new generation have failed woefully, a
fact attested to by the constant laments of officials.
Some students in secondary schools and universities are
plainly bored with the compulsory courses in ideology
and party history, and with the study sessions on the
same subjects conducted by the student youth organiza-
tion, the Komsomol. There are reports that they converse,
write letters, or sleep during classes, if they go at
all. Excitement comes only when the students take to
baiting the lecturer and to displaying what officials
call their "snorting skepticism." At one institute,
this note was handed to the propagandist presiding over
a dispute on the theme "Communism and I": "I want to in-
terrupt you. Who needs your primitive philosophy inter-
laced with little quotations--your examples so distant
from real life''" Complained one party secretary:
"Today's youth is certainly different from those.. .of
ten or fifteen years back. They have a different level
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of knowledge, a different view of the world. They
don't like trite and outdated forms of political work."
The lack of relevancy to their own lives is the
primary cause of the indifference of youth, whether
workers in factories with incomplete educations or
graduate students at universities, to the doctrinal
lessons of the Party. Belief in the party line is
eroded by its own flip-flops and by a knowledge of al-
ternative interpretations gained through studies or
contact with the outside world. Finally, for the more
sophisticated, it is increasingly clear that Marxism-
Leninism simply cannot answer the changing and com-
plex problems that challenge society in such fields
as economics, science, and sociology.
The political pessimism of the young generation
is fostered also by its exclusion from political
processes. To some extent this is an exclusion tra-
ditional to the authoritarian government that Russia
has-always known. Many, however, had been able to
experience in the early years after the Revolution
a sense of being part of the great enterprises of the
time; such feeling of participation has since been
largely lost.
An American who spent most of the 1930s working
in the Soviet Union at a mill in Magnitogorsk notes
that his fellow workers used to talk of our mill, our
government, and our Party, but now speak only of the
mill, the government, and the Party. In the thirties,
young people could plausibly identify plants as "theirs"
because of the good chance of becoming executives while
still very young. Now the plants are more complicated
and more highly "organized"; controls are more perva-
sive. The same is true of the political institutions,
including the Komsomol. An American describes the
Komsomol of the 1930s as a vigorous organization with
a largely voluntary membership whose activities, particu-
larly at the factory level, were supported by large
numbers of young people. There was an esprit de corps,
a feeling of belonging to the elite. There was some
spontaneity and not a little enthusiasm in the organiza-
tion and its activities, even though everyone knew
that the Komsomol was run by the Party.
Mass membership and stultifying bureaucratic control
have ktlled off these feelings, and the enthusiasm of
the few has been replaced by the apathy of the many.
The Komsomol has some 23 million members, including most
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urban youths between the ages of 1.4 and 25, all those
enrolled in school at those ages, and 80% of the army
conscripts. In official eyes the purposes of the Kom-
somol are to monopolize the field and -Prevent any other
spontaneous youth organizations from springing up, to
organize youth for "voluntary" participation in con-
struction jobs in remote areas of the country as well
as production caripaigns nearer hoc.e, and to cajole,
inspire, persuade, or force Soviet. youth into absorb-
ing Marxism-Leninism and becoming loyal servants of
the Party. A huge bureaucracy, including many paid
functionaries, has grown up to enforce the Komsomol's
program. Leadership in the Komsomol appeals mostly
to the very naive or to the would-be party careerists.
Most young people keep their distance from those who
take these posit:.ons, and they especially despise
the druzhinniki, the volunteer auxiliary police, whose
duty is to maintain a "revolutionary" discipline among
the young and to fiqht against Western cultural influ-
ences.
The young fully understand the power of the author-
ities and their own helplessness. Innocent attempts to
form groups outs-.de the control of the party as well as
more purposeful attempts to demonstrate or petition
authorities are quickly suppressed and have
disastrous results for those involved. Simple dis-
missal from a un:_versity, for example, can mean banish-
ment from cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, and
the loss of any chance for more than a work-a-day
career. Outward conformity is thus the rule. More-
over, it is the response encouraged by the entire
educational system, which is based on theories that
stress the importance of the conscious in human con-
trol and the ability to manipulate it ;chile scoffing
at the subjective aspects of human behavior.
In short, ii: is precisely this emphasis on the
political (and political sanctions) and the state's
monopoly on the exercise of political power that has
caused the young to turn their backs on official pol-
itics. Common responses by young people to questions
of national or foreign policy are, "That's a political
question," and `Yh,3i will decide it." Most of all
they wish to be Left alone, free t:o occupy themselves
in activities of personal interest and to have pol-
itics intrude as little as possib_e.
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Finally, the political pessimism of youth is in-
duced by the absence, in their opinion, of any attrac-
tive alternative to the present social order. If the
regime has not been able to rear a generation full of
ideological fervor and the conviction that they live
in the best of all possible worlds, it has accomplished
something equally, if not more, important to the
stability of society--the rearing of a generation
that does not seriously question the basic elements
of the social system. There seems to be no signifi-
cant body of opinion among the young that would
favor scrapping collectivized farming, the de-na-
tionalization of industry, alteration of the wel-
fare state, political independence for the nation-
alities, or, even, an end to generally centralized
and authoritarian government.
There is a relationship between boredom and ac-
ceptance in the attitudes of youth toward the govern-
ment and its policies. When an American exchange
student remarked to a Soviet friend how little Pravda
was read by students at Moscow University, he was
warned not to leap to the wrong conclusions. "Pravda
is a dull, pompous paper full of propaganda," said
his friend, "and you must read our more serious
journals to get a more objective view. But that
doesn't mean that Soviet people don't believe a
lot of what's printed in Pravda. They simply don't
like to wade through all of it every day. It's as
if you had to read a Fourth of July oration every
morning. You'd be bored, but you'd accept most
of it."
The young do not want to have anything to do
with capitalism, despite all that attracts them about
the West. Although well aware of the high standard
of living of the American worker, they are con-
vinced that Soviet workers enjoy, for example, better
and fairer medical care through their state health
service. Although they will admit that full employ-
ment in the Soviet Union is achieved in many in-
stances by underemployment, they believe that this
is better than no employment at all for a segment of
the population. Students cannot conceive of the
private or otherwise haphazard means that an Ameri-
can must employ to finance his college education.
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In thinking about an alternative to basic ele-
ments of the social order, the Soviet youth is ham-
pered, of course, by inhibitions in his mental proc-
ess, by unfamiliarity with modern developments in the
disciplines of political, social, and economic sci-
ences, and by ignorance of real conditions in the rest
of the world. The catechism taught in the school does
not encourage creative thinking along political lines,
the social science disciplines remain at a woefully
primitive level by Western standards, and the many bar-
riers maintained against the flow of information
from the West obscure a person's vision. Thus, a
student may mock his "choice" when it comes time to
vote in an election. But when he replies to a question
by an American about the two-party system with the ob-
servation that the system is meaningless in the US
because both parties represent the ruling class and that
it would be purposeless in the USSR because one party
already stands for all that could be desired, he is,
in addition to repeating the party line, probably also
presenting the only understanding that he has of the
subject.
Whether it derives from indoctrination, moderate
satisfaction, or ignorance, the acceptance by the cur-
rent youthful generation of the basic elements of So-
viet society has profound implications for the future,
far more so than the generation's present disaffection
from political processes to which it contributes. It
indicates that whatever political turmoil arises from
this generation 1l7il1 be directed at modifying the
system and will not be an attack on its essential
features.
,1wa_:eninq Interests
In frustrat=_on over political. issues, the young
have tended to w-.thdraw into more personal worlds. This
flight has been encouraged by the lifting of Stalinism
and the consequent awakening of concerns long repressed
in Soviet life. The "socialist morality" of their
parents discredited, the students have undertaken a
search for more personal, humanistic ethics. The
fact that their parents made enormous sacrifices,
often to no good end, has engendered among youth no
gratefulness or desire of imitation, but, rather, an
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insistence that a better and more just life must be
had in the here and now even at the cost of ignoring
ideology and distant goals.
Rare is a young Soviet who accepts his low posi-
tion in society, who is not trying his desperate best
to struggle up the stairs. There is often acute em-
barrassment among the lower classes over their humble
status. The young display an aversion to physical
labor and have a clear idea of what constitutes "dirty
work." A 25-year-old worker, in his fifth year of
correspondence courses at a technical institute, bluntly
admitted: "I am studying only because I don't want to
be walking around in dirt and swinging a sledge hammer
forever.... I am tired of being shoved around, of
being assigned dirty work. So much easier to command
others." "To know how to live" (umet' zhit', a favorite
expression of Soviet citizens "on the make") means to
achieve status, a comfortable home, a car, and other
tangible symbols.
The results of this attitude are the flight of
young people from the farms; conniving to be allowed
to live in the major urban centers, especially Mowcow;
fierce competition for admission to universities,
especially those of great prestige; and widespread
study in technical schools, by correspondence or on
a part-time basis if necessary. These efforts, whether
undertaken by workers in the factory or graduate stu-
dents at the university, are directed toward achieving
competence in science or engineering, fields that
offer the greatest prestige, remuneration, and freedom
from politics on the job. To the extent that mobility
remains possible, the competition is open and just,
and talent and work receive their reward, this "rat
race" effectively channels the energies of the young
and, to a considerable extent, satisfies their ambi-
tions.
Frustrations arise, however, because of several
flaws in the system. Entrance into institutions of
higher education is a highly competitive process.
In 1965 there were vacancies in higher educational
institutions for 20 percent of the appropriate age group
in the Soviet Union (39 percent in the US, 14 percent in
France, 7 percent in Denmark, and 7 percent in West Ger-
many). For some of the more prestigious Soviet institu-
tions there were as many as 26 applicants for one vacancy.
