INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500400032-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REGULATION

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8. What is CIA official position on S. 1935?
These views have not been cleared with the Office of
Management and Budget.
In view of the nature of the comments with respect to
certain provisions of the bill, this report has been classified
S. 1935 adds a new subsection to section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U. S. C. 403) "~ `up$ e E
11 laag 40 `Lth.e_b.ill and the ona_or.!_s statement ti - Wts I r_1
lntrndi,r
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the nt,rnnaa of the--bill is to modif the authority of the National Security
Council to proscribe certain functions for this Agency in th areah6
(1) internal security r,s, (2) illegal domestic activities, and (3)
"covert action" abroad,
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Internal Security Functions
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The provisions of theme lrelating to internal security functions
appear in new subsection (g)(1)(A) and (B). According to the sp s
statement i.n introduct Mthe legislation on 4 June 1973, th ins
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Qa Q utanucec alsapprovai
ctive domestic olice -type functions.." I i&-Ss tatec `e.oncern is- tint
A
a Wci O-L tine 7 LC B
C cit 10 160(3), +'.M If 'I
law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions. " 4Th -s n _
Nationa Security Ao,#-of 1947 that tka-GzA shall have no 'police, subpoena,,
r justify,"operations domestically" and "
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operations. " -his atated~~, 1 to review the
o ea -in question.,
(a) The word "powers" in the phrase "police, subpoena,
law-enforcement powers" means legal ability or authority.
The Agency has no police, subpoena, or law-enforcement
powers, has never attempted to exercise such powers, and
its legal inability and lack of authority to exercise such
powers is abundantly clear.
(b) The meaning of the phrase "internal-security functions"
is equally clear when considered in the context of both the
legislation in which it appears and the legislative history
which surrounds it.
The heart of the Central Intelligence Agency section of the National
Security Act of 1947 is subsection 102(d) which sets forth the duties of the
Agency under the direction of the National Security Council. The proviso
appears in t paragraph of subsection wh4ch deall specifically with
the correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information.
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The legislative history of section 102 of the National Security
Act reflects congressional intent that there be no confusion between the
pursuit of intelligence abroad and police, powers at home. In 1947 it was
very clear that the merging of these two functions was characteristic of
totalitarian states. The concern simply put was that there be no "gestapo
in the United States. " While this country has never had a national police
force, experience with the conduct of totalitarian states was uppermost
in the nation's mind.
In light of these concerns, a proviso was written into law to add to
the assurance that the Agency would not be engaged domestically in collecting
information on citizens of the United States who, unlike Agency employees
and others having access to our information, are not of legitimate interest
to the Agency. The proviso was patterned after the wording in paragraph 4 of
the 22 January 1946 Presidential directive which established the Central
Intelligence Group, the predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence
Agency (i. e. , "4. No police, law-enforcement, or internal-security
functions shall be exercised under this directive. ").
We do not view any f-T ons-of 102(d) as,-authority to
override the proscriptions that the CIA shall have no police,
subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions.
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However, neither do we view that proviso as prohibiting this Agency from
protecting its installations in the United States, conducting security
investigations of its personnel and persons having a need for access to
its information, and, of course, engaging in activities in the United States
solely suppor qhe Agency's foreign intelligence mission,
It-i.s--a -Timm -tfmt"jhe functions t3aab- as assigned to this Agency
under subsection 102(d) are limited to foreign intelligence activities even
though the word "foreign" is absent from the subsection. 'The insertion
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of the word "foreign" an the subsection would be preferable to
(g)(1)(A) and (B) of S. 19.35 and would appear to substantially meet
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the. go ncnrla objectivesI With the word inserted, subsection 102(d)
14i+j gl. the purpose of coordinating the foreign
intelligence activities of the several Government
departments and agencies in the interest of national
security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the
direction of the National Security Council.... "
An iaternative to inserting the word "foreign" in subsection 102(d)
d S. 1935 to read as follows:
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shall be construed as
uthorizing the Central Intelligence Agency to--
operation or activity: Provided, howeve~that nothing in this Act shall be
A
(A)
d .rectly or indirectly, within the United States,
coopexl~tion or conjunction with any other department,
age~cy, organization, or individual any police or police-type operation or
activity, any law enforcement operati n or activity, or any internal security
construed to prohibit the Central Intelligenc&,Agency f om protecting its
\ .4y
installations or co ducting personnel inv igatitknJr,elated-_td--performance
of-Ifis ;mi n; nor from carrying on within the ni a States activities
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in support oL-it`s foreign intelligence re popsibi-ltties other than police,
law.e forcemeat or internal sf-iC' ity activties;
g)(1)(B
ravides that CIA
hall not
rovid assistance of an
p
s
y
Ap
kind to any agency of the Federal or local government engaged in police,
law enforcement or internal security operations and activities unless such
assistance is provided with the prior approval of the CIA Oversight
Subcommittees of the Committees on Appropriations
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on Armed Services of the Senate
require mentapproval itt0e0 ss raises serious
constitutional questions.
