LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN C. STENNIS, CHAIRMAN FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500400001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LETTER

1ATIAL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
This is in response to your request of 8 June 1973 for the
recommendations of this Agency on S. 1935, "To amend section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 to prohibit certain activities by
the Central Intelligence Agency and to limit certain other activities
by such Agency. "
In view of the nature of our comments with respect to certain
provisions of the bill, this report has been classified Confidential.
S. 1935 adds a new subsection to section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U. S. C. 403), which, according
to the statement accompanying the introduction of the bill, modifies
the authority of the National Security Council to proscribe certain
functions for this Agency in the areas of: (1) internal security,
(2) illegal domestic activities, and (3) "covert action" abroad. (119
CONG. REC. Daily Ed. 4 June 1973.)
Internal-Security Functions
The provisions of S. 1935 relating to internal-security functions
appear in new subsection (g) (1) (A) and (B). According to the statement
accompanying the introduction of the bill, the proposed subsection is
designed to tighten up an existing provision of law:
"PROVIDED, That the Agency shall have no police,
subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security
functions." (National Security Act of 1947, section 102 (d)(3).
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According to the statement, this tightening up is needed because the
law prescribes other duties for CIA which justify "operations
domestically" and "even domestic operations."
It is believed that a review of the language and background of
the law establishes that:
(a) The word "powers" in the phrase "police, subpoena,
law-enforcement powers" means legal ability or authority.
The Agency has no police, subpoena, or law-enforcement
powers, has never attempted to exercise such powers, and
its legal inability and lack of authority to exercise such
powers is abundantly clear.
(b) The meaning of the phrase "internal-security
functions" is equally clear when considered in the
context of both the legislation in which it appears and
the legislative history which surrounds it.
The heart of the Central Intelligence Agency section of the
National Security Act of 1947 is subsection 102 (d) which sets forth
the duties of the Agency under the direction of the National Security
Council. The proviso in question appears in a paragraph of a
subsection dealing specifically with the correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination of intelligence information.
The legislative history of section 102 of the National Security
Act reflects congressional intent that there be no confusion between
the pursuit of intelligence abroad and police powers at home. In
1947, it was very clear that the merging of these two functions was
characteristic of totalitarian states. The concern simply put was
that there be no "gestapo in the United States." While this country
has never had a national police force, experience with the conduct
of totalitarian states was uppermost in the nation's mind.
In light of these concerns, a proviso was written into law to
add to the assurance that the Agency would not be engaged domesti-
cally in collecting information on citizens of the United States who,
unlike Agency employees and others having access to our information,
are not of legitimate interest to the Agency. The proviso was
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patterned after the wording in paragraph 4 of the 22 January 1946
Presidential directive which established the Central Intelligence
Group, the predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence
Agency (i. e. , "4. No police, law-enforcement, or internal-security
functions shall be exercised under this directive. ").
We do not view any provision in 102 (d) as authority to
override the proscription that the CIA shall have no police, subpoena,
law- enforcement powers, or internal-security functions. However,
neither do we view that proscription as prohibiting this Agency from
protecting its installations in the United States, conducting security
investigations of its personnel and persons having a need for access
to its information, and, of course, engaging in activities in the
United States solely in support of the Agency's foreign intelligence
mission.
The functions assigned to this Agency under subsection 102(d)
relate only to foreign intelligence activities although the word "foreign"
does not appear in the subsection. While it is not believed that any
amendment is necessary, the insertion of the word "foreign" appro-
priately throughout the subsection would be preferable to (g)(1)(A) and
(B) of S. 1935 and would appear to substantially meet the same objectives.
With the word inserted, the introduction of subsection 102(d) would read
as follows:
"For the purpose of coordinating the foreign intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies
in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council.... "
New subsection (g)(1)(B) proposed in S. 1935 would prohibit this
Agency from providing assistance of any kind to any agency of the
Federal or local government engaged in police, law-enforcement, or
internal-security operations and activities unless such assistance is
provided with the prior approval of the CIA oversight committees of
the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
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In carrying out its foreign intelligence function, the Agency
frequently develops information of major concern to domestic
law-enforcement agencies. In such areas as narcotics smuggling,
aerial highjacking, international terrorism, and, of course, foreign
directed espionage and subversion, the Agency has a capability, and
we think an obligation, to provide information which this Agency
acquires abroad in carrying out its foreign intelligence mission to
those domestic agencies who alone might be in a position to use it
effectively to forestall serious criminal action or security threats
within the United States.
Illegal Domestic Activities
New subsection (g)(1)(C) proposed in S.1935 would preclude
this Agency from engaging in 'any illegal activity within the United
States. 11 We see no merit in a proposed law forbidding this Agency
from doing what it is already forbidden to do under the law of the
land. Moreover, the very enactment of such a law would imply that
the Agency has conducted illegal activities in the past.
New subsection (g)(1)(D) proposed in S. 1935 would prohibit
this Agency from engaging in "covert action" abroad without the
specific written approval of the oversight committees of CIA in the
Congress. While the new subsection is proposed as a tightening up
of the current law, it actually constitutes a specific authorization for
the CIA to engage in "covert action in any foreign country. 1' It is
believed that a statutory acknowledgement that the United States
engages, or will engage, in covert action against foreign nations,
contrary to the United Nations Charter and principles of international
law, could be a cause for embarrassment in our international relations.
The present practice of providing a full and complete account of our
activities to our four oversight committees appears to be a more
satisfactory method for meeting the objectives of the proposed new
subsection.
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In view of the above considerations, it is recommended
that S. 1935 in its present form not be favorably acted upon by
your Committee. The Office of Management and Budget advises
that there is no objection to the submission of this report; that
serious constitutional questions are raised by those provisions
in the bill imposing a condition of prior approval by congressional
committees; and that the enactment of S. 1935 in its present form
would not be consistent with the Administration's objectives.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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