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The competition as intensified by the popularity of
certain courses, and many applicants have to accept
positions in the social sciences, or, worst of all,
in agricultural sciences. In addition, the fair-
ness of the compcti}ion is undermined by the influ-
ence the party, covernment, and intellectual elite
are able to wield on behalf of their children. The
situation is the subject of many complaints and the
cause of much bitterness.
Even for those who are admitted to the university
and are awarded diploma, happiness does not neces-
sarily follow. There is a general dislike of the
three years compulsory service that awaits every
graduate of an institute of higher education. Often
the assignments take students out into the provinces
and involve work which they feel is inappropriate to
their training. There is universal conniving by
students and their parents to avoid the worst hazards
of the system. Those who graduate in the less fav-
ored fields find that their pay is low and prospects
for raises unpromising. Even engineers complain that
their superiors assign them to dirty work in the plant
instead of the administrative or research work in
clean offices they think they deserve.
Many, of course, are excluded from higher edu-
cation by their lack of talents, ambition, or "pull."
Those who must work find themselves bored with dull
jobs in the factories without recreational facilities
and amusements after work. These young people soon
begin to contribute to the drunkenness and hooli-
ganism that plagues the regime. A growing number of
youths from better families do not have to work and
can live off the affluence of their parents. These
the regime rails against as "idlers," and they are
apparently another source of crime and unapproved
behavior.
Beyond their preoccupation with material wants
and career advancement, Soviet youth are Involved
with the rediscovery of themselves as individuals.
Throughout society, but most strongly among the
youth, there is a growing and self:-conscious return
of the repressed--a rediscovery of. the personality
denied during the long night of Stalinism. The
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values of individualism, of questioning, of the re-
ligious spirit, of the ethical personality, of
human relationships transcending party comradeship
are returning to the Soviet psyche.
Youth's fascination with things Western--clothes,
gadgets, music, slang--and their attempts to imitate
Western styles are apparent efforts to break out of
the impersonal mold decreed by the authorities and
to assert their individuality. They appear to be
trying to create something of a youth culture simi-
lar to those that adorn Western societies, but which
has been long impeded in the USSR by the Party's con-
trol over youth organizations and dictation of be-
havior. Similar urgings probably account for the
popularity of the poll or questionnaire which is
enjoying great vogue in the pages of Komsomolskaya
Pravda. The polls offer anonymity and an opportunity
to speak one's mind not available at official gather-
ings, where conformity is the rule.
The concerns of youth are reflected by their
cultural tastes. Two of the most talked about re-
cent films at the universities were Twelve Angry Men
and Inherit the Wind, in which the individual was
shown in conflict with the collectivity, and in
which the collectivity turned out to have been wrong.
"Surprisingly, the most popular and respected writer
among the general public is Somerset Maugham," notes
the radical Yugoslav writer, Mihajlo Mihajlov. Above
all, the Soviet reader finds himself fascinated by
such of Maugham's heroes as Strickland in The Moon
and Sixpence, who forsakes bourgeois society for
the "heavenly beauty" of Tahiti, "still yet un-
trampled by the iron heel of civilization." An Amer-
ican professor who spent some time at a leading
Soviet university noted that Salinger was popular
and that in the fall of 1964 everybody suddenly dis-
covered Kafka, whose works had been banned until
the early 1960's. It was too early, however, for
students to grasp all the implications of the worlds
of Salinger and Kafka in terms of their own so-
ciety. Nikolai Berdyaev and Mikhail Bulgakov
(Master and Margarita) are the most popular Russian
authors. Bulqakov, a brilliant playwright and novelist
of the 20's and 30's, died in disgrace in 1940. Some
of his works were finally revived in 1966. There is
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a crush to get into lectures on Bulgakov, whose
biting satire, flights of the absurd, and Stalin
parodies are widely appreciated. The popularity
of Berdyaev (1174-1948) , one of the foremost rep-
resentatives of "Christian existentialism," and
of his message concerning the world of the spirit
and the creativity of the individual indicates
the survival of religious values,
One of the most striking failures cf the re-
gime has been its inability to instill l a fighting
atheism among youth. Atheism is a satisfying creed
so long as one is fighting Z 'in fame, an oppressive
clerical. organization, But when Z'zrz fame is gone,
and one simply has one's irreligion to live by, a
certain disaffection arises with atheism, along with
a distaste for its dogmatism. The result. is an evo-
lution toward ca kind of religious agnosticism. There
are reports of growing numbers of young people at-
tending religious services,, apparently more out of
curiosity and for the atmosphere than out of belief.
At the same time students do admit to their own or
their friends' religious beliefs. Religious urgings
are felt perhaps more strongly among the working
class. The Baptists have gained since the end of
the Second World War.
Much of the interest in religion stems from
a potent nationalism not connected WLth the Soviet
experience? Arlong Russian youths such nationalism
expresses itse:_f in a fascination with prerevolu-
tionary Russian history and culture, A citizens'
group devoted to restoring architectural monuments
of old Russia received publicity in iomsomoZskaya
Pravda during ..965. Youths from all over the Russian
Republic:; in a rare example of voluntary endeavor,
enlisted in projects to restore and preserve old
churches. The Party seems to have been taken aback
by the mass appeal of the movement.. for it quickly
subsided,, suggesting official dispLeasure-
Nationalistic feelings are evident among most
of the minority groups of. the USSR: Here however,
they take on a more serious anti-Russian character.
Non-Russian youths, like their Russian counterparts,
are annoyed by the bureaucratic control imposed on
every aspect o:1 their lives. But precisely because
this control comes from Moscow, they resent it all
the more and speak of it as Russian-made, In
Soviet union 14
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Georgia a graduate student and a young playwright,
angered by'their inability to obtain Moscow's ap-
proval for a subscription to the London Times, com-
plained: "Why should Moscow decide everyth ni g?" and
"These Russians are impossible. They want everybody
to be like them and what Georgian wants to be like
a Russian?" Greater bitterness is engendered by
Moscow's official policy of Russification. Pamphlets
and leaflets circulate in the Ukraine filled with
hostility over the educational and job favoritism
shown Russians and the discrimination against the
Ukrainian language enforced in the fields of educa-
tion, publication, and official usage.
Among the cultural intelligentsia of the na-
tionalities, the struggle to transcend the con-
fines of "socialist realism" dictated by the Party
is combined with an effort to play up the national
heritage and patriotic feelings, which results in
both an anti-Soviet and an anti-Russian literature.
Champions of this cause in the Ukraine during the
early 1960's were a group of young poets, prose
writers, and literary critics who became well known
as the shestydesyatnyky, The Men of the Sixties. The
mood of protest is also apparent in demonstrations
that frequently occur on the birthday of Taras
Shevchenko, a nineteenth century national hero in
the Ukraine.
Soviet youth have elaborated no well-defined
philosophy behind which they can rally a majority
of their numbers Their opinions, however, contain
common elements which suggest a basic similarity of
outlook. An American exchange student came to the
conclusion that the majority wanted "a more humane,
more democratic, more efficient Communism, which
would live up to its own promises, obey its own
strictures, and abide by its own constitution."
The suggestion that there should be more than one
party, made to a Communist official at a Moscow
University meeting, startled students in the audi-
ence who replied. "Dont ask ridiculous questions.
Don't be naive," The American student found that
Kosygin is particularly respected because of his
frankness in admitting the need for economic
Soviet Union - 15
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reforms and his, caution in predicting future
achievements--in contrast to Khrushchev.
The outlock of students varies, of course, most
generally in accordance with field of study and
geographic location. Progressives are more prev-
alent in the physical and mathematical sciences,
which admit the brighter individuals and offer
greater freedom of inquiry. Progressives may also
be found in some of the humanities and in recently
rejuvenated sciences, such as sociology, cybernetics,
mathematical logic, and genetics. In general, the
youth one meets in the provinces are more conserva-
tive and cautious than those in Moscow and Leningrad,
while the Komsomol activists are more strident and
dogmatic. Scientific universities and institutes
at such provincial cities as Novosibirsk and Dubna,
however, are centers of more liberal thinking. Rad-
icalism at Kiev, Lvov, Tallinn, Tbilisi, and Yere-
van is linked tD nationalism.
Any attempts by the young to influence govern-
ment policy are hampered not only by the vagueness of
their political concepts, but also by their lack of
organization, leadership, and plan of action. Re-
ports of clandestine organizations, whether devoted
to the study of Berdyaev or to terrorist activity,
indicate that they are easily broken up by authori-
ties before the', can achieve much even organization-
ally.
Perhaps the most successful sustained activity
conducted without official sanction has been the
underground circulation of unpublished literary
works and polit_cal tracts. For years such materi-
als, written by prominent intellectual figures as
well as by budd__ng artists, have been passed around
and recopied individually or gathered together and
printed in various underground magazines. The
magazines appear to be the product of loosely knit
groups of young nonconformist intellectuals such
as the well publicized SMOG group in Moscow. (The
initials in Russian stand for "courage, youth,
form, depth.") Official crackdowns on traffickers
in this trade have failed to stop it. The American
exchange student. said "everybody" at Moscow Uni-
versity reads the underground literature, although
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he knew of no one who would acknowledge membership
in any underground group such as SMOG. It may be as-
sumed that this traffic, by providing a means of com-
munication and a common enterprise, helps to foster a
feeling of community among the young of nonconformist
leanings.
