NEW BOOK: THE BETRAYAL BY LT. COL. WILLIAM R. CORSON, USMC (RET.)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001600030006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 9, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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9 july 1968
Director of Central Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
Executive liegiz:try
New Book: The Betrayal by Lt. Col.
William R. Corson, USMC (set.)
1. This memorandum is for information only to invite your
attention to a new book entitled The Bstroyal by Lt. Col. William R.
Corson, USMC (ret.) (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1968).
Col. Corson has just retired after ZS years in the Marine Corps, fol-
lowing a last minute flap while the Marine Corps considered giving him
a court martial for releasing this book without departmental clearance.
The Corps finally opted for a reprimand, in order to avoid the publicity
of a court martial over a book bound to reopen old Marine Corps versus
Army feuds.
Z. The Betrayal is a bitter, cynical and smart alecky book
highly critical of the Army. the State Department, the South Vietnamese
hierarchy and ARVN. Only the Marine Corps comes out unscathed; the
author's hero?General Krulak. The jacket blurb states that Col. Carson
has lived, worked and traveled throughout Southeast Asia and participated
In World War 11, Korea and Vietnam. His final months on duty were spent
in Washington as a Systems Analyst in the area of pacification and insur-
gency in the Southeast Asia Programs Division.
3. Col. Corson has several references to CIA in The Betrayal.
At page 36, he writes of Robert Blum's mission during the Tillman
Administration as head of the United States Special Technical and
Economic Mission. Corson calls Blum "a protigi ofiA lien Dulles and
notes that General DeLattre described Blum "as the most dangerous man
in Indochina." In the 1950-54 period, Corson finds that all of the
American components in Indochina pursued their own course in the "other
war (Civic Action). He states that
"Ostensibly Blum was in charge, but the
military-political bureaucrats resented the free-
wheeling antics of the CIA and failed to support
Blum fully. Daring this period the CIA. went
(IX/Lrliii:
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'where the action is, while the rest
mission remained in their American ghettos.,
venturing out only to talk, dine, and play with
their Trench count parts. (IN 3)
4. Corson finds that General Mang Van Minks coup against
was a surprise to the U. S. Mission (citing David Nalberstam as
rce). X. add. that
"Allusions to a CIA-directed coup as set
forth in fictional accounts are just that- -fiction.
The CIA in November 1963 wall Like, the 'husband'
--that is, the 'last to know. (p. 50)
Regard!** control of the Montagnards Ccl. Corson state*
"The 40,000 members at the Civilian
Irregular Defeo.. Groups are superficially a
part of the South Vietnamese armed forces;
however, they actually make sp the Central
Intelligence Agency's and U.S. Special Forces'
shadow army.' Prior to the Taylor mission to
South Vietnam in 1161, the Montavards
people') who make up the CID? were strictly
nadir the control and direction of the CIA and
its little-brother Vietnamese counterpart, but as
part of a 'gentleman's agreement' the Vietnamese
were cut out early in 1962 and the Montegnards
were divided between the CM and the Special
/Forces. (p. 68)
H. then alleges that the Monteverdi; felt that the U.S. was a party to
double dealing with them, a record which Corson feels to be as -stupid-
as OSS and subsequent U.S. handling of the Kachins during end after
World War II.
6. Corson believes that CIA orgenia.d the "Omuta G
cadre. which "do their work well. ' He adds that General K
eyes on these cadres for some time, but that the "CIA thought the CG
were their 'boys' 'seta Thong took them over. (p. 119)
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7. Corson makes further mention of the independence of the
'various components of the Country Mission. writing that the Ambassador
rarely runs or controls their activities, partly because he has no control
over
'the internal workings of the so-called support
organisations. For example, in many countries,
until ?resident Kennedy negotiated an uneasy peace
between the CIA and this State Department in 1961,
the ambassador was frequently in the unenviable
position of not even knowing the identity of the CIA
Chief of Station in the host country. Today the
ambassador may know who tke man is, but he
usually has only a faint idea of what mischief the
CIA people are up to as they 'gather Information.'
Thus while the ambassador is supposed to be the
Chief of Mission, he actually sits uneasily on top of
a loose confederation of interests. (p. 101)
The author feels that the situation was slightly improved when General
Taylor, as Ambassador, set up the Mission Council on which, Carson
notes1 3ohn Hart. the CIA Station Chief" had a seat. (p. 20).
