LETTER TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MCNAMARA FROM JOHN A. MCCONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000400040004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: LETTER

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`.' ith reference to your prop sat to disc.tncinue
Lvaluation Subcommittee of the National bseurity
I am in agree gsn; with your draft :.exxaorandurrn
President whicla you sent a on 23 ece rb*r 1164,
in y -ipirtiwn, the wor* A the Subcommittee and
tail was necessary 'when they were est btisited in
o5 s. The Subcommittee has made a valuable contribution
cc that time, but I agree that it has served its purpose
and should n-: w be dis-establishes .
J(DHN
A. McC,one
'if he ii as orable Robert S. McNamara
etary of Defense
shington, 31). C.
WEltier:MMW (4Jan65)
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Remarks:
Mr. Kirkpatrick had originally marked the
basic for AD/NE for action (via you). You
prepared the response , but no copies of either
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The orig routing slip which had been put on here
was removed when the basic got back to ER.
If ONE should have colies will you pis ask Mary
to take care of it.
O/ExecDir/Rita
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
23 DEC 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of State
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference
The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security
Attached is a copy of a proposal that the Net Evaluation
Subcommittee of the National Security Council be discontinued.
Any comments you may have would be welcome. It is my
present intention to submit the proposal to the President early
in January.
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WASHINGTON
SUBJECT: Elimination of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the
National Security Council
As part of a continuing effort to increase the efficiency and
quality of various study programs, I have for some time questioned
the value of continuing the work of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee
(NESC) of the National Security Council (established by NSC 5816).
When the NESC was established by President Eisenhower in
1958, neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization nor the Office
of the Secretary of Defense included a capability for performing the
type of study assigned to the NESC. The original directive charged
the NESC with providing "integrated evaluations of the net capabilities
of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon
the Continental United States and to provide a continual watch for
changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities."
Subsequent directives have altered this task on an annual basis. For
example, the most recently completed NESC study was an evaluation
of a "war conducted in 1964 between the U.S., its Allies, and the
Soviet Bloc based on current U. S. war plans." Further, the over-all
purpose of the report was to "evaluate the validity and feasibility of
this type analysis as a basis for providing guidance for political-
military planning.... 11
Having studied the 1964 Report, I do not feel that a brief survey
of this type qualifies as a basis for planning guidance. As a broad
survey of the problem, it is not without merit; but our strategic
planning today is increasingly based upon more detailed studies of
specific problem areas, such as those included on the Secretary of
Defenses annual "Project List" and other studies conducted by the
Joint Staff and military departments.
For example, the Special Studies Group (SSG) of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff has developed a broader base of expertise than that of
the NESC staff. Both groups have explored similar issues, used the
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS.;
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same sources of input, obtained the same computer support, and have
performed the same type of analysis. Because of the close relationship
of strategic studies to forces, the budget, and other on-going Defense
Department studies, the usefulness of the SSG studies has been under-
standably greater than the annual survey of the NESC.
The economy involved in eliminating a major study group is
obvious. We can, I feel, make better use of our limited study skills
while simultaneously improving the product delivered to the consumer.
Participation in DoD studies by other government agencies is, of
course, welcomed when warranted by the subject matter. Similarly,
we remain responsive to requests for study reports from other
interested agencies of the government.
In summary, while the annual study program of the NESC had
value and relevance in,1958, its contribution today is marginal when
compared to the battery of specific studies which have become major
functions of the JCS and DoD during the intervening years. It therefore
appears logical to terminate the requirement for the NESC. Attached
is a draft implementing directive for signature.
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Effective this date, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the
National Security Council, having served its purpose, is discontinued.
This directive supersedes NSC 5816.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Effective this date, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the
National Security Council, having served its purpose, is discontinued.
This directive supersedes NSC 5816.
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIF II D AMER 12 YEARS.