In some ways it was out of this situation that
an open and, by Soviet standards, widely supported
confrontation between young people and the authori-
ties developed during the past year. The widely re-
ported trials of the past three years have been
conducted against writers connected with the literary
underground who sent materials abroad for publica-
tion: Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel in 1966 and
Aleksandr Ginsburg and Yury Galanskov in 1968. The
first trial aroused general disapproval among the
young, but no unified response. By the time of
the second trial in January 1968, however, a form
of protest was being elaborated and was gaining
wide support. Its substance was a protest against
the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the pro-
ceedings and a warning of the dangers of a return
to Stalinism. Petitions were sent to government
and party officials and passed to the West for
publicity. The movement seems to have developed
out of the trial in August 1967 of a demonstration
leader, Vladimir Bukovsky, who pleaded the consti-
tutional right to demonstrate and to criticize the
government. Before the trial in January, some prom-
inent intellectuals circulated a petition calling for
open and legal proceedings, and at the trial a few
perennial agitators audaciously distributed ringing
declarations to the Western newsmen.
Within two months after the trial at least 17
documents had reached the West containing the names
of over 300 signers. At least 10 of the signers
were intellectuals of national stature whose names
would be recognized at once by the man in the street.
Another twenty or more would probably be recognized
by other intellectuals. Otherwise, large numbers of
the signers were students and young teachers, research-
ers, and engineers. The majority were from Moscow,
but Leningrad, Magadan, Kharkov, Dubna, and Novosi-
birsk were also represented. An appeal on behalf
of the rights of man was presented to the Budapest
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consultative conference of Communist parties in
February.
The petition episode indicated the willing-
ness of youth -zo enter political battle. For the
first time an open, spontaneous movement was able
to attract support among various elements of youth
and the intelligentsia and to gain a life and momen-
tum of its own. Motivation came not so much out
of sympathy for the accused as out of an emotional
reaction to the repressive turn of government pol-
icy and to the specter of Stalinism reborn. De-
mands and tact:.cs were elaborated that could unite
many groups and that seemed to have some chance
of success in :.nfluencing the political powers.
Regime's Response
The latest demonstration of official concern
over the state of Soviet youth was the creation in
December 1968 of standing commissions on youth af-
fairs in both houses of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
The commissions will be involved in drafting legis-
lation on the education, vocational training, work,
and recreation of young people.
By Western standards, it is difficult to ex-
plain the regime's anxiety over the current activi-
ties of Soviet youth. The distress is apparently
a measure of what the regime thinks it owes to
ideology as a justification of its rule. Implicit
in the indifference and personal preoccupations of
youth is a protest against the official order. The
regime seems tc fear that even the small, demands
for change that may arise out of such attitudes will
work in the long run to undermine the fundamentals
of the system and the prophecy of its doctrine. A
totalitarian system regards any erosion, however
small, as being of cosmic significance. Further-
more, Communists, always future-minded, are deter-
mined not to leave the development of their doctrine
either to chance or to objective laws. Important,
finally, is the character of the collective lead-
ership that now rules in the Kremlin and the con-
servative bent of their personalities. At any
rate, the regime has not hesitated to answer the
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smallest fault that it detects in the younger
generation with more ideological indoctrination
and more police control.
One official explanation for the shortcomings
of youth argues that, because they have not suf-
fered the hardships and struggles of past genera-
tions, they are not sufficiently appreciative of
past achievements of the Soviet Union and have
unwarranted expectations for the present and future.
This official analysis lies behind the patriotic
campaign launched in 1965 and directed specifically
to the Soviet period of history. During the
year 10 million youngsters allegedly visited bat-
tlefields, talked with old Bolsheviks and war heroes,
and gathered materials for local patriotic museums.
In August 1966, thousands of youngsters marched in
Moscow with World War II weapons to climax the af-
fair. The theme was, nevertheless, continued in
saturation portions during the fiftieth anniversary
celebrations of the Revolution in 1967 and of the
Komsomol in 1968.
A series of measures has been taken since 1965
to improve the ideological training of the young.
The role of the Komsomol has been expanded and re-
peatedly underlined in official pronouncements. In
1966 the entire system of ideological instruction in
Marxism-Leninism was revised to put more stress on
reading the "classics" rather than secondary sources.
There is growing emphasis in military training on
improving political discipline and attitudes. A new
military law that went into effect in January 1968
makes premilitary training compulsory for all Soviet
males under the age of 18 and, by shortening the
length of military service, assures that nearly all
young men will experience the ideological benefits
of service in the armed forces.
Most recently, apparently under the influence
of events in Eastern Europe, the role of the West in
subverting Soviet youths has received special atten-
tion. Official pronouncements have named the young
and politically immature as the special target of
Western propaganda and have complained of Western
attempts to split the generations by theories that
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replace the class struggle with the struggle between
generations. The efforts to promote ideological pur-
ity and to root out any bourgeois tendencies were
focused on the young in a series of nationwide youth
and teachers' meetings during the spring of 1968, after
the Central. Committee plenum decreed an ideological
crackdown in April.
Where preaching has not been successful, the
regime has not hesitated to employ the police. In
July 1966 the internal police administration was re-
centralized in a new national Ministry for the Pre-
servation of Public Order (MOOD) to deal inter alia
with the problem of hooliganism. The same decree also
strengthened the hand of the police in dealing with
youthful criminals and specified harsher penalties
for common crimes such as disturbing the peace and
assault. Simultaneously, pressure was brought to
bear through the press against those factories, farms,
and other institutions which seek to protect members
of their collectives who have :=alien afoul of the law,
and judges were urged to levy sterner sentences in
cases of hooliganism. In November 1968, MOOP was re-
named the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), a title
that recalls Stalinist repression, and additional
measures were announced to strengthen the police forces
Dissidents of a more intellectual cast have suf-
fered a series of trials and sentences to prison camps.
Over twenty Uk:raini~zn intellectuals were tried in
various cities ueginning in 1965. Their activities
apparently involved the circulation of underground
literature and materials that branded them as na-
tionalists in the eyes of the authorities. Censor-
ship has been applied with an increasingly heavy
hand since the ouster of Khrushchev and has been
backed up by ?rosecution of writers who circulated
materials surreptitiously or passed them to the West.
Protests over these proceedings have been met by of-
ficial demands for recantations, denial of privileges
such as trips to the US and showings of modern art,
and dismissal from professional and Party positions.
Authorities, finally, have sought to limit con-
tact between Soviet citizens and foreigners. The
vigilance campaign has stressed that all visitors
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CROWD AWAITS VERDICT ON DEMONSTRATORS AGAINST
INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, OCTOBER 1968
from the West are potential spies and subversives.
Newsmen from Communist and non-Communist countries
were warned in early 1968 against unauthorized con-
tacts with Soviet citizens. Similar warnings to
Soviet citizens have practically dried up the Ameri-
can Embassy's contacts with young intellectuals. A
Polish cultural counselor in Moscow has complained
that relations between Poland and the USSR in the
fields of music, sculpture, and the theater have
dwindled to almost nothing.
Two things may be noted concerning the tactics
of repression: they are aimed across the board at
intelligentsia, young and old, and they are designed
to keep the symbols involved smaller than the message
conveyed. These characteristics are well illustrated
by the case of Ginsburg and Galanskov. The regime
chose to move against younger dissidents, of little
prominence, involved in the not entirely honorable
business of smuggling written material to the West,
on charges of subversive activities in collusion with
an "enemy" emigre organization. All these factors
limited the appeal of their case among the population
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at large. Protests were nevertheless heard, but they
were confined to questions of legal, procedures. The
trial, however, was understood by all segments of
the intelligentsia as a signal to maintain strict
discipline in their own profession or activity. The
regime did not hesitate to react to the protests,
and, according to reports, did so most swiftly and
severely against the prominent signers of the peti-
tions. What punishment, if any, was suffered by the
students and young professional people is not known
but, after witnessing the submission of their better
established elders to the administrative rod, little
was probably needed. It is evident that students are
the target, net of a particular policy of repression,
but of a general policy. While this fact works to
unite the generations of intellectuals and youths,
so far this has been a unity in weakness. There has
been no repetition of students assaulting authority
in the streets while professors in the conference
room stay the hand of authorities, such as occurs in
other countries, both Communist and non-Communist.
The authorities' hand will not be stayed.
By April 1968 the petition offensive had halted.
With the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the
completeness of the rout of the dissenters became more
clear. In a sense the invasion was the sort of ulti-
mate consequence that the narrower and legalistic pro-
tests had bee:z designed to forestall. In the face of
this actuality, the majority have stuck to silence.
Two of the best known leaders of previous protests,
Pavel Litvinov, grandson of Stalin's foreign minister,
and Larisa Daniel, former wife of Yuly Daniel, organized
a small demonstration against the invasion on Red Square
on 25 August. They were promptly arrested and in Octo-
ber sentenced to exile. While the trial was occasioned
by outspoken denunciations and political arguments on
the street outside the court, little attempt was made
to put objections on paper for the record. At this
point the dis:3affected, young and old, seem to be over-
come by the realization of the futility of their ef-
forts and fear of the penalties that their continua-
tion will likely provoke.
Prospects
As a whole, the young generation in the Soviet
Union is not out to force sweeping changes in the
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Soviet system. This does not mean that they are
pillars of the status quo or that the modifications
they may encourage will not in the long run produce
some fundamental changes. But their role will likely
be an evolutionary one--one of reform, rather than
revolution.
Pressure is building, however, to carry this
role onto the political stage. This is a natural
consequence of the conditions, the disillusionment
with the political regime and its ideology and the
development of personal ethics and concerns, that led
originally to a withdrawal to the wings. Organized
political activity on the part of the young, as the
petition drive has demonstrated, is showing its first
stirrings. Its realization is obstructed now only
by the repressive power of the regime. Political
action by the young, therefore, will have to wait
until there is either a change in regime policies,
the appearance of a faction within the leadership
willing to champion the cause of the young, or a
weakening of governmental authority until it can no
longer hold off the young.