In carrying out its foreign intelligence function, the Agency
frequently develops information of major concern to domestic law-enforcement
agencies. In such areas as narcotics smuggling, aerial highjacking,
international terrorism, and, of course, foreign directed espionage
and subversion,, the Agency has a capability, and we think an obligation to
provide to; domestic agenciesiethrough appropriate channels information
which this Agency acquires abroad in carrying out its foreign intelligence
ILlegal Domestic Activities
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e,.'provsion relating to illegal domestic activities
appea.rjnfubsection (g) (1) (C
el
would preclude th&4
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highjacking, international terrorism, and, of course, foreign directed
espionage and subversion, the Agency has a capability, and we think an
obligation, to provide information which this Agency acquires abroad in
carrying out its foreign intelligence mission to those domestic agencies
who alone might be in a position to use it effectively to forestall serious
criminal action or security threats within the United States./
Illegal Domestic Activities
New subsection (g)(1)(C) proposed in 5.1935 would preclude this
Agency from engaging in "any illegal activity within the United States.
We see no merit in a proposed law forbidding this Agency from doing
what it is already forbidden to do under the law of the land. Moreover,
the very enactment of such a law would suggest, where there is no
foundation in fact, that the Agency has conducted illegal activities in the
past. Finally, the enactment of the provision could be interpreted as
legally condoning such activities if they occurred prior to the provision's
enactment.
New subsection (g)(1)(D) proposed in S. 1935 would prohibit this
Agency from engaging in "covert action" abroad without the specific
wpr,ittent.kpproval of the oversight committees of d in (Congress.
Th4~_requirement prior approval ..:, r raises E&
serious constitutional question#. While A at. is proposed as a tightening up
of current law, it actually constitutes a specific authorizat~o _fRr the
CIA to engage in -covert action in any foreign country. "
a statutory acknowledgement that the United States engages, or will
engage, in covert action against foreign nations, contrary to the United
Nations Charter and principles of international law, ,mod could be a cause
for embarrassment in our international relations.
S1.
our activities to our four oversight committee
th
it is recommended that-the
In view of the Bove considerations, k zLt.
P40" Bair. S. 1935 not be favorably acted upon by your Committee.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no objection
to the submission of this report and that enactment of 5.1935 in its
present form would not be consistent with the Administration's objectives.
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Agency from engaging in "any illegal activity within the United States. "
a. y seee no merit in
T1 pr vision oTthe bill relating to "covert, ac,
doing what it is already forbidden to do under the, law of the land. More-
over, the very enactment of such a law would suggest, at the Agency
has conducted illegal activities in the past. Tia e u,gg stion
ew subsection (g)(l)(D)Y"While' it is pr"oposed as a tightening up of
law forbidding this Agency from
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current law, it actually constitutes a specific authorization for the CIA
ua -the direction of the National Security Council to engage in "covert
action in any foreign country!iwith, t~e specific written approval of the
oversight committees of the CIA in the Congress The requirement of
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l,aa nofowr&Atfon- in fact. F the enactment of the provision couel-
E
be interpreted as legally condoning such activities if they occurred -prior
to the provision's enactment.
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prior approval of committees of Congress raises serious cons titutional
questions, ~riislores~ites a statutory acknowledgement that
the United States engages in covert action against foreign nationee-h
tc~;
a Td On to a CtJri'~` a uestLC3YL~ i 5 r+nnnfir~~arl 'a Q
in
contrary to the United Nations Charter and principles of international law
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and could be a cause for embarrassment in our international relations.,
In view of the above, it is recommended that S. 193 not be
favorably acted upon by your Committee.
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