WORLD SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00357R000300200006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

~:CNFIFIAL INTELLI E~dC"' r,
CLASSIFICATION
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Charannd to .Se'.C.y T
BY AUTHORITY ems'
Name
ate'
I, Eastern Europe
A. With some notable exceptions, Eastern European Communist
leaders slavishly follow Moscow's lead and are working to-
ward "achievement of socialism" at home.
1. In Poland, Gomulka retains his independence in certain
on terms favorable to bloc, and,
fields like collectivization and church-state rela-
tions but expresses solidarity with Soviet position on
all matters of foreign policy and issues affecting
bloc as a whole.
2. Yugoslav "revisionism" is still prime target for at-
tack by bloc leaders--especially at XXI Congress now
_.-irL-a on'-but relations between Belgrade and Moscow
on state level remain correct. Tito's current Asian
tour is attempt to enhance his prestige with leaders
ti
of neutralist nations.
3,. East Germany is most vulnerable of Satellites as re-
sult of Ulbricht's Stalinism, economic problems,
Berlin as "window to West" etc.
II. Berlin crisis.
A. The Soviet initiative to convert Berlin into a Free City
probably is designed;
1. To forceregotiations on the future status of Germany
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2. At very least to gain some degree of recognition of
East German regime by West,
B. Moscow's note of 10 January containing draft German peace
treaty which would be signed by both Germanies is intended
to exploit growing pressures, particularly in Britain and
West Germany, to negotiate on German problem.
C. Meanwhile, Communists have kept up their pressure on Berlin.
1, The USSR has apparently transferred certain of its
control functions in Berlin to East Germans and is
endeavoring to force West to deal with East Germans
over question of allied military personnel who stray
illegally into East Germany.
D. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders have made it clear
they intend to hand over to East Germans remaining Soviet
occupation functions in Berlin if Western powers do not
accept Soviet proposals for "Free Berlin,"
E. It appears unlikely this move would be carried out before
six month deadline if negotiations meanwhile get under way.
F. All West German political parties agree that Soviet
proposal is unacceptable,
1. Differences in opinion between Bonn government and
opposition parties continue to exist, however, over
how to negotiate with Moscow on Berlin, German reunifi-
cation, and European security.
III. Geneva talks on nuclear test suspension have reached the
showdown stage.
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A. Soviet public charge that West is attempting to "torpedo"
talks reflects concern over favorable public reaction to
Western concession dropping disarmament link; private
assurances that Soviet delegation neither wishes nor intends
to break off negotiations contrasts with vitriolic tone of
public posture,
1. New Soviet proposal listing decisions to be subject to
veto reflects attempt to force US to present long
promised draft article on duration of agreement or, fail-
ing that, to underline Soviet charge of Western
"blocking tactics,"
B. Moscow's bid of 10 January to reconvene surprise attack
talks is propaganda move intended to contrast favorably
with Western desires to go slow~,pending study of results
of previous sessions, before setting new date,,
IV. Within Western Alliance, De Gaulle's rise to power is perhaps
most notable development during past year.
A. A strong government in Paris at last, but added problems
in maintaining closest relations between US, UK and France,
1. De Gaulle maintains France too long dominated by
"Anglo-Saxons,"
2. He would make France spokesman for continental Europe
and to this end is consolidating relations with Bonn.
Also apparently pushing nuclear program to avoid being
shut out of US, UK, USSR "nuclear club."
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VIII. Coming year certain to bring new evidence of accelerating
nationalism in African territories south of the Sahara.
A. During past year this reflected most strikingly in emergence
Guinea as independent state, transition all but one of
other French territories to autonomous status under new
De Gaulle regime. Also symbolized by December All African
Peoples' Conference--first of its kind--in Accrayand seen.
in recent rioting in generally quiet Belgian Congo.
B. In coming months new political explosions appear likely in
British East and Central Africa (especially in Kenya, maybe
in Nyasaland and Uganda). In Somalia and West African
territories slated for independence in 1960 (Nigeria,
Cameroun, Togo) evolution should be orderly. Violence a
real possibility, however, in Ivory Coast where a pro-
French African leader is bucking prevailing nationalist
C. Throughout area developments will provide UAR and Communist
Bloc with new opportunities for meddling.
IX. But the Middle East is the area most likely to provide us with
crises in the coming year.
A. General instability continues to characterize this area as
nationalist forces and ambitios clash with the traditional
power structure.
currents. or a~ dt,
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B. Communist influence finds obvious opportunities in this
situation, despite the claim of leading nationalists that
they are opposed equally to Communism and imperialism.
1. Arab nationalists continue to see in bigger and better
armaments one of the signs of independence, and. the
Sino-Soviet Bloc countries continue to cater to this
desire. Bloc arms are now going to:
a. UAR - total amount now more than $500 million (Egypt--
350 million; Syria--150 million), included are modern
jet fighters and bombers, radar equipment, heavy
ground weapons, and submarines.
b. Iraq - Bloc's newest customer, has ordered reportedLY
about $170 million worth, to include air and ground
have already arrived in Bairn
2. Genuine economic pressures provide other opportunities
for the Communist bloc to spread its influence. Examples:
a. Sudan, where present military regime as well as pro-
Western civilian predecessor feels compelled enter
into barter deals with the bloc to unload large
quantities of cotton.
b. Libya, where nation is so poor that politicians are
sorely tempted to try any device or source which
promises to gain them more money. This attitude could
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