The likelihood of such transformations occur-
ring behind the Kremlin Wall is a matter of specula-
tion. The regime, however, is running some definite
risks by its current heavy-handed exercise of power.
Compromise with the young generation and their as-
similation into the power structure becomes !r!ore
difficult. There is the danger than under present
conditions pressures may build and antagonisms may
fester to the point where they may carry the ranks of
youth to extremes of action far beyond their essen-
tially conservative concepts. The current leader-
ship's policy of retrenchment, following a period of
compromise and hope, has already sharpened the urgency
felt by many for guarantees and reforms. It is also
encouraging the use of demonstrations and broadsides
to attain these ends.
Soviet Union - 23
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SPAIN
Summary
Student demonstrations began over a decade ago
in an effort to gain recognition for autonomous stu-
dent organizations to replace the government-con-
trolled student syndicate and to promote university
reforms. During the 1967-1968 academic year, the
demonstrations took a political turn when protests
against the Franco regime itself were added. The
government reacted by closing the universities in-
volved for varying periods, arresting students, and
using the police to put down the demonstrations.
Police violence, however, only led to usually apa-
thetic students joining the demonstrations. The
threat of loss of academic credits if the university
remained closed temporarily cooled the students'
enthusiasm, but after new demonstrations.'in Jan-
uary 1969, the government closed indefinitely the
universities of Madrid and Barcelona and declared a
state of emergency to give police added power to
head off rising student and political unrest. Now
confident that it can put down any future demonstra-
tions, the government plans to reopen the univer-
sities soon.
Background
The current unrest in Spanish universities goes
back more than a decade when students began to agi-
tate for reforms in the official student organiza-
tion and then for organizations of their own. By
1963 the movement to break away from the constric-
tions of the official student syndicate was well
under way. Illegal student organizations of various
political colorations were formed, and student dem-
onstrations and strikes were conducted. The regime
responded by imposing academic sanctions and by some
use of the armed police.
In 1965 the government transferred disciplinary
control of the University of Madrid from the Minis-
try of Education to the Ministry of the Interior.
The expulsion of four professors for taking part in
a student demonstration, the closing of some schools,
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the occasional use of military courts to try arrested
students, generally stiff civil penalties, and the
regime's obvious unwillingness to meet all but mini-
mal student requests slowly opened the way for the
student protests to take on political ramifications.
Antiregime attacks, especially in the more important
universities in Madrid and Barcelona, followed.
In 1967-1968, demonstrations, now supported by
growing numbers of students, perhaps sometimes as
many as one thousand, were prolonged and intensified
by the brutal tactics of the police, especially in
Madrid and Barcelona. The students shouted anti-
Franco slogans, and a bust of Franco was defiled. The
demonstrations became so
violent that the government
closed the University of
Madrid several times, and
various university officials
resigned in protest over
police tactics. Barcelona
had similar demonstrations,
and the eleven other major
universities had protests
also, although on a lesser
scale.
Finally a new minister
of education was appointed
in April 1968, and an agree-
ment was worked out to keep
the police off the campus
unless summonec.. These re-
forms, however, were not
enough. Student demonstra-
tions began ag&in in Decem-
ber over dissatisfaction
with the university author-
ities, the government, and
the police. Fearing an in-
crease in violence, in Janu-
ary the authorities closed in-
definitely the universities STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, UNIVERSITY
OF BARCELONA, DECEMBER 1968
Spain - 2
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of Madrid and Barcelona. The government also pro-
claimed a state of emergency, suspending certain
civil rights in order to permit the police more
easily to control student and political discontent.
Some students were among the approximately 1,000
persons arrested, and many were later released.
But about 35 individuals, including at least 17 in-
tellectuals and professors, were deported to remote
Spanish provinces for the duration of the state of
emergency.
Government sources said that the authorities
wanted to avoid a crisis such as occurred in France
last May. The universities, the government announced,
would reopen in a few days but no new efforts to cause
disorder and revolution would be tolerated. A govern-
ment white paper on university reform was also prom-
ised soon.
Objectives
In addition to free student associations, the
students want university reforms to correct the prob-
lems of overcrowde( : classrooms, the system of life-
tenure chairs fille r)y professors who are rarely
seen by their students, lack of a student voice in
their own university councils, and too little stu-
dent-professor contact. On the international level,
students have protested the presence of US military
bases in Spain and the US role in the Vietnam war.
The students are not seeking power. for themselves,
but do hope to help bring about radical change and,
in some instances, the destruction of existing prac-
tices.
Groups Involved
The old picture of the average university stu
dent as an apathetic individual who takes to the
streets only when urged on by a tiny minority of
activists is being modified. The regime's recalci-
trance and repression have brought a growing realiza-
tion that a considerable number of students are de-
manding reforms. In the last few years, activists
have appeared from extreme right-wing groups, moder-
ate, democratically oriented groups, Social Christ-
ian groups, Social Democrats, Socialists, Marxists,
Spain - 3
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Communists of all persuasions, and anarchists. Al-
though official Spanish sources maintain that at the
University of Madrid, for example, only about 200
students form the nucleus of the troublemakers,
many more students have appeared willing to join the
demonstrations.
international organization does not play an
active part in Spanish student outbursts, but a
sense of fraternity with rebellious students else-
where in Europe is growing and contacts with French
students have been made. These links are giving
concern to the Spanish Government, which has taken
step-s to monitor and limit contacts. So far there
has been very little cooperation between student and
labor organizations. The fact that most university
students are from the upper classes has made dif-
ficult the establishment of close relations with the
workers.
Government Reforms
In May 1968, the government approved a decree
aimed at urgent reform of the university structure.
Key measures include the creation of new universities
in Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao, new polytechnic
centers in Barcelona and Valencia., and new schools
in several other universities. New facilities, addi-
tional professors, and scholarships were announced,
and limited student associations are to be permitted.
Prospects
Given the rapid politicization of students, the
moves toward university reform may have come too
late to prevent further trouble. Several years may
well elapse before any meaningful progress toward
meeting the problems of students can be made. Thus
the chances of renewed student unrest are high. But
the regime's readiness to use extreme measures to
control the situation may reduce the level of overt
student demonstrations.
Spain - 4
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TURKEY
Summary
Youth became a potent force in the last days of
the Ottoman Empire and reached their zenith during
April 1960 in the antigovernment demonstrations
that opened the way for the military revolution the
next month. Turkish youth are well-organized, al-
though not united, and have a high degree of political
awareness. They have repeatedly demonstrated a will-
ingness to take their cause--whether local, national,
or international--into the streets.
In general, the young intellectual elite is sanc-
tioned through government subsidization and is conse-
quently subject to a degree of government control.
Politicians of both the left and right, of both govern-
ment and the opposition, and incipient subversive
elements all make overtures to the "Young Turks" in
the hope of attracting their support.
Nature and Scope of Youth Activism in Turkey
For nearly four decades--1923 to 1960--the Republic
of Turkey maintained its independence under relatively
stable civilian government and also moved constructively,
if somewhat sporadically, in the direction of economic,
social, and political modernization. There were no coups
d'etat and only one major domestic eruption--the anti-Greek
riots in Istanbul in 1955, which were apparently govern-
ment inspired and, at least in part, government engineered.
The students ~pe_r se were not a major factor, but the youth
certainly played 'an important role before the rabble took
over and armored military units were required to restore
order. But this event, which virtually all Turks regard
as a blemish on Turkish history, was an exception.
Nonetheless, Turkish youth frequently have been
an element of dissidence. They have used public ral-
lies--usually at Taksim Square in the center of Is-
tanbul or at Kizilay Square in Ankara--and- fiery
speeches, followed by attempted marches on the centers
of government or to embassies and consulates, to make
known their grievances. Placing a black wreath at some
strategic location, as at the Ataturk monument in Taksim
Square, is often a symbol of opposition. This tactic has
been used in recent years by leftist students to protest
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visits of units of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Leftist
groups opposing NATO or the U.S. presence in Turkey
often are countered by rightist student demonstra-'
tions--sometimes leading to clashes and police inter-
vention.
Recent grievances have included the Cyprus
amnesty for political prisoners from the 1960 revolu-
tion, Turkey's membership in NATO, labor troubles
at American installations, and close ties with the
United States. Except for antigovernment demon-
strations during the last days of the Menderes
administration, the student organizations generally
have remained aloof from strictly domestic politics.
Individual stuc.ent leaders allegedly have been
linked from time to time with subversives, but
the student movement as such has not been involved.
The students are generally agreed on the need
for extensive educational reform. Even Prime
Minister Demirel has publicly acknowledged the need
for extensive changes in the educational system,
especially at the college and university level.
University Conditions
The quality and, indeed, the quantity of
institutions of higher learning, especially the
universities, have failed to keep pace with the
demands of a rapidly changing society, particularly
since the end of World War II. These changes
have included rapid population growth, increasing
contacts with foreign countries, extensive foreign
economic input which has brought the economy al-
most to the "take-off point," the spread of literacy
and urbanization, and the growth of the middle and
working classes. A social-cultural lag has
led to tensions among all elements of society but
especially among the youth. These tensions are
aggravated by the growing disparity between the
need of a rapidly developing society for highly
trained manpower, and the limited number of qual-
ified graduate, from schools, colleges, and univer-
sities. Another source of tension is the limited
number of universities and technical colleges avail-
able to the swelling ranks of lycee graduates.