STAT
STAT
8. Corson makes George Carver's article in Torsion Affairs
a special target of his disapproval. He calls the article an "Administra-
tion-inspired essay which uses its evidence for rather obvious political
reasons." He sums the article up in two words: "Carver misleads."
(p. 13). The full text of Ca. Coreon'eanalysisP of the Carver article
I. attached as Tab A. Another to receive Corson's dislike is Robert
Korner whose failures he ascribes to the fact, among others, that Korner
was a manager but not a leader. Mr. Komer's rebuttal from Saigon is
attached as Tab B.
Enclosures Walter Ffor sheirner
Tabs A and B Curator
Distribution: Historical Intelligen
Orig &l - Adopriefiee,-.
1 - DDCI JU 4104 ao 1 - 1)/Sec (Attn:
1 -1 - CI Staff (Attr
1 - Ex. Dir
1 - LC 1 - Asst to DCI (Mr. Goodwin)
1 - DDI
1 - ONE (Attn.: j 1 - Chief, F1 (Attn:
Cc
ection
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
1- DDS
1 - C/FE
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STAT
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57 22, 1967
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al difficult to ob-
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The Kid Next Door
735
tam. Leaving aside the implications of the oppressive actions
against the Vietnamese people committed by their own military
and government, the question "Who is the enemy?" is quite net-
tlesome, for the Communists have put together an organization
which makes drawing the line between the good guys and the
bad guys very difficult.
George Carver of the CIA, writing in the April 1966 issue of
Foreign Affairs, referred to the enemy in Vietnam as the "face-
less Vietcong." Carver's Administration-inspired essay was de-
signed to show who guides the Vietcong in South Vietnam and
how this control is exercised. From his evidence, for rather ob-
vious political reasons, Carver contends that the Vietnam war is
a result of the expansionist and militant policies of Vietnam's
Communists, North and South, with the Dang Lao Dang Party
(Vietnam Labor Party) of Hanoi at the head. Carver misleads.
The "liberation" struggle started in 1957 as a result of President
Diem's political-economic-physical oppression without benefit or
assistance by the North Vietnamese Communists. However, this
is not to say the North Vietnamese did not take over the move-
ment. They did and they run it today.
Carver's article is not worth considering except as an exam-
ple of the commonly held false assumption that the Communists
are the initial cause of trouble. The record throughout Asia,
Africa, and Latin America is quite clear?locally discontented
groups or persons do not respond in the beginning to those whom
they consider to be "outsiders." Wars of national liberation start
with hometown leadership, but are soon taken over by the more
experienced Communists who may or may not be nationals of the
given country.
In his article Carver plays the role of a demonologist who sees
Communists behind every expression of dissatisfaction with the
status quo. However, such expressions often have very legitimate
bases which we tend to overlook by focusing our national dis-
pleasure on the Communists. The Communists, meanwhile, are
very cleverly utilizing these basic causes of the,people's discon-
tent in conducting the revolution to their advantage. Conse-
quently, a far better perspective of how this is done is required
to oppose the Communists effectively. _
The very foundation of the enemy's strength in Vietnam is
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FAILURE OF PROGRAM
IS DENIED BY KOMER
SAIGON South Vietnam,
July 6 (AP)?The American re-
sponsible for the pacification
!program in South Vietnam? la-
beled as "grotesque" today
charges in a book published this
week that the program is "dead,
finished, kaput."
Robert W. Korner, assailed
"The Betrayal," by Lieut. Col. f.
William R. Corson of the Ma-
rines, who retired Monday, the
day the book appeared.
"His book is grotesque and
is an insult to the thousands
of hard working Vietnamese and
Americans who are out trying
to make these programs work,"
Mr. Korner said.
The book is a sweeping in-
dictment of United States pro-
grams in South Vietnam and of
corruption and incompetence
among South Vietnamese mili-
tary and civilian officials.
Mr. Komer said the book ac-
cused him of setting back ef-
forts by United States advisors
to help civilians by ordering
that all projects be cleared by
the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment.
"I am totally unaware of
what he's talking about," Mr.
Komer said. "Pacification is en-
tirely a Government of South
Vietnam-operated program. We
are only here in an advisory
role,
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP
DAT
(o r
TO: ti-lbescuttvs Director-Comptrellor
1,1201M ioi
BUILDING
He.. (111X4)
REMARKS:
FROM:
VAL-ILI-I PFC0i2:HEIMER
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
1 EXTENSION
-
FORM HO .9A I REPLACES FORM 36-8
1 FEB 55 &-T I WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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