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for suspen
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U S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0-587282
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
19 November 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: General Goodpaster's Comments on Proposed NESC Tasks
for 1965
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that:
a. The NESC's assignment has been under active
consideration in General Wheeler's office.
b. While no immediate action appears required,
you will probably be involved in basic decisions regarding
the NESC's mission in the relatively near future.
This memorandum brings up-to-date my memorandum to you
t,'
9 November.
2. General Johnson told the staff today that he had
just talked to General Goodpaster about the NESC's next assign-
ment. He quoted Goodpaster to approximately the following
effect:
a. There is no point in reassessing the effects
of a strategic exchange between the US and the USSR, since
this is already being done by all sorts of organizations.
If this is the only realistic option, he implies, the best
thing would be to abolish the NESC.
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b. The second and third proposed tasks, (especially
the second, with its emphasis on assessing the whole range of
possible confrontations with Communist China) made more sense.
But what was probably needed the most was an even broader
study, which Goodpaster envisaged as assessing the overall
problem as to where the US would stand about ten years out
vis-a-vis the rest of the world--militarily, politically,
economically, and so on. He expressed the hope that while
some policy-makers wished to continue the ad hoc decision-
making practices of the Kennedy era, there would probably be
more support now under President Johnson for an attempt to
lay out the whole range of problems confronting us on a long-
term basis.
C, Goodpaster acknowledged that this task would
require a change in the NESC charter but argued that in any
event the choice was between updating the NESC's mission or
abolishing it. He evidently shared General Johnson's view
that the NESC staff, if only because it had the time for
unhurried and thorough analysis, was uniquely qualified to
handle this and similar assignment and should be kept in
business.
d. Goodpaster had expressed these views to General
Wheeler, who had favorable initial reactions but felt the time
was not yet propitious to press for a decision: the real
problem here was that of approaching Mr. McNamara. Goodpaster
suggested that at least we could start laying out the problem.
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3. General Johnson is definitely interested in taking
on the job proposed by Goodpaster, which he almost certainly
regards as something akin to the Basic National Security
Policy restatement recommended in last year's NESC study.
We had no really detailed discussion of how to proceed, but
he indicated that what he had in mind was a venture involving
the assignment of some appropriate specialists (e.g., economists)
to the staff and the preparation of supporting studies by
various agencies (presumably including State and CIA). He
expressed the hope that we could get the job substantially
done before those members of the staff whose tours of duty
ended next summer had to leave.
1,4. I must confess to some initial misgivings about our
undertaking as unrestricted and all-inclusive an exercise as
many of the staff appear to have in mind:
a. There is some question as to how much top level
desire and need there is for such a paper--though admittedly
this is something that the President, in consultation with
his principal advisers, must decide for himself.
b. The long-range look into the future has been
a recurrent source of fascination to policy-makers and intel-
ligence programmers alike--and an equally recurrent headache
to those actually charged with preparing and achieving sub-
stantial agreement on such projections in the estimates
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business. If an actual requirement exists, it must of course
be tackled, but various past efforts to come up with meaningful
papers of this sort in places like ONE have certainly not
been very successful.
c. Finally, and most importantly, I question
whether a predominantly military body like the NESC staff has
either the bureaucratic standing or the professional qualifica-
tions to handle a comprehensive assessment of the American
political, economic and military position in the world a
decade hence. Granted that much of the basic work could be
assigned to the intelligence community and to offices in
Defense and State where the necessary expertise was available,
I don't think that a comprehensive survey of this sort can be
handled like a War College study group project. If there is
a need for a long-range look at the military requirements
which might confront the US, taking into account political
and economic factors as needed, the NESC Staff would be a
highly appropriate candidate for the job. If what is wanted
is another statement of basic national policy requirements,
political as well as military, then it seems to me that an-
other kind of NSC staff should be set up in which the skills
and approaches of the civilian agencies involved are more
heavily represented.
25X1
CIA Represen a ve
NESC Staff
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