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In recent years only about one third of the qualified
lycee graduates have been able to enter college
or the universities. Other student grievances,
some of which surfaced in the June 1966 student
boycott and sit-in, have been the badly overweighted
pupil-teacher ratio (many university lecture classes
have over 1,000 students, many regular classes
have 50 students, some laboratory classes have
as many as six working together on the same experiment)
overcrowded classrooms; lack of text books, stereo-
typed lectures, poor testing programs, virtually
no chance for personal attention by members of the
faculty, accompanied by a serious "brain-drain" of
those students who graduate.
It is estimated that out of a total of some
12,300 medical doctors trained in Turkey, 2,250
are working or studying abroad. About 500
engineers, architects, and scientists are believed
to have left Turkey for more promising prospects.
Despite the great need for trained specialists
there is also a lack of flexibility and receptive-
ness on the part of the universities toward students
who have graduated from foreign schools.
It is difficult to gain admission to a Turkish
university because of space, quotas, entrance ex-
aminations, and lack of housing. Once admitted,
the chances of graduating are slim. A study of
Istanbul University between 1957 and 1963 revealed
that the percentage of graduating students never
was higher than 28 percent and has been as low
as 11 percent.
While the students, and would-be students,
contend that reforms are necessary, university
professors and administrators insist that the
institutions long-standing ills can only be cured
by cutting down on the number of students, and by
insisting on higher levels of performance.
This year students representing practically
every university and school of higher education
struck for two weeks to protest the archaic methods,
lack of facilities, the system of fees, and gen-
erally to indicate their united displeasure with
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higher education in Turkey. They occupied univer-
sity buildings, boycotted classes, sent representa-
tions to Prime Minister Demirel, and allegedly
even threatened to burn down the University of
Istanbul. Government and school administrators
finally promised that the students' demands would
be studied and changes would be made.
It is worthy of note here that while there
were rumors of involvement by opposition parties
and attempts by both the Marxist Turkish Labor
Party and the clandestine Communist radio station
Bezim Radio (Our Radio) located in Leipzig, East
Germany, to exploit the situation, there is no
firm evidence that the unrest was planned, organized,
or promoted by politicians at home or abroad. it
was a bona fide student action aimed at correct-
ing legitimate grievances; student leaders agreed
to call off the strike when they were satisfied
that an honest effort would be made to improve the
educational system.
There can be little doubt that the student erup-
tions in Europe, France particularly, and in the U.S.,
encouraged the students to resort to a boycott and
the occupation Df school property. Turkey's univer-
sities are autonomous, for the most part; therefore,
the government remained aloof. If the demonstrations
had become viol-ant or had spilled into the streets,
the security forces undoubtedly would have moved
to bring them under control.
A more typical example of Turkish student ac-
tion on substan-:ially the same grievances took place
in 1964 when students got their message across by
stretching a black ribbon across the main entrance
gate to Istanbul University. The ribbon bore the
words "OLD FASHIONED IDEAS." The student leaders
then symbolically broke the ribbon and placed a
black wreath in front of Ataturk's monument within
the unversity grounds.
Educational deficiencies are equally bad at the
secondary level where there is also a serious shortage
of teachers. Basically the problem is one of tradi-
tion and cultural lag. The Ottoman heritage of rote
learning pervades contemporary Turkish education, as
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does the authoritarian role of the teacher. Little
value is placed on discussion and deductive reason-
ing. Program content, especially in the social sciences,
is the product of Turkish ethnocentrism and the deliber-
ate effort of the government to instill a sense of
nationalism.
In a 1960 report, the Turkish National Commission
on Education underscored the major deficiencies in the
educational system. These included: imbalance of
male and female students; need for program diversifica-
tion; almost total lack of extracurricular activities;
failure to encourage individual initiative; unsatis-
factory teaching methods due in part to poor training;
overemphasis on factual memorization at the expense of
personality and character development; and the rigid
examination system. The Commission expressed the fear
that frustration and discontent, resulting from an
inability to continue their education, might render
some students "dangerous to society."
Turkey's System of Higher Education
The fundamental distinction between peasant and
elite in Turkey is one of education. Traditionally
speaking, few doors were ever closed to the Moslem
youth of whatever origin who could write and speak
properly--and few were opened to those who could
not. This was especially true by the end of the 19th
century when Turkish society was divided between the
ruling elite and the peasant masses. To a large ex-
tent this same division is present today, although
there is greater opportunity to attain the educa-
tional prerequisite for membership in the intellec-
tual elite and a high government job. Among the
educated elite there are those who hold high office
in government, and those who think they should.
The history of westernization or modernization
in Turkey is largely the history of the development
of secular education. It wasn't until 1900 that a
civilian university was opened to train students for
other than official careers. The French Lycee, ex-
emplified by Galatasary, became the model for edu-
cational institutions at the secondary level, and
French culture soon became the dominant influence.
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In the universities, however, German concepts pre-
vailed. (Now after more than, a decade of US assist-
ance, includinq the establishment of a new university
in the northeastern city of Erzurum, American edu-
cational concepts have become competitive).
By the end of World War I, and he ensuing
Turkish War for Independence, the Turkish educa-
tional system contained, at least in rudimentary
forms, all the basic components of the educational
systems in what were then regarded as the "advanced
nations." Ataturk closed the religious schools in
1924 and a natianai Ministry of Education assumed
responsibility for all levels of public education.
Today most of t.e universities are autonomous.
The largest university, the University of
Istanbul, was established in 1933, and Ankara Uni-
versity, a consDlidation of several previously un-
related faculties, was chartered in 1.946. The
growth of the university system has been accelerated
as demands increased for university training. A
university degr;?e is a virtual prerecuisite for a
high-level gove:^nment job; and teachers and bona
fide students constitute two of the highest status
groups in Turki:3h society. But it is the lycee de-
gree which has become the dividing line between the
upper and lower ranks of Turkish society. By Turk-
ish standards, =he graduate of the academic high
school is an inll_ellectual.
There are over 100,000 students, out of a total
population of about 34,000,000, pursuing higher edu-
cation. There are over 68,000 students enrolled in
eight state universities, and about 26,000 others
attend private, mostly technical colleges. Another
8,000 attend teachers colleges and theological schools,
and several thousand are enrolled in technical schools
at near-college level.
While autonomous, Turkish universities are
chartered by the Grand National Assembly, and receive
the bulk of their financial support from supplemental
appropriations attached to the budget of the Ministry
of Education. Only a nominal fee is charged, but
the cost of books and room and board must be borne
by the student. These are not too onerous for those
who can live at home but clearly are beyond the
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resources of the youth whose family does not live
near a university.
Since 1946, Turkish universities have been pat-
terned largely after the German model with each sub-
ject within a faculty being grouped around a chair
held by a professor, who in turn is supported by a
cadre of junior faculty members. This method of or-
ganization, combined with the absence of a mandatory
retirement age, severely limits promotion possibili-
ties and lowers morale.
Enrollment is determined by each university
faculty, which administers its own placement tests.
A candidate often registers for several separate ex-
aminations. Students with lycee diplomas contend
they are automatically entitled to admission, and
the resulting clamor often forces university offi-
cials to allow still more students to enter already
congested faculties. Over-enrollment is probably
the most serious problem. In a law faculty at the
University of Istanbul a teaching staff of 40 at-
tempts to instruct 8,000 students. Existing re-
sources such as libraries are often underused because
of the emphasis on lectures. Except for a small core
of able teachers, the bulk are mediocre and under-
paid.
Istanbul University is the largest and most
influential educational institution in Turkey. Built
to accommodate 12,000 it has an enrollment of more
than 30,000. According to the rector of the uni-
versity, there are only 14,000 "real" students at
the university; most of the others enjoy the fringe
benefits of student status.
An estimated 3,000 Turkish students attend for-
eign universities each year, with US schools attract-
ing a number second only to West Germany. Since
World War II Turkish students abroad have concentrated
on science and engineering courses. None are official-
ly enrolled in schools in Communist countries, al-
though probably there are some Communist exiles at-
tending schools in Eastern Europe. The government has
discouraged students from traveling in Communist
countries but concedes that a few probably go via in-
direct routes. Student exchange may become an area
of Communist exploitation now that relations with
Turkey have become somewhat more amenable in the new
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age of detente. Jnderlying Turkish suspicions of
the Russians, however, will probably hold down the
number of students studying in the USSR
National Youth Organizations in Turkey
There are three major youth and student organiza-
tions. While most youth are affiliated with one or
more of the national organizations, there is no
acknowledged central leadership among the nation's
youth. In addition to the student unions, there are
also youth branches of many of the national polit-
ical parties, especially the ruling Justice Party
(JP), the major opposition Republican People's Party
(RPP), and the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP).
There are also smaller, somewhat less organized
groups, possibly cutting across party lines, drawn
to individual political leaders.
The three national organizations are the Na-
tional Youth Organization of Turkey--(Turkiye MiZZi
Genclik TeskiZati--TMGT), the National Student Fed-
eration of Turkey--(Turkiye Milli TaZebe Federasyonu--
TMTF), and the National Turkish Student Union--(Milli
Turk TaZabe Birligi- MTTB). The TMGT, officially
recognized in 1960, includes both student and other
youth organizations such as the Boy Scouts Union,
the Women's Union of Turkey, the Turkish Reform
Hearths and the Textile Workers Federation. It has
nine member bodies, of which the TMTF is the most
important, and is government subsidized. In 1964,
the last year for which we have statistics, the TMGT
claimed a membership of some 274,000.
The TMGT is leftist dominated, despite persist-
ent government efforts to gain control. Most of its
present leadership is said to be friendly to the op-
position, hostile to the Demirel government, and, al-
though basically pro-West, critical of the terms of
Turkey's relationship with NATO and the US.
With a membership at least of 100,000, and
chapters on all college and university campuses, the
National Student Federation (TMTF) is the larger and
more politically active student organization. The
TMTF was founded in 1946, has its national head-
quarters and over half of its members =n Istanbul,
where the Istanbul University Student Union (IUTB)
with 21,000 members often is able to p_ay a dominant
role in TMTF affairs.
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The TMTF is today split into left and right fac-
tions--both of which elected slates of officers in
separate congresses in 1966. Since then, the Federa-
tion has been rent by internal strife, court action,
and open clashes.
Leftist control of the TMTF was temporarily ended
in January 1967 by a court order which appointed
trustees to administer it. The leftists subsequently
defied the court and were arrested. They nonetheless
established a rival TMTF headquarters in Ankara and
probably have the larger national following. The
Istanbul leadership reportedly continued to control
the organization's teletype system, bank accounts,
and the bulk of its files. The government has an-
nounced that it will seek legislation to end control
of student organizations by "professional student"
politicians. A similar attempt to tighten control
of the student organization leadership in 1964 failed.
On 18 January the High Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the lower court and returned control
of the TMTF to the leftist leadership. The youth
struggle now appears to be polarizing between the far
left and far right groups represented by the leftist
Federation of Idea Clubs--sponsored by the Marxist
Turkish Labor Party (TLP)--and the young "commandos"
being trained by the rightist Republican Peasant Na-
tion Party (RPNP) led by neo-fascist, retired Colonel
Alpaslan Turkes.
The National Turkish Student Union (MTTB),
founded in 1916, is the oldest student organization
and with some 60,000 members in 27 separate affiliated
organizations, is more conservative than the TMTF and
is comparatively free from government control. Whereas
the TMTF is more interested in student problems, the
MTTB is oriented toward such political questions as
Cyprus, East Turkestan, and the Orthodox Patriarcate.
It tends to be strongly nationalistic and has tried
to maintain close bonds with the military hierarchy.
Both the TMTF and the MTTB utilize press con-
ferences to proclaim how the "Young Turks," in the
sense of the Youth of Turkey, feel about hot issues
of the day. Both publish periodicals and both, on
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occasion, send deputations to the prime minister or
other government officials in an attempt to make the
influence of youth felt by the leaders of government.
Talks regarding the merger of the two national student
organizations have been going on intermittently since
1963 with the conflicting ambitions of the various
leaders apparently constituting the chief obstacle.
The development of a strong leftist movement in the
TMTF would seem to preclude any serious hope of merg-
ing the two organizations in the near future.
It has beer suggested that leftist influence
among the teaching staff at Istanbul University has
grown in recent years and that newcomers have been
variously identified with the left wing. It has also
been alleged that these leftists have sought, with
some success, to take over the leadership of the stu-
dents as one element of the so-called "alert" or
"standing forceE" which include the intellectuals,
the press, and the military.
Little factual inforMAtion is available on sus-
spected Communist groups although they probably exist
and are probably concentrating on recruitment, in-
filtration of existing groups, and exploitation of
student interest in left-wing ideas. But Istanbul
University is no hotbed of Communism, and any such
groups are probably very small.
Prospects
Turkish youth have the incentive, the political
awareness, and the organization to play an increasing
role in the country. They lack only a full sense of
direction and a full awareness of their capability.
In contrast to the youth of many countries, Turk-
ish youth generally appear to be little affected by
cynicism or alienation; nevertheless, they do seem to
be experiencing a growing uneasiness probably due in
large part to the frustrations inherent in an outdated
educational system, which are enhanced by leftist
propaganda. The student disturbances in Turkey last
spring appeared to have no obvious political overtones,
except for the Tioient demonstrations against the
Sixth Fleet uni-:s that visited Istanbul in July 1968.
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The violence then may have reflected both the frus-
trations of the student boycotts and the indeci-
siveness of the police; the most important factor,
however, probably was agitation by leftists who ex-
ploited the fleet visit to embarass the Demirel
government and to demonstrate leftist opposition to
Turkey's membership in NATO and to the US military
presence in Turkey.
Widespread fear of serious trouble at the Turkish
universities when classes resumed last fall did not
materialize. Some students apparently were satisfied
with the conciliatory attitude shown by school authori-
ties; others were probably impressed by the firm public
warnings by both government and opposition leaders. A
few feeble efforts to resume student boycotts as a
protest against continuing educational grievances soon
faded. Nevertheless, in marked contrast with student
activities the previous spring, by the time school re-
opened in November the student activist movement had
taken on a distinct political coloration. Furthermore,
student leadership appeared to be better coordinated,
targets had been broadened to include "economic im-
perialism" and "foreign investment," and there were
increasing indications that leftist leaders intended
to try to exploit any student demonstration into
anti-regime and anti-US affairs. Following the So-
viet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, the anti-
NATO campaign became unpopular and was temporarily
silenced, but it was by no means abandoned.
During recent months, student leftists, almost
certainly under the general guidance and direction
of the Marxist Turkish Labor Party (TLP) and with at
least token financial support from Soviet representa-
tives in Ankara, tried to mount several major anti-
American demonstrations. These efforts were largely
frustrated by government restrictions, by close police
surveillance, and by the lack of popular interest.
Not to be outdone by the leftist students, right-
ist youth groups, such as the National Turkish Stu-
dent Union (MTTB) and the Struggle Against Communism
Society, are trying to become organized for more
effective counteraction. Rightist "commando" groups
have been organized and reportedly are being trained
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by the Republican Peasant Nation Party headed by neo-
fascist retired Colonel Turkes. This polarization
of leftist and :-ightist youth groups increases the
danger of serious incidents growing out of any demon-
stration. Some political observers believe the
leftists are pu::posely promoting such a polarization
in order to enhance the political tension within the
country.
The recent burning of Ambassador-designate Komer's
limousine by le:=tist students on the campus of the
Middle East Technical University in Ankara, while
probably a target of opportunity, appears to have been
in line with a calculated leftist. campaign to under-
mine US - Turkish relations. Some observers see the
real objective of the leftists as the creation of suf-
ficient dissension within the country to fragment the
government. They further theorize that a weak coali-
tion would become a necessity, which in turn would
foster further polarization beneficial to the extreme
left. There also seems to be a general consensus that
the leftists in-:end to attack the Demirel regime by
undermining US ?- Turkish relations, that Turkish offi-
cials generally are not yet fully aware of the inherent
dangers in the situation, and that Ankara's handling
of the leftist -problem thus far has been inept.
The apparent shift in focus from purely academic
grievances to political targets points to the probable
manipulation of the students by elements outside the
universities. The presence of outside influences is
further indicated by the increasing polarization among
the students, some of whom reportedly have joined pro-
left organizations for self-protection. This growing
polarization almost certainly will lead to a marked
increase in the number and intensity of student clashes
and isolated acts of terrorism, and may encourage
isolated leftist attacks on US property and nationals.
An added danger is that religious fanaticism among
some of the supporters of the right may spill over
into the streets thus heightening the atmosphere of
unrest.
The government is preparing legislation designed
to help control the spread of extremism within the
country and has ordered provincial governors to
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tighten law enforcement within their jurisdiction.
With memories of the student demonstrations that
preceded the 1960 revolution firmly in mind, how-
ever, Turkish officials probably will be somewhat
less than enthusiastic in any action that they
may feel forced to take against the student left.
The current mood of a major segment of the
Turkish youth, and of leftist-inclined students in
particular, is anti-American. In the absence of
firm action by the government, demonstrations of
anti-Americanism probably will increase both in num-
ber and intensity during the coming months. Under
the influence of anti-Americanism, the student left
will view the periodic visits of multiple units of
the US Sixth Fleet to the port of Istanbul as parti-
cularly attractive targets.
Forty-two percent of the population of Turkey
is under the age of fifteen; and the youth are, and
will continue to be, a major factor in the country's
political life. The youth of Turkey have been given
a heady assignment--to be the ultimate "guardians
of the Revolution." Where this leads to responsible
political activity it is an asset. Where it leads
to narrow, chauvinistic nationalism or leftist ad-
venturism, as in the near catastrophe over Cyprus,
it remains potentially dangerous.
The bulk of the politically active students can
be expected to remain anti-JP, anti-American, and to
call for closer relations with the socialist countries.
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YUGOSLOVIA
Summary
A decade of apathy on the part of the youth
of Yugoslavia ended last June, when Belgrade Univer-
sity students rioted and a week-long university
sit-in followed. Although partially inspired by
the example of rioting students in Poland, France,
Czechoslovakia and other European countries, the
Belgrade riots were, as Tito admitted on 9 June,
largely domestic in origin. The regime's slow re-
action to a deteriorating economic and social situa-
tion and its sluggishness in dealing- with youth and
educational problems had been at fault.
Yugoslav students left school following their
demonstrations last June in a triumphant mood. They
were, however, quickly disillusioned during the sum-
mer when the regime cracked down on liberal univer-
sity elements and took no action to meet student
demands that Tito himself had labeled legitimate.
Students and party'authorities appeared to be on
a collision course likely to erupt into large scale
disorder when school reopened in September.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia on 20 August
eclipsed this problem, as nearly all Yugoslavs
united behind Tito and the party in the face of
the potential threat from Moscow. The record num-
ber of young people that joined the party during
this period leavened the youth movement and Yugo-
slavia's youth organizations may gradually divide
into smaller more autonomous units in order to ac-
commodate divergent views. Events in Czechoslovakia
have also made participation in international con-
ferences by Yugoslav students increasingly diffi-
cult and have led to serious public clashes with
their counterparts from the Warsaw Pact states.
Students Versus the Regime
The June riots started with a trivial clash
between young people at a musical performance on
2 June. The disturbances soon took on a politi-
cal character when student anger at police tac-
tics and pent-up frustration over the lack of job
opportunities resulted in sweeping demands for
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change. An ad hoc student action committee quickly
formulated a four-point program which demanded:
--Removal of all antisocialist manifestations
and economic and social differentiation.
--Steps to remedy unemployment and reduced
job opportunities for university graduates.
--Greater democratization of all social and
political organizations, a more independent
press, and quicker removal from office of
antireform "conservatives."
--A thorcugh reform of the university, to
provide greater autonomy, a student voice
in university affairs, and improvement in
the living conditions of students.
The regime opted for conciliat_.on combined with
firmness: Its spokesmen were quick to concede the
justice of the students' demands, but deplored the
demonstrations and violence.
Several Serbian officials, including the presi-
dent of the Serbian parliament, were appalled by
police brutality and promised to investigate and
punish the guilty. Cognizant of the developments
in Paris, the regime set out to keep the students
and workers from uniting on the basis of mutual eco-
nomic grievances. The Belgrade press was filled
with telegrams--probably regime-inspired--from
factory committees who supported the students' "just"
demands, but denounced student violence and pledged ad-
herence to the regime's programs. The regime succeeded.
No workers joined the students or started sympathy strikes.
The sit-in at Belgrade University did not end,
however, until. 9 June, when Tito admitted on tele-
vision that there had been delays in implementing
the economic reform, in eliminating "shocking"
salary differences, and in dealing with youth prob-
lems and educational reform. Reminding his audience
that the party had been debating all these problems
for many months, he asked the youth to push his re-
form programs. Tito promised new party guidelines
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to deal with domestic problems--indicating that
they would be final and non-negotiable. Although
Tito implied that if he and the rest of the lead-
ership could not solve Yugoslavia's problems they
should resign, he gave no hint that he would bow
to the students' demand- that those responsible
for police brutality be sacked.
The economic guidelines, in preparation since
20 May, were published five days later. In part
an elaboration of the themes in Tito's speech,
they called for economic reform and reorganization
of the party. They also echoed student demands
for limits on income acquired in a "nonsocialist"
way (leasing of villas, for example) and a reduc-
tion of differences in wages. They allowed for
educational reform and more student participation
in the management of the universities.
Again there was a note of firmness. The resig-
nation of incompetent officials was implied, but
there was a clear warning that "enemy forces," such
as antiregime emigre groups, antireform conserva-
tives, and ultraliberals, were seeking to undermine
Yugoslavia. Emphasis was put on using and improv-
ing the existing Yugoslav system, albeit with a
major effort to make room for more young people.
The guidelines re-emphasized the party's determina-
tion to oppose the creation of the multiparty system
proposed by some liberal intellectuals.
Student unrest had occurred at a trying time
in the regime's three-year-old drive for economic
reform. Although the students exhibited no separat-
ist tendencies, the regime in meeting the students'
demands had to take into account the tense nation-
ality situation. Republic economic rivalries had
increases. Many Serbs believed that they had suf-
fered by the reform, while the Croats generally be-
lieved that the process should be speeded up. For
the first time in many years Tito was under pressu.:
from both the conservative and liberal wings of the
party from the first to go slow and from the second
to move ahead faster.
Economic reform brought increasing unemploy-
ment and labor unrest, with workers resorting to
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short strikes to push their grievances. Both the
Belgrade students and many workers were angry at
the high salaries and large bonuses paid factory
administrators while workers in some enterprises
remained poorly paid or paid only after long delay.
9arI Summer
The leadership's approval and support of stu-
dent demands, highlighted by President Tito's con-
ciliatory television address of 9 June, was a
major factor in calming disorder during the student
riots last June. After the students had dispersed
for vacation, however, the regime became increas-
ingly critical of the student movement and worked
against more autonomy for the universities and a
greater student voice in university affairs, both
promised in June.
During July virtually every major Serbian party
organization launched attacks on certain individuals
and party organizations at Belgrade University. A
session of the Belgrade party city conference developed
into a major indictment of "liberal elements" at
the university, and Belgrade party chief Vlahovic
made it clear that all necessary steps would be taken
to eliminate these elements. The session concluded
on 19 July by dissolving the party organization within
the departments of philosophy and sociology for their
antiregime be.Zavior during the student riots in June.
The hardening of the Serbian leadership's posi-
tion on dissident intellectuals and students who
support them was echoed by the Croatian party. The
faculties of philosophy and political science at
Zagreb University were the targets of a succession
of stormy party meetings resulting in mutual recrimina-
tions and threats of disciplinary action against
professors and students. Diss:_dent professors, how-
ever, continue to have a significant- influence within
the university's basic party organizations, and
Croatian party officials have not been able to re-
gain complete control over there.
Certain issues of the Belgrade and the Zagreb
University's student reviews have been banned and
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continued pressure to close down or shake up the
editorial staffs of these publications could es-
calate student-party tensions. Suppression of
some student publications has continued at Zagreb
University but has been abandoned at Belgrade Uni-
versity.
After Czechoslovakia
The occupation of Czechoslovakia and the fear
that Yugoslavia was to be the next victim of the
Russians completely overshadowed internal problems
as the populace rallied behind the federal aut.1,or-
ities. Appealing to patriotism, unity and internal
strength, the party launched a successful'drive to
bring in more youngsters. It is rumored, also, that
militant student leaders have been called into mili-
tary service. The kind of street action that erupted
at Belgrade University last June will not be re-
peated as long as alarm over a possible invasion
continues in Yugoslavia.
It is currently estimated officially that about
75,000 young people joined the party following the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. These figures do not
include new members in the Yugoslav armed forces,
and is impressive when compared with last year's
very modest figure of 23,235 new members. This up-
surge marks a sharp reversal cf the process which
had seen Yugoslavia's party membership steadily de-
clining,, it will add new vigor to the party, give
it a more youthful composition, and strengthen those
elements who support the party's reform programs.
Many students realize that joining the party
will detract from the effectiveness of continued
student opposition. Those students who have joined
the party find themselves effectively neutralized
and at the same time alienated from those who re-
fused to join. As a result, there are no realistic
possibilities for concerted student action in the
near future and the party can afford to be tolerant.
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The GeneratioYi Gam
The students' demands for jobs after gradua-
tion reflected more than a narrow-minded self-in-
terest. There is a profound difference in outlook
between the ycung and old, and the regime must cope
with a widening generation gap.
The bulk of the leadership at all levels in
Yugoslavia has remained the same for over 20 years.
Despite the purges of Cominformists in the years
immediately following 1948 and the ouster of Djilas
(1954) and Tito's former heir apparent Rankov.ic
(1966), the hard core of the party still has great
numbers of older ex-partisans and prewar members.
The upper levels of the party hierarchy are parti-
cularly laden with this older generation. "Older
generation" here, is relative: Most of these "older"
people are in their fifties, some still in their
late forties. Tito at 76 is by far the oldest of
the hierarchy.
The regime has attempted with only limited suc-
cess since 1963 to enforce a policy of "rotation"
in office in order to bring up younger men. While
the average age of the party leadership has declined
slightly, the old guard has departed only slowly
in a Yugoslav version of political musical chairs.
Thus the party reorganization of October 1966 re-
sulted in an executive committee (politburo) of
relatively younger and less politically influential
men, while almost the whole old-line leadership was
shifted into the policy-making presidium.
What has been true of the top leadership has
been even more evident at the lower levels of the
economic and political ladder. Many factory directors
and lower leve.L bureaucrats owe their positions to
their prewar party and wartime partisan service.
Many are ill-educated and not equipped to deal with
the sophisticar_ed socialist market economy which the
regime hopes to create. Understandably, they do
not wish to give up the income and status they feel
that they deserve.
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Partly as justification for its privileged
position, the older generation for years has ex-
ploited wartime sacrifice and glory. The values
of many of these older people are an admixture of
unsophisticated Communism, middle-class aspirations,
pride in what they have accomplished, and, in some,
a residual local nationalism.
Meanwhile, universities have been turning out
thousands of better educated young technicians.
Many are impatient with the bungling of their elders
and with the barriers to jobs and influence which
the latter have created. Tito himself has publicly
admitted many times that the Yugoslav economy badly
needs thousands of better trained men, and has com-
plained that many enterprises refuse to hire them.
The slogan "Down With the Red Bourgeoisie"
which appeared at Belgrade University in June under-
lined the younger generation's disenchantment, their
wish for an end to privilege built on party or par-
tisan service. This demand was not new--it simply
became louder. In the months after the ouster of
Rankbvic the Yugoslav press burgeoned forth with re-
ports of illegal building of villas and the accumula-
tion of art treasures and private wealth by party
functionaries.
The restlessness of Yugoslav youth reflects
the success of the regime in its liberalization
program. The curtailment of the power of the secret
police following Rankovic's fall, the enhancement
of parliament, more open elections, and curtailment
of direct government control of the economy--all have
fostered a more permissive atmosphere. Many of the
students' demands were inspired by the hopes engend-
ered by the liberalized Yugoslav constitution of
1963 and by promises implied in the current party pro-
gram. Conversely, the regime's compromises in the
face of opposition by conservatives who still hold
influential positions and the objective difficulties
of the economic reform probably seemed intolerable
obstacles. When the chief of the Belgrade party
organization, Veljko Vlahovic, a leading ideologue
and presidium member, attempted to speak to the
rioting students last June, he was howled down by
the cry of "Enough words--action is needed."
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It can be assumed that some children of party
officials were involved in the riots. Their pres-
ence did not inhibit the police, but it may help
explain the reg:_me's forbearance in the face of the
sit-in at the university and the release of all the
students arrested earlier during the riots.
The ,'oath Organzzar.ions
The student: unrest reflected in the June riots
revealed the ineffectiveness of the two main regime-
sponsored youth organizations--the Federation of
Youth of Yugoslavia (SOJ) and the Federation of
Students (SSJ).
Both federations originally were created to per-
form as "transmission belts" for party directives
and propaganda. Numerically at least, the SOJ has
been a success--its membership (2,034,523 in Decem-
ber 1965) includes about two thirds of all Yugoslavs
between the ages of 14 and 25. Resentment over the
Federation's position as "transmission belt" has
grown steadily over the years, and much of the organ-
ization's membership is pro forma. The SOJ became
a byword for careerism and a haven for young party
hacks.
The party's decision in 1965 to change its role
from that of an all-powerful, operational organiza-
tion to one of ideological leadership led to confusion.
Many young people wanted the Federation to reflect
the views and interests of its membership, not those
of the party. The SOJ, however, was not organized
to respond to pressure from below.. Its leadership,
moreover, was all over 30 years of age, which led
to charges of ov9rprofessionalization.
In the aftermath of the fall of Rankovic the
youth federation secretariat was dissolved (November
1966) for incompetence and heavy handedness. The
Federation was put into a form of "receivership"
in order to prepare for its reorganization, which
took place over a year later at the Eighth SOJ Con-
gress in Februar( 1968.
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Tito's speech opening the Congress offered noth-
ing particularly new. It was a call for more of the
ideological guidance the young had already come to
dislike. Indeed, instead of innovation, Tito pointed
with alarm to the need for the SOJ directing more
ideological political work toward intellectuals,
among whom he detected apathy and "alien concepts."
To restore the SOJ's effectiveness, a new sta-
ture was enacted decentralizing administration, pre-
sumably to make the federation more responsive to its
membership. What emerged was a compromise between
the old strongly centralized organization desired
by the conservatives and the loose coordinating
body called for by the ultraliberals. The age
limits were widened to include 14 to 27-year-olds;
a 27-year-old was elected president.
The considerably smaller (110,000 members in
1966) Federation of Students suffers from much the
same malady as the Youth Federation. If the regime
grants the SSJ the autonomy necessary to attract
large numbers of activist students, the party risks
losing control. Tight regime control, however, re-
sults in further alienation of the future intelli-
gensia and technocrats and an organization steeped
in apathy.
Regime control of the students through the SOJ
and the SSJ broke down at the time of the Belgrade
riots, when the groups were reduced to supporting,
ex post facto, the student demands while condemning
demonstrations and violence. Effective leadership
had passed to student action committees not in the
party's sway.
The organization of the youth movement in Yugo-
slavia is rapidly decentralizing. Youth organiza-
tions are reducing considerably their connections
with their former parent body, the SOJ. Last Decem-
ber members of the SSJ in Serbia and Macedonia sent
observers instead of delegates to the Youth Federa-
tion Congresses of their respective republics. This
tactic was designed to emphasize the independence
of the SSJ. In Slovenia the students have gone a
step further by announcing their intention to with-
draw from the SSJ to form their own independent
Slovenian student federation.
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These actions have drawn sharp criticism from
several fronts, but some higher authorities appar-
ently are willing to tolerate such an emancipation
rather than contribute to unnecessary conflicts with
the students. The Slovenian threat tc withdraw has
not materialized yet, but it is likely that the even-
tual resolution of the matter will take the form of
a significantly democratized student movement. The
students want an organization more responsive to its
membership and consequently less a vehicle for trans-
mitting party policy. This trend may also lead to
the fragmentation of the youth movement into students
and nonstudents, which might be accompanied by in-
creased militancy on the part of the purely student
organizations.
The Students and the Schocis
Early in 1968 the youth periodical Mladost re-
vealed that out of 3.5 million employees in Yugo-
slavia, about 200,000 have had no schooling, over
1.2 million have never finished the eight-year ele-
mentary school, and only 800,000 have an elementary
school education. The drop-out rate for elementary
schools is about 50 percent. The illiteracy rate
remains high, about 20 percent, with about 50 percent
of the illiterates under 50 years of age,
In part, the problem stems from limited finan-
cial resources. Under legislation passed in 1966,
local communities are responsible for financing most
basic education. Local enterprises are encouraged
to contribute loans and scholarships. Decentralized
financing has resulted in uneven quality in the pri-
mary and secondary school. systems, Poorer areas
naturally have inferior schools, particularly in the
villages, Peasant youth are at a disadvantage if
they wish to pursue university studies.
University education is tuition free. Cost of
living grants are available and many students receive
loans, repayable over a ten-year period after grad-
uation. The debt is reduced for those with good
academic records and those who finish their studies
early. Poor preparation and personal financial prob-
lems probably are the main reasons so many students
take extra years to earn a degree,
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The increased cost of living since 1965 has been
another factor barring the way to higher education
for the children of workers and peasants. In 1965
the average stipend for students at Zagreb University,
in comparatively wealthy Croatia, was 15,000 old
dinars (OD) per month. At the current exchange rate
of 1,250 old dinars to one dollar, this amounts to
$12. Living expenses, however, reached the level of
29,000 OD (about $23). In the past three years stip-
ends have not kept pace with the cost of living. The
average worker's wage (not including self-employed
peasants, the bulk of the rural population) in Janu-
ary 1966 was 57,000 OD (about $46). Moreover, the
highest average salaries were in the more developed
northern republics. This economic inequality is
transforming Yugoslavia's universities into preserves
for the children of highly paid business managers,
professional men, and party and government bureau-
crats. According to one Yugoslav source, in February
1968 only 13 percent of the children of blue collar
workers were receiving higher education.
Student discontent also has been stimulated by
the party's reluctance to loosen its grip on the
universities. Although "self-management" and uni-
versity control of its own finances has been con-
stantly ballyhooed, university party organizations
have usually had to bow to the wishes of their LCD:'
superiors. Party influence in faculty appointments
has resulted in providing sinecures for second-rate
but "safe" intellectuals. Only in the past four or
five years have liberal professors become more pub-
licly outspoken in their criticism of the regime's
policies. Yet as late as June 1967, a dogmatic,
authoritarian, second-rater, Dr. Dragisa Ivanovic,
was elected rector of Belgrade University over his
liberal opponent, Dr. Veljko Korac. Korac had made
the mistake of publicly doubting the ability of ill-
educated workers to manage increasingly complex busi-
ness enterprises and to contribute meaningfully to
the solution of complicated social and economic prob-
lems.
Korac is an example of the type of critical
intellectual who is anathema to the anti-intellec-
tual elements in the regime. The party has been
particularly vehement in denouncing those who at-
tempt to transform the intelligensia and students
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into an elite t.nat would usurp the leading role of
the party. It is ameasure of the regime's desire
to win support through liberalization, however, that
such critics have been given ever freer reign, despite
periodic threats by Tito to deal with their "alien
concepts."
I2*enational Relations
According to the Yugoslav press, the Ninth Con-
ference of Representatives of European National Stu-
dent Unions held in Budapest 3-7 January largely
foundered on the issues of the intervention in Czecho-
slovakia and the ideological differences in the so-
cialist world emphasized by that event. The chief
Yugoslav representative Vladimir Gligorov, who is
also chairman of the Commission for International
Cooperation of -:he Yugoslav Student Federation,
characterized the conference as a failure, noting
that no final communique was issued and the date and
place of the next conference were left very much up
in the air.
Gligorov c:sossed swords with the Polish repre-
sentative over the question of the danger to social-
ist countries fi_om internal reactionary forces and
with the Soviet delegate on the limited sovereignty
issue as it relates to the "socialist commonwealth."
A speech by the Hungarian representative at a re-
ception following the Conference, condemning those
who came to break up the meeting with "subversive
acts" caused the Yugoslav delegation to walk out.
Gligorov also c'aimed that the Hungarians had at the
start attempted to blackmail the Yugoslavs into si-
lence on the Czech issue by threatening to discuss
the nationalist demonstrations in. Yugoslavia's
autonomous province of Kosovo.
At about the same time as reports on the Buda-
pest Conference reached the press another clash be-
tween Yugoslav and Soviet youth organizations was
disclosed. In the 9 January issue of Mladost,
weekly of the Yugoslav Youth Federation, the Youth
Federation replied sharply to a letter sent by the
Soviet Komsomol in early November in reply to a
Youth Federation statement of its position on the
Czechoslovak intervention. After replying to
specific Soviet points the Mtadcst statement notes
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that the uncompromising Soviet concept of unity in
the socialist camp is not a desirable foundation for
cooperation between the Youth Federation and the
Komsomol.
Conclusion
The past year has been a critical period in the
relations between Yugoslavia's impatient youth and
the Yugoslav establishment. The Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia has allowed Tito more time to estab-
lish the reforms that both he and the students know
are necessary if Yugoslavia is to continue to pro-
gress. Tito wants to channel the youthful vigor
stirred by the June demonstrations and the Czecho-
slovak crisis into the implementation of his reform
programs.
Tito has made it abundantly clear that the party
needs new blood, and all signs point toward a major
rejuvenation of the party leadership at the Ninth
Party Congress in March. The ascendancy of a young,
competent, and generally liberal leadership in the
Yugoslav party apparatus will be applauded by the
youth and should in the long run lead to the solu-
tion of many of the problems that could have caused
a direct confrontation between party officials and
the younger generation.
Meanwhile, the Yugoslav Youth Federation will
continue to be condemned as too "progressive" by
Soviet-sponsored student associations, while its own
members deplore its conservatism and "bureaucratic
centralism." Yugoslav youth organizations probably
will decentralize gradually under the watchful but
tolerant eye of the party. This trend does not
represent a spectacular departure from the norm in
Yugoslavia and parallels similar moves toward local
autonomy by the party itself, the government, the
military, and other mass organizations.
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